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While drawing on theoretical arguments from media studies and cultural sociology, this 
thesis addresses the role of scandal in postwar Japan. I present an outline of what can be 
labeled as scandalogy, and introduce the historical background of scandal in Japan and 
the West. Furthermore, I locate the social phenomena of transgression and scandal in a 
wider field of social practice, and provide a theoretical package for critical analysis of 
media scandal as framed narrative and spectacular (pseudo)event. While utilizing the 
scope of contemporary neofunctionalist thought, I approach the social function of scandal 
as social drama and performance, semantically located between ritual (motivated 
expressive behavior) and strategy (conscious strategic action). After addressing the role 
3 
of scandal, media and corruption in Japanese postwar society, I closely elaborate on three 
selected scandals: the Sakai Noriko celebrity scandal (2009), the Ozawa Ichirō political 
scandal (2009-12), and the corporate scandal of the Olympus Corporation (2011-12). 
Based on the output from these case studies, I offer theoretical implications for the scandal 
mediation process in contemporary Japan, while highlighting the modi operandi of the 
mainstream media, weekly tabloids, and other outside media as the key players in a 
scandal-network of collusion and collaboration. Furthermore, I develop a model of 
scandal mediation in Japan, during which the mainstream media, the power elites, the 
business circles, and other interdependent forces intersect in sociopolitical and 
journalistic fields of struggle. While approaching media scandal as a commercialized 
product of the journalistic rituals of objectivity, I also touch upon the performance of 
scandal as a mediatized ritual of pollution, purification through exclusion, and 
reintegration. My basic assumption is that scandal is a multifaceted social phenomenon: 
while simultaneously serving the interests of capitalistic media institutions, the scandal-
rituals define social norms, reflect the values of society, and manage social transgression. 
If exposed, scandals often represent highly popular media commodities, but they do not 
seem to prevent future elite deviances, and they do not make the collusion of power 
structures in Japan more transparent. 
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1. THE RITUALIZATION OF SCANDAL IN POSTWAR JAPAN 
 
There exist various interpretations of postwar Japan. One of them, which might appear 
marginal at first glance, is that of reading modern Japanese history as a history of scandal. 
In postwar Japan, hundreds of scandals were registered, while serious cases of high-
profile political corruption occurred virtually every year, being followed by the public’s 
decreasing confidence in government and growing political apathy. Ever since the 1976 
Lockheed affair of the Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, media scandals became not only 
omnipresent components of Japanese social reality, but also a popular fixture in tabloids 
and the TV. Instead of any substantial attempt to ameliorate the situation, many high-
profile scandals followed the case of Lockheed – most notably the 1988 Recruit Scandal 
(Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru being involved in insider stock deals), and the 1992 
Sagawa Kyūbin Scandal (dozens of Japanese politicians accepting illegal donations from 
the parcel delivery company). Toward the end of the century, scandals became an 
emblematic – instead of deviant – form of Japan’s political and corporate culture, where 
conflict is either avoided, or ritualized. The real scandal season was however about to 
begin: the whole post-Fukushima period was overabundant in scandal of literally all sorts. 
The corporate corruption of Olympus (2011), Takata (2013), Toshiba (2015), Asahi Kasei 
(2015), and most recently the Mitsubishi scandal were exposed one after another. 
Furthermore, since 2014 many key members of Abe Shinzo’s cabinet (including Obuchi 
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Yūko, Shimomura Hakubun, or most recently Amari Akira) suffered scandals based on 
“financial irregularities” that led to four ministerial resignations. Moreover, major cases 
of plagiarism surfaced since 2014 as well: during the so-called STAP scandal, the female 
researcher Obokata Haruko became attacked over the authenticity of her work, the half-
deaf music composer Samuragōchi Mamoru became demonized after it was revealed that 
a ghost-writer wrote his music, and the prominent designer Sano Kenjirō was accused of 
plagiarizing the Japanese Olympic logo. Simultaneously, the Japanese media were 
overfilled on weekly basis by the never-ending chain of sex/infidelity scandals of the 
female celebrities (e.g. Yaguchi Mari, Minegishi Minami, Becky) same as male 
politicians (e.g. Miyazaki Kensuke, Ototake Hirotada, Mutō Takaya). All these scandals 
were numerous, repetitive, short-lived, and lacking any transformative potential, which 
made them not only hard to notice, but also hard to define. 
The Japanese news production today is unthinkable without scandal, and its 
enormous proliferation, same as the ritualized nature of scandal performances constitute 
the major puzzle of this thesis. My first academic encounter with this phenomenon 
occurred during the celebrity megascandal of Sakai Noriko in the summer of 2009. My 
initial impression was that more than pursuing social consensus based on conflict 
resolution, Japanese scandals rather portend outrage, disgrace, and humiliation. I also 
noticed that corrupted power elites are often treated rather benevolently, scheming their 
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comeback in a form of their own “purification”, whereas the insignificant moral 
disturbances of (mostly female) Japanese celebrities seems stand for a spectacular 
degradation of the moral “sacred signified”. The hypocritical cries of corruption, 
repetitive scandal frenzies, and the apathy of the Japanese public are often misunderstood 
by the foreign observers who naturally steer toward the tongue-in-cheek explanations of 
the inherent ridiculousness of Japanese scandals. These layman voices, combined with 
my own primary observations, established the central question for this thesis: what is the 
particular logic of Japanese media scandal, and how is the “scandal culture” constituted 
by the combination of a ritual-based performance of various scandal actors (most 
importantly the media institutions) on the backdrop of postwar Japanese history?  
There exist various phenomena that should be examined in order make sense of 
the enormous proliferation of Japanese scandals today. Importantly for this research, the 
culture of scandal had been developing on the backdrop of interrelated changes in media 
technology, journalistic practice, and political habitus throughout the postwar Japan. 
Furthermore, the rise of scandal can be especially related to the 1970s where the 
tumultuous years of social upheaval and economic recovery were supplanted by 
commoditization and media saturation. Moreover, scandals became widespread in 
corporate and political world, but their omnipresence does not correlate with any dramatic 
increase in corruption (as a matter of fact, the corruption levels in Japan are comparable 
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to other countries, while some scholars add that Japanese corruption is not entirely 
“dysfunctional”). Besides, the ubiquitous celebrity scandals that can be based on any 
transgression imaginable, constitute an important subgroup of the Japanese popular 
culture as such. In both cases, elite deviances do not matter as much as does the nature of 
their mediation, including the biased overmagnification and spectacularization of scandal 
events, which makes up for an attractive media commodity. 
While drawing on arguments from media studies and cultural sociology, the 
purpose of this thesis is to create a theoretical framework which would bridge media, 
ritual, and scandal. The starting point can be expressed by the neofunctionalist premise 
that scandal is a dramatic social performance between ritual and strategy. The “ritual part” 
of this argument points to the fact that Japanese scandal is always partly a cultural product 
which reflects social and moral conventions of the Japanese “civil religion” (shimin 
shūkyō). Here, the source of public symbolism during Japanese scandals derives less from 
private psychology, and more from the Japanese cultural code which is still integrated 
within the social structure of contemporary Japan. Consider for instance frequent tearful 
press conferences as performative rituals of confession and apologia that are conducted 
within prescribed patterns (kata), or the phenomenon of a “scapegoat suicide” as 
alternative means of handling responsibility in the wake of scandal. In other words, 
scandals are performed in a highly-ritualized manner, with designated scapegoats and pre-
17 
scripted speeches that constitute emotionally tense “degradation ceremonies” (term by 
Garfinkel 1956). The “strategy part” of the aforementioned acumen relates less to cultural 
scripts, and more to mediopolitical pragmatism of scandals. In this understanding, 
scandals are structured into systems of production, rather than disrupting those systems. 
Nonetheless, even here the ritualized quality of a scandal reporting plays an important 
role, while scandals are utilized by capitalist media organizations that wholesale them as 
media commodities. Following the work-ideology, which differs based on each media 
outlet, Japanese journalists are not encouraged to do any deep investigative reporting, and 
instead they conduct the so-called rituals of objectivity (see Tuchman 1972) in order to 
save their face while maintaining the elite status quo. These media rituals include self-
censorship based on informal agreements with the elites while being guided by the 
capitalist modes of production. The collusion and competition of various power circles in 
scandal forms a heterogeneous “actor-network” (Latour 2005) which becomes decisive 
in both soft-pedaling the coverage or fueling the media hype. 
The thesis is divided into six sections, each dealing with interrelated aspects of 
scandal in general, and Japanese media scandal in particular. The structure of the thesis is 
as follows. After explaining my methodological framework and literature review of the 
so-called scandal studies in section I, I suggest an interdisciplinary theoretical framework 
which bridges media, ritual, and scandal on the historical backdrop of postwar Japan. The 
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section II presents a conceptual framework for interpreting the social meaning of scandal 
as such (including its etymology, terminology, and basic definitions). Furthermore, I 
locate scandal and transgression in a wider field of social practice and provide a 
theoretical package for a critical discursive analysis of (not only Japanese) media scandal. 
In section III, I approach scandal from the dramaturgical perspective, i.e. as a social ritual 
of purification through confession and temporary exclusion. In section IV, I offer some 
implications related to the role of the media in postwar Japan, including the issue of 
collusion and competition of the Japanese elite/power circles during major power 
scandals. In this section I also delineate the five basic stages of an ideal-type scandal 
mediation process in contemporary Japan. In order to illustrate the point of scandal as 
both ritual and strategy, I elaborate in section V upon three distinct case studies that 
occurred between 2009 and 2012: I focus on the world of entertainment (the 2009 celebrit 
scandal of the J-pop idol Sakai Noriko), the world of high politics (the 2009 scandal of 
the political heavyweight Ozawa Ichirō), and the corporate world within the economic 
sector (the 2011 accounting scandal of the Olympus Company). These case studies aim 
to illustrate the main aspects of scandal that I elaborate upon in theoretical discussion.1 
                                                   
1 The sections II, IV and V of this thesis included some material that had been already 
published in its abridged version: “Media, Scandals, and Society: a theoretical 
introduction.” in Tōkyō Daigaku Daigakuin Jōhōgakkan Kiyō Jōhōgaku Kenkyū, Vol. 88, 
February 2015, “Theorizing about scandals and their mediations: the case of Japan.” in 
Electronic journal of contemporary Japanese studies, March 2010, and “Mediating 
Scandal in Contemporary Japan.” in French Journal for Media Research (Vol. 7, 2017). 
The case studies were published as “The Logic of Political Media Scandals in Japan and 
the Case Study of Ozawa Ichirō.” in Global Media Journal, special edition, Vol. 2, No. 
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2. READING SCANDOLOGY: FROM THE ROOTS TO PRESENT RESEARCH 
 
An increasing amount of scholarly literature on scandals, and a growing interest in 
academic discourse, which Anthony King (1985) proposed to call scandology, indicates 
that scandals do present certain qualities of constant social nature that are worth being put 
through a serious in-depth analysis. In this section, I review the academic literature related 
to media scandals. Simultaneously, this section aims to set up the historical context for 
the emergence of media scandal in Japan and the West. 
Researching on scandal is not a new phenomenon in social sciences. We can 
trace certain indirect roots of academic curiosity about transgression, gossip, and scandal 
in classical sociology, social/cultural anthropology, and political sociology (Durkheim 
1915; Garfinkel 1956; Goffman 1959; Gouldner, 1960; Gluckman 1963; Berger and 
Luckmann 1966; Hannerz 1967; Debord 1967; Merton 1968; Handelman 1973; Turner 
1974; Lukes 1975; Bourdieu 1984; Baudrillard 1988; Girard 1996; Boltanski 2004). All 
these scholars had in common the interest in everyday methods we use in order to make 
sense of the everydayness, which is being made up during multifaceted social interactions. 
Their insights are informative especially for the segment of scandal research that does not 
                                                   
2, Autumn/Winter 2012, “Megaspectacle and Celebrity Transgression in Japan: the 2009 
Media Scandal of Sakai Noriko.” in Idols and Celebrity in Japanese Media Culture, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, and “Corporate Scandal in Japan and the Case Study of 
Olympus/Woodford” in Electronic journal of contemporary Japanese studies (Vol. 16, 
Issue 3, 2016). 
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limit itself to scandal approached only as a mass media phenomenon.2 
Regarding the emergence of media scandal, its roots can be traced to 19th century 
with the advent of yellow journalism. It became however even more significant during 
the 1950s, when the world conflict was temporarily concluded, the new media platforms 
were emerging, and television had been introduced as a mass medium. By 1960s, the 
media mass circulation increased worldwide along with further development of 
investigative journalism, and since 1968, scandals gained a new momentum in the West 
due to a new polarisation of politics and media (e.g. Bösch 2011). In the West, the 
historical watershed came with the Watergate affair in 1972 which served as a framework 
                                                   
2 Emile Durkheim set the base for understanding the system of ideas that relate to the 
distinction of sacred versus profane and their role in maintaining societies as “civil 
religions” with occasional deviances representing “normal” phenomena. Max Gluckman, 
Don Handelman and Ulf Hannerz showed early anthropological interest in scandal and 
gossip when researching the tribal communities’ involvement in gossip (Gluckman 
emphasized the positive function of gossip as a powerful social instrument in the 
maintenance of social unity and social control). Erving Goffman elaborated on the 
dramaturgical perspective in context of our everydayness which is constituted through 
staged performances and face-saving/face-threating activities (the scandal performance is 
also characteristic of staging while transgressors become stigmatized and temporarily 
exiled). Alvin Gouldner contributed to scandology by discussing the norms of reciprocity 
as a point for understanding the relationship of accountability between the scandal-tainted 
elites and the media audience. The social criticism of Guy Debord updated the scandal 
theory by emphasizing that many scandals are emblematic of a high degree of staged 
spectacularity. Steven Lukes, Rene Girard and Victor Turner expanded Durkheim’s 
solidarity/ritual theory whereby using the notion of social drama and scapegoat for 
analyzing those episodes that manifest and manage social conflict. Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann stressed that our social reality (including the routine news broadcast 
and non-routine scandal events) is in many regards a socially constructed, “purposive” 
phenomenon (this notion was further applied to journalism by Molotch and Lester, Gaye 
Tuchman, or Herbert Gans). Robert Merton is instructive with his notion of 
manifest/latent dysfunction, while Pierre Bourdieu enriches scandology with theorizing 
the journalistic field of struggle. Harold Garfinkel and Luc Boltanski touch upon the 
sentiments of moral indignation as the main source for degradative manifestations of 
punishment.  
21 
for the public discourse about scandals, generated a vast amount of original academic 
elaborations, and became the point of reference when judging political corruption.3 
In Japan, the counterpart to Watergate became represented by the Lockheed 
corruption scandal, which climaxed in 1976 and involved the Japanese father of the so-
called “money politics” (kinken seiji), Tanaka Kakuei. Same as Watergate, Lockheed 
became one of the biggest postwar corruption cases, attracting media coverage like no 
Japanese scandal did before. 
Within the academic field of media studies, scandal came to be counted as a 
relatively new but important form of a media event worth serious academic attention 
(Yoshimi 2012). In 1980s, Anthony King proposed to divide scandals into three thematic 
categories (sex, money, power) while linking the issues of official misconduct to larger 
characteristics of political systems (King 1985). Despite frequent outbreaks of corruption 
in advanced democracies during 1980s, the events still did not spark any significant 
academic attention. Apart from scandal anthologies and insiders’ accounts, there existed 
only few scholarly analytical works that would focus on the nature of scandal including 
its emergence, development, and consequences (for the list, see Thompson 1997). In 
                                                   
3  The American imperatives of post-Watergate morality referred among others to 
revivified values of critical rationality, anti-authoritarianism, or civil solidarity when 
applied to group and interest conflicts. Apart from increased cynicism about institutions 
and bureaucracies, Watergate intensified investigative journalism, shifted orientation of 
reporting from description to prescription, and facilitated the media feeding frenzy (Szasz 
1986; Alexander 1988; Markovits and Silverstein 1988; Sabato, Stencel and Lichter 2000; 
Schudson 2004; Adut 2008). 
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Japan, the emerging critical issues of media error, political deception and scandal emerged 
earlier within the discourse of mass media criticism (Yoshimi and Mizukoshi 1997), and 
they became a commonplace especially in the aftermath of the Recruit scandal in 1988. 
In the same year, a new historical milestone was set in Europe: the end of Cold 
war and the subsequent new post-communist era stimulated interest in the mushrooming 
corruption. Since the 1990s, scandals have emerged widely in West European Countries 
– mainly as a consequence of the capitalist rules, new markets, and emerging 
mediopolitical competition. Finally, the horizontal and vertical media integration, and the 
expansion of cable/satellite TV and internet since early 1990s have dramatically changed 
the media environment in the media-saturated societies around the world, simultaneously 
impacting the production logic behind media scandal.4 
Since the 1990s, media scandals were gradually placed less outside of a context 
concerning truth and morality, and more in various metanarratives concerning journalistic 
practices and media technologies. In their analysis of media events, many scholars (Szasz 
1986; Dayan and Katz 1988; Alexander 1988; Schudson 2004) addressed the 
phenomenon of scandal while using the Watergate affair as an example for illuminating 
the relation of the scandal “ceremony” to both antecedent and subsequent events. 
                                                   
4 The epitome of this new era in Europe (and a sort of counterpart to Rupert Murdoch in 
the US) was the Italian media tycoon, politician and businessman Silvio Berlusconi. 
Scholars worldwide have ever since criticized Berlusconi’s extensive control over media, 
his corruption affairs, and conflicts of interest between politics and media ownership. 
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Furthermore, John B. Thompson (1995) touched upon the topic of scandal while relating 
the phenomenon to new technologies, media visibility and modernity, and developed his 
“interactional theory of scandal” (Thompson 1997) in David Lull and Steven Hinerman’s 
acclaimed volume on scandals (Lull and Hinerman 1997). Three years later, Thompson 
published his comprehensive analysis of political scandal (Thompson 2000), further 
confirming that the scandal sensitivity depends on both the form of interaction, and its 
sociohistorical context. While drawing examples from the Anglo-American world, 
Thompson’s main argument was that high-profile scandals are symptomatic of a profound 
transformation of the relations between public and private life, which is further related to 
the fact that technologies of communication are blurring the boundaries between public 
and private. Thompson further emphasized the role of increased mediated visibility being 
enabled by the development of communication media, triggering off a series of mediated 
events.5  
In its early stages, scandal was giving certain impetus for changes of broader 
political culture (Thomspon 2000; Newton 2006), while challenging the dominant culture 
in most stable and powerful nations (Dayan and Katz 1992; Lull and Hinerman 1997). I 
claim that this impetus for change is rather rare in today’s media culture, although the 
                                                   
5  Within this transformation, there occurred one fundamental change in media 
environment especially after the 1998 Clinton-Lewinsky scandal – namely elimination of 
the traditional notion of gatekeeping (see Williams and Delli Carpini 2004; Bennett 2007; 
Castells 2009).  
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newest technology, and the participation of online communities is indeed changing the 
face of media scandal. Contemporary scandals are struggles over symbolic power in 
which reputation and trust are at stake, while the negative impact on the public (which 
originally lays in betrayal of social trust) strengthens voter skepticism and political 
cynicism.  
In another seminal work on scandal, Ari Adut (2008) provided a general theory of 
scandal while combining phenomenological (“moral”) and structural (“strategic”) 
analyses (Adut 2008). Adut points out the diminishing confidence in politics and 
increased transparency, and shows that both the moral and the strategic are fused in 
scandal in the context of declining credibility of politicians since 1990s. According to 
Adut, scandals are “moral disturbances” that usually follow a predictable pattern: they 
reaffirm collective values by provoking a moral position-taking and dramatizing lines of 
difference. Adut however illustrates the “successful” provocations by mainly analysing 
scandals in art, which in the past led to cultural paradigm shifts. Adut however correctly 
notes that although the public feedback is indispensable for any scandal, the audiences 
remain largely bystanders – they stand for a forceful, performative fiction, fashioned in 
part by the media. 
This critical insight is shared by another prominent scandal scholar, Johannes 
Ehrat (2011). While emphasizing the semiotic and pragmatic features of scandal and 
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public opinion, Ehrat approaches scandals as “interpretations of signs” rather than mere 
functional operations. While sharing Adut’s constructivist view, Ehrat claims that 
scandals are related to conducts, but they primarily stand for narrativized constructions, 
while the public opinion on scandals is being monopolized by the media. Furthermore, 
scandal narratives need “facts” for purposes that are at not necessarily justified from those 
texts, whereas scandal is always a product with “surplus value over and beyond facts” 
(Ehrat 2011, 25). While this resonates with Zizekian lament that “there are no facts, there 
is only ideology” (Zizek 2012), it is indeed not the facts themselves that justify sanction 
in scandal, but the fact that the leaked transgression is made to be publicly opined upon. 
The western scandal scholars indicate that the Anglo-Saxon countries are 
inherently inclined to a libertarian philosophy where any exposure leads to a better system 
(both political and economic). This is deemed essentially “good”, albeit somewhat 
structurally perverted. These scholars believe that the anatomy of political scandal is the 
anatomy of modern society, while media politics automatically leads to scandal politics 
(e.g. Thompson 2000; Tumber and Waisbord 2004a; Esser and Hartung 2004; Liebes and 
Blum-Kulka 2004; Castells 2009). Furthermore, they associate scandal with liberal 
democratic regimes that are more vulnerable since moral opposition is systematically 
encouraged and the press is rather aggressive (Markovits and Silverstein 1988; Käsler 
1991; Barker 1994; Sabato, Stencel and Lichter 2000; Schudson 2004; Neckel 2005; 
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Garrard and Newell 2006; Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston 2007; Bulkow and Petersen 
2011; Dagnes and Sachleben 2014). 
Other European scandal scholars criticize media scandal as media(tized) construct 
while the political theater only surrounds it as an illusion of democracy. Global changes 
in the moral psychology of the business world, prevailing liberalism, free market, and 
deregulation are often seen as the main culprit in corporate scandals (Newton 2006). 
Especially the German scandal scholars produced a remarkable amount of critical 
interdisciplinary research on scandal (Holler and Wickstrom 1999; Luhmann 2000; 
Neckel 2005; Burkhardt 2011; Holldorf 2011; Poerksen and Detel 2014). Niklas 
Luhmann (2000) indicated that the politics of scandal is a complex and complicated 
system of decision-making agencies and processes, while the ultimate function of scandal 
is to maintain and reproduce the social body of the system. The French scholars tend to 
see scandals in a more positive light, i.e. as lessons that contribute to the improvement of 
rules and procedures while further improving a functioning society (Blic and Lemieux 
2005; Champagne and Marchetti 2005; Marciano and Moureau 2013). Scandals in such 
perspective facilitate transparency and give rise to organizational reforms and new 
practices. Nonetheless, the general tendency is that scandals are on the rise (Thompson 
2000; Tumber and Waisbord 2004a; Liebes and Blum-Kulka 2004), although it is not the 
corruption what has substantially increased, but the publicity of corruption (Mori 2004; 
27 
Bennett 2007; Adut 2008; Ehrat 2011). In other words, what really increases is the media 
attention to scandal, rather than corruption and crime.6  
Sstudies of political/corporate scandal were usually connected to liberal 
democracies, but an effort to internationalize scandal theory is on the rise as well, 
demonstrating that not all Anglo-American theories can be fully applied to scandal in 
non-Western cultures. Owing to this academic segment, we discover that political scandal 
is rather absent in Argentina (Waisbord 2004) or Spain (Pujas 2002), while environmental 
scandals are rare in Germany (Esser and Hartung 2004). Furthermore, the political sleaze 
quickly became a feature of big newspapers in post-Soviet Russia (McNair 2000), while 
sex scandals are much more common in Great Britain or USA than in Germany, France 
or Italy (Tumber 2004; Adut 2008; Carlson 2013). Regarding the Asian mediascape, a 
certain significance was attributed to intense emotional responses to celebrity scandals in 
China (Jiang et al. 2011), Taiwan (Chen 2003; Shiau 2014), and Japan (West 2006; Prusa 
2012a). Among many other findings, sex scandals in Japan emerge in principle only in 
tabloids (Carlson 2013), and despite the omnipresence of political scandal, the 
mainstream Japanese media does a poor job of treating governmental/corporate 
                                                   
6 In a similar vein, the crime rates are in consistent decline, but crime news continues to 
rise, alarming public concern with crime (Alheide 2002). This media aggrandizement 
exists in Japan as well: statistically, Japan had the least number of homicides in 2015 year 
since the end of World War II, but the Japanese media often spread a “discourse of fear” 
(term by Altheide 2002) while emphasizing those alarming issues that are related to social 
insecurity (Hamai and Ellis 2006; Leonardsen 2006; Mori 2014). 
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corruption (McNeill 2016; Kingston 2016; Cucek 2016; Prusa 2017).7 
While diverging from the original aim to focus primarily on sex, money and 
politics, other scholars introduced new interdisciplinary approaches to scandal in less 
traditional contexts. The scope of this academic segment ranges from applying critical 
social theory when analysing religious scandals (Bisbort 2008; Ehrat 2011; Senander 
2012) to analyzing sports scandals (Rowe 1997; Laine 2006; Finley, Finley and Fountain 
2008; Storm and Wagner 2011), and to scandals in history, art and literature (Stallybrass 
and White 1986; Cohen 1996; Mitchell 2002; Butler and Drakeford 2005; Miller 2008; 
Adut 2008; Bulkow and Petersen 2011; Rowley 2013).  
Despite the omnipresence of scandal in postwar Japan, a complex research that 
would both analytically and empirically examine the nature of Japanese scandals is still 
missing. So far, the phenomenon of postwar Japanese scandal was seriously elaborated 
by Maggie Farley (1996), Laurie Freeman (1996) and Mark West (2006), who assert that 
Japan’s sociohistorical idiosyncrasies (including the reporters’ club, or kisha kurabu) 
deemphasize conflict and controversy while failing to develop the media-watchdog 
tradition in scandal. Furthermore, these authors remind us that biggest Japanese scandals 
                                                   
7  The endeavor to internationalize scandalogy includes scandal case studies from 
Australia (Tiffen 1999; 2002; 2004), Germany (Käsler 1991; Giannakopoulos, Maras and 
Amano 2009; Bulkow and Petersen 2011), Austria (Nick and Sickinger 1989), France 
(Chalaby 2004; Adut 2008), Spain (Pujas 2002; Jimenez 2004), Great Britain (Tumber 
2004), Argentina (Waisbord 2004), Finland (Laine 2006; Handstad 2008), Netherlands 
(Ruigrok 2007), Sweden (Jacobsson and Löfmarck 2008; Ekstrom and Johansson 2008) 
and Italy (Pujas 2002). 
29 
surfaced from sources outside the Japanese mainstream media (I elaborate on this point 
more closely in section IV, chapter 6). Furthermore, these authors touch upon the 
discrepancies between the Japanese mainstream press, which concentrates on stated 
principles and political façade (tatemae), and the weeklies that strive to capitalize on the 
reality behind it (honne). In both cases, the anti-governmental stance is rather superficial, 
while most important in scandal is the Japanese preference for private ordering by groups 
(West 2006). The media institutions are divided in the way they “search for truth” in 
scandal, while the importance lies in the location of the private-public line. Besides, their 
accounts indicated usefulness of the actor-network theory (Latour 2005) for 
understanding Japanese scandal, because there is always an interplay of heterogeneous 
forces (both media and non-media actors) that become involved in the scandalization 
process. Nonetheless, many authors were rather monothematic in their focus on 
organizational pathologies and sociolegal backgrounds while overlooking the fact that 
Japanese scandals are “meaningful” social performances and ritualized social dramas of 
“restorative justice” (shūfukuteki seigi) with little or no social impact at all.    
There exist many accounts on political, bureaucratic and corporate corruption in 
Japan (e.g. Aritake 1970; Tachibana 1976; Johnson 1986; Nester 1990a; Mitchell 1995; 
Leggett 1995; Woodall 1996; Johnson 1997; Blechinger 1998; Pascha 1999; 
Giannakopoulos, Maras and Amano 2009; Berkofsky 2002; Kingston 2004; Bowen 2003; 
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Messersmith 2003; Sato 2005; Babb 2005; Pharr 2007; Gaunder 2007; Pontell and Geis 
2008; Nyblade and Reed 2008; George Mulgan 2010; Herzog 2013; Maeda and Aoyagi 
2013). Unfortunately, academic accounts on scandal reporting and investigative 
journalism in Japan are less frequent (e.g. Morikawa 1992; Farley 1996; Asano 2004; 
Gamble and Watanabe 2004; Uesugi 2012). Within this body of research, considerable 
academic attention was paid to the 1976 Lockheed scandal (Tachibana 1976; Blaker 1977; 
Johnson 1982; MacDougall 1988; Pharr 1996), the 1988 Recruit scandal (Rossett 1989; 
Ishikawa 1989; Yayama 1990; Nester 1990b; Kerbo and Inoue 1990), the 1996 HIV/blood 
scandal and other cover-ups (Miyamoto 1996; Feldman 1999; Kingston 2004), sports 
scandal (Ezawa 1999; Duggan and Levitt 2002; Tajima 2004; Kawai and McDonald 
2012; Manzenreiter 2014), and most recently the 2011 Olympus scandal (Yamaguchi 
2011; Maeda and Aoyagi 2013; Prusa 2016b). 
Finally, various accounts on Japanese scandals can be found in secondary texts on 
corruption: there exists a plethora of opinional treatises, testimonies, and popular 
accounts written by people with varying degree of insider knowledge (e.g. Miyamoto 
1996; Kerr 2001; Berkofsky 2002; Nashimoto 2009; Sakai 2010; Ezoe 2010; Wolferen 
2011a; Sassa 2011; Yamaguchi 2012; Woodford 2012). The main limitation of these 
treatises lies in the subjectivity of authors that either criticize the system in a 
partisan/moralizing way (Miyamoto 1996; Nashimoto 2009; Wolferen 2011a), or they 
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were directly involved in a scandal, approaching the writing more as a sort of confessional 
auto-therapy with a certain commercial effect (Sakai 2010; Ezoe 2010; Woodford 2012; 
Ozawa 2015; Obokata 2016).   
I believe that the limitations of previous literature can be overcome by steering 
the scandal research more toward the neofunctionalist train of thought, i.e. by 
systematically examining Japanese scandal as a ritualized social performance that 
resonates with some features of the culture’s civil religion, and as a constructed pseudo-
event that only seemingly rejuvenates or transforms social norms. The focus will then lie 
not only in narrative structures, but also in staged performances, their functions, and 
generally in the discursive practices of scandalization (Alexander 2011; Burkhardt 2011). 
Contrarily to large media events as analysed by Dayan and Katz (1992), media scandals 
in Japan are less natural in terms of their emergence. Furthermore, despite 
institutionalized attempts to reform and redress (i.e. orchestrating apologia, setting up 
committees, calling for reforms), media scandals are rather nontransformative in terms of 
dealing with elite deviance in society or making the collusion of power structures more 
transparent. On the contrary, an important aspect of Japanese scandal lies in its 
“hegemonic force”, i.e. in legitimating and maintaining the status quo of the ruling elites 
without coercion while utilizing scandals as degradation ceremonies of soft social control 
(see section III, chapter 3).  
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3. WIDENING THE SCOPE: APPROACHING SCANDAL AS SOCIAL RITUAL 
 
Making sense of an era in which scandals became an institutionalized part of our mediated 
everydayness requires combined tools of an updated social theory when analysing images, 
events, narratives, and performances. My aim is to knit together various subfields as they 
bear on scandal: following the interdisciplinary method of neofunctionalism and media 
studies, I integrate humanities (philosophy, metaethics, cultural studies) with social 
sciences (sociology, social/cultural anthropology, communication studies). 
The overarching methodological frame of this thesis is neofunctionalism 
(sometimes also labelled as cultural pragmatism, cultural sociology, or conflict 
structuralism). Being popularized by Jeffrey Alexander, this discipline presupposes that 
every action, no matter how instrumental, reflexive, or coerced, is ritualized and 
embedded in a horizon of affect and meaning (Alexander 1989; 2003; 2011). 
Neofunctionalism draws upon Durkheim’s ideas about the moral basis of society 
(Durkheim 1955), combined with Victor Turner’s notions of social drama and ritual 
(Turner 1990). The main departure from Durkheimian functionalism lies in claiming that 
ritual does not symbolize only social solidarities, but perhaps more importantly social 
conflicts. Neofunctionalism takes its core analytic insights from semiotics and 
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structuralism while applying theories of dramaturgy and performativity.8 
The neofunctionalist approach provides analytic concepts for common 
performative productions and receptions while extending the definition of scandal beyond 
the Durkheimian framework. It highlights that any social drama – including scandal – is 
inherently embedded in cultural contexts, framed narratives and power relations. Within 
this theoretical framework, culture is perceived as being structured and patterned through 
binary codes, within which the sacred/profane binary is of central importance. The sacred 
stands for the collective identity of a “good” social community based on a cognitive mode 
by which a community refers to itself in distinction to the sum of its individual members. 
On the contrary, the profane points at a representation of “impurity” constructed in direct 
relation to the sacred (i.e. the transgression threatens to pollute the sacred). In scandal, 
one’s actions become often typified into general codes of sacred/profane, pure/impure, or 
democratic/antidemocratic.9 
While further expanding the scope of neofunctionalism, I combine both the 
                                                   
8 In their interdisciplinary endeavor, the neofunctionalists draw upon cultural sociology 
(Simmel, Bourdieu), cultural anthropology (Geertz), dramaturgical sociology (Burke, 
Goffman), ritual theory (Turner), or speech acts theory (Searle, Austin). All these sources 
assert a link between institutional and discursive analyses of cultural phenomena, calling 
attention to the mutual influence of institutional environments and cultural scripts. 
9 Durkheim distinguished between the positive (redeeming, charismatic) force as the 
ultimate source of the cosmic order and identity, and the demonic force that aims at chaos, 
pollution and dissolution of order (Durkheim 1915). This dichotomy seems to parallel 
with Friedrich Nietzsche’s Apollonian ideal of conduct, drawing and respecting 
boundaries and limits, worshipping the ethics of moderation and self-control, as opposed 
to the Dionysian ideal, driven toward dissolution of boundaries, transgression of limits, 
worshipping excess and ecstasy (Nietzsche 1999). In the light of this parallel, scandal can 
be conceptualized as a sudden outburst of the demonic/Dionysian in everyday social life.  
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constructivist and the objectivist view of scandal. The constructivist approach focuses on 
scandals as nonroutine form of social punishment, secular rituals of renewal, and media-
framed pseudo-events that produce scapegoats. The objectivist approach relates 
transgression and corruption to organizational pathologies (structural issues, 
malfunctions of the system, the role of whistleblowing), and it focuses on how the media 
contribute to making (and unmaking) of scandals. The former approach uses the tools of 
sociocultural anthropology or narratological analysis, while the latter approach is 
grounded in critical media studies and journalism. I believe that the neofunctionalist 
framework allows to conflate these two perspectives while emphasizing the culturally-
pragmatic aspect of scandal. To sum up, scandals will be in this thesis treated as social 
dramas with ritualized qualities (diachronic analysis), symbolic products of media 
institutions’ modi operandi (social/institutional analysis), and commodified media texts 
(synchronic analysis). Thus, I will operate in three methodological dimensions, where I 
approach scandal as: 
  
1. social drama and secular ritual (dimension: diachronic) 
2. product of media routines and biases (dimension: institutional) 
3. narrated and framed text (dimension: synchronic) 
 
35 
 
 
Ad 1: Scandal as Social Drama and Ritual 
In neofunctionalist perspective, social collectivity (kyōdōtai) is approached as a cultural 
space which various actors performatively co-operate in constructing. If a conduct 
becomes revealed as transgressive or corrupted, scandals are the tools that aim to maintain 
the boundaries between the “good” (sacred) and “evil” (profane). While echoing both 
Emile Durkheim (1915) and Jeffrey Alexander (1988), I understand the ideal social 
function of scandals as narrativized and ritualized performances that follow major moral 
disturbances. 
Durkheim emphasized the relationship between ritual behavior and the 
adherence to social order, while understanding collective veneration of the sacred as the 
key element of social solidarity. However, more than rejuvenating the solidarity of a 
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collective identity, modern Japanese scandals are pragmatic performances between ritual 
and strategy with hegemonic force. While being performatively punitive and shameful, 
these performances stand for “degradation ceremonies” of pollution and purification 
through exclusion. In Japan, the Durkheimian solidarity is often expressed dramatically 
as a polarization and tension between the sacred “inside” (naibu/uchi) and the profane 
“outside” (gaibu/soto). In all media-saturated societies, this sentiment of both solidarity 
and conflict is realized via the channels of mass communication, during which the 
audiences are made to believe that the media are at their society’s imagined center (Shils 
1975; Couldry 2003).   
Finally, the production and dissemination of scandal can be illuminated by the 
actor-network theory (Law and Hassard 1999; Latour 2005), where scandal represents a 
heterogeneous engineering and assemblage of various interrelated actors. In media reality, 
these social dramas are being given form and shape through complex struggles (both 
conflicts and collaborations) inside and outside the journalistic field. In such scandal-
network, the scandal drama unfolds through interactions between various media/non-
media actors (power elites, journalists, critics, whistleblowers, prosecutors) within their 
respective systems (the political discourse, the business circles, the world of 
entertainment). The outcome of what I call scandal is then a composite product of these 
interactions and performances. 
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Ad 2: Scandal as product of media routines 
According to basic reporting principles, the media’s interest in scandal is generally shaped 
by organizational news values, the way of media's self-understanding of their social role, 
and perhaps most importantly by the market forces (e.g. Galtung and Ruge 1965; McQuail 
1994; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Hara 1997; Bennet 2007). The media as social 
institutions do have mechanisms at their disposal to both support the establishment and 
to challenge it (the latter is in the West accounted for by the media-watchdog theory, 
where the media as guardians of public standards provide visibility and accountability by 
turning the dealings of elite power groups into public knowledge). In reality, the media 
certainly are the key channels in displaying corruption, while scandal can be seen as the 
quintessence of professional journalism. However, the journalistic agenda in Japan and 
elsewhere has become largely commercially driven and susceptible to political pressures. 
Besides, the logic of Japanese scandal is always marked by interlocking mechanisms and 
informal contracts (see below). 
Every transgression concerns specific rules of an organization. Scandals are non-
routine media products of “ritualistic performance strategies” where professional 
journalists entail strategic rituals that justify a claim to “objectivity”, and develop 
ritualized procedures in order to protect the system (and themselves) from eventual blame 
(Tuchman 1972). At this level of analysis, I utilize the diachronic approach in order to 
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illuminate how in Japan transgressions progress to the future state, giving a shape to a 
media scandal. My motivation for such analysis stems from the fact that scandals do not 
represent only evident “phenomenological” qualities (i.e. scandal as text), but equally 
importantly they represent a social reality in which scandals are commodified products 
of ritualized routines and biases.  
At this level of method, I elaborate on the general process flow of scandal 
mediation in Japan. In this endeavor, I aim to offer a window into the interplay of those 
factors that typically define and shape Japanese scandals. Furthermore, in order to grasp 
the complexity of the scandal mediation process in Japan, I will suggest five consecutive 
stages of an ideal-type scandal mediation process: the scoop leak to the media, scandal 
data processing, transgression leak to the public, confessions and damages, and return to 
everydayness. 
 
Ad 3: Scandal as media text 
Scandal must be simultaneously seen as a continuous product of media routines, and it 
becomes fixed as a media text. Thus, at this methodological level I analyze the structure 
of scandal as text and approach scandals as framed narratives and mediated 
(pseudo)events that are conditioned by various ideological formations.10 
                                                   
10 When approaching scandal as text I depart from conceptual assumptions shared by the 
contemporary cultural pragmatists, who were informed by the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 
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I was further inspired by Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
and its interdisciplinary applications (Jaworski and Coupland 1999). Importantly for 
scandals, the CDA emphasizes that a discourse is both constituted and constitutive. 
Scandals are also constituted (but not triggered) by the media, and they may become 
constitutive of a liminoid state upon which retributions and reforms may be applied. 
Equally importantly, the discourse at work conceptualizes scandals as “morality tales”, 
where points of view and value systems are reflected in terms of what is morally 
appropriate and what is not. 
In Japan and elsewhere, scandals are necessarily manufactured via the mass media 
channels. While conflating ordinary news and media events (Dayan and Katz 1992), the 
omnipresent Japanese scandals often turn into pre-scripted pseudo-events (Boorstin 1992) 
and media spectacles (Debord 1967; Kellner 2003) that are disseminated in a form of 
media commodity (the section III explains these theoretical concepts in detail). 
Most of the material presented in this thesis will pertain to large-scale media 
scandals that have occurred since the outset of the Japanese postwar period. In my case 
studies, I focus on three social systems that represent the most frequently scandalized 
platforms in Japan: the world of entertainment (where illicit drug use among celebrities 
is considered a serious transgression), the world of high politics (which is emblematic of 
                                                   
where meaningful actions are considered as texts. They explore narratives and rituals in 
various institutional domains (e.g. Ricoeur 1983).  
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donation scandals and collusive practices within the power circles), and the world of 
Japanese corporate culture (with dubious accounting practices and internal cover-ups). 
The celebrity scandal of Sakai Noriko was selected because in 2009 the event 
became a national obsession, major media spectacle, and the biggest Japanese celebrity 
scandal in years. The political donation scandal is represented by the case of Ozawa Ichirō 
– not only because his scandal occurred simultaneously with that of Sakai, but because 
Ozawa (whose mentor was Tanaka Kakuei, the “father” of money-politics) can be 
regarded as one of the epitomes of political corruption in postwar Japan. Finally, in my 
analysis of corporate/financial scandal I focus on the Olympus accounting fraud from 
2011. The reason for this choice is that the Olympus scandal had developed into one of 
the biggest and longest-lived loss-concealing financial scandals in the history of corporate 
Japan. Equally importantly, it re-opened the discussion on whistleblowing in corporate 
Japan. 
Each of these three case studies invite further discussion on various “pathological” 
phenomena that co-constitute the scandalization process. The celebrity scandal of Sakai 
Noriko points at the culture-specific phenomenon of celebrity in Japan, and the way the 
Japanese media and the entertainment agencies (jimusho) contribute to making and 
breaking of Japanese stars. The chain of political corruption scandals of Ozawa Ichirō 
brings to the fore the role of structural corruption in Japan (kōzō oshoku), but also the role 
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of prosecutors in power scandals, since their performance can dramatically change the 
course of scandal. Finally, the economic scandal of Olympus versus Woodford offers a 
discussion on some pathologies of Japanese corporate governance, including the role of 
whistleblowing in Japan.  
I analyze these three scandal narratives based on a full-text coverage available 
through the mainstream media sources (newspaper articles from the big Japanese dailies 
such as Yomiuri Shinbun and Asahi Shinbun), Japanese tabloids (sports magazines and 
semi-tabloids such as Shūkan Shinchō or Shūkan Bunshun), the foreign press (e.g. The 
Japan Times), and by evaluating transcripts of televised news reports, interviews, and 
press conferences related to each scandal. The screening period was identical with the 
duration of the scandal narratives since their outset, namely the years 2009-10 in the case 
of the Sakai Noriko scandal, the period of 2009-2012 in the case of the Ozawa Ichirō 
scandal, and the years 2011-12 in the case of the Olympus/Woodford scandal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
II.  
THE SOCIAL MEANING OF SCANDAL 
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1. TOWARD BASIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCANDAL 
 
This section offers a conceptual ground for interpreting scandal in media-saturated 
societies such as Japan. In the past, the western research on scandal was conducted from 
multiple academic perspectives. The fields of study worth mentioning are sociology, 
anthropology, history, rhetorical linguistics, narrative/semiotic analysis, comparative law, 
political science, research on media, communication and journalism studies. Nonetheless, 
in Japan the topic is still more common outside the formal scholarly discourse since it is 
viewed as too frivolous and fleeting to arouse serious academic attention. Yet, some 
scholars focusing on scandals in various contexts have so far produced a significant 
amount of theoretical accounts and definitions. Before introducing them, let me clarify 
the general terminology and etymology of scandal. 
 
1.1. Historical and Etymological Contexts of Scandal 
 
Having Indo-European origins (skand referred to “stumbling block”), the etymology of 
scandal in the West goes back to Early Greek, Latin, and Judeo-Christian history of 
thought. The Latin scandalum means “trap” or “obstacle”, while the term scandalon 
(“sin”) was used in a religious sense in Greek version of the Old Testament (Adut 2008; 
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Ehrat 2011; Senander 2012; Marciano and Moureau 2013). Scandal in its original sense 
had a different meaning because it was later recontextualized in the moralistic literature. 
According to the Christian theology, scandal (both in word and action) points to a moral 
offence, or even the “evil” itself (if only in appearance). An active scandal, seen by Christ 
as a mortal sin, occurs when a sinner orders, requests, or advises another to commit the 
sin, while the passive scandal is a sin which another commits in consequence of the active 
scandal (see Heeren 1912; Girard 1996).  
The history of scandal in secular culture is dated similarly, going back to the 5th 
century BC. The first written account of scandal leads us back to the late period of Greek 
antiquity. The term skandalēthron appeared already in a comedy ascribed to Aristophanes 
(445-385 BC). Furthermore, the prominent Athenian commander Alcibiades is in the 
chronicles mentioned as creating a “scandal” during the Peloponnesian War (431-404 
BC): he allegedly smashed in anger the faces of the stone images of the Athenian gods 
whereby defiling the symbols of collective belief, being consequently accused of 
sacrilege (Neckel 2005). The public displays of transgressivity were with us since the 
dawn of civilisation.11   
                                                   
11 Already the so-called primitive societies of ancient times were through pre-literary 
categories (ritual, myth, and folk-tale) expressing and enjoying moments of 
transgressivity. In medieval and early modern periods of European civilization, there 
existed a long tradition of officially approved periodical venting of psychological 
pressures based on the magnetic antipathy between order and excess. Periodical escape 
from everydayness was made possible on a regular basis: starting with ancient festivals 
of the Roman Empire (saturnalia) and continuing the tradition in Middle Ages 
(calendaria), the lower classes were allowed to negotiate their identity via masks and 
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The traditional societies around the globe exhibited a certain taste for malicious 
gossip, which is an intimate form of communication being as old as language itself.12 
The real advent of denunciatory scandals is usually historically located in medieval and 
early modern Europe. The term esclandre appeared in English and Romance languages 
in the 16th century, and was used in two meanings: as an art of improper conduct leading 
to damage to reputation (including defamatory speech), and as a form of an obstacle 
which hinders religious belief. In early modern English, the words “scandal” and “slander” 
were synonymous, referring to defamatory gossip, or general comment injurious to 
reputation (Adut 2008). Particularly important for the scandal development were the 
disruptive events since 17th century England (i.e. the so-called war of pamphlets), the new 
literary genre of scandalous chronicles, which scrutinized private lives of the monarchs 
throughout the 18th century, and finally the emerging culture of political periodicals since 
                                                   
costumes. In order to “recreate” the working class, power holders were publicly 
demonstrating their benevolence and power by enabling the transgressive mode of upside 
down reality (carnival event is one example of such culturally allowed transgressivity). 
Even the religious medieval festivals were hedonistic, loud, and rich in visual spectacle, 
providing a platform for gossiping about those in power. Similarly, in medieval Japan the 
extravagant folk festivals (matsuri) served as a medium for re-creating subordinate 
classes in strictly hierarchical society, and were later prohibited in the name of decorum 
(Yanagita 1957). In both East and West, the local tradition of morally justifiable 
transgressivity was transformed into national forms of social banditry and anti-heroism 
(Hobsbawm 1969; Prusa 2016a).  
12 One of the oldest examples of gossip points to the Mesopotamian mayor’s affair with 
a married woman, carved on a clay tablet as early as in 1500 BC. The ancient Greek poet 
Hesiod (around 700 BC) described gossip as “the wretched talk of mortals”, while the 
Roman poet Virgil talked about the multiplicity of rumor (fama), which can be both good 
and bad. In Middle Ages, the term entered modern language as gossib in Geoffrey 
Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, and its contemporary version (gossip) was coined by 
William Shakespeare in The Comedy of Errors (Act V, Scene I). 
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the late 18th century (e.g. the British Journals such as The Tatler or The Spectator).  
In Japan, same as in the West, the terminology of corruption and scandal was 
always involved in religious considerations and folk beliefs. In Christianity, corruption is 
characteristic of this sinful world, but the filth and decay of the Japanese term for 
corruption (oshoku, fuhai, wairo) similarly resonated with Buddhist and Shintoist 
implications (Mitchell 1996; Babb 2005). Moreover, some traditional concepts of the 
Japanese civil religion such as hare, ke, kegare, or misogi can be related to the 
neofunctionalist distinction between the sacred and the profane (see below). 
Scandal took on a new meaning as a mediated event toward the end of the 19th 
century with the advent of mass printing. In Japan, the traditional media for incidents in 
daily life and gossip were the news pamphlets (kawaraban), followed by the “small 
newspapers” (koshinbun) that carried scandalous articles before they were absorbed into 
“industrial papers” (shōgyō shinbun) toward the end of 19th century. One of the first 
Japanese publications that directly espoused “scandal journalism” was Yorozu Chōhō 
(active in 1892-1940). Further proliferation of scandal in both Japan and the West 
occurred since the 1960s when new media technologies (most importantly the TV) offered 
the most potent merging of private and public spheres while transforming the notion of 
publicity (see below). 
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This was an important moment for the history of scandal, because many scandal 
stories fall in a broad zone between private and public. In the light of this transformation, 
scandal was rendered as private sin and public dishonesty (Ehrat 2011), or the means by 
which the private and the public worlds transgress each other (Holler and Wickstrom 
1999). Especially in Japanese scandal, the collusive backstage relationships of the power 
elites typically blur the lines between individual income (private) and political funds 
(public). In any case, the symbolic separation of the private and public sphere is a cultural 
norm, and the limit between them seems to have absolute validity for any society.13 
We can delineate three main changes that facilitated the growing prevalence of 
scandals in postwar Japan same as in the West:  
                                                   
13 What is conventionally defined as private and public varies from one historical period 
to another, and from one culture to another. For instance, the old Greeks distinguished 
between the public (bios politikos) and the private (oikos). The former was a realm of 
freedom for both action, speech and the “space of appearance”, while the latter was born 
out of necessity and needs for (re)producing human life (Arendt 1958; Holldorf 2011). In 
Japan, the notion of public versus private was largely defined under the influence of the 
Confucian ideology, and it was traditionally viewed in terms of broader communities 
(public) versus the narrow selfish interests (private) (Haley 2006). This distinction 
however was not clear, while the cultural norms of reciprocity between political 
authorities and citizens (including the role of gift-giving) were highly valued (Befu 1975; 
Rupp 2003; Chang and Chu 2006). A rather passive nature of the Japanese public sphere 
was a result of specific historical development. Until the end of World War II, the 
Japanese public was always more or less subjugated, based upon the authority of the 
feudal Tokugawa rule (1603-1868). Under Tokugawa, no clear distinction was made 
between public and private. After the Meiji restoration of the emperor system (1868), the 
term “public” (ōyake, or kōkyō) had strong associations with governmental authority (i.e. 
it referred to something given from above). Importantly for scandals, the conception of 
privacy points today more toward interpersonal dignity and respect (e.g. West 2006). The 
bourgeois public sphere in Europe emerged as a space in between the state and the private 
realm, just to be gradually undermined by the orientation toward entertainment and profit 
(Habermas 1989; Thompson 1995). The partial disappearance of public sphere became 
axiomatic for any consideration of 20th century life, while its absence in Japan was tied 
to the existence of the emperor system (Hanada 1997). 
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1. changing technologies: the enhanced visibility increases the likelihood of 
scandals that depend on technologies of recording, processing and transmitting 
information 
2. changing journalism: investigative journalism became accepted part of 
journalistic activity, giving impetus for changes of broader political culture 
including scandals 
3. changing politics: a growing competition among political organizations and the 
decline of class-based ideological politics at the expense of the competitive 
“politics of trust” in which scandal came to represent a credibility test. 
 
Under the influence of these changes, authenticity became an attribute of the visual and 
spectacular (Debord 1967) and social consciousness became “mediated consciousness” 
(Meyrowitz 1986). The newly emerging technology required social elites to learn a new 
audiovisual vocabulary in order to maintain their status (see Corner 2003). In Japan, this 
phenomenon occurred since mid-1950s, when the popular weekly magazines (shūkanshi) 
dominated the media market. The sensationalist articles on corruption and scandal 
became the most important force before the spread of television (Kabashima and 
Broadbent 1986). During the 1960s, the electronic media supplanted the influence of print 
media, and in 1975 the television overtook newspapers as the prime medium for 
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advertising (Gordon 1993). The whole zeitgeist of 1970s was typical of a shift from the 
tumultuous years of economic recovery and social upheaval to consumption and 
commodification (Yoshimi 2009), while the media saturation and the “information 
fetishism” represented a fertile ground for media scandals. Besides, the growing influence 
of the Japanese TV dramatically increased the popularity of the top politicians such as 
Nakasone, Hosokawa, and later Koizumi and Tanaka Makiko, while on the contrary, the 
triumph of presentation over substance was rather detrimental for old-school 
heavyweights such as Miazawa Kiichi or Ozawa Ichirō. 
In both Japan and the West, the third age of political communication (term by 
Blumler and Kavanagh 1999) nurtured the journalists’ focus on dramatic incidents and 
scandals while bringing about a distorted sense to the viewing public. What followed was 
a decline of admiration as social emotion (Wetherell 2010) and radical decrease of public 
trust in politicians and institutions (Wuthnow 2004). The positive coverage of presidential 
aspirants slumped, sex scandals became naturalized, and negative gossip about political 
elites has increased (Edelman 1977; Achter 2000; Thompson 2005; Bennett 2007; Adut 
2008; Bösch 2011). 
The technological transformation media modernity in 20th century Japan started 
at approximately the same time. As early as in 1950, the Tōkyō Tsūshin Kōgyō (later 
known as Sony) constructed the first tape recorder, and within five years the company 
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introduced the first compact transistor radio. In 1951, the new commercial radio stations 
were established in Tokyo and Osaka, in 1952 the first tabloid weeklies (Shūkan Sankei 
and Shūkan Yomiuri) were published, and in 1953 the NHK and the commercial NTV 
started its first television broadcast. In 1959, the tabloid industry was booming with the 
new titles Shūkan Bunshun, Shūkan Gendai, Shūkan Kōron, Shūkan Heibon, and in the 
same year the first televised media event took place (the wedding ceremony of Prince 
Akihito and Shōda Michiko). In 1960, the public TV channel NHK aired the first televised 
political debate in Japan, being watched by around twenty million viewers. Only between 
1952 and 1976 the circulation of daily newspapers almost doubled, while the households 
with TV rose dramatically from 1.425 in 1952 to over 27 million in 1976 (Kabashima and 
Broadbent 1986). 
The negative consequences of these transformations soon emerged in Japan. Since 
1960s, the Japanese public witnessed an increase in the media’s invasion of privacy and 
defamation (Asano 2004), while frequent pollution scandals had become foci of citizens’ 
protest movements (Gordon 1993; Broadbent 1998). In 1970, television played a key role 
in the Lockheed scandal, while the newspapers became obsessed with the phenomenon 
of “money politics” (kinken seiji) following the corruption of Kakuei Tanaka. In 1970s 
and 1980s, the Japanese media were drawn to commoners, focusing on their individual 
crimes in a sensational way: they were often targeting suspects and their families before 
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the beginning of their official trial, while the assumption of innocence until proven guilty 
was rarely practiced by them. Throughout the 1980s, the main role of the public 
broadcaster NHK was to legitimize the LDP’s hold on power by portraying the 
government as a competent caretaker of the Japanese public (Krauss 2000). This 
hegemony however became weakened by the increase in tabloids’ investigative reporting 
since late 1980s. Especially the Miura scandal from 1984 (discovered by Shūkan 
Bunshun) and the Recruit scandal from 1988 (uncovered by the local branch of Asahi 
Shinbun) became a commercial threat to other mainstream media outlets since the outside 
media that triggered these scandals were now drawing advertisers away from the inside 
media. In the meantime, the private television stations started broadcasting more politics 
on infotainment-oriented soft-news shows in order to catch up with the new wave of 
sensationalism and scandal (see Taniguchi 2007; Kabashima and Steel 2010). Throughout 
the 1990s, frequent corruption cases were scrutinized from within the discourse of “tele-
politics”: the relaxed-style and infotainment-oriented coverage of sensitive issues was 
practiced especially by the TV Asahi’s news program News Station (aired since 1985 and 
replaced by Hōdō Station in 2004). This “quiet revolution” in press relations, including 
the shift from print news to television, was further facilitated by the Prime Minister 
Koizumi who was well known for preferring smaller news outlets. Ever since Koizumi 
took power in 2001, the esteemed Yomiuri Shinbun became more vulnerable toward the 
52 
commercial TV stations and the scandal-hungry weeklies. Another revolution in 
information exposure (jōhō kōkai) occurred when the DPJ won the elections in 2009 and 
allowed the journalists from weeklies and the foreign press to attend their press 
conferences. This however changed with the return of the LDP in 2012, weakening the 
role of the media as a media watchdog.    
While approaching the new millennium, both Japan and the West experienced an 
advent of the new media, which once again changed the rules of scandal. Firstly, the 
mainstream news outlets gradually ceased to serve as the exclusive gatekeepers of 
information. Secondly, the mediated visibility of late modernity introduced computer-
mediated interaction along with new modes of surveillance. The realm of politics and 
entertainment was transformed into a glass house, while the new technologies contributed 
to a situation where the intimate processes of our life become virtual feeding ground for 
the media. In terms of surveillance, the old notion of panopticism (the few observe the 
many), which was originally outlined by Bentham and discussed by Foucault, became 
challenged by synopticism (the many observe the few) whereby the public can now 
record/report sensitive moments that would otherwise go unnoticed.14  
                                                   
14  Synopticism was enabled by the latest technology of communication (miniature 
recording devices, handheld cameras, satellite relay systems and ubiquitous high-speed 
internet, digitized CCTV systems connected with computer databases), and by the 
technological ease of producing evidence (including recent infiltration of small media 
into nationwide channels). Moreover, the contents of symbolic exchange can be now 
preserved in a durable fashion (e.g. by using digital storage systems), so that many past 
transgressions can be retrospectively recalled through the process of spotlighting (Liebes 
and Blum-Kulka 2004). Some scholars exalt the emancipatory potential of the new media, 
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Apart from the technological transformations, we register a growing trend 
toward an increasing media self-censorship in Japan. This crisis in media democracy is 
deepening especially during the second tenure of the Prime Minister Abe Shinzō (2012-
present), and became characterized by Momii Katsuto (the director-general of NHK) who 
became infamous for his remark that NHK cannot say “left” when the government is 
saying “right”. In the course of 2016, Japan dropped to number 72 in the World Press 
Freedom Index (conducted by Reporters without borders), while David Kaye (UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression) reported in the same year that the independence of Japanese press faces 
serious threats, mainly related to jeopardizing journalistic objectivity and ignoring 
whistleblower protection. Needless to say, these political developments can influence the 
exposure of power scandals and the nature of their mediation. 
In this chapter, I conducted a brief diachronic analysis of scandal, and 
commented on scandal’s etymological roots and transformations on the backdrop of 
mediated visibility. Scandal in its original meaning already contained its basic motive, i.e. 
                                                   
or celebrate internet as a decentralized, “anarchic” place, however the cyberspace is 
equally the cardinal site of the “carnival of crime” (term by Jewkes 2011). Consider the 
Japanese ultra-right-wing activists that use the new media and spread their beliefs 
effectively via internet (the so-called netto uyoku). Moreover, the means of surveillance 
are in Japan often used to monitor consumption patterns in order to put together detailed 
consumer profiles, and the disclosure of buying/selling personal data is usually 
surrounded by massive publicity in Japan (e.g. the 2003 Lawson data leak, the 2004 
Softbank data leak, or the 2014 Benesse data leak scandal).  
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the transgression of moral codes and eventual damage to the identity of a community. It 
pointed to a “fall from grace” which was condemned as serious deviance from what is in 
given society viewed as sacred. However, the secular base of scandal, and its religious 
(biblical) version cannot fully serve as the basis for understanding contemporary media 
scandals in Japan. Besides, it was the transformation in technology, politics, and 
journalism, which became axiomatic for any consideration of 20th century life, and which 
influenced the way scandals are mediated today. Furthermore, in 21st century, the changes 
in mediated visibility due to the emergence of new media made scandal a fixture in global 
media agenda. Needless to say, this visibility will always be a double-edged sword: on 
the one hand, the elites can better engineer their backstage, but on the other hand they are 
drawn into a space where they are likely to be caught in the web of public scrutiny. To 
borrow from Thompson: those who live by the media are most likely to die by the media. 
 
1.2. Contemporary Uses of Scandal Terminology  
 
In its present form, the semantic core of the term “scandalous” still relates to deviating 
from a certain norm (i.e. “scandalous” can be synonymous with “transgressive” or 
“deviate”). “Transgression” or “wrongdoing” is however not fully equivalent to scandal 
– it is the revelation that elevates a certain transgressive occurrence into a media event. 
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Generally speaking, the betrayal of both personal and social trust is similarly “scandalous” 
since they trigger moral indignation. The betrayal of personal trust, existing in principle 
only in private communication, can develop from “gossip”, “hearsay” and “rumor”, while 
a serious public scandal (financial, sexual, power-related) usually emerges from the latter 
(i.e. betrayal of social trust). 
The semantic meaning of scandal is not fixed. In its normative sense, the term is 
usually connected with a certain disgraceful situation or event, but scandal also points to 
original transgression, and to negative public backlash which follows. In a similar vein, 
the meaning of corruption is seen as in the process of being revealed rather than as a fixed 
truth (Heidenheimer 1978). Being directly related to scandal, corruption points to abuse 
of public office for private gains, and it may give rise to a power scandal. We can roughly 
distinguish between individual/personal corruption and a “systemic corruption”. These 
categories may become confused since in scandal a system failure becomes in principle 
attributed to individual transgressor. At any rate, scandals that indicate the system failure 
are expressed by adjectives such as “organizational”, “structural”, “institutional”, or 
“official” corruption. 
The deliberate acts of surveillance, wiretapping and whistleblowing might be 
perceived by the offended side as “scandalous” (especially when the activity is employed 
on a continuing basis), but they are just a primary triggering device. Faux pas, gaffes, 
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diatribes, hate speeches and other “talk scandals” (term by Ekstrom and Johansson 2008) 
depend on the social position of the speaker, but they usually do not generate any large-
scale scandal, and the eventual outcry can be subdued either by ignoring the accusation 
or by a swift official apology. 
The expressions “affair”, “case”, “controversy”, and names with the suffix “-
gate” usually appear in political/government corruption or in sex/infidelity scandals, and 
they are used interchangeably (e.g. the Lewinsky-Clinton affair, or Monicagate). 
Furthermore, the label “affair” indicates that some scandal has transformed reality into 
intrigue while generating opposed entities and reversing the accusation process (e.g. 
Boltanski 2004; Blic and Lemieux 2005). 
As “social problems” can be described those non-normative practices that are 
perceived as an ongoing condition (e.g. ijime, prostitution, human trafficking, illegal 
workers or child pornography). If the media bring forth some of these issues, they can 
gain a certain scandalous potential (see Ito 2006). On the other hand, the culturally 
determined sensitive “controversial issues” (e.g. Japanese politicians’ visit to Yasukuni 
shrine) may become a topic of discussion, but as “high-order events” they will hardly 
crystalize into a proper scandal despite the criticism from abroad. 
The Japanese media dedicate a lot of time and space to various incidents (jiken), 
accidents (jiko) and other “problems” (mondai) that can stay on front pages for weeks to 
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months’ time. The western media draw the readers’ attention by using reinforcing 
headlines such as “shock” or “sensation”, but the Japanese headlines related to a certain 
moral disturbance are usually less dramatic. Furthermore, despite the frequent use of 
foreign words in Japan, the term sukyandaru (“scandal”) is rare in Japanese media, and 
so is the old Japanese term shūbun. The tabloids and television channels publish goshippu, 
uwasa, fūhyō or denbun (gossip, rumor, talk, or hearsay). When reporting on certain skūpu 
or tokudane (scoop, newsbeat) the Japanese media use a rich variety of somewhat vague 
expressions such as wairo, shūwai, or gigoku (bribery), funshoku (embellishment), fushōji 
(disgraceful matter), oshoku or fuhai (corruption) or giwaku (suspicion). In Japanese 
celebrity scandals, the terms furin (adultery), uwaki (cheating) and kakuseizai (stimulants) 
come to the fore as newsworthy vices. In order to point at larger social issues related to 
corruption, the media utilize less straightforward terms such as yarase or netsuzō (hoax), 
kōzō oshoku (structural corruption), fusei kōi (unfair practice), fusei keiri (illicit 
accounting), funshoku kessan (creative accounting) or generally kinken seiji (money 
politics). The money politics can get further divided in media coverage into kinmyaku 
(money connections), jinmyaku (personal connections), or uragane (slush funds). If these 
connections are disclosed publicly, they may lead to sōdō (disturbance) or ōsawagi 
(uproar) in society. Some minor scandals are related to shitsugen, futekisetsu hatsugen, 
bōgen, yaji (gaffe, slip of tongue), and sabetsu sendō hyōgen or hēto supīchi 
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(inappropriate utterance, hate speech).  
When we look at the Japanese expressions related to scandal, we may notice a 
certain linguistic idiosyncrasy. The celebrity scandals are abundant in strong moralizing 
expressions, but political/corporate corruption is often referred to by less pejorative, 
vague terms. This points to institutional attempts to detach pejorative labels from certain 
transgressive/corruptive practices, and to re-shift scandalicity away from real structural 
issues to human-interest stories. Furthermore, it can be seen as part of practicing linguistic 
vagueness which lies in modifying negative terms into milder ones (see section IV, 
chapter 5). Besides, similar scandals offer different vocabulary depending on the media 
bias: what is dealt with as “disturbance” in the mainstream media can be seen as “fiasco” 
by the foreign media, but a grave “scandal” in tabloids and weblogs (this was e.g. the case 
of the 2015 Olympic logo scandal coverage). 
 
1.3. Alternative Typology of Scandal Theory 
 
While following King (1985), scandal researchers distinguished between sexual, financial, 
and power scandals. Today, it is problematic to force the complex phenomenon of scandal 
into such framework, with Japan showing much wider variety of scandal types (especially 
with celebrity scandals surpassing others in relevance for the public). For my own 
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theoretical purposes, I find it useful to categorize the contemporary scandal theory via 
scandal as (1) media construct, (2) public reaction, and (3) a power tool:  
 
(1) the role of the media (mediacentric perspective): scandalous behavior is a behavior 
that opposes ethical norms of a society/community (Merry 1984; King 1985). More 
importantly, scandal is an event in which the public revelation of an alleged private breach 
of law or norm results in social disapproval or debate, followed by reputational damage. 
It is however always the case that we have “politics of scandal” only because the media 
put before us the “scandal of politics” (Schudson 2004). Related to this, the dominant 
perspective of scandal research points to media and journalism as the main sources of 
scandal. While being narrated by the media, scandals occur when private acts that 
disgrace or offend the dominant morality of a social community are made public, 
producing a range of effects (e.g. Lull and Hinerman 1997).  
As I indicated above, development of investigative journalism has played an 
essential role in constituting what scandal looks like today. The mediacentric perspective 
indicates that real scandal does not begin with the transgression itself, but with the 
activities through which the transgression is made public, and depending on the normative 
news values (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Watson 2007). The 
news values that determine a media scandal are constituted by these attributes: 
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- threshold and magnitude (i.e. a certain disturbance needs impact to become a 
scandal) 
- continuity (i.e. once scandal is defined as news, it usually returns in a follow-up) 
- reference to something controversial, deviant and negative (i.e. the “bad news”)  
- oddity (i.e. unusual events that happen without warning) 
- reference to human-interest aspects of scandal 
- reference to power elites and celebrities 
 
(2) the role of the public (sociocentric perspective): according to the sociocentric 
perspective, the proliferation of scandal requires studying the conditions for publicity 
rather than the conditions for corruption or its mediation. Scandals are played out in front 
of a public in order to acquire their meaning, and it does not matter whether a 
transgression is real or just an accusation. What matters is the public articulation of an 
opprobrious discourse (Thompson 2000; Tumber and Waisbord 2004a; Adut 2008). In 
such understanding, scandals are synonymous with negative public reaction against 
deviation (Jimenez 2004). Scandal, understood here as public outrage, lies in the fact that 
it is unacceptable for the public to accept that the deviance of an individual may reflect 
the deviance of the society as a whole (Sherman 1978). Moreover, if we discuss the role 
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of public opinion, we must bear in mind that it stands for a mere statistical abstraction, or, 
as Ehrat puts it, it is “what all think that All think (Ehrat 2011, ix, emphasis retained). 
Furthermore, Ari Adut (2008) defines scandal as an event that starts with the publication 
of a certain transgression to a negatively oriented audience, and it lasts as long as there is 
a sustained public interest in it. Also, focusing on the role of the public, Johannes Ehrat 
(2011) claims that scandal is a meaning type generated by public opinion as a necessary 
by-product. While stressing that scandal is a crisis communication pattern, Esser and 
Hartung (2004, 1041) define scandal as “…intense public communication about a real or 
imagined defect that is by consensus condemned, and that meets universal indignation or 
outrage”. Sherman (1978) also understands scandal as a social reaction to a violation of 
socially invested trust in an institution or role, and in the same vein, Jimenez defines 
political scandal as “…public opinion reaction against a political agent regarded 
accountable for certain behavior that is perceived as an abuse of trust on which that 
agent’s authority rests” (Jimenez 2004, 1100). In other words, the public must negatively 
react to accusations, but it is equally necessary to publicly express this disapproval. At 
any rate, the synonym of scandal is in this perspective a negative public opinion against 
a behavior that was widely considered deviant. Nonetheless, this opinion is largely 
constructed and capable to create an impression that everybody feels the same. The 
externality of public opinion does in fact not really exist, and politicians act only as-if 
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they were attentive to a public opinion (Boltanski 2004). While being based on the 
feelings of betrayal of social trust, the negative impact on the public lies either in 
generating moral indignation (Boltanski 2004), or in reaffirming political cynicism 
(Schudson 2004). 
 
(3) the role of power struggles (functionalist/hegemonic perspective): basic conditions 
upon which a successful scandal can be generated, lie fundamentally in having access to 
channels of publicity. In other words, it is indispensable to secure the best grounds for a 
negative public reaction, and the access to those channels can become a subject of the 
power struggle. Despite the aforementioned role of the public, scandal is seldom deployed 
for purely civic purposes. On the contrary, publicity can be used as an effective weapon 
in social, political and artistic conflict, with elite actors at times strategically manipulating 
scandals. The power-struggle orientation in scandology focuses on multidimensional 
social resources and the contest over them – it understands scandal as a struggle over 
symbolic power in which reputation and trust are at stake (e.g. Thompson 2000). Scandals 
then function as relations of the power holder to the powerless (Tumber and Waisbord 
2004) and struggles over representation and framing (Alexander 2011). They become 
instruments of power, occurring when an act is journalistically constructed and subjected 
to a sanctioning judgement (Molotch and Lester 1974; Ehrat 2011). In the same vein, 
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Sighard Neckel understands political scandal as a mechanism of informal social control 
interlinking the social relationships of competing power groups in a way that it serves the 
function of moral regulation of politics (Neckel 2005). To sum up, scandals contribute to 
maintaining the symbolic reproduction of the ruling power conditions, and they can be 
understood as side-effects of the symbolic rules of political representation. 
 
1.4. Defining Ideal-type Media Scandal 
 
Not every scandal exists in its pure form. The aforementioned theorists usually deal with 
an ideal-type, large-scale, high-profile media scandal in which the majority of non-
participants are alarmed by certain publicized transgression/corruption for a protracted 
period. It is important to define an ideal-type scandal in order to stress some elements of 
scandal that are common to most cases of the phenomenon. By doing so, we can further 
distinguish between a “successful” and “failed” scandal. Some scandals do not catch up, 
or they fail to get magnified by the mainstream media. Regarding the processuality of an 
ideal-type scandal, we recognize five basic stages: 
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1. transgression (departure from everydayness)  
2. secrecy (followed by motivated disclosure) 
3. disapproval (authorities/media → public) 
4. damage (individual and/or institutional) 
5. stabilization (return to everydayness). 
 
This processuality indicates that there are multiple necessary preconditions for a scandal 
to occur. Firstly, there must exist a collective definition of an act/behavior as 
“transgressive”. If the social consensus is not sufficient, the act could not be considered 
as deviant and “polluting”. Secondly, transgression must be individualized via at least one 
person (alleged culprit, scapegoat). Thirdly, there must be certain negative collective 
response toward the transgressor (i.e. the revealed transgression must be denounced by 
the public and the authorities). To sum up, I suggest the following definition of an ideal-
type media scandal: 
 A transgression/corruption is disclosed (via whistleblowing), attributed to at least one 
individual (real or alleged) who belongs to some elite circle (political, cultural, 
corporate), is framed by the media (guilt frame or excuse frame) and eventually 
denounced by the public (leading to individual sanctions or institutional consequences).  
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Figure 1. The basic structure of a scandal flow (ideal-type). 
Source: Author  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
2. LOCATING TRANSGRESSION AND SCANDAL IN SOCIAL COLLECTIVITY 
 
2.1. Maintaining the Sacredness of Social Collectivity  
 
Scandals are integral for any social collectivity (including the traditional gemeinschaft 
and its Japanese equivalent kyōdōtai). They confirm the rule and strengthen social 
integration by the social group accepting them, and by punishing the those do not follow 
the rule. The logic behind transgressions is in social practice orientated toward the 
collective. Scandals would hardly exist without shared beliefs, conventions, and the 
control mechanisms that validate them.15  
The basic form of scandal as conflict-resolution pattern seems to be universal for 
any social collectivity. After all, the fundamental tendency to hold the presence of others 
as the necessity of man is found practically everywhere. Our humanity and sociality are 
intertwined, which is also why Berger and Luckmann (1966) insisted that Homo sapiens 
                                                   
15  In non-democratic, authoritarian states, the media are explicitly subordinated to 
various forms of state power, so that scandals will take on a different shape. Furthermore, 
in totalitarian states the media events are usually imposed and monologic, while it is the 
public itself (not the power elites) that constitutes the main spectacle (Dayan and Katz 
1988). The non-democratic media are based on censorship, repression, and manipulation 
of polls, while the antidemocratic politicians use their power to prevent opinion of civil 
society from being separated from the state (Neckel 2005; Alexander 2006c). In other 
words, there is little space for scandals and other “bad news” in totalitarian states. 
Nonetheless, these regimes do investigate compromising facts about their enemies, which 
can be used as a “scandal threat” (e.g. Ehrat 2008). Conversely, scandals would be 
avoided altogether in perfectly transparent societies, or in societies that became 
completely demoralized (Garfinkel 1956; Marciani and Moureau 2013). 
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is always in the same measure Homo socius with its natural inclination to empathy, 
cooperation and social affiliation (e.g. Latour 2005; Lakoff 2009; Sapolsky 2013). 
Nonetheless, the propensity for corruption, greed and gossip are built into our genetic 
heritage as well (e.g. Gluckman 1963; Nietzsche 1966; Sloterdijk 2010). Besides, many 
classical political scientists (e.g. Montesquieu, Rousseau, or Hobbes) stressed that any 
social collectivity hardly survives unless it solves the problem of linking individuals to a 
broader society, notwithstanding the (originally Aristotelian) skepticism toward any 
social togetherness which renders individuals as mere discursive constructs that identify 
themselves by superimposed worldviews and imitated desires (Wittgenstein 1953; Sartre 
1956; Girard 1996).  
Maintaining social collectivity is a double-edged sword. While circumscribing 
our natural liberties, we sacrifice our individual freedom in the name of the common good 
while being made to endorse core ideological values. Furthermore, our disciplined selves 
easily become a part of ornamental culture (term by Susan Faludi), which encourages 
people to play almost no functional roles at the expense of only decorative, consumer 
roles. Under these hegemonic forces, the dictum of collective responsibility is being built 
into a logical grammar of our moral categories (Smith 2008). In order to preserve our 
personal security and individual rights, we subordinate ourselves to collectivity through 
a social contract (Hobbes 1960; Rousseau 1994). This contract is being grounded on a 
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“common sense”, it assures our social liberties, and it is structured by various “norms of 
reciprocity” (term by Gouldner 1960). On a political level, this bond involves a covenant 
between the governing and the governed, and it is based on social trust. The exposed 
deviances do not necessarily damage the social system in question, however the 
transgressor is judged as betraying social trust when violating the norms of reciprocity 
between the governing and the governed.16 
In order avoid moral chaos, a society sets up a system of laws and moral 
prohibitions. If this symbolic system starts disintegrating, the society becomes “unhealthy” 
and begins to show signs of breakdown: the rejection of imposed rituals, and the 
destruction of symbols associated with them are typical elements in the collapse of social 
orders (e.g. Collins 2004). Thus, the “sacred” spirit of society (or the conscience 
collective) must be stored in our cognitive map (or collective unconscious). Only with 
such “mental equipment” – which in turn informs our beliefs, conventions, and social 
rituals – we both maintain and represent en masse the social collectivity we claim to 
                                                   
16 Social trust is an aspect of the normative system that makes up the social structure in 
which we live (Wuthnow 2004). On macrosocial level, trust is an important lubricant of 
a social system (e.g. Arrow 1974), while a sovereign is needed to create such “situation 
of trust” where people can rely on the promises they make to each other (Hobbes 1960). 
On microsocial level, social trust is a part of a rational actor’s effort to calculate the costs 
and benefits of entering a specified relationship with another person (Wuthnow 2004). In 
a high-trust society like Japan, where mutual basic trust is central to Japanese morality 
(e.g. Yamamoto 1990) loyalties are likely to facilitate trust. On the one hand, damaging 
social trust leads in Japan to dire consequences, but on the other hand, the conservative 
public holds that respect and trust should be automatically passed over to people and 
groups of a certain elite rank despite their corruption (see below). 
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belong to (Durkheim 1915; Lipmann 1922). Needless to say, some of the attributes are 
hegemonic in their nature: they are being legitimized and maintained without direct 
coercion and at the level of various sets of ideologies without us clearly noticing it. These 
ideological values inform societal norms (both formal/explicit regulations, and 
informal/unconscious understandings), and these norms become in turn authentic 
projections of the general will (Hobbes 1960; Rousseau 1994). Only this makes us 
morally responsible persons capable of feelings of guilt, bad consciousness, and 
resentment (Nietzsche 1966; Freud 2003; Boltanski 2004).  
Despite all this socioethical engineering, conflicts and crises occasionally 
surface within the apparent consensus. This is however nothing surprising because some 
degree of conflictuality is always present: any deviation from norms must be understood 
as a “normal phenomenon” and an inevitable condition in any society (Durkheim 1982). 
Nonetheless, these transgressive eruptions do offend the “sacred center” of the conscience 
collective (Alexander 1988) while generating “moral disturbances” in society, politics, or 
art (Adut 2008). First of all, these disturbances are caused by the sheer fact that we live 
in intersections of different norms and discourses as diffused by various institutions. We 
are the members of different social groups at the same time (e.g. family, company, 
political party, university seminar), whose moral expectations always differ. Thus, the 
diverse moral codes passing between groups cannot always lead to a consensus. Secondly, 
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each individual has his/her own particular way of thinking about individual morality 
which is not a fixed entity and can grow contradictory over time. If we apply this to the 
world of governance, we see that the political representatives have to govern their conduct 
and strategies simultaneously as members of their political subfield (i.e. maintaining party 
loyalty and alliances), and the broader political field of citizens or non-professionals. 
Consequently, political scandals indeed render themselves as involving elements of 
hypocrisy, since every political donation bears an element of bribery. Especially in Japan, 
the political corruption became confused by payments of “illegal” gifts to public officials 
and distributing funds under cover of the culturally established and officially prescribed 
custom of gift-giving (Befu 1975; Mitchell 1996; Rupp 2003). The “scandalous” conflict 
between political goals and general norms becomes especially apparent in case of those 
politicians who switch too often between “just politics” and “non-routine politics” 
(Alexander 1988; Thompson 1997; Neckel 2005). Moreover, we shall also consider the 
debilitating side-effects of power-holding, the individual psycho-social weaknesses of 
certain elites, and the unconscious “Dionysian” drive toward transgression of limits 
without considering the impact.17  
                                                   
17  The rich and powerful are often “powerfully reckless” (term by Gibbs 2011), 
shamelessly persisting in defying gossip while continuing to break basic social rules. As 
a matter of fact, they are emblematic of Shakespeare’s Macbeth, who represents corrosive 
psychological effects produced when evil is chosen as a way to fulfil the ambition of 
power. Such elites are pathologically prone to moral hypocrisy, monetary greed being set 
out of control, and ignorance toward contested features of social life. Importantly for 
scandal, this self-assuredness of political power can cast elites careless in moments of 
engaging in certain transgressive conduct (this is especially the case when certain 
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In order to avoid the breakdown of an established collectivity, our individual 
desires (including the Nietzscheian/Freudian desire to transgress) must be curbed by 
authoritative social forces of law and order. These forces in turn generate disciplinary 
emotions of moral indignation (guilt, shame, and fear of getting caught), and they become 
important when discussing the hegemonic force of media scandal (see below). 
Unfortunately, we usually notice these forces only after going “against the stream” (unless 
the transgression is a form of perversion). Once the deviance from norm becomes an 
offence to the sentiment of the collectivity per se (i.e. the imaginary we, or wareware), 
the disapproving reaction to scandal occurs as-if spontaneously.   
Some philosophers of human nature insist that people are inherently 
aggressive/transgressive, but I believe that this radical notion applies less to commoners 
and more to the powerholders.18 In any case, the state, family, community – and the 
                                                   
transgression is performed on a continuing basis). This becomes especially evident in 
embezzlement scandals, and in cases where power elites (presidents, Prime Ministers, 
chairmen, CEOs) send themselves over the top with alcohol, drugs, infidelity or gambling. 
For instance, the KDD president Itano Manabu was in 1979 found guilty of embezzlement 
based on extensive personal use of golf clubs and artwork purchased by the company. 
Furthermore, the Mitsukoshi president Okada Shigeru was in 1982 found guilty of 
directing extraordinarily high commissions to a company run by his lover, while the 
former Tokyo Governor Matsuzoe Yōichi was discredited by using political funds for 
private purposes. In a similar vein, the Italian media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi and the 
French politician Dominique Strauss-Kahn both discredited their career because of their 
extravagant sex scandals. In this regard, Ruth Miller echoed the thought of Pier Paolo 
Pasolini when insisting that the “pornographic force” of political corruption is what 
makes transgressions possible (Miller 2008).    
18 Apart from the drive of self-preservation (Nietzsche), or the survival of the fittest 
(Darwin), Sigmund Freud (2003) discussed the mankind’s innate inclination to 
aggression and non-cooperative principles at uncivilized level. Thomas Hobbes even built 
his political theory on our chronic anxiety and fear of violent death in a “wolf-like” world. 
Even Aristotle warned us that “…appetite is like a wild beast, and passion perverts rulers 
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media as “social guardians” – present the modern civilizing forces. Similar as the 
Freudian superego, these forces stand for anything what issues commands: parents, 
teachers, laws, class prejudices, public opinions (Nietzsche 1966). On the other hand, 
however, many social theorists insist that conflict enhances a group’s “consciousness of 
kind” (Simmel) while reviving its self-image (Turner) in a society that “needs” friction to 
work as a dynamic social system (Durkheim). In such functionalist logic law needs crime, 
religion needs sin, and people “need” scandal. I would like to offer here a more flexible 
interpretation of this socioethical conundrum, which might shed some light on the power-
related scandals in Japan and elsewhere: the elite institutions and political rulers are a sort 
of evil-but-necessary entities that only reflect the inevitable moral imperfection of 
democracy (cf. Aristotle’s archaic belief that democracy is yet another “perverted” form 
of governance). Since these institutions are often operated by other “wolf-like” actors just 
like ourselves, the struggles and conflicts will be always recurring as a sort of perpetuum 
mobile. Needless to say, this interpretation lends itself to the controversial claim that 
scandals themselves are not scandalous (see below).   
In this subchapter, I aimed to show that the notion of social collectivity, with all 
its benefits and limitations, maintains and reproduces its sacred social structures through 
institutions, organizations and discourses that frame and regulate social life – importantly 
                                                   
even when they are the best men” (Aristotle 1998, 97).  
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including transgressions and scandals. The existence of these networks of power is 
conditioned by various socially-integrative and hegemonic mediations and other forms of 
social control that induce conformity to social norms. In Japan and other media-saturated 
societies that are simultaneously based on collective imaginations, social codes of 
morality, and cultural myths, the mediated experience of witnessing the elites’ fall from 
grace becomes central – especially, when the mass-media present a certain transgression 
as “everyone’s issue”. In next three subchapters, I touch more closely upon the social and 
sociological meanings of transgression, gossip, and scandal.  
 
2.2. Transgression as Prelude to Scandal 
 
Scandal underlies all kinds of events and processes that are related to transgression. 
Simply put, transgression is any action that can constitute violation of social norms or 
moral codes. Transgression, followed by moral indignation, is a part of social processes, 
and a part of the individual psyche as such (Garfinkel 1956; Jenks 2003).  
In transgression, the agency initiates a transition from one order to the other 
while defying (denying, inverting, “polluting”) the conventional schemata of a structure. 
More importantly, transgression is a “limit experience” which exceeds the borders of 
conventionality but does not destroy them. Thus, rather than undermining conventional 
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morality, transgression “underlines it” in a hegemonic manner (e.g. Bataille 1986; 
Stallybrass and White 1986). This twofold effect of any transgression is crucial for the 
social meaning of scandal: primarily, one violates rules and goes beyond certain limits set 
by commandment, law or convention, and secondarily, one simultaneously announces 
(and thus “praises”) the same commandment, law, or convention. In other words, 
transgression is a component of any rule, and it is confirming limits of normality by 
exceeding and destabilizing them. Besides, transgressions are charged with meanings that 
reflect each society’s background and experience, and therefore they are always based on 
culturally-specific evaluations (i.e., we register certain action/behavior as legitimate and 
normative in one society, but being condemned as scandalous in other culture). 
In neofunctionalist terms, transgressions are complementary to the profane, 
mundane world. Thus, they are judged within the sacred-profane framework of the 
dichotomised moral continua (e.g. social-antisocial, democratic-antidemocratic, sane-
mad, pure-polluted), and if the latter framing prevails, a scandal can be generated via 
negative public backlash. Nowadays, some major transgressions become mediated as 
great media events that allow a new symbolic order in response to contradictions of the 
existing system, eventually initiating institutional reforms or cultural paradigm shifts (e.g. 
Dayan and Katz 1992). Nonetheless, in contrast to purely violent transgressions that are 
based on actual intention to cause harm or damage, scandals are in principle not grounded 
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in subversion or deliberate challenge to the status quo. Exceptions to this rule are the 
conspiracy-motivated political scandals, and artistic scandals that are motivated by one’s 
artistic confession. 
Ordinary citizens who engage in transgressive conduct can also be demonized 
by the media, e.g. by being depicted as “folk devils” (Cohen 2002) or by becoming 
“accidental celebrities” that were accidentally dragged in some “psychodrama” (Lull and 
Hinerman 1997; Marshall 2010). However, it is in principle the “conspicuous elites” and 
other elite representatives whose transgressions become rendered as eminently 
newsworthy. Commoners usually do not become main scandal subjects because they 
usually do not belong to any elite institution, and they do not directly represent/symbolize 
any system or societal structure. Thus, they are not the trustees of public moral standards 
and conventions, and thus their social status does not wield any potential to seriously 
violate social trust. 
 Any limit carries with it an intense relationship with the desire to transgress that 
limit (if only in a form of fantasy that gathers around what is illicit). Especially the art 
scandals indicate that transgressions involve limits while searching to break them. These 
aspects of transgression are essential to modern media culture as a means by which people 
one can re-invent their image or demonstrate their individuality. No matter if they sustain 
or transform any stasis, their manifestation is above all “purposive” (Jenks 2003). For 
76 
instance, as purposively transgressive can be understood those practices that belong to 
liminal zones of culture and thought (e.g. the counter-cultural avant-garde, radical 
political movements, or culture jamming). The “Dionysian” desire to transgress aesthetic 
and moral limits was central to the development of classical and modern art (e.g. 
Nietzsche 1999; Jenks 2003; Adut 2008) and this desire rendered itself as particularly 
purposive in postmodern art, with attempts to break rules and step outside of moral 
conventions while celebrating chaos within the modernity’s quest for order. In Japan, 
same as in the West, we witness an increasing trend of incorporating transgressivity into 
mainstream content, while fictional accounts readily incorporate transgressive anti-heroes 
in order to transform revolt into style and dissatisfaction into a commodity (Prusa 2016a). 
Importantly for this thesis, the identification of transgression is one of the key 
aspects integral to maintaining social order. After all, man adjusts to what he should not; 
he is unable to adjust to what he should (Toomer 1991, XI). In other words, it is through 
the violation of prohibition that the force of this prohibition is fully realized, and the 
structure and coherence of a social system is provided. Moreover, both the general 
principles related to an ideal of conduct, and the social meanings of transgression and 
deviance are always “constructed” – both socially (Berger and Luckman 1966), and 
journalistically (Molotch and Lester 1974). In other words, transgression is not a crime 
per se, but it can become criminalized (i.e. jurally defined as crime), and publicly 
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condemned via mass media channels. To be deviant means that others treat someone like 
he/she is deviant based on our common knowledge related to deviations.19 
 
2.3. Scandal as Sociological Phenomenon 
 
Scandal is fundamentally a form of conflict (contest, confrontation, competition, or crisis). 
For scandalicity to function, at least two ideals must be negatively polarized through 
accusation and defense in order to create an “issue”. Certain ideal purpose of conduct (or 
its interpretation) enters into conflict with another ideal (interpretation), either from 
within the same social collectivity, or from beyond the boundaries of cultures, eventually 
triggering a global/international scandal. Usually, one interpretation of conflict is 
subjective (individual), and the other is institutional (social). In other words, a scandal 
subject becomes sanctioned when certain conduct appears to involve private, “egotistic” 
interests over the “sacred” interests of social collectivity. In politics, the conflict of 
scandal lies in a serious misuse of power and breach of the norm of reciprocity between 
the governing elites and the people who gave them power (Hobbes 1960; Rousseau 1994). 
In Japan, conflict is a complex phenomenon whose cost are rather high in a society that 
                                                   
19 Common knowledge can be defined as a symbolic public arena, where “everyone 
knows that everyone knows that everyone knows” (Gluckman 1963; Meyrowitz 1986; 
Adut 2008). More importantly for our context, it is the public rituals of all sorts that are 
the most effective generators of common knowledge about what is deemed appropriate 
or not in society (Schwe 2001). 
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emphasizes social harmony and conflict avoidance. However, many scandalous affairs 
relate competition between groups of producers, actors, and partial audiences, and the 
form and outcome of scandal is the product of their interactions. The scandal actors 
express opposing social claims to the validity of norms, and instruments of power are 
eventually used in order to defeat opposing forces. That is why in political discourse the 
so-called attack-politics is a powerful tool, and not a mere distraction from the real 
substance of political life.20 
Furthermore, we can argue that scandal always represents a form of struggle. 
Seen from the perspective of the transgressor, it is a struggle for public trust which is a 
key factor for the elites to maintain their face. The success or failure of struggling 
individuals depends on skill and fortune same as on effectively commanding the 
frontstage (Goffman 1959; Alexander 2011). Once entering the media arena, scandal 
becomes a mediatized struggle and a process of cultural, semiotic and linguistic battle 
over meanings (Hall 1997; Bourdieu 1999). This occurs simultaneously within the 
“journalistic field”, where in-group frictions between different bureaus, media producers, 
editors and journalists occur, and within the “mediopolitical field”, which is emblematic 
                                                   
20 In attack-politics, scandal becomes a political tool on the backdrop of internal struggles 
between powerful groups, factions, and individuals. Consequently, a certain damning 
evidence surfaces while some politicians threaten their suspect opponents with media 
exposure of their transgression. Any scandal provides opposition lawmakers with 
ammunition during the Diet session: calls for investigation by ethics committees (in order 
to determine whether any violation of rules occurred) and calls for resignation made 
during parliamentary discussions are the main strategies of attack-politics. 
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of out-group frictions between the media and their sources, and between the competing 
journals and papers. 
Scandal-as-struggle is logically tied to an understanding the phenomenon as 
strategy. The mediated visibility (which can cause a character failing of one’s opponent) 
became a potent weapon in the struggle for political advantage, while the cumulative 
effect of scandal was incorporated into the electoral style in Japan and elsewhere. Leaking 
a damaging information has become the most powerful weapon for politics in society 
(Castells 2009). Needless to say, without oppositional and factional pressure, many 
corruption cases would remain unnoticed. 
Same as gossip, scandal can be approached from a functionalist/hegemonic 
perspective, i.e. as a tool for maintaining and re-establishing the morale of the community. 
In this understanding, scandals present a form of coercive social pressure which lies in 
encouraging the spirit of “togetherness” via sanctioning antisocial behavior. While 
promoting social cohesion and supporting the status quo, such coercion is conceived of 
as “integrative” since certain media events can evoke renewal of loyalty to the society 
with its legitimate authority (Dayan and Katz 1992; Couldry 2003). In such cases, a 
“successful”, ideal-type scandal is conceived of as a statement of the norm (i.e. a 
declaration of what is considered by the members of a society to be good and proper), and 
a lesson that contributes to the improvement of the functioning of the society (e.g. Blic 
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and Lemieux 2005; Newton 2006; Marciano and Moureau 2013). Thus, scandal serves as 
a sign that moral community needs to be restored while learning a lesson form it. This 
understanding resonates with those conflict theorists that argue that inter-group conflicts 
are “beneficent” since they stand for safety valves that restore the integrative core and 
solidify groups (e.g. Simmel 1955). Nonetheless, every scandal always simultaneously 
represents a “latent dysfunction” (Merton 1968): it is an unanticipated and unintended 
temporary disruption of order and stability, with both the “manifest function” (proving 
that the supervisory organs of the state and the media-watchdogs are working) and the 
“latent function” (triggering scandal fatigue and political cynicism among the public.  
Most importantly for this thesis, scandal can be approached from within the 
neofunctionalist perspective as social drama and ritual. Scandals are in this light 
approached as degradation ceremonies and media-sponsored rituals cast into a pattern 
that is reproduced, institutionalized, maintained and understood as such. The section III 
of this thesis will develop the argument of media scandal as social ritual, but before that, 
it is important to theorize scandal as media text.   
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3. THEORIZING SCANDAL AS TEXT 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of those theoretical perspectives 
that help to illuminate the characteristics of scandal as media text. In this orientation, 
which brings together theoretical insights from various disciplines, media scandal will be 
analysed as a structured and framed narrative, and a more or less spectacular pseudo-
event. As the illustration below indicates, these features of media scandal are overlapping 
and they do not exclude themselves. 
 
Figure 2. The main features of scandal as media text. 
Source: Author 
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3.1. Media Scandal as Narrative  
 
Formally speaking, narratives are discursive accounts of important factual or fictitious 
events and experiences of humanity. They help to organize our world and shape both 
our lived and mediated reality. According to William Labov (1999), narrative is a 
method of recapitulating experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the 
sequence of actual events from the past. We usually construct narrative structures in a 
temporal order, and in verbal, musical, and pictorial forms (Berger 1997; Jaworsky and 
Coupland 1999). These structures are essentially stories “about people” (or about types 
of people) that are co-constituted by cultural prototypes, images, and icons, and that have 
meaning for all those who live, create, or interpret them (Lipmann 1922; Fisher 1984; 
Lakoff 2009). 
Narration is the quintessential form of customary knowledge. It aims to civilize, 
educate and develop (Lyotard 1984), and in order to maintain our social reality and avoid 
the chaotic, we “tell stories about ourselves to ourselves” (Geertz 1973). With the outset 
of media modernity, it is mainly through the mass media of communication that society 
“talks to itself” (Kabashima and Broadbent 1986; Thompson 1995). At any rate, the 
fundamental means for any communicative and reflexive endeavour is that of a 
structured and framed narrative. 
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The narrative turn in social sciences posits that man is essentially a “story-telling 
animal” (term by MacIntyre 1981). In this light, all sorts of everyday language come in 
a form of a story (including casual communication), and all mediated discourses, where 
“journalists are storytellers” (Barkin 1984) are in principle narrative devices. Narratives 
are embedded in various media contents and literary sources as distinct as Twitter and 
the Bible. Furthermore, no set of legal institutions exists apart from the narratives that 
locate it, while even the scientific discourse (with its paradigm shifts) comes in a 
narrative form. Various traditional ceremonials and rituals also appear in a form of a 
structured narrative, moving from equilibrium to disequilibrium/liminality to 
equilibrium again (see section III). It is the case that through complex cognitive 
processes the human mind tends to construct a coherent story out of any material 
available in order to maintain objective experience. Clarissa Estes aptly described this 
inclination in a psychoanalytical manner: the soul wants stories in order to flood the 
fertile psychic delta (Estes 2004, xxxi-xxxv, original emphasis).21  
In this regard, scandals are no exception. Scandals are media-focused texts that 
find their expression only through being articulated in a narrative mode. In terms of 
                                                   
21 Life itself is structured as a complex macro-narrative, triggered by birth, concluded by 
death, and marked by various rites of passage. Thus, the “accident of birth” can be 
understood as a moment where equilibrium is disrupted whereby initiating the narrative 
of life, only to be later re-established by the “catastrophe of death”. Life and death are 
correlates that neutralize and cancel each other out (Schopenhauer 1993), while the 
narrative of life is a full circle “…from the tomb of the womb to the womb of the tomb.” 
(Campbell 2004, 12). 
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narrativity, the linear ordering of scandal parallels with the conventional narrative order, 
steering toward some “truth”, which is essentially deemed a result which only appears at 
the end of the scandal drama. The basic narrative structure of scandal can be directly 
linked to Aristotle’s Poetics (2006), where every effective plotting that hopes to affect the 
audience demands a narrative with beginning, middle, and end. The same narrative 
structures keep recurring from scandal to scandal, being constituted by opening 
(disclosure of transgression), the middle (scandal proper), and closing (apologies, 
damages). Scandals then ideally progress from crisis to a resolution that concludes the 
sequence of events. In terms of their narrative function, scandals came to be perceived as 
fairy tales for adults (Burkhardt 2011), whose grammar is based on the principles of folk 
tales (Dayan and Katz 1988). Moreover, the media rhetoric in scandal can be paralleled 
to that of the Greek tragedy (Ruigrok 2007), or even a detective novel (Boltanski 2004) 
which follows the transition from indignation to denunciation based on a clash between 
good and evil. 
Every effective scandal story is to be persuasive, dynamic and prominent. The 
absence of a progressive narration or narrative incoherence can be confusing, hindering 
the audiences their appropriate responses, eventually withdrawing their involvement 
which is essential for any media event. Furthermore, in order to be effective, the scandal 
narrative must imply a certain amount of “moral agonism”, which hinges on a conflict of 
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good against evil (Alexander 2006a). The central point of the narrative lies in a plot, or a 
“complicating action” (transgression of rules or conventions), which sets a climate of 
suspicion. Thus, scandal is in principle a morality tale, constructed primarily for 
condemnation purposes. It claims to possess knowledge of “doing the right thing” while 
aiming to mandate others to sanction in the context of the journalistically constructed 
public opinion tribunal (Molotch and Lester 1974; Ehrat 2011). In other words, the main 
teleological purpose of scandal is to narrate for sanctioning, and if this teleology fails, the 
entire story will collapse and give way to a different story. 
Throughout political histories, power holders were frequently transforming their 
interest conflicts into dramatic performances, portraying themselves in simplified 
narratives as protagonists, and casting their opponents as antagonists. The mediated 
politics today still draws upon similar dramatic tropes: scandals as morality tales have 
their actor-categories: protagonists (“heroes”), antagonists (“villains”) and victims. Those 
who represent heroes fight for a “good cause” (i.e. the sacred, the right, and the moral of 
a collectivity). The so-called villains (symbolic transgressors and legal rule violators) 
restrict them while representing danger for the social system. Finally, the victims are in 
scandal usually citizens to be saved.22 
                                                   
22 The public is perceived as victim especially when the citizens/consumers are directly 
affected (e.g. in cases of food/safety scandals). Although Japanese executives and 
officials often proclaim that their public enterprise is in the “public interest”, it is in 
principle the shareholders, industries, and advertisers they feel primarily responsible to. 
Thus, in corruption cases, the victimized outsiders are usually the taxpayers, in food 
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Scandals are construed as morality tales with heterogenous actor-categories:   
 
- the media are the narrators (i.e. storytellers) that re-present a transgression 
- the agents of justice (prosecutors, police, jury) are the heroes of morality 
- the main transgressor is the villain (i.e. perpetrator of injustice, defendant) 
- the public (including the loyal fans and voters) is the indirect (mass)victim. 
 
In other words, the news department puts together a minidrama, which is co-constituted 
by the alleged villain (the transgressor), conspicuous heroes (prosecutor, courts, the 
police), indirect victims (commoners, taxpayers) and storytellers (the media) that promise 
investigation as a sort of deus ex machina. Furthermore, scandal narratives are always an 
issue of both performed narrativity, and contextualized morality. In scandal, the actions 
of main actors are subjected to moral evaluation: the “good people” assume the 
protagonist status, while those who appear to pursue consensually condemned causes are 
attributed the antagonist status. Throughout the unfolding of a scandal narrative we are 
expected to identify the goodness and badness whereby “naturally” siding with the 
protagonist and detesting the antagonist. 
                                                   
scandals it is the consumers, and in pharmaceutical scandals, it is the patients. Sadly, in 
Japan the reputation of ministries and the well-being of the clients in industry was often 
said to be more important than the lives of ordinary people (see e.g. Yayama 1990; 
Miyamoto 1996; McCormack 1996; Kerr 2001; Kingston 2004; Murphy 2014).  
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Scandal is an open story with twists and turns, sub-dramas, peripheral stories, 
and competing interpretations. Moreover, the basic narrative is accompanied by the 
event’s textual suburbs: various “secondary texts” (term by Fiske 1989) include 
interviews, publications and documentaries about the transgressor, panel discussions, and 
other texts that usually only reinforce the preferred reading. The scandal narrative can 
also shift its focus away from the key transgressor to other individuals and “pollute” them 
in the so-called snowball effect. This effect becomes significant in Japan, where the group 
traditionally assumes collective responsibility (rentai sekinin) for the wrongdoings of 
each member. Finally, some scandals trigger a political or public debate on some 
originally unrelated “higher grade” issue (this was the case of Prime Minister Uno’s 
infidelity scandal in 1989, which brought to the fore some gender-related issues). 
Scandal narratives are intertextual: they are characteristic of a strong interplay 
between other texts, both nonfiction (referring to similar scandal cases) and fiction 
(paralleling popular narratological plots). The way, in which various narratives are 
interwoven throughout the course of social history creates a narrative framework against 
which a scandal will be read, pre-orienting the reader to read new scandals in reference 
to the past ones. This is also why there can hardly be anything like a “new scandal” since 
all its performative utterances depend on iteration of scripted events and background 
structures of meaning in successive performance (Fiske 1989; Giesen 2006). In this light, 
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new scandals are just “replays” of previous scandals, while it is only the scale of 
corruption, and the density of media coverage which differs.23  
The formal climax signals that the basic scandal narrative is to be concluded, and 
it usually comes in a form of a non-routine media event, namely the televised press 
conference (see below). After this point, the media gradually disengage from the event, 
signalling that following events are little important to the concluded narrative. The 
scandal “coda” can be understood as the post-narrative part of the scandal where general 
observations are made, and effects of the event are shown. During this phase, various 
(auto)biographical accounts appear on the market. Big scandals sell books and films, 
continuously generating further commercial profit.24 
                                                   
23 For example, the 1976 Lockheed scandal became the prototype for any future 
political corruption case, while the 1992 Sagawa Kyūbin scandal was just a “follow-up” 
to the 1988 Recruit Scandal) 
24 For instance, Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal inspired many movies including All 
the President’s Men (1976), Nixon (1995) and Frost/Nixon (2008). Among popular 
dramas that were inspired by actual scandal worth mentioning are Eight Men Out (1988), 
dealing with a sports corruption scandal, Scandal (1989), based on the British Profumo 
scandal from 1963, Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (2005) and Inside Job (2010), 
both based on one of the largest corporate scandals in American history. Other recent 
scandal adaptations include The Armstrong Lie (2013) based on the doping scandal of 
Lance Armstrong, Welcome to New York (2014), depicting the sex scandal of Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, and Spotlight (2015) scrutinizing the religious scandal of British Catholic 
Church in 2001. Contrarily to the West, the Japanese media/film production does not 
paint journalists and whistleblowers as “heroes”. A scandalous accusation, made about 
Kōno Yoshiyuki in the aftermath of the 1994 sarin gas attack, was dramatized by Fuji TV 
in 2009, and the Japanese celebrity megascandal of Sakai Noriko from the same year was 
adapted for the screen under the title Setsuna (“The Moment”). Furthermore, a feature-
length documentary about the 2011 Olympus scandal, titled Samurai and Idiots: The 
Olympus Affair, was released in 2014, and another film-documentary on the 2014 
Samuragōchi scandal was released in 2016 under a title Fake by the acclaimed 
documentarist Mori Tatsuya. As for the fictional accounts on scandal, the Japanese 
comedy Shazai no Ōsama (“The King of Apology”) from 2013 ridiculed apologetic 
performances in contemporary Japan, while two classic movies by Kurosawa Akira 
89 
Figure 3. General scandal narrative flow (ideal type). 
Source: Author 
 
Although scandals are generally pre-structured by the teleology of pursuing the truth, 
some scandal narratives die without actual resolution. This can also be a result of shifting 
attention to a new scandal, since the only reality, which can compete with a media event, 
is another media event (Dayan and Katz 1992). By continuously producing new scandal 
narratives in endless succession, the media usually maintain the repetitive cycle of 
perpetual disintegration and renewal in order to secure circulation.  
                                                   
Shūbun (“Scandal”) from 1950 and Warui yatsu hodo yoku nemuru (“The Bad Sleep 
Well”) from 1960 depicted corruption between politicians, bureaucrats, big business, and 
the yakuza in postwar Japan. 
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3.2. Media Scandal as Frame 
 
Scandal narratives are made up of frames – smaller narratives with simple structures that 
tend to organize our experience (Goffman 1974; Entman 1993). The framed narratives 
bind various facts together into a logically conceivable pattern: they create awareness on 
unconscious level while anchoring real occurrences via symbolic coordinates. For 
instance, scandals are always bound in space and time, so the basic framing coordinates 
are “we” (wareware), “now” (ima) and “here” (koko) (e.g. Ishida 2003). Furthermore, the 
media are framing scandals by their placement, visual portrayal, and the overall tone of 
the media report. In other words, the media discourse, understood as a set of interpretive 
“media packages” (term by Gamson and Modigliani 1989), not only transmits media 
narratives, but it also suggests further meaning through framing. 
Frames are both conscious and unconscious, visible (i.e. immediately 
identifiable), and invisible (i.e. they become visible in practices). They render experience 
by defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgements and suggesting 
remedies. Furthermore, they involve selection, salience, and moral positioning of 
protagonists versus antagonists. While being typically based on the arousal of emotions, 
media framing proceeds by the structure and form of the narrative including the use of 
sounds, images, headlines, illustrations, or metaphors. While activating our mind with 
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proper stimulus, the frames – both cultural and ideological – exert significant influence 
on our evaluations of social elites’ transgressions (Lippmann 1922; Castells 2009; 
Kepplinger, Geiss and Siebert 2012). 
Frames are related to news values (metatextual routines that predetermine 
meaning before any journalistic text is generated). Moreover, the news is being 
simultaneously selected based on the significance of other news emerging at the same 
time (cf. media priming), and on the social importance attributed to news via their 
placement and ordering (cf. agenda setting). Besides, the journalists know in advance the 
type of story they are looking for, so the general frame, including its negative codes and 
associations, is already in motion. Even the public shock, which eventually results from 
a scandal, is culturally predetermined since public expectations are guided by 
preconvention which generates regularities (Tiffen 2004; Mast 2006). 
The inherent pathology of media frames lies in the fact that they by necessity 
oversimplify reality while being tied to over-signification (i.e. they magnify or reduce 
meaning). First, it is the contextualization (and equally importantly the absence of 
context) that modifies the meaning. Secondly, frames entail a way of discussing the 
problem (including how it will be discussed) and they entail the kind of discourse that 
will follow (e.g. treating illegal drug use as “public health issue”, or “criminal justice 
issue”, or “foreign crime issue”). Thirdly, visual frames are often applied in Japanese 
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scandal reporting: diagrams, maps, charts, and other presentations of “objective 
knowledge” are presented to the audiences. They are highly effective tools since they are 
ostensibly free from emotive involvement and subjectivity whereby increasing the degree 
of trustworthiness. Furthermore, the televisual framing offers patterns of expressing 
distance, such as close shot (intimate/personal), frontal angle (involvement), oblique 
angle (detachment), high angle (viewer power), low angle (models depicted as exercising 
symbolic power over the viewer), long shot (socially distant “stranger”) (Kress and van 
Leeuwen 1999). Especially during scandal hearings, the “bracketed experience” includes 
in-camera editing, repetition and juxtaposition (Alexander 1988), while villainy is 
metaphorically transformed into the representation of the subject in extreme close-up 
(Fiske 2011). Especially Japanese apologia, extreme close-ups show anything less than 
head and shoulders of the subject, and such framing is an effective means of enhancing 
the visual spectacle of degradation.25 
Media framing is not a single-layered, monolithic process. It is co-defined by 
negotiations and struggles among political actors, media institutions, and interest groups. 
                                                   
25 Also consider the pseudo-aesthetics of the paparazzi style-footage in TV and tabloids: 
the presented material often looks shoddy in terms of composition, lighting, shooting 
angle, or sharpness. This evokes a sense of raw realism, and aims to reveal a momentary 
glimpse into “evil” (consider the snapshots of culprits back-seated in the dark of a car and 
hiding their face during their transport after arrest). Also, worth noticing is utilization of 
music and sound in TV clips: positive sound-framing is facilitated via bright tunes and 
optimistic themes in the major key (e.g. depictions of the transgressor prior to scandal), 
while negative sound-frames are tinged with suspicious and gloomy tunes in the minor 
key. 
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Besides, scandal frames are always positioned within a certain interested moral system: 
they move from their starting point, that is usually chosen, and they aim at specific and 
usually predicted end, which lies in public condemnation of immorality. For this purpose, 
a “guilt frame” is established by the media based on available information with regard to 
selected components. The emotional reaction to a guilt frame is moral indignation, anger, 
and calling for punishment. On the contrary, the excuse frame in the media solicits 
sadness and calls for no or mild punishment (Garfinkel 1956; Kepplinger, Geiss and 
Siebert 2012). Within the guilt frame, which dominates in media scandals, the 
transgressor becomes associated with the profane code of motives, relations, and 
institutions, which can lead to misinterpretation and “symbolic annihilation” of alleged 
transgressor (term by Gaye Tuchman). Besides, media frames cause the public to view 
scandal protagonists as guiltier than the media portray, or on the contrary excusing them 
more than the media do (Kepplinger, Geiss and Siebert 2012). 
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Figure 4. Media framing based internal and external pressures. 
Source: Author 
 
 
In postwar Japanese history, consider the case of Tanaka Kakuei: his popularity reached 
its peak in 1972, but the public opinion changed rapidly after the allegations in 1974 
surfaced. By stripping all honorifics from his name in the news, the media applied the 
guilt frame on Tanaka’s case whereby directly contributing to his popularity fall to lowest 
levels. In a similar vein, the charismatic but controversial entrepreneur Horie Takafumi 
(head of the Livedoor Company) was in 2006 effectively demonized by the mainstream 
media (based on his criticism of Japanese conservative business circles), which 
contributed to his jailtime. Similarly, Ozawa Ichirō, who was always on bad terms with 
the mainstream media, also ended up being negatively framed, which significantly 
threatened his power (see below).  
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3.3. Media Scandal as Event 
 
Media event is a more or less pre-planned coverage of a certain real event or chain of 
events. It represents a dramatized, complex process shaped as stories and scripts that are 
being construed by mediated forms of communication. Contrarily to ordinary news, the 
ceremonial media events are performances that can challenge or affirm the established 
order while temporarily disrupting the normal flow of broadcast (Dayan and Katz 1992). 
Being based on ideological and commercial motives, the contents of media events are 
dictated by writers and journalists, and its distribution is decided by corporate or state 
organization. Besides, the event’s framing packages have usually sponsors, i.e. 
organizations employing professional specialists whose daily job bring them into contact 
with journalists and promote preferred package (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Boorstin 
1992). On the contrary however, scandal professionals in Japan are scarce, often leaving 
amateurs as scandal spokesmen, or merely producing manuals of “criris management” 
(kiki kanri) (see West 2006).  
Media events are usually pre-planned, but the organizers cannot be fully certain 
how they proceed. This is especially the case of events based on accidents and other non-
routine, disruptive events, including scandals: they crash through the ongoing habitual 
arrangements of newsmaking, or they rest upon miscalculations that lead to a breakdown 
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in the customary order (Molotch and Lester 1974; Dayan and Katz 1988). Big media 
events –  including large-scale scandals – are conducted in a breaking news-style and 
provided simultaneously by multiple mass media channels often through live 
transmission. The live broadcast invites an awareness participating in ongoing scandal 
with all its subtleties. Equally important is the right timing of a live event (i.e. the “sacred 
time”), and the right venue (i.e. the “sacred place”).26 
While echoing the actor-network theory (Law and Hassard 1999; Latour 2005), 
media events represent a heterogeneous engineering and assemblage of various related 
actors. In other words, these events are neither a result of a single self-conscious 
performance, nor are they reducible to one particular actor. They are constituted by 
negotiations between organizers and broadcasters, while the broadcast can be both forced 
and denied. The journalistic paradigms of objectivity and neutrality become contested, 
since unlike ordinary news, media events are less descriptive of a state of affairs, and 
more “symbolically instrumental”: they display what they wish to achieve (Dayan and 
Katz 1992). 
The coverage of media events is usually extremely intense and out of proportion 
to the event being covered, due to which other important news issues might get less 
                                                   
26 For instance, it makes a difference if a high-ranked politician conducts an apologetic 
press conference in a hotel (the “constructed” center) instead of his official residence (the 
“real” center). As for the timing, it is a part of scandal strategies to schedule the coverage 
for a Friday evening edition of a newspaper, or for the more closely watched Monday 
morning edition. 
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coverage at the expense of a media frenzy. Nonetheless, some of these events enter 
collective memory either in a form of historic “triumph”, or as a cultural “trauma”. Such 
trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to an event 
that leaves marks on the group consciousness (Alexander 2012), and it is the case of major 
scandals in a country’s past. (In Japan, this was the case of Lockheed and Recruit scandals, 
where some “ordinary” bribery case brought down many political leaders). Private homes 
are temporarily transformed into public spaces, where debates on given moral issues are 
activated, and changes of attitudes are made possible. In other words, the ideal-type 
scandal is a media event which aims for normalization of certain conflict with the “help” 
of the public (i.e. if the public does not approve or take part on the event, it decreases 
chances for its success). Eventually, in scandal the media “monopolize” public opinion.27 
  The media event of scandal is both an unfolding event (with eventual surprises, 
twist and turns), and a scripted event (goal-oriented, media-framed, bound in space and 
time). While differing from traditional media events as described by Dayan and Katz 
                                                   
27 The notion of public opinion is to a significant extent a mediopolitical construction 
(Lippmann 1922; Anderson 1983; Alexander 2006c), whereas the opinion polls are 
always partly illusory. Firstly, the elites who act only “as-if” they were attentive to public 
opinion, only support each other in a “circle of belief” (Ehrat 2008; Lakoff 2009; 
Boltanski 2004). Secondly, the outcome of the polls represents only a soft data based on 
different questions. Thus, various surveys with different institutional background can 
come to a wide range of conclusions because of the way the poll questions are defined. 
For instance, apart from the basic set of options (“agree/disagree”), some Japanese 
pollsters offer the option “don’t know/no answer”. In a comparative study conducted by 
Ikeda and Kohno (2008), the Japanese respondents provided the highest percentage of 
such evasive responses. In addition to this, some surveys on distrust in Japanese politics 
are also slightly misguiding because they ask about “satisfaction” with politics rather than 
about “confidence” or “trust” (e.g. Pharr 2000).    
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(1988; 1992), scandals are in principle not experienced as positive displays of 
togetherness: they do not celebrate reconciliation, but rather manage conflicts. Scandals 
wish to be spontaneous exposures and rejections of thing concealed. In order to illuminate 
the specific essence of scandals, I sum up those features of scandal event that are in 
contrast to the category of media events as postulated by Dayan and Katz: 
- scandals highlight social structure through disapproval, degradation and exclusion, 
while many large media events highlight the same structure through displays of unity 
and solidarity 
- scandals are built on a blameworthy/newsworthy transgressor (as opposed to 
praiseworthy/heroic figures of great media events), and they disseminate sentiments 
of moral indignation (as opposed to empathic experiences facilitated by big media 
events)  
- scandals are not advertised, rehearsed or pre-planned (except for those scandals that 
are the outcome of strategic use within the attack-politics, or some other form of pre-
planned conspiracy) 
- big scandals usually surprise large audiences, the whole nation in case of a national 
scandal, or even the world as such in case of global scandal (on the contrary, in big 
media events the audiences/participants are urged for weeks or months in advance) 
- scandals are repetitive and rather monologic (on the contrary, some great media events 
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are unique, innovative, dialogic, eventually initiating a “new order” by contesting the 
status quo) 
- the significance of scandal is usually assessed as soon as the transgression has been 
revealed and the transgressor identified (on the contrary, the significance of many 
media events is assessed and constructed post facto) 
- apart from a handful of megascandals (e.g. Watergate or Lockheed), scandal events 
do not wield significant transformative potential of changing societal, political or 
economic attitudes, as is the case of major movements and revolutions. 
 
Regarding its journalistic form, scandal is a hybrid text: it shares the features of both 
routine events (ordinary news), and non-routine accidents (media events). Thus, based on 
their journalistic format, they are both descriptive (a state of an affair is on a periodical 
basis presented in the news), and symbolically instrumental (they aim to achieve certain 
ideological/hegemonic goal). Moreover, the treatment of scandals in the news is changing 
throughout the time: at the beginning, the routines of objectivity are transcended to some 
significant degree, allowing access to otherwise unavailable elite information. Eventually, 
the situation becomes transferred from scandal investigation to a televised ceremony. 
Finally, the anti-routine, liminoid event becomes again treated by the routine-making 
media procedures. 
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Figure 5. Media scandal as journalistic hybrid between ordinary news and media event. 
Source: Author 
 
Furthermore, Dayan and Katz (1992) indicated that the most significant of media events 
are those “pseudo-events” that actually work. In the same vein, scandal is not an media 
event per se. It is always a more or less hyped report of certain eventworthy occurrence 
that is turned into a media event, and eventually becomes scandalized through negative 
public opinion. Many contemporary scandals not only in Japan can be critically 
approached as pseudo-events (or even “non-scandals”), because: 
- they represent rituals that are planned, reproduced, and used strategically by different 
groups, exerting or seeking power in society 
- they emphasize the act of visual stimulation at the expense or “real” knowledge 
whereas mesmerising the public by focusing on attractive trivia  
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- in many pseudo-scandals, journalists tend to blow things out of proportion, 
penetrating the audience by feelings of “unhealthy curiosity” 
- their structural/institutional background becomes deemphasized, while the public’s 
attention is drawn away from general issues toward the abnormality of specific event. 
 
Seen from a philosophical perspective, we can add that a scandal phenomenon is 
something that “shows itself” (or is becoming visible), while scandal noumenon stands 
for the initial transgression (i.e. the invisible, transgressive force, which is normally 
unrepresented). In this light, the original transgression (noumenon) is always less 
scandalous than its mediated version (phenomenon). Moreover, the original transgression 
can hardly be understood as scandalous itself since the intersection and relationship 
between “transgression” and “limit” occurs outside of the social coding, and it becomes 
negatively labeled if, and only if it is exposed by a motivated whistleblower. The media 
events in general and media scandals in particular invite implosion between the “real” 
(noumenal) and the “representational” (phenomenal), which allows for countless pseudo-
events.28  
                                                   
28 The dichotomy of noumenon and phenomenon was a key part of the philosophical 
inquiry since its outset. We find discussions on noumenon in Plato (as abstract ideas or 
forms), in Immanuel Kant (as the thing-in-it-self), or in Martin Heidegger (as opposed to 
phenomenon). The Cartesian dualism is also based on this discussion (i.e. the distinction 
between noumenon as a proto-core of a meaning, and phenomenon as a “secondary reality” 
of appearance/representation. Simply put, the binary of noumenon and phenomenon refers 
to occurrences in reality per se (the unmediated, unreflective, “actual” world) as opposed 
to the realm of appearances (thoughts, images, and sounds that only reflect/refer to 
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Figure 6. Scandalization as transition from noumenal to phenomenal reality. 
Source: Author 
 
3.4. Media Scandal as Spectacle 
 
Big media events often emphasize the act of audiovisual stimulation at the expense of 
“real” knowledge. Thus, they can be theoretically related to the notion of media spectacle. 
Spectacle (from the Latin spectaculum) refers to displaying a visually striking 
performance that is primarily memorable for its appearance. In the context of media 
scandal, spectacles are understood less as occasions that publicly demonstrate civic 
collectivity, and more as media-organized public events with more or less distracting, 
                                                   
genuine reality). In terms of public involvement, the former can be understood as occasion 
for citizenship (audience-as-citizens), while the latter points to a media-constructed 
pseudo-event (citizens-as-audiences) (see Waisbord 2004). 
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superficial, and deceptive qualities. The critics of modernity claim that through various 
spectacles our perceptible world is being replaced by a set of superior images mediated 
by signs and signals. In spectacle, the see-worthiness (i.e. the “politics” behind the 
promoted phenomena) retreats at the expense of mere seen-ness (i.e. their representational 
and visual aspects).29 
As I will futher indicate in section III, the traditional rituals had a capacity to 
transform people, ideas and mores. However, the modern ritualized spectacles in the West 
merely present and persuade spectators that the surface visions are meaningful refractions 
of social order (e.g. Handelman 1997; Kellner 2003; Alexander 2006a). Similarly, in 
postwar Japan the so-called spectator democracy is typical for spectacles that are 
conditioned by the passivity of their audiences, setting them apart from the performers 
and making them deliver their vote when requested (e.g. Stockwin 2008; Kabashima and 
Steel 2010; Kruze 2015). Modern capitalist media spectacles were scrutinized as mere 
                                                   
29 For Guy Debord (1967; 1973) spectacles were a by-product of the development of 
capitalist society where the commodity came to gradually colonize social life. In this train 
of thought, media spectacles can be positioned within the paradigm of postmodernism, 
where excess of information, preference for infotainment, and packaging of a media 
commodity win over actual substances of the content. Consequently, authenticity 
becomes more an attribute of the audiovisual, while the spectators end up acquiring a 
falsified knowledge of general aspects of life (Debord 1967; Kellner 1989; Toomer 1991). 
Some postmodernists further argued that the electronic media supplanted the scene of the 
spectacle by “fascinating” ceremonies of the obscene: questioning the distinction between 
reality and its (mostly televisual) representation plunges the universe into the postmodern 
“beyond of the spectacle” while obscenity begins when there is no more spectacle 
(Baudrillard 1988b; Virilio 2000; Boltanski 2004). In other words, everything becomes 
immediately transparent, pervertedly open, and exposed in the raw light of information 
and communication.   
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“declaratives” that actualize other possibilities of bureaucratic logic through large-scale 
aesthetic productions (Baudrillard 1988a; Handelman 1997). These spectacles do not 
challenge the hegemonic power, and rather serve as pacifying tools of initiating 
individuals into “proper” ways of life. 
In both East and West, the “hegemony of the visual” became paradigmatic of the 
contemporary era in which politics, entertainment and information merge. Our everyday 
life is now spectacularized through various media representations (this situation was 
primarily triggered by the advancement of spectacle in the medium of television). Scandal 
belongs to one of such spectacles: it is a declarative public event, which is tied to over-
signification, and to the act of exclusion (Handelman 1997). There is nothing truly 
“revolutionary” or transformative in contemporary scandals: we only keep on re-telling 
stories to ourselves about our “normal sins” (term by Gamson 2011) that are transformed 
by the media into profitable media commodities. 
The ultimate form of a media spectacle is what Kellner (2003) describes as 
“megaspectacle”. Megaspectacles dominate the mediascape for long periods of time, and 
are being endlessly scrutinized in the media whereby co-defining the entire era of politics 
and culture. While stemming from a relatively mundane transgression, scandals constitute 
a postmodern spectacle where the primary goal is to keep audiences interested.30  
                                                   
30 Kellner distinguished between regularly scheduled megaspectacles (the Oscars, the 
World Series, the Olympics, presidential elections) and media extravaganzas (the Gulf 
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War, the televised O.J. Simpson trial, the Clinton sex scandal, or the 9/11 terrorist attacks). 
Most of these megaspectacles are simultaneously global spectacles since they are 
televised all around the world. In Japan, consider the megaspectacle of Sakai Noriko 
(2009), which was reported in many Asian countries, the Nonomura Ryūtarō faux pass 
(2014) that went global, or the Olympic logo scandal of Sano Kenjirō (2015) which 
became a major global news.    
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1. SCANDAL AS SECULAR RITUAL WITH SACRED AMBITIONS 
 
1.1. Scandal as Social Performance 
 
In this section, I aim to connect the performance/ritual theories to a broader theory of 
scandal as a secular social process. In order to prepare the ground for such 
interdisciplinary theorizing, I find it necessary to elaborate on the understanding of 
scandal as social performance. This orientation is in accord with the neofunctionalist 
framework, where the materiality of social practices – including both traditional rituals 
and modern scandals – is replaced by the more multidimensional concept of performance 
(see Alexander 2006b). Performances are coexistent with the human condition, and they 
can take place anywhere, depending on a variety of circumstances. Besides, every social 
performance (including religious rites, artistic/sports performances, and the so-called 
theater of politics) is constitutive for human communication, and the only type of living 
thing capable of realizing such conduct is the symbol-making homo symbolicus (Cassirer 
1946) with his cognitive inclination to emblematize and narrate reality.31 
                                                   
31 The dramaturgical perspective in arts and sciences is not a new phenomenon. In the 
West, we can find its roots in Hellenistic and Roman satirical poetry, or in the Stoic 
philosophy that often mentioned the illusory character of our social reality. In theater, 
Shakespeare famously stated that “the world is a stage”, and the notion of theatrum mundi 
was defining the dramaturgical essence of society until 18th century (e.g. Boltanski 2004; 
Junge 2006). In philosophy, performative aspects of behavior and language were 
discussed already by Thomas Hobbes (1960). In social sciences, the dramaturgic aspect 
of performances was closely elaborated by Erving Goffman (1959), Kenneth Burke 
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In this perspective, we realize that at both the macro and the micro levels the 
contemporary societies are permeated by symbolic performances and ritualized activities. 
If approached macro-sociologically, we can state that the whole of our social world, 
constituted by objects, people and events, is one big “meta-performance” (or 
“macrodrama”) in which spectators can become performers and vice versa. The 
mediopolitical world is particularly emblematic of performance and dramaturgy. Within 
the so-called theater of politics, the actors, producers, and stage managers craft discourse 
as drama, transform public into a stage, and unfold the script (e.g. Edelman 1964; Law 
and Hassard 1999; Apter 2006). In a similar vein, various practices within the journalistic 
field materialize depending on the way the newspeople perform their tasks (Tuchman 
1972; McQuail 1992; Bourdieu 2005). 
In a micro-sociological perspective, individual human behavior becomes 
expressed in a form of performance that is grounded on highly symbolic axiological 
systems. People are usually unaware actors on a metaphorical stage playing out roles 
while all performances are grounded in any activity that takes place before particular set 
of observers (Goffman 1959; Burke 1969). The actor’s stage is any place that is bound to 
some degree by barriers to reception, while the front stage in scandal functions in a 
ritualized fashion to define the situation for the observer (Meyrowitz 1986; Giesen 2006). 
                                                   
(1969) or Richard Schechner (1988), who stressed in a similar vein as Shakespeare that 
people are actors on a metaphorical stage. 
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The main dramaturgical aspect of scandal performances lies in the fact that the 
conduct is a staged activity that attempts to conceal some inappropriateness. While 
paraphrasing Goffman, we can talk about a “dual presentation of self” in scandal: the 
elites perform their expected roles based on their “delegated trustworthiness” (Bourdieu 
1984), but their private actions deviate from certain conventions. Once this schism 
becomes exposed, the elite actors readily follow a “new” dramatic script of public 
confessions (either a scripted apology, or manifestation of denial). The confessional 
performance in Japanese scandals is usually conducted in predefined categories (passivity, 
approval of authority, admittance of transgression), but it is not necessarily fixed: the 
more assertive actors employ evasive strategies (circumlocutions, phrasing the utterance 
with ambiguity, counter-attacking and refusing to admit the guilt). They can also switch 
between these two strategies depending on the scandal development (such as in the case 
of the 2009 Ozawa Ichirō scandal – see below). 
Every scandal performance is in principle directed to other institutionalized 
platforms. The elites do not represent only their transgressive selves, but they 
simultaneously stand for some shielding subject (a sports team, a corporation, an 
entertainment agency, political party/faction, a public institution, or the nation as a whole), 
which becomes polluted by the individual’s transgression. This fact becomes especially 
highlighted during the apologetic confessions during Japanese scandals where the culprit 
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never fails to apologize to institutions and systems he/she is related to, although the 
institution in question ritually disassociates from him/her (see next chapter). 
Any dramaturgical performance implies the existence of a more or less 
responsive audience. The reaction needed to fuel a scandal is from the most part a reaction 
undertaken in and by the public, which can get expressed by the opinion polls, street 
interviews, but also in internet chatrooms. Apart from the primary audience that witness 
a certain event on the spot, scandals necessitate a presence of a secondary media audience. 
Large media audiences (or whole nations in case of global scandal) are “invited” to 
interrupt their daily routines and join in the media event. Some scholars claim that in 
media (post)modernity, the tide of information does not require a response by the recipient, 
so scandal performances too are seen primarily as “monologic” media events (e.g. Dayan 
and Katz 1988; Thompson 1995; Adut 2008). Indeed, scandals do not require a fully 
participating public – at the most basic level it is enough that the public “simply watch”. 
The publics usually spectate on scandal reality but are not usually part of it, although they 
too can become “ritualists” rather than mere audience members (Grimes 2006). In other 
words, some public reactions to scandal in Japanese past clearly indicate that the 
audiences can become proactive performers that make the communicative situation in 
scandal at least “quasi-dialogic” (see below).  
Finally, scandals are enabled and shaped by the performance of the media 
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organizations themselves. Their journalistic performance depends on internal routines, 
media biases, and other external forces that determine the scandal frame (see section IV, 
chapter 6). If the guilt frame prevails, the media performance will highlight the sacred 
values of a society by pointing at exposed pollution and, ideally speaking, by reaffirming 
the morality of a community in crisis. At any rate, Japanese media scandals are however 
achieved less as morality-checks in the name of solidarity, and more as ritualized social 
performances during which the culprit struggles to minimize the gravity of sanctions 
related to him/her and those involved. 
 
1.2. Bridging Ritual and Scandal Theory 
 
If there is one universal cultural quality that marks the earliest forms of human social 
organization, it is the centrality of rituals. In premodern times, various social processes 
were heavily marked by episodes of ritualized cultural communication in which the direct 
partners to a social interaction, and those observing it, shared a mutual belief in the 
descriptive and prescriptive validity of the communication’s symbolic contents 
(Durkheim 1915; Turner 1967; Geertz 1973). The result of such rituals was manifold: the 
spirits were appeased and neighbourhood solidarity strengthened, while the acceptance 
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of authority was flowing from the enactment of the public ritual.32 
Since the beginnings of the social sciences, ritual as a specific category of social 
behavior has been perceived in different ways. For instance, the traditional rituals were 
understood as re-enactments of historical or mythical precedents (Eliade 1959), but also 
as important “safety valves” that exhibit (and exaggerate) real conflicts in order to release 
tension and afford social catharsis (Gluckman 1963; Bell 1992). Moreover, the exchange 
rituals were rendered as having political significance (Mauss 1966), while the rituals of 
penal discipline were correlated with “economies of power” (Foucault 1977). Ritual was 
recognized as a preeminent form of cultural practice (Geertz 1973), but also as a type of 
political power (Lukes 1975) and effective tool of social control (Douglas 1973). Such 
rituals are not dead repetitions, but continuous erasings and superimposings (Schechner 
1985) which simultaneously renders them as “statements” being paradigmatic of social 
order (Leach 1954). Such body of research indeed makes an impression that ritual is 
humanity’s basic social act (e.g. Bellah 2005). 
Durkheim (1915) believed that both the archaic man and the secular man of today 
have their “civil religion” which provides individuals with meaning and binds them into 
                                                   
32 The notion of ritual encompasses a vast number of elements, but most generally it 
relates to repetitive and memory-inducing patterns of life, thought, belief or behavior. In 
case of animals, ritual consists of a certain formalized and fixed pattern, and it is a key 
concept for their behavior. In case of humans, ritual can be understood at the corporeal 
level (i.e. as any habit or repeated pattern with or without particular meaning), or at the 
level of “interaction ritual” (e.g. face-to-face meetings and greetings, maintaining a dress 
code, attending burial ceremony), which stands for prescribed mechanisms to ensure the 
apparent social unity (Goffman 1959; Collins 2004). 
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a community. Both the notion of civil religion and its later sociological applications (see 
Bellah and Hammond 1980; Alexander 2006a; Giesen 2006) are useful starting points for 
approaching scandal as a secular ritual of civil religion, which aims to contain conflict 
and prevent a community from degenerating into chaos. In this train of thought, the 
existence of a community per se relies on symbolic representations and ritual 
performances that re-narrate both the triumphant and traumatic moments by accentuating 
the boundary between inside and outside. Scandals can be seen as one of those rituals: 
same as the archaic religious/folk performances, they aim to sustain and mobilize 
collective sentiments and solidarities based on the sacred-profane binary. They maintain 
a “logical void” between the sacred and the profane that re-affirms the symbolic 
boundaries of good and evil (Durkheim 1915; Alexander 2011). However, while 
diverging from Durkheimian understanding of the sacred, scandal is not the veneration of 
an object held to be sacred by a community, but it lies in a public degradation that aims 
to serve as affirmation of collective conscience, and a call to obey the commonsensical 
morality. To borrow from Edmund Leach (1954), scandal is a ritual which is not a chorus 
of harmony, but a language of argument.  
In order to further demonstrate how the logic of ritual is related to modern 
Japanese scandal, it is equally necessary to discuss the notion of social drama (Turner 
1969; 1980). Victor Turner developed his early notion of ritual as social drama while 
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using the performance approach to ritual. Importantly for the scandal theory, Turner, 
followed by the neofunctionalist theorists, emphasized the role of frictions and constraints, 
which are mitigated by ritual in the face of certain conflict. Furthermore, I believe that 
the performance of modern Japanese scandals is semantically close to the premodern 
“rituals of affliction” that served as the means of repair and purification due to some crisis 
(see Turner 1967; 1990). Differing from the rites of passage as theorized by Arnold van 
Gennep, rituals of affliction can be forced on those who have been caught deviating from 
norm. They are terminated by a purification ritual that re-establishes the line between 
good and evil – a transition made possible only by the act of punishment. The punitive 
exclusion of the transgressor is believed to reduce the appetite for transgression in a 
community, and to legitimate the authoritarian status quo. 
Importantly for understanding modern scandals, the Turnerians believed that the 
basic components of premodern social dramas and modern rituals can be treated as 
fundamental aspects of social behavior as such. The modern media only “repackaged” 
ancient subjects and themes: the social ritual of meeting, talking, gossiping, and telling 
stories with peers about each one’s latest exploit is just a reassertion of tribal story 
gatherings (Barkow 1992; Estes 2004; Schwab and Schwender 2011). In the same vein, 
neofunctionalists believe that there exist continuities between premodern sacred rituals 
and contemporary social performances, including the phenomena of stardom, fandom, 
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and scandal. Of course, the premodern model cannot be taken as a strict analogy for 
certain universal processes of secular social life today. Nonetheless, some contemporary 
social symbols are like sacred ones, while the conflict between social values is like the 
conflict between the sacred and profane, and pure and impure (Alexander 2010). A 
significant affinity between premodern and (post)modern actions and motives lies in their 
processuality. According to Turner, every social drama follows this processual pattern: 
 
1. breach of norm-governed social relationships (more or less deliberate) 
2. crisis or extension of the breach (revelation of hidden clashes) 
3. redressive mechanisms (public actions undertaken by authorities) 
4. reintegration of disturbed social group (or recognition of a schism). 
 
The social drama works itself out the way a dramatic plot works. Its performance is not 
only analogous to classical and modern Western drama, but also to the Japanese aesthetic 
notion of jo-ha-kyū, where there is a breach (jo), eruption of crisis (ha), and a rise to 
climax that displays the conflict (kyū). More importantly for our context, we notice that 
many of them basically follow the same progression as Turner’s social drama (ideal-type): 
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1. a scandal is triggered by a certain transgression  
2. the breach leads into a crisis that cannot be simply sealed off 
3. purifying sanctions (both symbolic and legal) are brought into operation 
4. the transgressor is publicly displayed, punished and eventually reintegrated.  
 
The processual similitude is apparent, although in contrast to traditional communitarian 
rituals, contemporary scandal is less a humanly meaningful cultural rite, and more a 
commoditized social performance with strategic features. Nonetheless, both ritual and 
scandal is a pragmatic form of cultural practice which stands for the very production and 
negotiation of power relations. They function as an instrument of social control which 
effects social conformity and reinforces collectively held values and attitudes. 
Premodern social dramas and (post)modern media scandals share their 
fundamental logic: while following the aforementioned stages of the purification process, 
they reflect and perpetuate the principles of order (moral, social, cultural, political) and 
they neutralize (if only temporarily) assumed danger of protracted pollution by 
sanctioning and scapegoating the transgressor. Thus, the modern mechanisms of redress 
operate as alternatives to the ritual mechanisms used in tribal societies (Gluckman 1963; 
Merry 1984). The main mechanism for neutralizing the pollution in both cases is that of 
a public ritual. 
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Ritual in modern secularized societies became even more complex. Modern 
secular rituals are ceremonies that present doctrines and dramatize moral imperatives 
without invoking the other-worldliness of some mystical powers (Moore and Myerhoff 
1977). It is the ideological element that distinguishes a secular ritual from mere custom. 
Rituals as metaphysical containers of human nature always “hold something”, and they 
can become vehicles for a particular ideology (Lukes 1975; Marvin 2002). They sustain 
the shared meanings of society – in our context especially those meanings that postulate 
norms for transgressions, and, in the words of Bell (1992) such conceived rituals have 
power to discipline the body and regulate the mind. 
Ronald Grimes argued that the media model the ritual, while the ritual models 
the media (Grimes 2006; 2011). In other words, ritual and media interact – either by 
“mediatizing of ritual”, or by “ritualizing of the media”. As for the former, various social 
ceremonies today are indeed mass-produced as media events, and scandal is one of the 
archetypical forms of such media rituals (Couldry 2003; Cottle 2006). As for the latter, it 
is not only the transgressors who perform their repentance/denial in a ritualized way: it is 
also the journalists who practice during scandals various “ritualistic performance 
strategies” (Tuchman 1972): they entail strategic rituals that justify a claim to objectivity, 
and they develop ritualized procedures in order to protect the system (and themselves) 
from eventual blame. 
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The media/scandal performance is a form of a dramatic ritual that makes 
individuals cohesive within a society: nothing really new is learned but a particular view 
of the world is portrayed, and the common sense reconfirmed (e.g. Carey 1998; Chwe 
2001). Some media rituals (for instance, the high rituals of state or royal ceremonies) 
integrate societies in a collective heartbeat and evoke a renewal of loyalty to the society 
and its authority (Dayan and Katz 1994). However, this is rarely the case of contemporary 
scandals in Japan since during scandal the aforementioned values are portrayed less as 
subjective human preferences, and more as imposed conditions. After all, contrarily to 
religious rituals that are foundational to voluntary collective action, media scandals are 
“involuntary rituals”. Besides, the scandal-ritual serves as a hegemonic tool of soft social 
control while standing for a commercialized media fixture which deepens political apathy. 
At any rate, every scandal offers a “window of ritual”: both rituals and scandals provide 
a limited area of transparency in otherwise opaque surface of the regular, uneventful 
social life. 
 
1.3. On the Japanese Sense of Ritual 
 
The extent of ritualistic behavior in Japan appears to surpass other cultures, both Western 
and Asian. The foreigners are often mesmerized by the “elegance of ritual” that surrounds 
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Japanese social performances including religious parades and local festivities, various 
official and royal encounters, or the ceremonial rites of Japanese business culture (see 
Hirano 1989; Davis 1992; Bremen and Martinez 1995; Steunebrink and van der Zweerde 
2004; Murphy 2014). Moreover, it is the omnipresence of various interactional rituals in 
Japanese everydayness that further points to a heightened sense of ritual and ritualization 
in Japan: more than in any other country, the apparently insignificant mundane practices 
of Japanese daily life gain potency through incessant repetition, effectively constructing 
and sustaining cultural systems (McVeigh 1994). In the same vein, many aspects of 
Japanese group life are highly ritualized, calling for a “quasi-religious” behavior 
(including admittance to a group, behaving inside the group, or when leaving the group). 
Especially, the relationship between group members and outsiders in Japan has a 
remarkably ritualistic character (Sugimoto 2010; Prasol 2010). Some scholars assert that 
a smooth functioning of ritualized mechanisms of group life and its governance – 
including public humiliation in case of rule violation – forms the foundation of the 
distinctiveness of Japanese society as such (Haley 1982; Pye 1985).33    
The religious belief systems are rather weekly-rooted in Japan, where animism, 
                                                   
33 Marry Douglas (1973) stated that ritual is an important and effective tool of social 
control in societies that are 1) closed social groups with 2) restricted codes of linguistic 
and symbolic communication, in which 3) there is great emphasis on hierarchy as opposed 
to personal identity, and 4) yet a general social consensus still upholds the system. Japan 
arguably belongs to such societies.  
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contemplation, and syncretism often prevailed at the expense of any fixed form of 
religious dogmatism (e.g. Bellah 1970; Hirano 1989; Davis 1992). On the other hand, 
however, Japan developed a strong civil religion (shimin shūkyō) and folk customs 
(minzoku) that are institutionally different from religion systems, and are typical for their 
emphasis on public ritual (e.g. Yanagita 1957; Bellah and Hammond 1980; Okuyama 
2012). In Japan, it is not the belief per se, which forms the core of Japanese religion, but 
more importantly it is the praxis (shugyō) the feelings (kimochi), and all the “religious 
aestheticism” that surrounds them (e.g. Davis 1992).  
In the Japanese past, ritual always played a salient role at various levels of 
Japanese polity. The cultural rituality, same as “spontaneous” adherence to rules, were 
underpinned by the historical development of society, politics and culture, and many 
scholars registered parallels and continuities between rites in pre-industrial and industrial 
Japan (e.g. Smith 1961; McVeigh 1994; Schnell 1999). Besides, many idiosyncratic 
features of premodern Japanese culture are tied to folk religion and village ethos 
(Yanagita 1957; 1962). In other words, there was always a strong link between Japanese 
community rituals as both cultural performances based on folk beliefs of “civil religion”, 
and ritual as a strategic quest for managing sociopolitical order. Thus, both Shinto, 
Buddhism and Christianity were pragmatically adapted and integrated into the framework 
of political ideals, while the community festivals of agrarian Japan (matsuri) derived from 
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a long tradition of combining religion and government in Japan (Yanagita 1957; 
Steunebrink and van der Zweerde 2004; Sugimoto 2010). Consequently, the institutional 
basis for many ritual practices still rests on religious rules and folk traditions that were 
only altered by the zeitgeist of political history. The facets of Japanese social existence 
and ritual mutually construct each other (McVeigh 1994), which renders ritual and 
hierarchy as highly effective means of maintaining social order in both modern and 
premodern Japan. 
Talcott Parsons (1954) noted that in Japan the social structure is permeated by 
both the magico-religious and secular aspect, while much of ordinary social obligation in 
Japan carries a directly sacred character. Such conceived “sacredness” points to a 
ritualized hierarchical order of the Japanese elite where seniority, loyalty and reciprocal 
obligations are the norm. Importantly for this section, the sacred and secular aspects do 
not necessarily exclude each other. Firstly, Japan is one of those countries, where profane 
and sacred denote aspects of almost any kind of action. Secondly, the sacred and the 
profane are not understood as categorical opposites, but rather as a continuity of sacred 
and profane experiences and feelings. This is also why the largely “pragmatic” (technical, 
rational) ritual of Japanese scandal simultaneously appears as a form of “sacred drama” 
with (pseudo)religious traits. This duality in both ritual and scandal is a reflection of a 
highly situational relationship between the “magical attitudes” and “goal-rationality” in 
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Japan (Davis 1992; McVeigh 1998). 
I indicated above that it is not only the rituals for the dead, the Japanese rites of 
passage, or the religious beliefs related to the imperial system, that represent the elements 
of civic religion in contemporary Japan. Equally importantly, the Japanese ritual functions 
as a performative expression of governing ideology through a symbolic medium, while 
the ritualization of conflict is characteristic of the political and corporate culture. The 
social obligations in Japan are immediately and directly “ritual obligations” (Parsons 
1954, 282), and saving/losing one’s face guides daily life from the Japanese business 
etiquette to transactions on a village market. A face loss based on disrupting some of these 
obligations has serious impact on one’s group/institution, and a grave infraction might be 
sealed off only via a ritual of purification. Here, the tripartite structure of hare-ke-kegare, 
which permeates some traditional Japanese festivals, can partly illuminate the operational 
logic behind the scandal performance in Japan.34 
The traditional Shinto, which can be understood as a body of spiritual rituals, 
teaches about the act of becoming impure (kegare) and the necessity of purification 
                                                   
34 The Japanese anthropologists emphasize three traditional concepts related to ritual 
purity in Japan: the sacred or “non-everyday” (hare), the ordinary or “everyday” (ke), and 
the polluted (kegare), while pointing to certain affinities with the functionalist distinction 
between the sacred and the profane (Yanagita 1957; Sugimoto 2010; Okuyama 2012). 
Hare refers to something which is public and common, but also extraordinary and special 
(the opposite is ke, which is associated with private, informal things). Kegare was 
originally believed to point to defilements such as death, birth, menstruation, and others.  
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(misogi) stemming from certain forbidden behavior that brings about impurity and 
pollution (e.g. Hirano 1989). Kegare is less a form of moral judgement, and more a 
spontaneous reaction to some amoral forces (therefore, kegare is not synonymous with 
the Christian notion of sin). While being still a part of Japanese mentality today, kegare 
points to some form of taboo violation that needs to be “undone” by the person 
responsible via a purification ritual (misogi, harae). 
The ritual of exclusion (and eventual reintegration) is a form of purification 
deeply rooted in Japan’s mythology and political history, while the processuality of 
scandal can be related to the complex symbolism of purification rituals in Japanese 
folklore. In Japan, the retention of earlier forms of social control, importantly including 
modern versions of gossiping and village ostracism (mura hachibu), are still among the 
most prevalent means in social ordering (e.g. Haley 1982; Prasol 2010). In a similar vein, 
the phenomenon of “social exile” in modern scandal is informed by the traditional extra-
legal sanction of mura hachibu, i.e. the punishment of severing of community ties with 
the offender in order to preserve internal harmony. Furthermore, only a complete 
confession of error served to reconfirm the rightness of the villagers’ reaction to deviation. 
This again parallels with apologetic confessions in media scandals that become a 
precondition for elites’ future comeback.  
While following the neofunctionalist argumentation, this chapter stressed that in 
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Japanese culture and society there exist parallels between modern cultural practices and 
premodern sacred dramas informed by religious and folk beliefs. In scandal, various 
myths, narratives, and performances of the sacred are assembled in a dramatic form while 
reflecting the desirability of avoiding the “evil”, polluted, and tabooed. In following 
chapters, I will illustrate how the Japanese media scandal is a meaningful cultural practice 
that was to an important extent informed by the rules of Japanese civil religion. Thus, 
scandal can be metaphorically approached as a cleansing ritual of pollution and 
purification via confession and temporary exclusion.  
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2. PERFORMING THE RITUAL OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE  
 
One of the particularisms related to Japanese scandals is the public performance of the 
scandal culprit and its media coverage. The social role of apology, confession and 
repentance (including the readiness to take responsibility and admit guilt) partly diverges 
from its understanding in the West. On the one hand, the police and prosecutors 
traditionally place emphasis on confession, since admission of guilt is a necessary 
condition for the “restorative justice” (shūfukuteki seigi), in which a transgressor’s “return 
to society” is realized through behavioral correction instead of mere punishment (e.g. 
Haley 1982; Yamamoto 1990; Pontell and Geiss 2008). On the other hand, the Japanese 
apology performs a kind of “lightning conductor function” (term by Stockwin 2008). 
While being less a conduct of admitting guilt, and mitigating a wrong for which one is 
responsible, confession disperses tension in a ritual way, and satisfy the damaged party. 
The idea behind Japanese scandals as mediated rituals of restorative justice is 
grounded in a firm inclination of the Japanese legal system not to punish or retaliate, but 
to correct and restore. The logic of such conceived justice emphasizes the act of 
confession (more or less forced), public humiliation (more or less staged), and the ritual 
of exclusion (more or less temporary). Especially the “masochism” of public humiliation 
(including the obligatory “tears test”, see below) is regarded as a primary virtue that 
125 
enables the forgiveness (yurushi). Furthermore, it is believed that it restores the sense of 
oneness (ittaikan) which still seems to pervade the Japanese society (e.g. Davis 1992). 
Equally importantly, the ritualized scandal performance is based on conditional rules, and 
all scandal actors must be aware of the constitutive elements of a ritual action. The logic 
of the performance is underpinned by a set of prescribed rules and patterns (kata) for 
proceeding in given situation.35  
The Japanese scandal-ritual is both dramaturgical and performative: it involves 
doing/saying things via both physical and verbal communication, while using media 
technology to enhance the effect of “collective effervescence”. It is both a symbolic and 
instrumental activity that reflects the distinction between sacred and profane in a 
moralizing manner. The Japanese are said learn conformity and solidarity predominantly 
through emotive means (e.g. Matsumoto 1996; Sugimoto 2010) whose impact can be seen 
in the “emotive moralizing” in Japanese scandal. This becomes especially evident during 
the “degradation ceremony” (i.e. the scandal climax in a form of a televised press 
conference), where the emotionally-charged moral indignation serves to affect the ritual 
                                                   
35  The notion of kata usually refers to conventions that are used repeatedly in the 
production or practice of an art form in Japan. It is however not only the traditional 
Japanese arts (including martial arts or the classical theater form of kabuki), where kata 
becomes indispensable: the adherence to kata is a notion equally respected in Japanese 
social everydayness. In this relation, some scholars describe how the Japanese need to be 
familiar with the nature and sequence of any process they are about to undergo, which at 
times renders them “naturally” adhering to algorithms (e.g. Sugimoto 2010; Prasol 2010). 
If one makes mistakes in the processuality of Japanese scandal-rituals, or refuses to 
participate, it significantly deepens the scandal crisis while provoking negative public 
backlash.   
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destruction of the transgressor (Garfinkel 1956). In order to maintain the separation 
between the positive (“good”) and negative (“evil”), the culprit’s performance becomes 
mediated as a “movement” from purity of the sacred inside (naibu) to impurity of the 
outside (gaibu). 
 
Figure 7. The symbolic polarized structuring during the scandal-ritual. 
Source: Author, inspired by Alexander (1988) 
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2.1. Confession and Apology 
 
Kenneth Burke (1969) once noted that the ultimate motivation for all public speaking is 
to purge ourselves of a sense of guilt. The act of confession of guilt is a concept to be 
found in both Christian and Confucian traditions same as in the cannons of western 
philosophy from Augustine to Rousseau. In most of these sources, confession is seen as 
an indication of remorse and a step towards moral rehabilitation. 
The willingness to confess and apologize, which can avoid litigation and further 
prosecution, is critical for the Japanese justice (see Johnson 2002; Haley 2006). In 
Japanese legal system, the accused person’s confession, remorse and cooperation with 
the agents of social control are considered as highly favorable, although they are often 
forced and can lead to serious cases of judicial error. Notwithstanding the actual share of 
one’s guilt, confession lays the foundation for apology and expression of remorse. This 
plays a vital role in Japanese custom, and it gets reflected in scandal performances as well. 
When people’s expectations are shattered and social trust damaged, a common 
response is to develop explanations of what went wrong in order to realign social 
relationships (Wuthnow 2004). In confessing and apologizing, the offender is given a 
chance to correct for the offence and re-establish the expressive order (Goffman 1999), 
and in the same vein, the confessional and corrective ritual of apologia quells the scandal 
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situation. It is based on the dialectic of accusation-cause, and it usually stands for the most 
spectacular part of a scandal narrative. Ideally speaking, the apology, which is performed 
as interaction with the sacred, becomes accepted by the public if the perpetrator repents 
by readily acknowledging the wrongfulness of his/her act.36  
Throughout the course of media modernity, apologia became part of the 
linguistic context of scandals, rather than potential rhetorical antidote for them (Achter 
2000, 321, emphasis retained). The speech act of apologia creates social reality by “doing” 
something with words and gestures. This act becomes judged on the backdrop of a binary 
felicitous-infelicitous (or efficient-inefficient), rather than on the metaethical binary true-
                                                   
36 Before discussing the performance of confessional apologia in Japanese scandals, it 
might be useful to sum up the basic theoretical notions that underlie the act of apology as 
such. The essentialist (or evolutionary) understanding stresses that apology is a device 
inherent in us to resolve natural conflicts (the standard of reconciliation protocols as 
“natural conflict resolutions” were registered already between chimpanzees). Apology is 
in this understanding approached as aggression control (i.e. the way to mitigate the 
victim’s anger). The religious (or theological) understanding renders apologies as being 
connected with religious rituals of repentance: it is not a kind of social necessity, but 
primarily an act of demonstrating faith in one’s god (transgressors are conceived of as a 
“sinners” or “souls to be saved”). The western conception of apologies emerged from this 
understanding (Thompson 1997; Smith 2008; Ehrat 2011). The metaethical (or 
deontologist) understanding emphasizes that both the victim and the offender recognize 
each other as two people struggling to make sense of the very meaning of their lives and 
values, whereas the centrality of intentions is emphasized when assessing dignity, 
rationality, and morality of a certain act. Emphasized are the consequences of action rather 
than the transgressor’s mental state). The gradual loss of metaethical meaning of apology 
is ascribed to the general decay of meaning and non-instrumentality in modernity (Smith 
2008). Finally, the dramaturgic (or performative) understanding claims that apologies 
are offerings (i.e. performative moves of the corrective process where the offender is 
given a chance to correct for the offence and re-establish the expressive order), and 
intrapersonal accidents (one’s identity is divided into a rebellious self and a conforming 
self) (Goffman 1959; 1999). Besides, apologies are performative utterances: the act of 
uttering “I apologize” or “I will not do it again” is a performative speech act that brings 
some condition into being through the act of speaking (Austin 1957; Searle 1979).  
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false. In other words, the main goal of a scandal apologia is not the so-called pursuit of 
truth, but a transgressor’s performative efficiency and willingness to confirm the authority. 
Regarding the rhetoric style and verbal eloquence of an effective performance, 
it is more efficient to proclaim, “I was wrong” rather than just “I am sorry” in order to 
demonstrate shared commitment to moral principles (Smith 2008). Consequently, a 
promise (no matter how implicit) which postulates “never to do it again” constitutes the 
most important aspect of apologies. A perfect apology expresses both humiliation and 
humility, where shame and gratefulness are mixed in one single proclamation. Equally 
effective is a demonstration of one’s moral and physical transformation, which is 
substantiated with concrete plans (e.g. immediate hospitalization and temporary 
withdrawal from one’s post). By doing so, transgressors can alleviate the public outrage 
by exhibiting clear symbolic evidence of their commitment (e.g. Sakai Noriko underwent 
psychological health check, wrote a confessional autobiography, started attending 
university courses, divorced from her dubious husband, and attended anti-drug 
campaigns.) By expressing one’s personal commitment, the transgressor can facilitate the 
media’s excuse frame, based on which the audiences react less negatively to the 
transgressor and call for minor or no punishment (Jiang et al. 2011; Kepplinger, Geiss and 
Siebert 2012). The excuse frame has a potential to “cancel the debt to society” (Lakoff 
2009), but if the guilt frame prevails, the transgressor will have to “pay the debt” for 
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causing troubles (meiwaku). 
The televised performance of confession and apology determines the overall 
media frame. In Japan, these televised ceremonies are largely polysemic: they serve as 
both PR tools for improving one’s image by updating the support base, and as emergency 
tools to alleviate a scandal crisis. In case of the latter, these press conferences are used to: 
 
- announce information before it leaks somewhere else (strategic info-leak) 
- denounce transgression but assert innocence (face-saving coming-out) 
- ritually degrade and exclude the transgressor (punitive sanctioning). 
 
Especially the Japanese weeklies and the TV utilizes aforementioned moralizing while 
discussing to what extent did certain media apology present an inherent moral value (i.e. 
the apology proved us that it speaks directly to identity of the transgressor, thus enabling 
his/her moral transformation), and to what extent was it emblematic of a purely 
instrumental value (i.e. the apology served merely as social tool with utilitarian benefits). 
If the latter impression prevails, the transgressor can be additionally accused by the media 
of obscuring justice by conducting a skilful performance.37 
                                                   
37 The weeklies sometimes use pie charts to illustrate the overall quality of one’s scandal 
performance. This chart is determined by factors such as the gravity of transgression 
(jiken no ookisa), impact of the press conference (kaiken no inpakuto) or the length/depth 
of one’s bows (ojigi no fukasa).   
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Lucien Pye insisted that the Japanese leaders follow the rule, “Merely apologize, 
so as not to have to explain” (Pye 1985, 168). Being a part of the cooperative strategy, 
apology is a means of inducing conforming behavior. The public scandal apology (shazai 
kaiken) is itself hardly a spontaneous act since apologizing in public carries with it the 
stigma of loss of reputation. The confessional patterns, including the wording of the 
speech, the emotional expressions, and other “standardized expressive equipment” 
(Goffman 1956) are usually fixed. In Japanese scandal, I distinguish between three main 
patterns of handling the confession: 
 
1. apologetic/cooperative strategy (shazai/kyōryoku no senryaku) 
2. protective/offensive strategy (mamori/seme no senryaku)  
3. strategy breakdown (senryaku hatan).  
 
The apologetic/cooperative performance is typical for celebrity scandals and corruption 
scandals where gathered evidence became overwhelming. The protective/offensive 
strategy usually is utilized by stubborn and relentless politicians. The apologetic and 
offensive strategy however does not exclude each other and can be effectively combined 
as part of one’s damage control (this was the case of Ozawa Ichirō, see below). Finally, 
strategy breakdown is a result of losing emotional control over the situation, or it is caused 
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by dramatically over-performing one’s confession. It occurs rarely, but has to be counted 
for another possible outcome of confessional press conferences.38 
The act of Japanese post-scandal confession is strictly ceremonial in its nature. 
It is a ritualized performance which occurs usually during an urgently arranged news 
conference at some public “non-place” (e.g. a hotel’s conference room). The event is 
rigidly structured, inaugurated by a selected spokesperson, sealed by long bows that 
indicate the degree of deference, and followed by a shower of camera flashes. The culprits 
use a highly polite, humble form of Japanese language (kenjōgo). At the outset, they in 
principle apologize (owabi, shazai) sincerely (kokoro yori, makoto ni, fukaku) for failing 
their personal responsibility (sekinin) and causing inconvenience (meiwaku), worry 
(shimpai) and distrust (fushin) to citizens (kokumin), clients (okyakusan), fans (fan), 
investors (tōshika), stakeholders (sutēkuhorudā), or simply everyone they offended 
(subete no minasan). While apologizing to affiliated institutions (including their 
members) is partly related the historical phenomenon of collective responsibility (rentai 
sekinin) in Japanese social collectivity, apologizing to “everyone” points to the fact that 
the Japanese seken (i.e. the total network of social relations that surround a Japanese 
individual) wields a certain normative power.  
                                                   
38 One such example which went viral in 2014 was the press conference of a provincial 
politician Nonomura Ryūtarō, who ended up crying hysterically and banging his fists on 
the desk while trying to mystify his profligate use of public funds. 
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Those culprits who utilize the cooperative strategy usually indicate gratefulness 
for learning a lesson (hansei) and readiness to prevent recurrence (saihatsu bōshi) of the 
transgression in question. Some add that a transgression like theirs should not be 
permitted (yurusenai), promising to undergo investigation (chōsa) of the 
corruption/scandal by ad hoc committee. Some culprits express in a hegemonic fashion 
their gratitude for cooperation (kyōryoku) and support (sapōto) from those social groups 
they belong to (showbiz agency, political party, company), but they also express gratitude 
to the police and the media.   
Ambiguity as an important aspect of any ritual (Bell 1992), and the Japanese 
scandal-ritual is no exception. As a matter of fact, many scandal performances violate the 
Griceian maxims of linguistic utterance (Grice 1999): expressions are carefully 
ambiguous, usually too brief or too circumlocutory, and the explanation of the motive 
sounds either irrelevant or doubtful. (Or, to use Socratic reasoning: the expression is 
usually neither “true”, nor “good” or “useful”). Besides, this ambiguity, expressed in the 
“soft language” of Japanese politeness contributes to an impression that the culprit either 
camouflages the real motives of transgression, or he/she does not apologize for the 
transgression per se, but for the exposure of the transgression. 
Both the voice and the body of the apologizer play their role during the mediated 
confession. Apart from the aforementioned linguistic utterances, the nonverbal body 
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communication is observed very closely in Japan. It is the physical entity in ritual which 
is followed most closely (Marvin 2002). These “rituals of power” (term by Douglas 1966) 
work upon the body politic through the symbolic medium of the physical body, including 
postures and movements. Moreover, they forge he body of the transgressor as a medium 
of the play of power (Foucault 1977). 
The auxiliary criteria for judging apologetic performances become those 
artificial extensions of personality such as hair color, make up style, or dress code. 
Furthermore, the “struggle for renewal” (both physical and mental) is in Japan valued 
especially in case of those celebrities who announce their plans to undergo medical 
treatment after their scandal (this is the case of celebrities’ drug/sex scandals). During 
their public confessions, the celebrities appear in a physically degraded state, which is yet 
another strategy of Japanese apologia. Finally, the public expressions of feelings are 
generally not favourable in Japan, but the emotional scandal performance reverses this 
ideal. The final sequence of “crime and punishment” includes displays of one’s deep 
sadness, which provides the imagined offended side with observable physiological 
evidence. Here, the tearful performances prove that one’s tears are both natural facts and 
cultural realities of public symbolism.39 
                                                   
39 In Japan, where people are by nature soft on tears, the so-called tears test proves the 
plausibility of transgressor’s self-reflection (hansei) under the scrutiny of a disciplinary 
gaze. In this culture-specific setting, the reason (risei) being overpowered by emotion (jō) 
through tears helps to deform the context (Kishima 1991; Matsumoto 1996; Yano 2004). 
Thus, the source of this public symbolism derives less from private psychology, and more 
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Instead of admitting guilt and asking for forgiveness, a culprit can choose a 
defensive strategy in order to control the scandal fallout by submitting their own self-
narrative. This image restoration strategy lies in denial and avoiding responsibility based 
on reducing offensiveness of transgressions or disguising accusation (Benoit 1995). The 
ulprits avoid taking sides, refrain from comments, or they counter-attack the accusation. 
The Japanese scandal-tainted celebrities are in principle cooperative, submissively 
undergoing the scripted ritual of confession. On the contrary, many Japanese politicians 
and corporate heads choose the noncooperative strategy of denial. (For instance, the 
Japanese heavyweight politicians such as Tanaka Kakuei and Ozawa Ichirō employed 
strategies of attack in order to preserve their face in the wake of their scandal, or they 
aimed to neutralize the impact of accusation by maintaining the atmosphere that no real 
scandal has actually occurred.) Such actors choose to engage in denial in order to 
construct a separation of the accusation and the accuser. By doing so they let the audiences 
shift their attention away from the accusation by shifting blame on other scandal actors 
(e.g. secretaries, biased journalists, or oppositional politicians that scheme one’s character 
assassination). Other transgressors at times utilize the strategy of acting casual and 
relaxed (both in word and action) whereby trying to avoid the “sacred” realm of values. 
                                                   
from the Japanese cultural code. Nonetheless, such public humiliation can provoke 
voyeuristic entertainment bordering with sadistic gaze. In this “spectacle of suffering” 
(term by Boltanski 2004), the unfortunate is being observed by those who do not 
necessarily share their suffering. It can be assumed that some spectators actually find joy 
in the pseudo-sadistic spectacle of a tearful apology. 
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Such scenario is however rare in Japanese scandal apologia.40 
One’s resignation is a usual outcome for Japanese politicians and celebrities 
involved in a scandal. The p litical elites may step down, but they can keep on pulling 
strings behind the scene (the typical case of this was Tanaka Kakuei who became more 
powerful after his scandal). Besides, some scandals are managed as a publicity tool and 
a good showbiz strategy: the moments of confession and apology are covered as a pure 
spin, collapsing apology and comeback phases into one another.41 
By utilizing protective strategy instead of straight apology, the culprit makes the 
scandal look like an “affair” (i.e. a site of contestation and political conspiracy). The most 
common defensive strategy of Japanese elites is to claim innocence via “televised 
vindication” (keppaku kaiken). In such cases, the elites either insist that there occurred no 
illegality (in funding/accounting), or that they did not know that some practice was illegal 
                                                   
40 They are exceptions to this rule in Japan. For instance, consider the not-so-apologetic 
press conference of the Japanese TV host and top-celebrity Shimada Shinsuke who in 
2011 resigned over his links to yakuza, but showed little remorse during the televised 
event. In another case of a unrepentant “powerless elite”, the Olympic logo designer Sano 
Kenjirō shocked the Japanese and international public in 2015 when he vehemently 
denied any guilt in his pending plagiarism cases (Prusa, forthcoming). Most recently, the 
young actor Takahata Yūta surprised the Japanese public by his arrogant stance after his 
alleged rape scandal in August 2016. He looked unrepentant during the bowing ceremony 
upon his release from detention, and refused to conduct any press conference himself. 
(His mother, the veteran actress Takahata Atsuko conducted the confessional ritual 
instead.)         
41 Consider the case of the J-pop star Inagaki Goro who returned after 143 days of exile, 
while his apologetic performance during the TV show SMAP x SMAP garnered a 39 
percent rating. In a different case of the 2011 aftermath of the nuclear crisis in Japan, the 
TEPCO Company apologized to the public by running an apologetic advertisement 
(owabi kōkoku) whereby simultaneously securing further profit for the media (Uesugi 
2012). 
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(in case of drugs). Some culprits simply claim that they did not know about a 
transgression (shirimasen deshita, shōchi/ninshiki shinakatta, mattaku/hakkiri to 
wakarimasen), they cannot comment (nanitomo ienai, komento/kotae ha sashihikaeru), 
or they do not remember (kioku ni gozaimasen, wasureta). The more assertive reactions 
of the Japanese heavyweights include “unnecessary to answer” (kotaeru hitsuyō ga nai), 
“I left the matter up to my secretary/staff” (hisho/sutafu ni makaseta), or claiming that the 
evidence was based on a hearsay (denbun). 
The protective/offensive strategy is chosen by those politicians who know that 
their professional platform (or the cabinet in case of ministerial scandals) will try to 
protect them, because admission of guilt would cause even bigger damage. The less 
defiant politicians express their embarrassment over their carelessness, admit to their 
share of responsibility (sekinin) and emphasize their duty (ninmu) to investigate (kentō) 
the issue in question. In inevitable cases (e.g. based on the excess of corruption, the 
pressures of backstage politics, or based on results from prosecutorial investigation), the 
designated culprits offer resignation (jinin) while distancing themselves from their 
professional platform (entertainment agency, political party, board of directors). In case 
of drug-related scandals the entertainers often apologize but deny the allegation since 
acknowledging any drug abuse in “drogophobic” Japan usually spells the end of career. 
By consulting the substances of scandal confession, it becomes clear that in 
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Japanese scandals, apology has primarily strategic (or instrumental) value with 
performative force. In this approach which counters any metaethical (or deontological) 
understanding of apologies, confession is a mere sociopolitical tool and rhetorical 
stratagem. It is fundamentally motivated by the offender’s attempt to change how others 
perceive them, to keep relationships intact, and to maintain their social stature. Once 
transmitted as a televised performance, the act of confession and apology is turned into 
an orchestrated media pseudo-event with a high degree of spectacularity and elevated 
media ratings. Despite the pseudo-quality of these events, the media offer a window onto 
the mental and physical states directly relevant to apologetic meaning while evaluating 
the trustworthiness and appropriateness of the performance. The media anticipation is 
centered on wording of the confessional statement, while the transgressor’s glances, 
gestures and postures become commented upon. Demonstrating affect and breakdown of 
one’s physical control over body (e.g. lacrimation, sweating or blushing) represents a 
decorum which becomes closely associated with scandal denouement. Nonetheless, most 
scandal denouements do not get by without the ritual of exclusion, which usually follows 
the public confession and apology.  
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2.2. The Ritual of Exclusion 
 
In Japanese ethos, the recognition of harm to one’s group is ideally expressed by 
voluntary disassociation from it. In scandal, where the dissociation is usually not 
voluntary, the aim of this ritual is to display the transition of conflict to resolution by 
publicly degrading and excluding the alleged culprit. As I indicated above, in Japan the 
persistence of religious (liminal) and quasi-religious (liminoid) activities is included in 
the purification ritual. Traditionally, they were conceived as a form of exorcism in order 
to appease deities, but today, this moralizing technique is enforced with the reasoning that 
offenders need to cleanse their spirits to conform to social norms in future (Sugimoto 
2010). In Japanese past, the nonroutine group punishment of exclusion and ostracism 
(mura hachibu) was a form of public boycott of the transgressor, and a punitive 
foundation for regulating group behavior. In a similar vein, ostracism based on pollution 
was one of the crucial themes in Greek tragedy, and it was an important conduct in many 
other areas of Greek life. In other words, humiliation based on differentiation from a 
group, and social exile as a form of radical social isolation, are one of the tenets of the 
civil religion worldwide. I believe that the public ritual of exclusion and social exile in 
Japanese scandal today is just a modernized version of this traditional communal rite. The 
modern ritual of exclusion in scandal is based on the same principle, although its 
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prerequisite is more “technological” (i.e. the ritual is made public, and is “unnaturally” 
magnified, through mainstream media channels). 
The social phenomenon of taboo in Japan is related to ideas of pollution (kegare) 
and evokes antipathy toward the impure (antisocial, unlawful or anomalous). The 
maintenance of taboos was since premodern times constituted by a symbolic 
differentiation of us (the pure ones) and them (the polluted ones), while in serious cases 
the latter is to be excluded in order to maintain the integrity of the sacred. In Japanese 
scandals, the transgressor becomes excluded to the “outside” (gaibu) – that is, beyond the 
imaginary border that delineates their difference to the sacred “inside” (naibu). In practice, 
the inside represents in Japanese context a political faction, party, or even the political 
system as such. Similarly, in Japanese celebrity scandals the popstars and actors become 
temporarily excluded from their mother-agency (jimusho) and are not seen in on stage 
unless their “social exile” has been lifted, which usually depends on the decision of their 
agency. In politics, the primary aim of putting a scandal-tainted party through the ritual 
of exclusion is in principle to prevent failure in upcoming elections, while in celebrity 
scandals the exclusion is primarily capital-oriented: it wishes to “purify” the 
entertainment agency in the eyes of advertisers and audiences. These parties seek 
replacement (resignation, retreat to background) for those members that became “polluted” 
by a transgression beyond the possibility of immediate recovery.  
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Figure 8. Scandal as mediatized ritual of exclusion and reintegration. 
Source: Author  
 
In neofunctionalism, moral meaning is relational, and we establish it in principle by 
comparing “good” meaning to “bad” meaning. This too can be applied to scandals: the 
good members of civil society respect the sacred side of the code, based on which the evil 
(impure, corrupted) one’s should be excluded. This “readjustment” is effected 
performatively, i.e. by means of the ritual of exclusion. 
Marking the boundary between inside and outside while keeping transgressors 
at a distance is one of the tenets of community rituals (Giesen 2006). The discursive 
marking is an outcome of a simplified polarized network of the culturally-specific 
understanding of certain conduct. The deep semiotic framework of good versus evil 
(sacred versus profane, pure versus impure) parallels with the differentiation of us (the 
142 
good community) and them (the evil perpetrators). As previous figure showed, the 
scandalization process in Japanese scandal is also a boundary-marking activity 
constitutive of shifting boundaries between us and them. Similarly, in Japanese attack-
politics it is the “good” actors who represent the delegated sacredness by publicly 
charging the “evil” actors during a scandal. Their motivation however lies less in 
protecting their platform (party, faction, tribe), and more in securing their own political 
capital by making personal profit out of the scandal.42 
In media representation, the impure is made to stand for those signs of pollution 
based on taboos being broken. The polluted transgressor has to be made to stand as “out 
of the ordinary”, and is separated from a place in the legitimate order. In both cases, the 
media and the agents of social control make use of the imaginary moral sentiment of the 
“we” (the normal, moral, respectable), indicating that the transgressor is different from 
the sacred ideals. It is the gravity of the transgression and the confessional performance 
of the transgressor (to which the public responds in a certain way) that influences the 
length of one’s social exile. It is however in principle the case that every scandal culprit 
becomes sooner or later reintegrated to society.    
                                                   
42 The interpellations during the Budget Committee meeting (Yosan Iinkai) are attended 
by all ministers and broadcast live on television and radio. They are one of those “free” 
occasions where rival politicians grill their counterparts on grounds of their alleged 
wrongdoings. As a matter of fact, some interpellations in the past did influence the course 
of a scandal (consider the 1989 sex scandal of Uno Sōsuke, or the 2007 corruption scandal 
of Matsuoka Toshikazu). 
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2.3. Toward Reintegration  
 
In Japanese scandal, confession and temporary exclusion is one of the milestones in the 
restorative process toward the transgressor’s second chances. Japanese moral perception 
values the rehabilitation of the offender, which also becomes reflected in national folk 
tales where those villains who repent are forgiven (e.g. Yanagita 1957; Prasol 2010). The 
aforementioned ritual of exclusion appears damning for one’s career (especially when 
transmitted by the mainstream media). However, the most of transgressing celebrities are 
in Japan allowed to proceed with their comeback while many scandal-tainted politicians 
return to high-profile politics, or they are parachuted to less visible ranks. Some 
politicians resign from ministerial/party posts, or they quit the Diet for certain period of 
time. The scandal-tainted politicians are often re-elected, resorting to (originally 
Shintoist) metaphor of misogi (“purification”) and interpreting their comeback as a 
completion of their purification ceremony. According to Sugimoto (2010), this tendency 
to override ethical considerations with more pragmatic judgements corresponds with the 
social habits of the common Japanese. 
For instance, one of the most corrupt politician in Japan, Suzuki Muneo, was 
expelled from the Liberal Democratic Party in 2002, but he apologized and returned to 
the Diet three years later as a representative of his regional constituency in Hokkaido. 
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Similarly, the Finance Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō resigned in 1991 over a stock market 
scandal, but in few years’ time he became the Prime Minister of Japan. The ex-Prime 
Minister Mori Yoshirō was tainted by the Recruit scandal (1988), involved (together with 
Ozawa Ichirō) in the Nishimatsu scandal (2009), and discredited by his frequent slips of 
tongue. Nonetheless, the scandal-tainted Mori was in 2014 appointed to head of the 
organizing committee for the 2020 Summer Olympics, which itself became scandalized 
by the controversies related to the Olympic Stadium and the Olympic logo. 
The ritual of reintegrating the scandal-tainted elite is not limited to the world of 
politics. For instance, Wakasa Tokuji, the former president of ANA resigned in 1976 after 
being implicated in Lockheed scandal, but before stepping down in 1997 he became a 
honorary chairman. Furthermore, the 2015 plagiarism controversy related to the Olympic 
logo designed by Sano Kenjirō also did not annihilate the stigmatized designer altogether. 
Sano’s logo was withdrawn, but one big advertising agency hired him in order to improve 
their own image based on Sano’s “bad boy” reputation (Prusa, forthcoming). 
  The tradition of purification and reintegration has been a commonplace in 
Japan’s high politics. For instance, Tanaka Kakuei and Fukuda Takeo were indicted in the 
Shōwa Denkō scandal (1948) and Ikeda Hayato and Satō Eisaku were implicated in the 
shipbuilding bribery scandal (1954), but all of them were soon reintegrated and later 
became Japanese prime ministers (besides, Satō received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974). 
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Miyazawa Kiichi resigned in the wake of the Recruit scandal (1988) but returned to 
government in 1998, serving a three-year term as Finance Minister. Abe Shinzō was 
forced to resign in 2007 partly because many of his Cabinet Members were involved in 
corruption, but he was re-elected as Prime Minister in 2012. In another case from the 
same year, Maehara Seiji and Noda Yoshihiko from the DPJ had their donation scandals 
pending (the former resigned as Minister for Foreign Affairs), but they had little trouble 
being re-elected in the 2012 election. More recently, the scandal-tainted Obuchi Yūko 
resigned in 2014 from her post as the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, but soon 
she returned to high politics, while her Minister-colleague from Abe cabinet Amari Akira 
stepped down in 2016 after accusations of political bribery, but as soon as in June of the 
same year he publicly announced that he would resume his political activities. 
The second chances seem to be more common in case of political scandal 
(involving men) than celebrity scandals (involving women). Firstly, this impression 
becomes underpinned by the fact that transgressing females are publicly treated in a more 
humiliating and emotionally tense manner then their male counterparts. Secondly, many 
male celebrities get away with their scandals rather easily. For instance, consider the 
popular entertainers Shimizu Kentarō or Tashiro Masashi (aka “Marcy”) who were both 
arrested multiple times during their career on charges of stimulant possession, but always 
made their comeback while promising to never do it again. In addition, Masashi, who is 
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deemed one of the most notorious transgressing male celebrities in modern Japan, wrote 
his own scandal memoir in 2002, titled Jibaku – The Judgement Day. Similarly, the singer 
and actor Oshio Manabu reappeared on stage in the beginning of 2016 despite the fact 
that in 2011 he was embroiled in a drug scandal which was connected to death of a hostess 
who lost her life after taking drugs with him. 
Most of Japanese celebrities are allowed to come back on stage after their scandal, 
albeit with a different agency or with a modified image. Moreover, many celebrities write 
in the meantime their “scandal memoir” which can be compared to Japanese politicians 
approaching their re-election after scandal as a form of “purification” (misogi). For 
instance, Sakai Noriko released her confessional autobiography after her scandal in 2009, 
and announced her comeback in 2012 (see below). Furthermore, the Japanese celebrity 
Yaguchi Mari, who became famous as a former member of the idol group Morning 
Musume, temporarily fell from grace after her infidelity scandal in 2013, but made her 
TV comeback in 2015. Similarly, the weekly tabloid Shūkan Bunshun in 2013 triggered 
the infidelity scandal of Minegishi Minami from the idol group AKB48, but Minegishi 
impressed many after shaving her head in a self-imposed act of contrition and was 
allowed to make her comeback within just few months’ time. Finally, the Japanese TV 
personality Becky was discredited by the same weekly because of her own infidelity 
scandal but was allowed to return to show business in less than half year despite the 
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unprecedented media frenzy surrounding her case.   
I believe that corruption in Japan is pervasive but rather nontransformative in 
terms of general effect on the elites’ mores. Nonetheless, the scripted (pseudo)ritual of 
pollution and purification based on temporary exclusion is a must. Many “cleansed” 
politicians are re-elected and come back to politics, while most of the transgressing 
celebrities reappear within months or years’ time, depending on the gravity of their 
transgression. Once the shame of degradation from exclusion is endured, most of 
deviating elites are back on track because their political/cultural capital is too precious 
for the system to be wasted by annihilating the transgressor altogether (this was also the 
case of Sano Kenjirō and his Olympic logo/plagiarism scandal from 2015 which did 
humiliate the designer, but thanks to his connections in the world of advertising his 
reintegration is being planned). 
Nonetheless, there are some exceptional cases, where reintegration is likely to 
be impossible. This applies to cases where one’s scandal lead to national disgrace (e.g. 
the 2014 case of Samuragōchi, who falsely claimed to be totally deaf, while his work, 
including the acclaimed No.1 symphony “Hiroshima” from 2003 was actually written by 
a ghost-writer). Furthermore, if the scandal triggers a global ridicule (such as the infamous 
hysterical press conference of Nonomura Ryūtarō in 2014), it is highly unlikely for the 
transgressor to get any second chances in the world of politics. Finally, the reintegration 
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becomes troublesome if the transgressor was involved in a scandal more than one time 
(this is the case of the entertainer Tashiro Masashi, who was arrested based on drug 
possession on multiple times in the past). At any rate, it is safe to conclude that the 
repetitiveness of these ceremonies of confession, exclusion and reintegration (being 
accompanied by the media over-exposure) only intensifies political apathy and moral 
skepticism among the Japanese public. 
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3. ON HEGEMONIC USES OF THE SCANDAL-RITUAL 
 
3.1. The Hegemonic Force of Media Scandals 
 
The previous chapter aimed to illuminate the cultural pragmatism of rituals of pollution 
and purification based on socio-culturally grounded notions of confession, exclusion and 
re-integration. There is however another feature embedded in these scandal-rituals: their 
hegemonic power lies in indirect enforcement of general morality via shaming and 
punishing via adverse publicity.  
In this vein, scandal functions not only as a strategic tool in political discourse 
(see below), but also as a hegemonic tool of soft social control. In the latter case, scandal 
reminds the commoners indirectly to refresh their commitments to rules and conventions. 
In the former case, scandal becomes a pragmatic means of shifting scandalicity from 
corrupted structure to individual agency by attacking and eventually scapegoating 
selected individual. The ultimate argument of this socioethical engineering is to 
demonstrate that “the system worked” while scapegoating (displaying and excluding) the 
transgressor as a “rotten apple”. 
Hegemony is a conflicted and dynamic process, which must continually absorb 
and incorporate disparate values and transgressions (e.g. Williams 1977; Gitlin 1980). 
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Today, these processes would be impossible without the mainstream media that not only 
in Japan play an important role in constructing and controlling the moral discourse. 
Especially in case of crime and scandal reporting, the mainstream media are the primary 
sources of textual and audiovisual messages that transform people’s minds in terms of 
what they want and fear, while legitimizing their power through displaying confessions 
and apologies of rule violators (Edelman 1964; Jenks 2003; Castells 2009; Lakoff 2009). 
Owing to these capacities, the media play the key role in maintaining hegemonic power 
in society.43 
The role of any ritual is either to effect social change, or social conformity (Bell 
1992). In the same vein, the effect of scandal can be disruptive and transformative, as 
well as socially integrative and hegemonic. (Likewise, the public can feel both 
empowered and enthusiastic, or undermined and exhausted by a scandal.) This section 
touches upon the hegemonic features of scandal as informal means of social control 
                                                   
43 Hegemony, a concept originally derived from Antonio Gramsci (1971), describes a 
process where the approval of a certain action is reached through consent rather than 
coercion, being supported by presentations of appropriate meanings on everyday basis. 
Hegemony works by being articulated between the realm of coercion and punishment; it 
is a non-decision-making process which is in part predicated on the media as “ideological 
state apparatuses” that exert power to dominate communicative exchange and define 
reality (Althusser 1995). The primary function of modern disciplinary apparatuses is 
however not revenge for transgression (as was often the case of the premodern 
punishment), but a reform as the means of coming to live by society's standards or norms 
(e.g. Foucault 1977). The media hegemony points to the fact that every media content is 
influenced by the ideology of those in power in society (Herman and Chomsky 1988). 
More importantly for this thesis, the hegemony of scandal (same as the hegemony of 
punitive ritual) lies in the acceptance of authority, which flows from the enactment of the 
scandal-ritual itself, and in the act of production of a subordinate, ritualized agent.  
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through displays of public condemnation. Moreover, relating hegemony to scandal can 
illuminate why the media in Japan possess no coercive and little economic power, but 
they still have significant social and symbolic power over society. 
The hegemonic approach in scandal studies renders media scandals as rituals 
whose mediations serve as an articulation and regulation of dominant moral codes and 
values (e.g. Lull and Hinerman 1997; Thompson 1997). Thus, scandal-rituals attend to 
the process of periodic moralization which supports dominant values, reinforces norms 
and reaffirms the status quo. This symbolic domination includes rhetorical devices public 
degradation ceremonies that aim at making for docility and subordination (Garfinkel 
1956; Foucault 1977). In scandal, the institutional norms are felt as “moral imperatives” 
whose violation is expected to be followed by feelings of guilt and shame on one side, 
and moral indignation on the other. 
Maintaining collective identity by shaming and exclusion is one of the most 
powerful means of shaping and controlling social order (Alexander 1988; Couldry 2003; 
Giesen 2006). Furthermore, the “politics of scandal” relates to a symbolic framework, 
where embarrassment (both personal and institutional), fear (from getting caught), and 
shame (from losing face) becomes a powerful hegemonic tool. This becomes especially 
apparent in Japan where the combination of generating feelings of guilt and exacting 
shame for failure to conform does not encourage rebelliousness (Pye 1985), and where 
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the threat of shaming contributes to the maintenance of Japanese culture as such 
(Matsumoto 1996).44 
The institutional systems manipulate the everyday life of the Japanese from a 
variety of angles in a wide range of spheres. In the past, the Japanese civic religion often 
rendered itself as a “political religion”, which is an example of conscious manipulation, 
only depending on what political regime it serves (Bellah 1957;1970; Bellah and 
Hammond 1980). Contemporary Japanese civil religion is to a significant degree still a 
state-sponsored civil religion that facilitates “massive gentling of the people” (term by 
Bryan Wilson), due to which the Japanese are said to be prone to accept economic 
exploitation and political authoritarianism. One function of this political religion lies in 
offering “reassurance rituals” (term by Edelman 1964) that generate hegemony in a 
pivotal way (Foucault 1977; Thompson 1995; Giesen 2011). 
                                                   
44  The media can enforce behavioral rules by displaying/imposing feelings of guilt 
(which derives from individual reflection of wrongdoing) and shame (which is a socially 
constructed, permanent condition that stigmatizes and makes the shamed person publicly 
undesirable). Guilt is constituted when we act against our personal convictions and it 
accompanies the recognition of our transgression. It is therefore our own conscience (i.e. 
our own readiness to feel guilty) that belongs to hegemonic mechanisms of constraint and 
social control. On the other hand, shame is a social feeling based on being symbolically 
or physically exposed (e.g. Benjamin 1968; Adut 2008). In any case, shame and guilt are 
self-aware moral emotions that evaluate social behavior. Some scholars claim that these 
emotions are to a certain extent culture-specific. Ruth Benedict (2005) stirred academic 
debate over the idea that contrarily to the Western/Christian “guilt culture” (tsumi no 
bunka) with strong sense of sin, Japan represents a “shame culture” (haji no bunka) in 
which there exists little inherent moral pressure in transgressors as long as their 
transgression remains undiscovered. While this dichotomy had certainlimitations, some 
interdisciplinary research recognized its usefulness (e.g. Kerbo and Inoue 1990; Miller 
and Kanazawa 2000; Messersmith 2003; Pinnigton 2010). 
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In Japan, the techniques of “soft social control” ensure that the dominant moral 
order is reproduced. The power of the state is brought into daily mediated experience in 
moralistic fashion, while the moralizing technique is enforced with the reasoning that 
offenders need to “cleanse their spirits” to conform to social norms in future same as in 
the past. There is a continuity in forming moral uniformity on the national scale in Japan. 
In Japanese history, these inclinations became more apparent especially after 1868 when 
the government proceeded to educate its people on ideology (e.g. Prasol 2010). This 
“social management” included the way how Japanese bureaucrats and private groups 
envisioned their task (Garon 1997). For instance, much of the Japanese work ethic, which 
can be traced back to Confucian moralism of the Tokugawa period, continues to be 
promoted today via “administrative guidance” or “spiritual education” programs 
sponsored by the power elites. Throughout Japanese postwar history, these programs 
aimed to inspire the morality of others and legitimate accumulations of capital already in 
place. In case of displaying conflict and scandal, it was traditionally the Japanese 
television news (most notably the NHK) that throughout the postwar history portrayed 
the Japanese bureaucratic state as “conflict manager” and ritualized rule maker (Krauss 
1996; 2000). 
The media hegemony in contemporary Japan (represented by the big five dailies, 
the main news agencies, and the public broadcaster NHK) is closely related to the political 
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hegemony (the nearly uninterrupted postwar rule of the LDP). The better these 
hegemonies cooperate the more effectively will the overarching ideology translate into 
an effective form of soft social control. Such control standardizes the thought patterns and 
attitudes of the Japanese, and it is an important means of “friendly authoritarianism” in 
Japan (Pharr 1990; Miller and Kanazawa 2000; Sugimoto 2010). Furthermore, these 
forces shape both the news content, and the entertainment programs that encourage a 
feeling of social stability which is resistant to substantial social change (Gitlin 1980; 
Shoemaker and Reese 1996). Indeed, these mediated performances originate less in ritual, 
and more in the non-political entertainment itself. This is especially the case of the 
“national medium” of Japanese TV, which relies heavily upon celebrity fetishism, food 
programs, and festival-like spectacularity of mundane things. 
The Japanese conservative media generally respect authorities and condemn 
transgressors from a seemingly removed position. By doing so, they hope to discourage 
social subjects from violating conventions by showing deviation from the desired norm. 
Simultaneously however, they emphasize that corruption and criminality is a function of 
the wicked individual rather than of the “unfair society”. By practicing “general 
deterrence” (term by Sherman 1978), the media aim to scare most people in the population 
from a wrongdoing by publicly punishing few individuals who allegedly “did it”. People 
respond to scandals in a form of moral reflection. This may lead to a minor moral panic 
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in a society, but more often the effect of scandal on the growingly apathetic Japanese 
public is nontransformative or contradictory (see below). 
In a covertly hegemonic mode, the Japanese media for one thing offer a 
compensatory alternative to the public by showing elites being humiliated and persecuted, 
and for the other, they produce an amorphous “atmosfear” in which anybody can be 
shamed and persecuted for defying given conventions. Thus, the seemingly 
subversive/transgressive acts of pollution actually uphold the existing social order – both 
through the media displays of the shaming process, and through a cathartic release of 
divisive tensions. In such cases, the viewing public can find enjoyment by experiencing 
the (Aristotelian) therapeutic relief based on viewing dramatic representations of tragic 
events, or they vent the (Nietzscheian) ressentiment toward the elites via a “bitter joy” 
(schadenfreude) stemming from one’s fall from grace. In other words, the hegemonic 
interpretation of scandal stresses that the confessions and degradations of the rich and 
famous offer certain delight in witnessing the social elites being persecuted, whereby 
releasing the tensions and frustrations of the public. Finally, in scandal, the 
aforementioned affects bridge between the emotional, hegemonic and economic realms, 
which makes them a sought-after media commodity with high levels of emotivity and 
cheap production costs. 
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3.2. Rendering Corruption as Human-Interest Story 
 
In many scandals, the mediopolitical hegemony tends to deemphasize issues of structural 
corruption by pointing at individual cases, and by focusing on human-interest aspects and 
various second-order transgressions. While utilizing adversalialism as ritual, the charges 
against officials are often restricted to them personally while being separated from their 
institutions and offices. In other words, especially the mainstream media tend to focus on 
whether a certain social elite was personally corrupt while ignoring larger structural 
issues.45  
The Japanese media often distract attention from deeper structural problems – 
either by focusing on the secondary transgressions, or by making scandals into spectacles 
about the private lives of individual elites. They redirect the public attention to human 
interest-related sensations while keeping the deeper background beyond reach. Quite 
common in this regard are scandal sub-dramas that contain elements of sex, drugs, and 
public indecency. A telling example is the Nishiyama incident from 1972 (also “Okinawa-
                                                   
45  Individualization of corruption is however inevitable because official policies or 
operations of political parties cannot become scandals – no matter how unreasonable, 
wicked, and inherently scandalous they are. In other words, corporations have neither 
bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned, and after all it is not the system that 
cheats, lies and steals, but it is the people (Sherman 1978; Barker 1994; Newton 2006). 
Besides, events discussed in terms of individual actors are always more likely to be 
reported than those that are the outcome of abstract social forces (Galtung and Ruge 1965). 
Finally, it is only via individualization that someone can be held responsible in order to 
ameliorate the public backlash. 
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gate”, or Okinawa mitsuyaku jiken). The political journalist Nishiyama Takichi disclosed 
a top-secret official document, in which the Japanese government paid millions of dollars 
to the US government in order to end the occupation of Okinawa. Nonetheless, Nishiyama 
was soon after the disclosure accused of an extramarital affair with the (female) source of 
his scoop. This human-interest story became the main focus of media coverage. The 
accusation generated a new sex scandal while redirecting the attention away from 
governmental deception which was at the origin of the incident. The Japanese mainstream 
media sided with the government while Nishiyama went in a 30-year self-imposed exile. 
In a similar case from 2002, the Japanese prosecutor Mitsui Tamaki, who claimed he was 
arrested for being whistleblower, was brought down by a constructed scandal based on a 
claim that he was seen with an escort during his business hours (West 2006).  
There are many other cases of shifting scandalicity from the inherently corrupted 
structure to individualized agency. For instance, in 2014 the trade minister Miyazawa 
Yōichi was accused of a conflict of interest over his shares in the TEPCO Company while 
receiving illegal donations from a foreign-owned firm. These issues were however soon 
overshadowed by a sex scandal related to Miyazawa (his underlings spent office cash in 
a sadomasochism bar in Hiroshima). Moreover, the primary controversy itself (i.e. the 
minister owned 600 shares in the de facto nationalized company under his jurisdiction) 
was an effective distraction from restarting nuclear reactors and raising the sales tax (see 
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McCurry 2004). Much earlier in 1994, the Chief of MOF’s Inspector’s Office became a 
target of scandal after enjoying himself in a shabu-shabu restaurant with waitresses in the 
nude from the waist down. The extraordinariness of this scandal also distracted the public 
from the fact that mismanagement of economy is a deep structural problem within most 
elite ministries in Japan (see Johnson 1982; Amyx 2003; George Mulgan 2006). By 
making the MOF staff into the main villain, the Japanese media avoided examining the 
flaws of the system he exploited. 
Other Japanese scandals were fueled via connecting the transgressor to some 
sensitive issue while rendering as dangerous for the system in question. For instance, the 
sex scandal of the China-born DPJ member Nakai Hiroshi in 2012 received bigger 
coverage because the reporters were interested in how the DPJ government of Hatoyama 
would respond (see Carlson 2013). More recently, the LDP’s Mutō Takaya became in 
2015 infamous for his ultra-rightist remark on his Twitter account (he called the Japanese 
youth as “selfish” (rikoteki) since according to him they tend to avoid war). Shortly after 
this gaffe, Japanese tabloids ridiculed Mutō based on a sex scandal very similar to that of 
Nakai (Mutō allegedly let a male prostitute access the lawmakers’ lodging in Tokyo’s 
Akasaka district). 
Avoiding the corruptness of the elites’ structure by refocusing on some second-
order transgression with a human-interest quality is practiced in Japanese entertainment 
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as well. For instance, the Japanese pop-star Aska was in 2014 arrested in a drug scandal, 
but soon the media focused on his multiple lovers while leaving aside the well 
documented proliferation of illegal drug use in Japanese showbiz. Similarly, during the 
megascandal of Sakai Noriko from 2009 the media for ignored the structural issue of drug 
use in Japanese celebrity world while focusing instead on human-interest features of 
Sakai’s troubled past (see below). 
While pushing structural scandalicity toward individual agency, the Japanese 
media tend to focus on marginal “objects of interest”, rendering them as profane symbols 
of corruption. For instance, the academic controversy of Obokata Haruko (the 2014 STAP 
cell scandal) made headlines in every newspaper, but the TV stations focused more on 
Obokata’s cooking apron (kappōgi) than on the original issue of thesis fabrication. In the 
same year, the Justice Minister Matsushima Midori was accused of violating the election 
law, while the object of interest was the paper fan which the Minister distributed to voters 
in her district. (Similarly, Matsushima’s colleague-Ministers Obuchi Yūko and Shimajiri 
Aiko were ridiculed based on aa paper calendar bearing the politician’s’ name). Finally, 
earlier in 1990s the LDP politician Kanemaru Shin became vilified based on millions of 
dollars and gold bars found in his home. The object of interest (i.e. the stash of gold bars 
in Kanemaru’s closet) became the symbol of political greed.46  
                                                   
46 The scandal of Kanemaru Shin was a “moral paradox”: the prosecutors were under a 
strong pressure after it became clear that Kanemaru was allegedly receiving only a mild 
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3.3. Scapegoating and Attack-Politics 
 
If unsound practice is publicly recognized, the related institution must designate a target 
to blame in order to protect itself (in organizational analysis, this phenomenon is known 
as “bad apple frame”). Rene Girard (1996) located ritual sacrifice as the central act of 
cultural systems, while Durkheim (1915) understood the act of sacrifice as a symbol of 
social alignment. Furthermore, Kenneth Burke (1969) insisted that there are only two 
ways of redemption from the guilt: mortification (i.e. confession of guilt and request for 
forgiveness) and victimage (i.e. placing the blame on someone else, usually via the 
process of scapegoating). In the same vein, Georg Simmel criticized the practice of self-
sacrifice as an act flowing from the irrational forces of feeling and volition which points 
to a lack of intelligence, or to a desire to disguise one’s hidden egoism (Simmel 1978). 
These insights are reflected in institutionalized treatment of transgression and corruption 
in Japan and elsewhere. For instance, in his classic research on police corruption, 
Lawrence Sherman (1978) registered a frequent strategy of “rotten apples”: in order to 
defend the corrupt police department from the all-encompassing deviant label, the police 
                                                   
treatment. However, Kanemaru became eventually exposed because he compassionately 
insisted not to let his personal secretary take the blame for the scandal (see Babb 2005). 
In Japan, it is usually the aides and junior associates of senior politicians who buy stocks 
on the market instead of their bosses whereby keeping superior’s name technically clear. 
While protecting his aides (instead of using them as protective shield) Kanemaru 
destroyed his political career and contributed to the fall of the LDP from power in 1993.  
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rather admitted to individual deviance whereby re-shifting the responsibility from the 
corrupted system to few individual policemen. In Japanese context, David Johnson (2003) 
found that the problem of police corruption (i.e. the embezzlement of money from police 
slush funds) is not a problem of a few rotten apples, but of a failed organization. My case 
studies (see below) also show a tendency of the elite backstage to blame individuals 
instead of scrutinizing the inherently corrupted structure. At any rate, an individual 
sacrifice for the sake of social preservation is a social function that is at the core of any 
society, while scapegoating contributes to maintaining the sociocultural order.  
The social practice of scapegoating can be found in traditional rites where the 
transgressor becomes a moral sacrifice that is offered for the group’s sin. In Japan, the 
scapegoat legacy and ostracism has been present in communal existence since ancient 
times, and it co-defines everyday interaction in order to enforce social consensus (e.g. 
Eisenstadt 1995). In Japanese scandal, there exist a tendency to punish the lowest 
accountable person instead of the highest, while the Japanese corporate monoculture gets 
usually strengthened by the illusion that bad apple has been rooted out (Johnson 2001). 
In contemporary Japan, the formal and informal agents of social order are more interested 
in finding someone guilty rather than finding the guilty someone. According to Pascha 
(1999) and many other, one of the main reasons why cases of corruption are made public 
in Japan is related to looking for scapegoats. In this subchapter, I further elaborate on 
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argumentation and indicate how scapegoating works as a patterned mechanism of turning 
structural corruption into a forced public ritual of confession and exclusion. 
Generally, scapegoats are individuals who are designed to personify a 
wrongdoing, and/or to be punished for the errors of others. Besides, they can be 
stigmatized by their rivals in order to ameliorate the public outrage and to use support of 
public resentment to gain power. The elite deviants can become scapegoats of the social 
system as a whole: the guilt is relieved by blaming and excluding the individual in 
question while attempting to save the reputation of one’s professional platform. If there 
exist concerns that a certain scandal could have a negative effect on social processes (e.g. 
during elections), others want to keep a demonstrative distance. By accusing someone of 
immorality via scandal, the collective fault is thrown onto a scapegoat which becomes 
characterised as profane, and foreign to “sacred” ideals. Besides, once a transgressor 
becomes publicly convicted, he/she serves as an easy target for unloading the surplus 
confusion in the public (i.e., the frustration is directed towards the spoiled and overpaid 
elites). Consequently, the pubic polls allocate support for the stigmatizer and approve of 
the stigma of the alleged offender. This process becomes crucial for the stigmatized 
transgressor especially in Japan, where the stigma runs very deep (see West 2006).   
In Japan, the act of self-victimizing bears on ritualistic features. The Japanese 
elites usually admit fault without further elaborating on questions surrounding his guilt. 
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Their performance however varies depending on how seriously they implement the 
expected appearance (tatemae). The scandal performance is typical of dramaturgical 
perfection in case of those who willingly accept the role of culprit, only to be given 
another portfolio at the next occasion. This is also the case of mothers/wives apologizing 
on behalf of their transgressing sons/husbands.47 
On the contrary, the heavyweight politicians insist that that they were made 
scapegoats by their opponents – either in politics, or by the media. Indeed, these cries are 
hard to refute since many Japanese political scandals are attributed to the invisible part of 
politics (Taniguchi 2007). There are many cases of lobbying, majority manoeuvres, 
attack-politics, and politically-motivated use of corruption which is the main force behind 
many Japanese scandals. On the other hand, however, blaming the opponents for 
conspiracy can be rendered as a cheap strategic tool to win the sympathy of the viewing 
public.48 
                                                   
47  For instance, the wife of Ototake Hirodata, who was in 2016 embroiled in a 
sex/infidelity scandal, apologized publicly while stating that she too “shared 
responsibility”. Only few months later, the veteran actress Takahata Atsuko apologized 
for his son’s sex scandal, although the purpose of her apology was motivated by 
safeguarding her own position in show business (Brasor 2016). Similarly, when the son 
of the actress Mita Yoshiko was arrested for drugs in 1998, she apologized in person, 
because – same as in the case of Takahata – she was blamed for securing jobs for her son 
despite his unprofessional attitudes. According to Brasor (2007), this case illuminates the 
deeply-rooted issue of gender inequality in Japan since nobody expected the person’s 
father (former NHK director) to take the responsibility for his son’s scandal.  
48 Let us consider here the conspiratorial nature of political scandal in postwar Japan. 
The Shōwa Denkō scandal from 1948 was said to be used by the Liberal Party to attack 
the Socialist and Democratic Parties coalition, while the Shipbuilding scandal from 1954 
pointed to political opponents that used the crisis to attack the government and damage 
its reputation. The 1974 scandal of Tanaka Kakuei was propelled by Sasakawa Ryōichi 
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The most radical form of scandal performance is the so-called scapegoat-suicide. 
It is not unusual in modern Japan that some scapegoats loyally divert the responsibility 
from their superiors by killing themselves. This is not identical with Durkheim’s 
“altruistic suicide”, and it stands for yet another Japanese phenomenon which points to 
the fact that there are clearly different cultural responses to shame and responsibility. 
Some political aides and high officials approach the act of suicide as “alternative means” 
of taking full responsibility for a scandal, but they can also perceive it as a duty to make 
sure that the scandal will not cause trouble to the authority they serve. In such cases, 
suicide effectively hinders further investigation of the prosecutor’s office.49 
                                                   
(see Samuels 2003) while Tanaka’s Lockheed scandal, which occurred two years later, 
was allegedly generated by the prosecutors cooperating with the ruling party and the 
media (Johnson 1986; The Asahi Shinbun Company 2015). Some cases of attack-politics 
such as the Teijin scandal in 1934 and the Recruit Scandal in 1988 were allegedly used as 
attacks on political parties in general (Yayama 1990; Mitchell 1996). Furthermore, the 
first female foreign minister Tanaka Makiko was scapegoated because she was too critical 
about the Prime Minister Koizumi (Berkofsky 2002). More recently, the donation scandal 
of Ozawa Ichirō (2009) and Obuchi Yūko (2014) were perceived as a character 
assassination of those who posed a threat to the establishment. 
49 In the aftermath of the so-called STAP cell scandal in 2014, which targeted the RIKEN 
researcher Obokata Haruko, the co-author of the controversial research paper on STAP, 
Sasai Yoshiki committed suicide. In 2009, the former Minister of Finance Nakagawa 
Shōichi apparently committed suicide following his faux-pas (he seemed to have been 
drunk during the press conference) at the G7 finance Ministers’ meeting in Rome, which 
lead to his resignation. Matsuoka Toshikatsu (then Minister of agriculture) and Yamazaki 
Shin’ichi (former executive director of a government environmental agency) committed 
suicide after a scandal regarding suspicious book-keeping practices in 2007-8 (Matsuoka 
became the first sitting member in the postwar period who committed suicide). In 2004, 
the former chairman of the renowned Seibu Group, Tsutsumi Yoshiaki and the president 
of Seibu Railway Koyanagi Terumasa, both committed suicide in the wake of the 
Seibu/Kokudo insider trading scandal. In 2001, the former junior minister Nakajima 
Yōjirō hanged himself after being convicted on charges of vote-buying and bribe-taking, 
while in 2006, a young executive at securities linked to Horie Takafumi’s Livedoor 
scandal (Noguchi Hideaki) also committed suicide. In the aftermath of the 1998 
bureaucratic scandal (no-pan shabu-shabu), one official involved in the scandal hanged 
himself. Earlier in 1997 the police raid of the offices of the corrupted Ministry of Finance, 
165 
IV.  
MEDIATING SCANDAL IN POSTWAR JAPAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
and another corporate raid in the Dai-Ichi Kangyo bank scandal resulted in two suicides 
(the latter was former chairman of the bank, Kunji Miyazaki). One year later, the Diet 
member Arai Shōkei hung himself after receiving funds illegally generated on the stock 
market. In one of the police scandals from 1990s, a Fukuoka police officer committed 
suicide after it was revealed that the police psychologically pressured suspects and 
defendants. In 1989, the chief aide and finance secretary (Aoki Ikei) of then Prime 
Minister Takeshita Noboru committed suicide in the aftermath of the Recruit bribery 
scandal. Earlier in 1983, Nakagawa Ichirō (the father of aforementioned Nakagawa 
Shōichi, and a patron of Matsuoka Toshikatsu) also committed suicide, which was linked 
to skeletons in his closet. In 1980, the managing director of the trading Company Nissho-
Iwai committed suicide after receiving bribes from the McDonnell-Douglas company. 
The largest number of scapegoat suicide in postwar Japan is attributed to the Lockheed 
scandal from 1976: the American corporate treasurer of Lockheed, Robert N. Waters 
committed suicide on the eve of the senate inquiry; the film actor Maeno Mitsuyasu died 
in a suicide attack on Kodama Yoshio (who was the key figure in the very same scandal), 
and even the chauffeur of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei killed himself in the aftermath 
of Lockheed.   
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1. UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR QUALITIES OF JAPANESE SCANDAL 
 
Scandals occur in every society. At first sight, the conduct of corruption and scandal does 
not differ much from culture to culture, while the “minimal structure” of scandal is 
universal. Everywhere in the world, corruption, scandal and gossip focuses on areas of a 
structural tension in whic conflicting interpretations of obligation and expectation cause 
certain strains (Turner 1969; Merry 1984). The existence of liminal and remedial phases 
(i.e. conflict/transgression, and resolution/redemption) was confirmed cross-culturally 
(Turner 1990; Bell 1992; Barkow 1992; Jenks 2003; Alexander 2006b). Historically, a 
culture at the edge of utter corruption is one of the oldest themes found in narratives of 
the human race as such (see Girard 1996; Campbell 2004; Estes 2004), while the 
narratives of scandal as epic, tragedy, and heroism are present in both East and West 
(West 2006; Prusa 2016a). Furthermore, feeding on one’s private issues and scandalizing 
one’s inappropriate behavior was part of social and political communication since 
antiquity. Transgression and corruption has been occurring in ancient Rome, the Islamic 
World, or Communist China (Pascha 1999; Murphey 2009; Sato and Doggett 2013), but 
scandal is not limited to these regions. Especially in last decades, major corruption 
scandals have rocked on a massive scale many Asian countries including South Korea, 
Indonesia, Cambodia, the Philippines or Myanmar (see Pharr 2000; Kidd and Richter 
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2003; Chang and Chu 2006). 
If we take into account the recorded cases of unveiled corruption, followed by a 
public scandal in various world regions, we can safely assume that this phenomenon is a 
standard feature of all forms of political systems worldwide. The present-day systemic 
corruption is attributable to various normative strengths (e.g. personal moral obligations, 
effective voluntary associations, the centrality of elections in politics and the value of 
winning them, which can trigger attack-politics with scandalization as one of its tools). 
In the West, same as in Japan, scandal derives from capitalist conditions, the influences 
of globalization, and the distorted public sphere which is now heavily mediated by money 
and power media (e.g. Hanada 1997; Castells 2009).  
Corporate contributions and donations that bear an element of bribery are evident 
in many democracies including Japan. Buying political influence and influencing 
governmental policy is a “legal” way of institutional corruption in the U.S. today (Lessig 
2011; Gilens and Page 2014), while the semi-independent American press is seriously 
failing its role tied to social responsibility (Bennett 2007; Bennett, Lawrence and 
Livingston 2007). In a similar vein, illegal financial practices in many European countries 
had been common and tolerated throughout the 20th century with many European 
politicians relying on illegal funds (see Barker 1994; Pujas 2002; Adut 2008). Besides, 
scandals and other socially harmful acts of power elites in the US are less common in 
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Japan (e.g. Reischauer 1977; Kerbo and Inoue 1990; West 2006). Likewise, gossip is also 
a universal social phenomenon, while the contents of gossip do not differ much across 
human societies. In Japan and elsewhere, judgemental/malicious gossip leads to being 
ridiculed with derogatory nicknames with victims of foul gossip being ostracized (see 
Smith 1961; Gluckman 1963; Merry 1984). Even the use of gossip for the sake of 
informal social control and maintenance of discipline is not unique to Japan.50 
In the same vein, nepotism and cronyism are endemic in all kinds of systems and 
cultures. Especially the psychological trait of nepotism, which is constitutive of many 
power scandals based on bribery and kick-backs, is in many cultures considered as 
immoral, although its psychological mechanisms have universal design features that 
make human beings everywhere tend to be nepotistic (e.g. Barkow 1992; Matsumoto 
1996). Besides, politicians everywhere came to be gradually perceived to be more or less 
inherently corrupted, so the issue of frequent political corruption does not bring about any 
serious public outrage in Japan and other “disaffected democracies” (term by Pharr 2000).  
On the other hand, however, corruption cannot be viewed in isolation of its 
societal context: the recognition of certain behavior as scandalous, and the way how each 
                                                   
50  In feudal Japan, intra-group mutual surveillance (including village gossiping and 
reporting deviances to authority) played an important socially-integrative role in 
maintaining group responsibility (cf. the goningumi system, or the han system). In rural 
Japan, people still receive occasional visits from agents of social control who collect 
gossip about their neighborhood. We can find similar utilization of gossip in western 
corporate culture: consider only the 2015 Amazon scandal which revealed that the 
workers were instructed to gossip about their colleagues and encouraged to send secret 
feedback to their bosses for the good of the company (see Kantor and Streitfeld 2015). 
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society treats transgression, is to an important degree culturally-specific, and reflective of 
each society’s mores and attitudes. What constitutes transgression and corruption is 
culturally variable: the forms of institutionalized corruption are not the same in all places 
and times, and the boundaries for defining what is deviant or antisocial are also “cultural 
boundaries”. Equally importantly, what matters in culture-specific scandal performance 
is the varying dominance of beliefs, emotions, and ritualized modes of expression. Some 
researchers emphasized that in Asia, the media logic when treating transgression is linked 
to preserving the onfucianism-influenced social harmony, face-saving, mutual trust, and 
respect for leadership (Masterton 1996; Pharr 1990; 1996; Hanitzsch 2007). Besides, the 
sense of “institutional sacredness”, and the authoritarian aura that surrounds the rituals of 
power is characteristic for Asia in general (Chang and Chu 2006) and Japan in particular 
(Parsons 1954; Pye 1985; Bellah 2003; Murphy 2014). Furthermore, the Japanese media 
system, the political style and the nature of Japanese public sphere are the products of 
their own distinct histories (e.g. Hanada 1997; de Lange 1998; Freeman 2000; Pharr 2000; 
Krauss 2000). 
The scandalization of the Japanese politics in postwar Japan was partly a 
consequence of specific electoral system (i.e. the multi-seat constituency system which 
let parties strive to win as many seats in the same constituency as possible, wherefore the 
candidates from the same party must fight one another). In the celebrities’ drug/sex 
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scandals, it is the Japanese media that deliberately exaggerate the transgression (this 
becomes more apparent if compared to a rather benevolent approach to celebrity scandals 
in the West). Furthermore, a rather humiliating public treatment of female celebrities 
during their closely watched press conferences, same as a rather harsh treatment by their 
agencies (jimusho) reflects both the sexism of the entertainment industry as such (e.g. 
Marx 2012; McCurry 2016), and the deeply rooted patrilineal family system (ie) in which 
female adultery is seen as a serious infraction (Sechiyama 2016). On the contrary, the 
overflowing sexuality is thought to be part of the package that makes for a vital, 
charismatic male leader.  
Japanese commercial sector is often perceived as a homogeneous communal 
society with tight social networks based on mutual trust, ritual deference to authority, and 
a sense of shared self-interest in pursuit of national advancement. The governing bodies 
might be weak, but Japanese corporations maintain strength via internal rules, norms of 
silence and extralegal punishments. Besides, in societies such as Japan, where the lasting 
social ties are based on mutual obligations and gift-giving, removing oneself from the 
obligation to receive or give can become the object of denunciatory scandal (Gluckman 
1963; Mauss 1966; Blic and Lemieux 2013). Japanese corporate governance is typical of 
opaque decision-making, hierarchy-driven culture, and internal managerial rigor. A 
failure to abide by the law may be known to, but not condemned by the group, while 
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avoiding a leak of a sensitive information in order to maintain the group is considered 
public morality. Besides, in Japanese corporate world these factors impede outside 
directors from having sufficient independence from the management, while he statutory 
auditors wield not enough power against directors. 
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2. CORRUPTION AND SCANDAL IN POSTWAR JAPAN 
 
Political scandals seem to similar structural features across cultures, but they must be 
examined in a historical context of a particular system. Clearly categorizing Japanese 
political system is however problematic since contemporary Japan inheres non-Western 
heritage while assimilating various aspects of Western thought in many areas. The twin 
imperial/government system with its ancient roots, and the postwar constitution (drafted 
by the United States but being different from the US model) are just two examples that 
impede us from a clear categorization of Japan being centralised, traditional, or 
“democratic”.51 
 
 
 
                                                   
51 There exist countless accounts on the state of democracy in postwar Japan (western 
scholars used various labels such as Asian-style democracy, democracy without 
opposition, pseudo-democracy, interest democracy, it-can’t-be-helped democracy, 
MOFocracy, karaoke democracy, or feudalistic democracy). Some revisionists suggested 
to abolish the concept of democracy in Japan altogether (Wolferen 1989), while other 
Japanese critics claimed that the mediopolitical complex in Japan is using democracy to 
undemocratize the society (Asano 2001). Indeed, the contemporary Japanese voters have 
lower levels of voluntary political participation while being skeptical toward democracy 
as a dynamic system (Ito 1993; Ikeda and Kohno 2008; Yamamoto 2010). Nonetheless, 
by comparative standards, Japan represents an industrial democracy much like the 
Western democracies (see Pye 1985; Reed 1993).  
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2.1. Locating Corruption in Political Practice 
 
Political corruption can be described as a trade-off between corporate and private 
donations, and unlawful selling of services by politicians and officials in exchange for 
personal or party benefits (e.g. Rothacher 1993; McCormack 1996; Castells 2009). 
According to Japan’s bribery law, bribe becomes a crime if 1) the official demanded, 
received or contracted to receive money or something else of value, 2) the official knew 
the money was a bribe, and 3) the official was in position of authority to influence official 
business in favor of the briber (e.g. Johnson 2002).52 
One of the most frequent corruptive practices in Japan is the bid-rigging on 
public projects (kansei dangō). In such case, a contract is awarded at a price higher than 
if it were put out to bid through fair competition whereas the successful bidder makes 
unfair gains at the expense of taxpayers’ money. Other frequent forms of corruption are 
money laundering (i.e. making hidden money public), offering lucrative insider stock 
information, donating money through multiple routes, constructing law-evading sales 
systems and converting tax moneys into slush funds (uragane), using illicit, “creative” 
accounting (fusei keiri) via shifting the losses to different accounts (tobashi), “cultivating” 
                                                   
52 Moreover, the Japanese Political Funds Control Law (Seiji Shikin Kisei Hō) prohibits 
corporate donations except to political parties or their organizations for managing 
political funds (see Giannakopoulos, Maras and Amano 2009). Prohibited are also 
donations made under the name of another person or body, donations from foreign firms, 
and donations accepted from “anti-social” forces (i.e. yakuza). 
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bureaucrats via entertainment (zōtō settai) and spending official expenses on vote 
buying.53 
It is rather unsurprising that the father of money politics in Japan, Tanaka Kakuei 
insisted that his political modus operandi was consistent with Japanese traditions of 
political action (Stockwin 2003). After his scandal, Tanaka stated that he did not do 
anything out of ordinary, and that his political opponents only changed the rules on him 
(Johnson 1986). In a similar vein, the LDP Secretary-General Abe Shintarō (the father of 
Prime Minister Abe Shinzō) defended the culprits in the Recruit scandal from 1988 by 
stating that political donations are essential to maintaining a dynamic politics in Japan 
(Herzog 2013). Furthermore, during the 2005 scandal of the Japan Highway Public 
Corporation, Okuda Hiroshi (then chairman of Keidanren) insisted that the practice of 
bid-rigging (dangō) is a custom one finds just about everywhere (Hatch 2010), while the 
scandal of Matsuoka Toshikazu in 2007 revealed that the custom of kickbacks in public 
construction projects is practiced by virtually every Japanese politician – including the 
political heavyweight Ozawa Ichirō, who in the midst of his own scandal in 2009 insisted 
that politicians should be able to use political donations as they wish (Time, March 13, 
2009). 
                                                   
53 Some politicians make use of social expenses (kōsaihi), office expenses (jimushohi), 
utility expenses (kōnetsusuihi) and expenses for investigative activities (chōsakatsudōhi) 
by listing them as expenses, but spending them on vote buying or embezzling them for 
personal profit. 
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The cost of becoming a politician in Japan today, and the cost of operational 
expenses needed to run the personal support groups (kōenkai) surpasses any other country. 
Japanese politicians face pressures to raise large sums of money, which necessarily 
overrides any ethical considerations. Corruption in Japan becomes more a question of 
competitive pressures, and less of the politicians’ personal benefit. While illustrating this 
fact, Nyblade and Reed (2008) distinguished between the political corruption of cheating 
(i.e. use of illicit means to enhance one’s chance to be elected), and the economic 
corruption of looting (i.e. illicit use of public office private material gain). The authors 
confirmed that in Japan, much of political corruption has centered on improving the 
political fortunes in elections. Cheating can even be seen as “noble” since the elites utilize 
unethical/illegal means only to obtain a desired result, which eventually benefits some 
“greater good” (i.e. benefits for supporters/voters). On the contrary, looting, with its 
individualistic character and disregard for economical/political interaction, was regarded 
as profoundly dysfunctional (Girling 1997). It is also condemned by the spirit of Japanese 
law, where the rejection of private self-interest is a justification of authority and public 
welfare (Haley 2006). 
Another important factor related to political corruption scandal is the degree, and 
the excess of a certain illegal/inappropriate act. In Japanese past, only those spirited 
individuals were celebrated who were prepared to take risks and exploit openings in order 
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to accomplish great things (Pye 1985). Today, corruption in Japan is structural and thus 
unavoidable if a politician wants to succeed. The problem can however surface if a 
politician is all-too-successful and ambitious while threatening the balance of the 
conservative hierarchical system. In other words, “excess” becomes a prelude to scandal 
in Japan (Nester 1990; Wolferen 2011a; Murphy 2014). The magnitude of such excess is 
expressed either by the amount of money at play (i.e. huge amounts are used for personal 
profit), or by an individualist, arrogant and “revolutionary” spirit (i.e. one attempts to 
extensively change the established power alignment).54 
There are more explanations behind the omnipresence of political, bureaucratic 
and corporate corruption in Japan. If seen from the Weberian perspective, the 
phenomenon of corruption can be conceived of as a despicable pathology for developing 
societies. Eventually, this pathology would be wiped out in the process of modernization, 
bureaucratization and rationalization (Weber 1978). This hypothesis however becomes 
                                                   
54 Consider the case of Horie Takafumi (aka Horiemon) and his Livedoor scandal from 
2006. Horiemon was arrested on suspicions of market manipulation which lead to a 
disastrous loss of his company’s market value. He was accused of securities fraud and 
sentenced to two and half years in prison. The problem with his transgression, which was 
nothing new in Japanese business world, was rendered as excessive, and undermining the 
foundations of Japanese market norms. Horiemon was just an independent actor who 
aimed to trigger a revolutionary change in the old political economy in Japan. In the same 
year, another activist investor, Murakami Yoshiaki was convicted based on insider 
trading in Nippon Broadcasting System shares. They both became a dangerous force for 
the long-standing elites who resented Murakami and Horie as “cowboy capitalists” (term 
by Hatch 2010). Besides, we can notice similarities between Murakami, Horie and the 
founder of the Recruit Company, Ezoe Hiromasa, who also attempted to bypass the 
traditional Japanese employment with a new labor market, but was undone by the Recruit 
scandal in 1988. 
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problematic if applied to modern Japan. For example, Weber’s rationalization referred to 
eliminating the old-fashioned practices, but various ritual exchanges are still prevalent on 
various levels of Japanese polity (e.g. gift-giving as a fixed custom that may or may not 
constitute systemic bribery). More importantly, the corruptive practices in Japanese 
political and corporate world cannot be regarded as “dysfunctional” – quite to the 
contrary: in Japan, the business collusion came to be perceived as “function of culture” 
(Johnson 2001; Hatch 2010), while corruption often served as a grease for the economy 
(Blaker 1977; Pascha 1999). Simultaneously, a corruption which increases loyalty and 
political trust was in Japan intimately connected with the growth of democratic 
governance (Babb 2005), with the meritocratic bureaucracy generating social benefits and 
redistributing income from the rich sectors to the poor ones (Johnson 1982; 1986). Seen 
from the postmodern perspective, the corruption is a coordination game among various 
relevant actors within a polity, while the issue at stake is no longer the “truth” behind 
corruption, but the best possible input/output equation. 
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2.2. Historical Observations of Political Corruption in Postwar Japan 
 
Corruption and bribery was a common affair since the beginning of Japan’s recorded 
history. The political corruption in official places dates back to the Heian period (794-
1185), being a source of repeated scandals in feudal, prewar and postwar periods (see 
Calder 1988; Mitchell 1996; McCormack 1996; Curtis 1999; Hayes 2005). In Japan, the 
long tradition of social stratification and feudalism laid the foundation of “interest 
democracy”, in which collaborative competition with collusive traits was supported 
(Kyogoku 1987; Leggett 1995; Pharr 2000). Furthermore, the postwar Japanese public 
approached voting as a duty rather than a right, while being more concerned with practical 
ends than the ethic of the means (Kyogoku 1987). Bribery was officially deemed immoral 
(by the Confucianists) and illegal (by state authorities), but it was widespread before and 
after the Meiji Restoration, and it played an important role in political processes while 
greasing the political machinery. Since the beginning of 20th century, the most sensational 
political/corporate corruption cases were: 
- sugar bribery case (1909): Diet members accepted bribes in return for tax concessions 
for Japan’s leading sugar producer 
- Siemens scandal (1915): bribery of naval officers to secure a contract with the German 
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arms maker to provide the electrical equipment for a naval vessel.55 
- Teijin scandal (1934): a group of investors was accused of manipulating market for 
the benefit of key politicians when purchasing shares of the leading textile firm from 
the Bank of Taiwan 
- Shōwa Denkō scandal, or Shōden (1948): the executives of the largest fertilizer 
producer bribing officials and politicians in order to obtain low-interest loans   
- The shipbuilding scandal, or Zōsen giwaku (1954): the Liberal Democratic Party was 
accused of involvement in bribes and kickbacks from Hitachi Company in return for 
government contracts and subsidies. 
 
Apart from its pre-war roots, the phenomenon of structural corruption in Japan must be 
attributed to the postwar zeitgeist. In postwar Japan, the government, business and 
bureaucracy were often united on the strategy of absolute priority of economic growth. 
Moreover, the government, business and bureaucracy agreed on absolute priority of 
economic growth under “administrative guidance” (gyōsei shidō), which stood for 
another example of manipulative power of the national bureaucracy over the business 
                                                   
55 Being triggered by Asahi Shinbun, this was the first scandal to bring down a cabinet in 
Japan. Important was the role of Procurator-General Hiranuma Kiichirō, who was willing 
to prosecute the politicians involved in the Siemens scandal but reluctant to prosecute any 
officers of the Imperial army (see Mitchell 1996; Haley 2006). The person of Hiranuma 
influenced today’s understanding of Japanese prosecutors as guardians of national virtues 
who charge the corrupted politicians. 
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world and further facilitated the culture of backroom dealings and political manipulation. 
Consequently, a strict sense of personal morality was reinforced by the corporatist culture, 
including the company loyalty, cooperation between employers and workforce, and 
discouraging domestic cut-throat competition (Sato 2005). In terms of politics, where 
competition is generally proved to curb corruption, party competition disappeared in 1955 
while the dominance of the LDP was continuously supported by farmers and business 
circles who provided funding. Regarding the electoral corruption, the medium-sized 
district system caused in larger districts competition between the members within the 
LDP, which in turn necessitated high amounts of campaign spending (Sato 2005; Babb 
2005). Such historical development generated political domination of conservative 
coalition with weak rival parties, but it also formed the discourse on corruption in postwar 
Japan. Throughout the postwar political development, the key role was attributed to the 
conservatives of the ruling LDP. While being backed by the US government, they created 
and maintained a strong coalition of politicians, business and landed interests. The 
economic success in the 1960s and 1970s was a result of a close collaboration between 
the power elite and the businessmen While enjoying the “emptiness of affluence” (term 
by McCormack 1996), the Japanese were kept on supporting the conservatives 
notwithstanding the mushrooming corruption scandals. 
In postwar politics, the role of money politics goes back to the Kishi cabinet. 
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Later, it was spearheaded by Tanaka Kakuei, and most recently by Ozawa Ichirō (see 
below). Apart from scandals involving bureaucrats at government ministries, many Prime 
Ministers and cabinet members were forced to resign throughout this period. Satō Eisaku 
(along with Yoshida Shigeru and Ikeda Hayato) was investigated on multiple occasions – 
most notably because of the aforementioned Shipbuilding scandal from 1954, where 
leading shipbuilding firms bribed the government into revising a law to increase 
government shipbuilding subsidies. Kishi Nobusuke (Satō’s brother) was employing 
government programs to generate business for political supporters, and Tanaka Kakuei, 
who was implicated in the Lockheed affair earned the status of father of money politics 
in Japan. The Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro was also indirectly implicated as a 
recipient of Lockheed funds and Recruit shares, while the Prime Minister Miyazawa 
Kiichi resigned in the wake of the Recruit scandal. Prime Minister Uno Sōsuke was an 
exception because he was doomed by a sex/infidelity scandal. Hosokawa Morihiro 
resigned after allegations that he had misused personal funds back in the 1980s, 
Hashimoto Ryūtarō had to resign over his involvement in concealing political donations, 
and Hatoyama Yukio resigned after misreporting vast number of donations in the context 
of Japan’s securities’ scandals in 1991. Kan Naoto, who “heroically” exposed the 
wrongdoing of his own ministry’s HIV-tainted blood scandal in 1996, later joined the 
Japanese politicians who failed to pay mandatory premiums into the National Pension 
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System.56 
Takeshita Noboru and his cabinet were involved in aforementioned stock-for-
favor Recruit scandal. Prime Minister Abe Shinzō was forced to resign in 2007, although 
he was not personally embroiled in any political scandal, however many of his Cabinet 
Members were involved in corruption (including Matsuoka Toshikazu, who in 2007 
committed suicide in the wake of his scandal). Mori Yoshirō was tainted by the Recruit 
scandal, involved in accepting illegal donations through shady political organizations, and 
associated with Ozawa Ichirō in the Nishimatsu scandal (see below). Besides, together 
with Obuchi Keizō, he accepted in 1997 a donation from the renowned Osaka Oil dealer 
Izui Jun’ichi (Blechinger 1998). Mori was politically undone by various scandals during 
his administration (especially the embezzlement scandal of Matsuo Katsutoshi in 2001) 
while scandalizing the Japanese public based on his numerous gaffes.57 
 
 
                                                   
56 Some argue that Kan simply utilized the highly-mediated HIV affair for his own 
political gain, because his officials suddenly discovered (after 13 years of protraction) the 
corpus delicti documentation, while Kan used the corrupted ministry bureaucrats as an 
easy target in order to expose the HIV scandal (see Miyamoto 1996; Feldman 1997). 
57 Apart from calling Japan a “divine nation” (kami no kuni), Mori’s reputation suffered 
the most when he continued to play golf after being informed about the fatal Ehime Maru 
fishing boat accident in 2001. Consequently, only 14 percent of the electorate expressed 
support for the Mori cabinet (Kabashima and Steel 2010). Interestingly, a situation not 
dissimilar to that of Mori occurred one year earlier in Russia, where the Russian president 
Putin waited for five days before he finally interrupted his holiday due to the fatal Kursk 
submarine incident. Amid the public outcry during which his favorable ratings fell 
dramatically, Putin easily survived the crisis by removing one of his generals from the 
post of the defense minister (Gorshkov 2002).  
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Figure 9. Japanese postwar prime ministers and their involvement in scandal.  
Yoshida Shigeru (1946-1954) 
– investigated (Shipbuilding scandal in 1954) 
Hatoyama Ichirō (1954-1956) 
– indicted (Shōwa Denkō scandal in 1948 
Fukuda Takeo (1976-1978) 
– indicted (Shōwa Denkō scandal in 1948) 
Kishi Nobusuke (1957-1960) 
– generated businesses via government programs; links to yakuza 
Ikeda Hayato (1960-1964) 
– investigated (Shipbuilding scandal in 1954) 
Satō Eisaku (1964-1972) 
– investigated (Shipbuilding scandal in 1954) 
Tanaka Kakuei (1972-1974) 
– investigated (Black Mist scandal in 1965); involved (Lockheed in 1976) 
Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982-1987) 
– suspected (recipient of Lockheed funds), admitted to receiving Recruit shares 
Takeshita Noboru (1987-1989) 
– involved (Recruit scandal in 1988) 
Miyazawa Kiichi (1991-1993) 
– involved (Recruit scandal in 1988) 
Hosokawa Morihiro (1993-1994) 
– accused (accepting loan from Sagawa; shady purchase of NTT shares) 
Hashimoto Ryūtarō (1996-1998) 
– involved (concealing political donations, and the Dental donation scandal) 
Obuchi Keizō (1998-2000) 
– involved (shady donations: Osaka Oil scandal 1997, Nishimatsu scandal) 
Mori Yoshirō (2000-2001)  
– involved (shady donations: Osaka Oil, Nishimatsu scandal, links to yakuza) 
Hatoyama Yukio 2009-2010) 
– involved (misreporting donations; Japan’s securities scandals in 1991).58 
                                                   
58 Not included in the chart are Prime Minister Uno Sōsuke (1989) who resigned after 
his extramarital sex scandal, and Prime Minister Kan Naoto (2010-2011) who failed to 
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Almost every year, the LDP government since the reign of Tanaka Kakuei has been tainted 
with corruption. Even today the nation’s politics runs on money: political operations 
require underground funding which necessitates accumulation of large amounts of money 
by parties and factions. Exchanging favors is an indispensable component of the Japanese 
political/voting process, while bribes point to additional cost of projects in the world of 
political/capitalist competition. The whole picture gets further complicated once we 
include to our discussion the Japanese organized crime, which occasionally generates a 
yakuza-related corruption scandal (see below). In order to get the whole picture behind 
the logic of scandal in postwar Japan, I will map the collusion and competition of media- 
and non-media actors within the Japanese power-network.       
 
2.3. Collusion and Competition of Power Circles in Japanese Scandal 
 
In modern social sciences, the notion of one fundamental force within any social 
phenomenon was refuted, because there exist reciprocal relations and gaps between 
intentions in relation to one another (Foucault 1972; Lyotard 1984; Latour 2005). The 
actor-network theory came to emphasize that the social is not a sort of special domain or 
                                                   
pay mandatory premiums into the National Pension System. Considering the 
omnipresence of structural corruption, it is presumable that other Japanese Prime 
Ministers did not make it to the list simply because their corruption was not exposed.  
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reality, but a principle of connections and associations. Similarly, the political power in 
Japan is not in the hands of concrete identifiable actors, because the responsibility is 
diffused (Maruyama 1969; Pye 1985). If applied to scandals, the main actor (i.e. the root 
transgressor) is not the only source of action. During the scandalization process he/she 
becomes “…the moving target of a vast array of interconnected entities swarming toward 
it” (Latour 2005, 46). These entities are associated in such a way that they “make others 
do things” in a network of mediations (ibid.). In other words, Japanese power scandal 
highlights the continuing web of financial/policy ties between, and within the elite actors 
and their institutions. 
The postwar research implies that Japanese power elites make for an interlocked 
“iron triangle” of the ruling political party, elite bureaucracy and business/finance circles 
(sei-kan-zai). Within this reciprocal power setup without any clear center of political 
accountability, the politicians master bureaucracy, the bureaucracy controls business, and 
business has influence over members of the LDP (Johnson 1986; Kabashima and 
Broadbent 1986; Kerbo and Inoue 1990). Nonetheless, the contemporary Japanese power 
system lacks central coordination while letting the weak external controls reinforce each 
other (Johnson 2002; Asano 2004; Sato 2005). During a crisis, various ad hoc committees 
and panels exercise authority without being held accountable while the Japanese elites 
claim to be the victims of a “system of irresponsibility” (musekinin no taikei) which, 
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according to Maruyama (1969) came to typify the power structures of postwar Japan. The 
main aim of this section is to examine this collusion as related to scandal, and to extend 
the list of scandal participants by including prosecutors, entertainment agencies, 
organized crime, and civic groups.  
The most distinct protagonists of power interest are depicted by the political 
circles (seiji). They are represented by cabinet ministers, members of the Diet, the 
strongest factions of the ruling party, and other key decision-makers. The Diet member’s 
local support groups (kōenkai) came to represent effective “political machines” that were 
transformed into local party chapters. Furthermore, Japan’s highly organized farmers 
became a pillar of the political circles in exchange for generous protections (Gordon 
1993). Moreover, the Japanese political circles are submissive to the elites from the 
private sector in order require financial contributions and to maintain the political 
machinery. Also, important for understanding scandal in Japanese politics is the fact that 
large political parties operate on the factional level. In other words, the basic unit of 
political organization in Japan is not the party, but the faction (habatsu). Factions include 
a range of cultural, historical, and institutionalized forces that also account for their role 
intrafactional struggles and attack-politics (see Watanabe 2013). In the light of these 
realities, scandal is less of a morality tale of “searching for truth”, and more a result of 
power struggle between parties and factions.  
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The main decisions for the society are formally made by the bureaucracy 
(kanryō), which is represented by elite bureaucrats, chiefs of civil service personnel, the 
Prime Minister’s office, and the prosecutor’s office as an autonomous institution within 
the Ministry of Justice. The financial sector provides employment for retired bureaucrats 
via the mechanism of “landing from heaven” (amakudari, see below). The bureaucracy 
was traditionally a key support structure for the LDP and a major institutional pillar of 
corruption within the politician-bureaucrat nexus. The important player in the collusion 
and competition of power is the Ministry of Finance, because it controls the budgeting 
process through its Budget Bureau. On the one hand, the Japanese bureaucracy (both elite 
bureaucrats and the retired ones) is endemic of corruption because the discretionary 
regulatory and distributive authority is vested in ministries and open to direct political 
interference (e.g. George Mulgan 2006; 2010). On the other hand, the basic information 
policy of the Japanese state bureaucrats lies in concealing real facts from the public 
(Miyamoto 1996; Sassa 2011). In Japan, the bureaucratic scandals are most frequent in 
industries such as aviation, oil and energy, and defense (Blechinger 1998). In the past, the 
Japanese bureaucrats discredited their trustworthiness due to bribery scandals that include 
exposures of lower bureaucrats entertaining higher bureaucrats at taxpayers’ expenses 
(kankan settai), or by accepting entertainment from business in exchange for favors (zōtō 
settai). Furthermore, the Ministry of Education and Labor was in the past involved in 
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stock transactions related to the Recruit Company, while the Ministry of Finance was not 
taking action about corruptive practices of the Japanese banks (Kerbo and Inoue 1990; 
Amyx 2003). Furthermore, more than one half of corporate wrongdoing, known to both 
the bureaucrats of MITI and the police, were effectively covered up (Johnson 1982; Amyx 
2003). Te most tragic outcome of bureaucratic corruption in Japan was the HIV scandal 
from 1996: despite knowing that the imported unheated blood products could lead to the 
spread of HIV in Japan, the Ministry of Health and Welfare did not order companies to 
recall unheated blood products. In 1990s, the public mistrust spread from political 
authorities to bureaucratic institutions, and nowadays the mismanagement of the 
economy is still occasionally being exposed through corruption scandals at the elite 
ministries. The trust in bureaucracy was further eroded after the 2011 Tohoku disaster: it 
became clear that some state bureaucrats (along with the Japanese mass media) were 
obfuscating the truth about the impact of the disaster (Wakiyama 2011; Uesugi 2012; 
Tsukada 2016). 
 One of the most important players within the justiciary bureaucracy as related to 
scandal in Japan are the prosecutors (kensatsukan). The prosecutor’s office is an 
autonomous institution within the Ministry of Justice (Hōmushō) and it is responsible for 
conducting investigations and presenting cases in a criminal trial against those accused 
of breaking a certain law. While the police are the primary investigating authority in 
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criminal cases, Japanese prosecutors have the power to investigate any offence (including 
bribery and white-collar crimes), and to decide if they institute prosecution (e.g. 
Hasegawa 2000). Their determination of whether or not they think a defendant is guilty 
comes when they decide to prosecute (kiso) or not prosecute (fukiso). Simultaneously, 
they act as important “norm entrepreneurs” who seek both acknowledgement and political 
profit when they set up enforcement priorities. Especially the special investigation 
authority at the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office (Tokusōbu) is stuffed by elite 
prosecutors and stands behind the biggest corruption scandals in 20th century Japan – 
among others, the scandals of Lockheed, Recruit, Sagawa Kyūbin, but also one of the 
earliest Japanese scandal cases, the Teijin affair from 1934 where the prosecutorial 
scandal leak turned the public opinion against the political opponents for the first time 
(see Yayama 1990; Mitchell 2002). The Japanese prosecutors are easing leaks according 
to a double standard (Yayama 1990), “borrowing” some major scandal cases from the 
police (Johnson 2002), or selling information to mobsters while ignoring police 
corruption (West 2006). Moreover, Japanese prosecution usually ignores the widespread 
use of police slush funds, but they also tend to neglect the control of the pachinko industry, 
and the connections to organized crime (Johnson 2003; West 2006). 
In cases of political bribery, successful convictions and possible jail time remain 
rare in Japan. This is due to the fact, that prosecutors must prove that the defendant 
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actually received the money, that he knew it was a bribe, and that he used his authority to 
benefit the briber (George Mulgan 2010). Since confession is the most important evidence, 
the Japanese prosecution can hardly prove all these things with all suspects (consider only 
the 1988 Recruit scandal, where the prosecutor’s office indicted only 12 out of 159 
transgressors due to lack of evidence). Once they take a case to court, the Japanese 
prosecutors are known for an extremely high conviction rate, but if corporate elites and 
government officials are involved, the conviction rate almost halves (Johnson 2002). At 
any rate, it is the public prosecutors, along with judges and editors of some quality 
newspapers that are said to feel most responsible for protecting the face of Japan. 
The business circles (zaikai) are largely represented by Japan’s Federation of 
Economic Organization (Keidanren), along with the most powerful Japanese corporations. 
This organization shields the top executives and major Japanese corporations, and in the 
past, it often acted as go-between for political funding, channeling the funds to political 
parties whereby maintaining the power triangle (Leggett 1995; Kerbo and Inoue 1990). 
Keidanren’s main role is to coordinate political contributions, and it was in principle 
distributing all political foundations to the LDP (it temporarily withheld the donations 
after the LDP regime was toppled in 1993, and in 2009). The reputation of Japanese 
business circles suffered the most by frequent consumer-affecting scandals (e.g. the 1996 
HIV contamination scandal, the 2000 Mitsubishi safety scandal, or the 2001 false 
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labeling/BSE scandal). The business circles collude with bureaucratic and political circles 
through the so-called “descent from heaven” (amakudari) in which former senior officials 
join some of those organizations that used to be under their jurisdiction before their 
retirement (see below). 
It is a well-known fact that the advertising agencies (most notably Dentsu) are 
in position to intimidate companies since they have access to delicate information and 
can both publicize and cover up scandals. Equally important in controlling information 
flow are the celebrity-managing offices (jimusho) such as Johnny's, Yoshimoto Kōgyō or 
Up front.59 These showbiz-news gatekeepers protect their clients and themselves from 
scandals by putting pressure on media networks, the tabloids and their publishers. They 
attempt to suppress scandalous leaks once they emerge, and they do this via restrictions 
on first-hand access to the show business industry (Marx 2012). Furthermore, these 
agencies have power to influence programming and plant in the weeklies stories with 
positive spins about their stars (or negative spins on their rivals), using the tabloids in the 
same way the politicians use press club members from the newspapers (West 2006). The 
agencies threaten publishers to deny the coverage of all other artists under the office in 
                                                   
59 While creating rather than managing idols, these offices wield an enormous amount of 
power with which they dominate other institutions and influence overall decision-making 
processes (Marx 2012). The top powerbrokers dictate to the media and advertising 
agencies which members of their keiretsu they want used, and perhaps unsurprisingly 
they often become a subject of scandal, mostly related to tax evasion, sexual harassment, 
or links to organized crime).  
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question, while the publishers often cooperate since they lose profit once being 
excommunicated by the office.60 
The organized crime (yakuza) is sometimes described as the “fifth estate” in the 
power system represented by the ruling party, key ministries, big business, and the 
mainstream media. Apart from their ethically ambiguous activities, the yakuza is well 
known for penetrating the world of economics and politics since the end of World War II 
(see Messersmith 2003; Hill 2003). While establishing its position throughout the course 
of Japan’s modern history, the yakuza came to collaborate with politicians (Adelstein 
2015), bureaucrats (Kerr 2001), big banks (Yukawa 1999), entertainment agencies (Marx 
2012), or even the world of sumo (Manzenreiter 2014). The organized crime is heavily 
involved in structural corruption, which is a tradition that stretches back to the beginnings 
of liberal democracy in Japan. (For instance, Kodama Yoshio, the notorious right-wing 
intermediary between the world of politics and the worlds of gangsters, was financing the 
LDP lead by Yoshida, Hatoyama and Kishi.) The same applies to the commercial sector. 
Perhaps the first postwar involvement of yakuza in scandal was the infamous Minamata 
pollution case, where the Chisso Company used gangsters to keep the demonstrating 
victims away from company executives (e.g. Johnson). While moving into areas generally 
                                                   
60 For instance, in 2008 the pop-star Satoshi Ōno from the idol-group Arashi became a 
topic due to his alleged drug/sex scandal published in a tabloid Shūkan Gendai. 
Consequently, Ōno’s managing office, Johnny’s cut business ties with the tabloid’s 
publisher Kōdansha. 
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associated with the finance word and real estate industry, the yakuza was involved in big 
corruption scandals such as the 1990 Itōman incident (speculation in property), the 1992 
Sagawa Kyūbin scandal (bribes in return for political favors), or the 1997 Nomura scandal 
(insider trading). Many yakuza-related scandals are based on the so-called sōkaiya 
practice: sōkaiya can literally translate as “general meeting specialists”, but they are 
essentially corporate blackmailers. The sōkaiya scandals involve large Japanese broking 
firms that were accused of paying large amounts of money to persons blackmailing the 
management in connection with the shareholders meeting. The yakuza extort millions 
from companies by promising to stay away from the meetings and not asking 
embarrassing questions. The collusion with yakuza exists most profoundly in the banking 
sector. For instance, in late 1980s one of the largest banks in the world, the Dai-Ichi 
Kangyō Bank was accused of loaning a huge amount of money to yakuza, while in 2004 
Citibank Japan helped to launder money from the Japanese underworld (Messersmith 
2003). The involvement of yakuza may be far-reaching, but it will not be easily exposed 
since the Japanese media usually avoid touching upon any sensitive topic related to 
organized crime. (The aforementioned Sagawa scandal in 1992 was among the first ones 
where the media openly discussed the involvement of organized crime in politics.) 
Besides, the attitudes toward yakuza in postwar Japan were not entirely negative.61 
                                                   
61 Apart from the Japanese commoners being usually afraid of yakuza, approximately 
one half of the respondents in a survey conducted by Messersmith (2003) stated that the 
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The logic of avoiding the mainstream media coverage and marginalizing their 
role in scandal applies to other circles: smaller minorities that become tabooed in Japan: 
the civic organizations (shimin dantai), the NGOs, the victim support networks, lawyers, 
independent journalists and academics. Unfortunately, their involvement within the 
power circles is often marginal, same as their potential to scandalize general public in 
case of the civic issues (see Ogawa 2009; Sugimoto 2010). Average Japanese citizens that 
seem to generally dislike litigation only seldom protest in case of scandal, but there were 
cases of effective public pressure in case of some scandals (see below). Similarly, 
Japanese civil groups and NGO's exert certain pressure, eventually resulting in legal 
defamation suits, but the chance of success (and mainstream media coverage of such 
protests) is usually low (West 2006). Besides, the power of the third sector is in Japan 
limited also because they are neither perceived as working for the “public good”, nor do 
they usually mobilize en bloc (Kabashima and Broadbent 1986). 
The power center does not explicitly incorporate the mass media (masukomi). 
They are not part of the administrative authority, but they have a social monopoly on 
covering activities of the power circles. The reporters usually cannot be held accountable 
for anything since the final responsibility is diffused. 
                                                   
Japanese organized crime helps make things run more smoothly in situations where 
government is ineffective or itself corrupt. The image of yakuza in Japan further improved 
due to their humanitarian efforts in the aftermath of the earthquake in Hanshin (1995) and 
Tōhoku (2011). Simultaneously, the heroic aura of yakuza members as tragic anti-heroes 
was maintained throughout the postwar Japanese fiction (Prusa 2016a).  
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Figure 10. Colluding and conflicting power during Japanese scandals. 
Source: Author 
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3. SCANDAL CONSEQUENCES IN POSTWAR JAPAN  
 
3.1. General Typology of Scandal Consequences  
 
Every moral indignation over publicized transgression can produce a social crisis which 
translates into a pressure related to accountability (both institutional and reputational). 
Same as traditional rituals, scandals are simultaneously effects and causes of social crises 
(Alexander 1988). Theoretically speaking, by prosecuting and punishing transgressors a 
precedent is set, which may in turn influence how individuals and groups would act in the 
long run. Besides, any kind of punishment related to legal transgression is a precedent 
that the elites are not above the law, and that they cannot always hide behind political 
immunity, corporate bureaucracy, or celebrity fame. 
There exist two ideal types of consequence theory in scandal discourse. The “no-
consequence” theory posits that scandals, largely fabricated by the media, might have 
some impact on the careers and reputations of individuals involved, but they have no real 
impact on processes which shape social and political life (Thompson 2000). Scandals are 
in this light approached as nontransformative, “conservative” media events. On the other 
hand, the neofunctionalist perspective takes into account the scandal consequences as 
reaffirmation (consolidation) of the disturbed (dislocated) social order, based on which 
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reforms and improvements within social system can be implemented. It is however 
misleading to lean toward just one of these perspectives. Besides, there exist various 
factors that hinder any strict categorization: the consequences depend on the attributes of 
the individual, same as on the character of the scandal itself. Furthermore, not all 
irregularities (economic, political) develop into scandal, some scandals disappear 
immediately, while others grow big with major effects. The impact may stretch beyond 
the lives of involved individuals, and it can undermine social relations, institutions, and 
policies linked to those individuals.  
Regarding the individual effects, defamatory gossip and scandal can seriously 
challenge a person’s honor and social prestige. One’s political reputation erodes and 
symbolic capital diminishes. In order to avoid further damage and secure positive 
publicity, the Japanese authorities proceed with “consultations”, reprimands, resignations, 
firings, or they let candidates drop out of a race, relinquish presidential runs, and so forth. 
Corporate representatives are being driven from their offices, having their salaries 
adjusted, head managers are removed, and new administrators are installed, academicians 
can have their degree cancelled, while even the sports athletes are stripped of medals or 
banned from upcoming events.62 
                                                   
62 In cases of corporate corruption, the disciplinary action toward individuals varies from 
company to company in Japan, but generally the heaviest individual punishment is 
“punitive dismissal” (chōkai kaiko), which is applied for actions warranting criminal 
punishment such as fraud or embezzlement. The next heaviest punishment is “resignation 
under instruction” (yushi kaiko), where the transgressor’s past contributions to the 
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Other transgressing authorities are simply “side-slipped” (yokosuberi) to some 
different sections while being assigned a lower post, or they start working as company 
advisers. Simultaneously however, it is not unusual in Japan that people close to corrupted 
elites commit suicide in the aftermath of a scandal – either because of their own perceived 
share of responsibility, or in order to loyally avert further investigation (see below). 
Public scandals can also lead to political, economic and social consequences, not 
to mention that a grave political corruption can be perceived as undermining the 
institution of democracy per se. Regarding the institutional/structural effects, it is the 
nature of transgression, the public response to it, and the institutional importance of 
people involved that determine to what extent a scandal becomes consequential. For 
instance, a corporate scandal that is badly handled can cause irreparable damage leading 
to board resignations, a plunge in share values and corporate takeover. As an immediate 
short-term consequence of a political scandal, the cabinet’s approval can plunge, the 
political party connected to the transgressor registers loss in votes, and the factional 
proportion of power may change. Moreover, in the wake of major political scandals, 
moral campaigns, calls for action, and “administrative reforms” (gyōsei kaikaku) are 
eventuated. Management practices are inspected, new laws are passed in order to prevent 
                                                   
company are considered. Short suspensions from one day to one week (shukkin teishi) are 
common, as is a removal from position (yakushoku kaijo). Slightly lighter is suspension 
of position (yakushoku teishi) which enables the worker to return after a few months. A 
reprimand (kenseki) is the lightest form of punishment, in which the transgressor is 
generally required to write a letter of apology and is urged to reflect on his/her actions. 
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the type of scandal in question, administrative processes are put on hold, and in-
house/outside committees are set up.63 
Finally, the consumer-related scandals, food/safety scandals, and cover-up/false 
labeling scandals can have serious commercial/business-related effects. Companies, 
and agencies involved in transgression report disastrous net losses based on store closures, 
restructuring costs and re-branding strategies, losing sponsorship/advertising revenues, 
and shareholder losses. In order to save a company tarnished by scandal, corporations 
merge some part of the production with others (e.g. Olympus merged with Sony after the 
Olympus accounting scandal, Toshiba combined its PC production with Fujitsu and Vaio 
following the Toshiba accounting scandal, and Nissan took a 34 percent share in 
Mitsubishi right after Mitsubishi’s latest data fuel scandal). The negative commercial 
effect must be attributed to public backlash during a scandal, which leads to sudden 
                                                   
63 Here are just few historical examples of the transformative potential of scandal. For 
instance, Upton Sinclair’s muckraking novel The Jungle from 1906 directly contributed 
by exposing conditions in the U.S. meat packing industry to the passage of the Pure Food 
and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act. The 1920s’ Teapot Dome scandal preceded 
the passage of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, while the 1972 Watergate scandal lead 
to establishing the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, and the special prosecutor’s office. 
In 1990s, the British Committee on Standards in Public life was set up after multiple 
scandals around John Major, and in Australia a Royal Commission into the police force 
was created as a reaction to serial police corruption. In Japan, the 1995 Marco Polo tabloid 
scandal was an impetus to establish a position of press ombudsman within the tabloid’s 
publishing company, while the Japanese “HIV scandal”, which gained its momentum in 
1996, lead to at least partial rehabilitation of its victims. Consider also the varying 
consequences of environmental scandals: the documentary Under the Dome (2015) about 
air pollution in China shortly after first screening made the market shares of air-cleaning 
technology companies rise by up to 10 percent, while the controversial document The 
Cove (2009) about dolphin slaughter had virtually no impact on whaling industry in Japan. 
200 
decrease of trust toward the brand in question, including cases of complete devastation of 
a brand due to the media outcry.64 
 
3.2. The Impact of Power Scandals in Postwar Japan 
 
In terms of political trust, lower levels of confidence in government represent the basic 
pattern in postwar Japan. The Japanese nowadays have a lower level of voluntary political 
participation, and are generally rather skeptical toward democracy as a dynamic, process-
oriented system (Ito 1993; Ikeda and Kohno 2008; Yamamoto 2010). Thus, the national 
mood has been more often that of skepticism and the belief that Japanese politics is 
inherently corrupt (Yayama 1990; Johnson 2001; Sato 2005; Babb 2005). Starting through 
the late 1970s and culminating in 1990s, lower levels of political trust were registered 
because many Japanese felt weak in the face of arrogance implied by corrupt dealings of 
the elites (Yamamoto 2010; Tsukada 2016).  
Once broadcast, power scandals in Japan seem to have an anti-democratic 
fallout: firstly, the publicity given to corruption in postwar Japan has directly contributed 
                                                   
64 For example, in Japan the 2015 McDonalds lost more than 30 per cent of revenue after 
the 2014 scandal in which its major Chinese supplier of chicken was accused of food-
safety violations in a string of food contamination cases. Similarly, following the 2015 
Toshiba scandal the company in question showed a net loss of around 10 billion as a direct 
consequence of their accounting scandal, while in 2016 Mitsubishi Motors logged 130-
billion-yen net loss on their fuel data scandal. 
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to the growing number of non-voters (Kabashima and Broadbent 1986). Secondly, the 
category of “less interested” audiences in Japan is spreading by including the “critical 
citizens” (kihaku), but also the “apathetic cynics” that ignore sociopolitical issues 
altogether, and the “disconnecteds” (masukomi tsukare) who grew tired of the mass media 
as such (e.g. Takahashi 2010; Heinze 2011). 
As I indicated above, large corruption scandals were rocking Japan since the 
beginning of 20th century. The first large scandal of the postwar period, Tanaka Kakuei’s 
Lockheed scandal shocked the Japanese public primarily because it was largely exposed 
by the media. Representing one of the biggest postwar corruption cases, the Lockheed 
scandal attracted media coverage like no scandal did before. It was rendered as a deep 
“national crisis” but it was basically a crisis for the rule of LDP (Watanuki 1977; 
Kishimoto 1977; Blaker 1977). Lockheed did have some transformative features: 
immediately after the scandal, the political funding system was revised in response to 
public demand for reform. The law from 1975 had complex and persuasive implications, 
but it had many loopholes (e.g. the law imposed no restriction on political contributions 
from registered “political groups”) (Kono 1997). In any case, the scandal made the 
popular vote for LDP in the 1976 election drop to its lowest level in party history, it lead 
to a major revision of laws related to campaign financing, and some claim that it 
ameliorated the structural crisis of conservative politics (e.g. Calder 1988). In the end 
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however, the scandal changed the internal dynamics of the political apparatus only 
slightly. Firstly, Tanaka Kakuei was re-elected with the highest winning percentage of 
the vote ever recorded while becoming even more powerful than before the scandal. 
Secondly, in rural areas, as many as five of the six Lockheed-associated candidates were 
successful, and thirdly, those cabinet ministers who pushed for investigation lost later 
their own seats (see Blaker 1977; Johnson 1986; Schlesinger 1999; George Mulgan 2010; 
Woodall 2015). Besides, after the scandal the LDP left responsibility for political 
fundraising with individual politicians in order to prevent damage to the party, which 
partly contributed to the fact that corruption scandals became a familiar feature ever since 
(Blechinger 1998). The McDonnel Douglas scandal from 1979, which appeared only few 
years after Lockheed, actually shared similar features, but all involved politicians escaped 
lightly. In general, Japan’s economic and foreign policies after the scandal did not change 
at all (Nester 1990a). Thus, the most tangible scandal consequence of Lockheed was the 
birth of investigative journalism in Japan. Since Lockheed, the Japanese media became 
more progressive in their reporting, bringing down cabinets and politicians in future. 
One of the largest scandals in Japan’s history, the Recruit scandal from 1988 
showed certain consequences for the political discourse. In terms of immediate 
consequences, Prime Minister Takeshita established an advisory board to advise on 
political and electoral reform (Kono 1997). In terms of political representation, the Upper 
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House election deprived the LDP of its traditional majority for the first time since 1955, 
which clearly demonstrated Japan’s dissatisfaction with increasing political corruption.65 
Nonetheless, the public outrage seemed to be less a direct consequence of preceding 
scandals, and more a negative reaction to a declining sense of economic well-being in the 
“bubble era” (e.g. Girling 1997; Pharr 2000), and passing of the unpopular consumption 
tax one year prior to the scandal (Kerbo and Inoue 1990). Besides, the second cabinet of 
Kaifu Toshiki reinstated many of the scandal-tainted party bosses, and in upcoming 
elections the LDP won majority while only one of the fourteen members implicated in 
the scandal failed to win re-election (Rothacher 1993; Hayes 2005). The main culprit, 
Ezoe Hiromasa, was after thirteen years in Japanese court handed a suspended sentence. 
The Recruit scandal is often seen as a significant turning point, in which Japan moved 
from the bubble economy to the following “lost decade” (e.g. Ezoe 2010). However, the 
events of 1988-9 only briefly threatened the LDP, which itself did only the necessary 
minimum to fight corruption.66 
                                                   
65 When Prime Minister Takeshita proclaimed that he would carry out a political reform, 
the opinion surveys showed that more than 70 percent of people did not believe him, 
while up to 97 percent of respondents expected little or nothing from the reform measures 
(Yayama 1990; Nester 1990b). Still in 2001, only 9 percent of Japanese adults had 
confidence in Diet, while 8 percent of respondents had confidence in their national 
bureaucracy (Johnson 2001). 
66 Despite its gravity, the megascandal resulted in indicting only 12 individuals (out of 
159 involved), while legally punished were only two politicians. This is however a rather 
unsurprising feature. In the shipbuilding scandal of 1954, only one person convicted (out 
of 71 arrested) was actually sent to prison, in the Lockheed scandal of 1976, altogether 
around 460 persons were questioned but no charges were made, and in the MOF’s wining-
and-dining scandals in 1997-8, hundreds of officials were involved but only one was 
charged with crime (Mitchell 1996; Pascha 1999, Johnson 2001). 
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Throughout the postwar development, the annual average of political and 
bureaucratic misconduct jumped significantly in the 1990s on the backdrop of a 
prolonged recession in this decade. there were certain attempts to improve the 
compromised system, while fighting corruption was the most important objective in 
Japan’s electoral reform. In the aftermath of the Sagawa Kyūbin scandal (1992), in which 
more than one half of voters admitted they were once again ashamed of their politicians, 
it was perhaps paradoxically Ozawa Ichirō - one of the epitomes of political corruption – 
who actually helped to push the anti-corruption reform (Leggett 1995; Vogel 2006; 
Gaunder 2007). The “revolutionary” year of 1993, and consequent political shift can be 
understood as a delayed result of the two high-profile scandals in the post-bubble 
economy era (Pak and Kawai 2010), although other scholars argue that the scandals of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s were not a convincing explanation for the political 
upheaval (Christensen 2000). At any rate, the LDP’s one-party hegemony was finally 
overthrown, and the new establishment again promised to cleanse Japanese politics from 
corruption. Four sweeping reform bills introduced a new electoral system, new 
regulations on political donations, government funding for political parties and special 
legal status for political parties.67 
                                                   
67 The idea of separating politicians’ responsibility from the party, which emerged after 
the 1976 Lockheed scandal, was now reversed by introducing a new electoral system 
combining single-seat districts and proportional representation (Iwai 2015), and by 
shifting responsibility for the raising of political funds back from individual politicians to 
parties (Blechinger 1998). 
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The focus in LDP was now on the local support groups (kōenkai), which in turn 
required massive political funds, while politicians were literally forced to seek fund-
raising opportunities. In the end, the measures implemented by the government following 
the wave of corruption were not successful in reducing corruption scandals (Bowen 2003; 
Stockwin 2008; George Mulgan 2010). The revised Political Funds Control Law imposed 
only few effective controls on how political funds can be used, while politicians quickly 
adapted to the new regulation, finding new loopholes (see Reed and Thies 2001, Yoshida 
2014; Iwai 2015; Brasor 2017). The new Prime Minister Hosokawa was pushed to resign 
within less than a year in office based on accusations of corruption (he was accused of 
accepting unlawful loan from the Sagawa Kyūbin Company, and of trying to cover up the 
purchase of shares in the privatized NTT Company). 
Being fully exposed in 1996, one of the biggest bureaucratic scandals, the HIV 
hemophilia fiasco, eroded tremendously the public trust in bureaucracy, especially when 
it became obvious that the epidemic was not inevitable. The consequences however, were 
rather marginal. The national legislation on information disclosure was passed in 1999, 
but the attempts at institutional reform were not really meaningful. In early 2000s, three 
executives were given light prison sentences, while the distributor of the HIV-tainted 
blood (The Green Cross) was for nearly a decade denying any responsibility. The main 
individual responsible for the tragedy (the hemophilia expert Abe Takeshi) resigned as 
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dean of Teikyo Medical College immediately after the scandal, but was found not guilty 
of criminal charges (the Tokyo High Court suspended the appeals trial in 2004).  
   The emerging cases of police corruption in 1990s lead to the establishment of a 
Council on Police Reform, which was concerned with improved procedures for disclosing 
information (Tipton 2002), however the police scandals had an aggravating effect on a 
crime trend, actually contributing to the escalation of crime since the end of the century 
(Leonardsen 2006). More importantly, the practice of bid rigging on public projects 
(kansei dangō) started to be prosecuted in this decade, while the LDP even included the 
eradication of the infamous practice of “descent from heaven” (amakudari) as one of its 
campaign promises. However, the data indicates that this practice kept on flourishing 
notwithstanding the public exposure.68 
Without learning any lesson from the disastrous cover-up scandal of the previous 
decade, other consumer-related cases soon emerged. The 2000 Mitsubishi safety/cover-
                                                   
68 Amakudari, which is one of the causes for the bid-rigging practice (kansei dangō), has 
toward the end the last century been decisive in 30 to 40 percent off all corporate 
executives in Japan (Kerbo and Inoue 1990). In 2010, only between 2007-2009, 1,757 
bureaucrats received job position at organizations that received government contracts 
during 2008 (The Japan Times, August 24, 2010). The institutionalized practice of 
amakudari however rarely brings about a major scandal since it is not the primary cause 
in scandal. For instance, one of the root causes of the Japanese HIV scandal was the fact 
that upon their retirement many senior bureaucrats from the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare joined the Green Cross company which was at the core of the scandal (Miyamoto 
1996; Feldman 2004). Two other publicized cases of amakudari-related scandal were the 
Zenekon affair in 1993-4, in which corrupted bureaucrats were found to be associated 
with general building contractors, and the financial scandals of 1997-8, where Yomiuri 
Shinbun reported that more than 250 former officials from MOF and BOJ had descended 
into high-ranking posts in financial institutions that they used to regulate (Blechinger 
1998). 
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up scandal, the 2000 Snow Brand milk scandal, the 2001 false labeling/BSE food scandal, 
the 2002 Nippon Ham cover-up, and other “corporate betrayals” once again located the 
citizen/consumer in the role of “victim”. As is usually the case, these crises were 
emblematic of maintaining bureaucratic continuity at the expense of effective crisis 
management (Miyamoto 1996; Kingston 2004). 
Another major corporate scandal broke in 2005, this time related to the Japan 
Highway Public Corporation, and based on this corruption the Diet actually approved an 
amendment to the Anti-Monopoly Law which was originally established in 1947 
(Dokusen Kinshi Hō). One year later, however, another bid-rigging scandal occurred, this 
time at the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA), which rendered the Law 
in question ineffective, while confirming once again bid-rigging on public-works projects 
remained an entrenched practice. (The Japan Times, February 7, 2006; Hatch 2010). 
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the corruption scandal of Matsuoka Toshikatsu in 2007, 
the Political Funds Control Law (Seiji Shikin Kisei Hō) was revised once again, however 
both MAFF ministers who succeeded the deceased Matsuoka were quickly discredited by 
their own corruption scandals. Same as in previous elections, most campaign finance 
scandals failed to become a decisive factor in the 2012 general election (Carlson 2013), 
and financial scandals related to political funds kept on hitting the Abe cabinet.69 
                                                   
69 In October 2014, the Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Obuchi Yūko and her 
fund-management organization used political funds for “private” purposes (e.g. baby 
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Aside from political corruption, major corporate scandals, that were 
mushrooming during the “lost decade” of 1990s and onward, have not generated any 
significant transformative force so far. While the trend of secret political contributions 
continued, big corporate scandals kept on emerging since the beginning of 21st century: 
Horiemon/Livedoor scandal (2006), the Woodford/Olympus scandal (2011), the Takata 
air-bag scandal (2013), the Toshiba accounting scandal (2015), the Sumitomo 
Mitsui/Asahi Kasei construction scandal (2015), and the Mitsubishi data-rigging scandal 
(2016). Partly related to these cases, a new legislation on corporate whistleblowing was 
approved (the Whistleblower Protection Act was passed on May 2004, effective in 2006). 
Especially the scandal-tainted Toshiba Company created whistle-blower protections in 
2006 and implemented mandatory compliance seminars for all departments in 2011, while 
a panel of outside advisers was created to consult on safety and legal issues. Nonetheless, 
during the upcoming scandals of Toshiba, Olympus and Mitsubishi, it became clear that 
those laws failed to curb corporate deception (for the issue of whistleblowing see the case 
study of Olympus). 
When discussing Japanese corporate corruption, some scholars point to the 
                                                   
products, cosmetics, designer accessories), which forced the minister to step down. Her 
resignation was soon followed by a controversy of her successor, Miyazawa Yōichi, 
whose fund-managing body was found to have used its funds to settle expenses at an 
S&M club back in 2010. In 2015 the Minister of Education, Hakubun Shimamura became 
involved in a scandal where the Yamaguchi crime syndicate donated large amounts of 
money to a branch of the LDP headed by him (see Adelstein 2015). Finally, in a big blow 
for Abe’s cabinet, the Minister of State for Economic Revitalization, Amari Akira had to 
resign in 2016 amidst allegation of bribery.  
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failure or unwillingness to reform the opaque decision-making with the traditional 
corporate governance, and to establishing post-scandal quasi-committees with non-
professional knowledge and contaminated “yes-men” (Woodford 2012; Maeda and 
Aoyagi 2013). Besides, it is understandable that the government will not suggest any 
drastic punishment for major contractors since they will be needed for future cooperation 
(e.g. for the 2020 Olympics-related construction work). The scandal consequences within 
the corporate culture do not lie in transforming the culture per se. For instance, in the case 
of Toshiba, after a one-day suspension from work, pay cuts and reprimands, the scandal 
culprits continue to work, or they become executives of Toshiba group companies. (The 
real scandal consequence lay in Toshiba selling some of its subsidiaries and medical 
devices units to Canon, including the selling of a majority interest in its home appliance 
business to China’s Midea.) Some argue that there have been only little changes in 
corporate governance in the aftermath of these scandals simply because Japan’s 
community firms never really collapsed in a way Enron or WorldCom did in the US (e.g. 
Deakin and Whittaker 2009). 
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3.3. On the Nontransformativity of Japanese Scandal 
 
The general impression is that shady campaign financing and other scandals related to 
money politics simply keep on erupting and fading away without any significant effect. 
Besides, it can matter when a scandal occurs (e.g. the consequences are generally more 
serious at a time of recession, while unprecedented economic growth usually allows 
transgressing politicians to uphold their status), while the scandal effects on public 
opinion can differ depending on the transgressor’s local support and personal charisma. 
In terms of their structural consequences, the large postwar scandals did offer some 
opportunity to modify norms and conventions, while some scandals helped to bring down 
governments. It is however more often the case that scandal reporting does not directly 
influence the outcome of elections but the societal mood at that time.   
Other scandals contributed to new regulations, while more regulation again lead 
to more scandal. Some major postwar scandals could have forced fundamental changes 
in political fund-raising, but the opposition either failed to address the issue effectively 
(Halloran 1970; Taira 1993; Scheiner 2006), or the media did not properly cover the 
oppositional effort (Kabashima and Steel 2010). Another obstacle, which directly relates 
to scandal consequences, lies in the conception of the Political Funds Control Law. Its 
purpose is not to regulate or restrict the flow of political funds, but to ensure that those 
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funds are properly managed (Yoshida 2014; Iwai 2015). Besides, the severity of scandal 
in Japan, including the increase in “reform rhetoric”, which immediately follows, neither 
becomes a decisive factor in the passage of structural reforms, nor does one’s involvement 
in scandal necessarily decrease one’s political capital (Gaunder 2007). In fact, many 
Japanese politicians are being elected based on their populist rhetoric of cleansing of 
corruption, eventually using their own past scandal as an opportunity for “purification” 
(misogi) of their own political face (see previous section). 
The laws related to corruption have been slightly strengthened in Japan 
throughout the last few decades, but scandals became even more persistent after changes 
in the law in 1994. In this regard, Chalmers Johnson (2001) correctly pointed that every 
new corruption-related law is only as strong as their enforcers are skillful and vigorous, 
but this ideal can be hardly implemented since many Japanese bureaucrats and politicians 
who have benefited from the structurally corrupted system have actively resisted attempts 
to reform it (e.g. Sugimoto 2010). Besides, placing a legal ban on political donations from 
private companies in Japan would not eliminate donations from industry groups and labor 
unions (Iwai 2015), while the conduct of financing Japanese politicians would only 
become harder, inviting new patterns of criminal conduct and increasing the cost of anti-
corruption activities (Pascha 1999). 
In postwar Japan, hundreds of corruption scandals were registered, while a 
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serious political bribery, which implicated both prime ministers and cabinet members, 
occurred virtually every year. Nonetheless, a scandal with magnitude strong enough to 
generate a “scandal election” (term by Steven Reed) and bring down government 
occurred on average only once a decade. Today, some observers claim that the scale and 
frequency of corruption, same as the public tolerance of corrupt politicians, seem to be 
slightly diminishing (Pharr 2000; George Mulgan 2010), while the Japanese bureaucracy 
is now subject to a greater legislative scrutiny (Amyx 2003; Kingston 2004; Woodall 
2015).  
Despite the “quiet” social transformation (Kingston 2004), the core institutions 
of Japanese capitalism have not really changed, while the opaque bureaucracy keeps on 
maintaining its continuity at the expense of any effective crisis management (e.g. 
Miyamoto 1996; Witt 2006). Despite all the reformist endeavour, the political funds are 
today still declared in inadequate way (Yoshida 2014) and the political system is 
extremely slow in moving away from corruption environment (Pascha 1999), in which 
most of the corrupted politicians are nearly always re-elected (Bowen 2003; Nyblade and 
Reed 2008).  
It can be assumed that the already low trust in Japanese government will depend 
less on actual political, bureaucratic and corporate corruption, and more on the way how 
(and how often) will people learn from the media about their leaders’ misconduct. In other 
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words, the key role in rendering corruption is to be still attributed to the media in Japan, 
where the public’s confidence was always influenced less by economic deficits, and more 
by the reports on governmental misconduct (Pharr 1996; 2000). The media’s increasing 
impact on electoral outcomes became most apparent in the three postwar elections before 
1990, in which they sought to make corruption the top issue (i.e. the Black Mist scandals 
of 1967, the Lockheed scandal of 1976, and the Recruit scandal of 1988). In each election 
associated with one of these scandals, volatility rose and the LDP support temporarily fell, 
and this situation repeated itself after the recent scandals of the Abe cabinet, that however 
had no impact on the last election. This, and the absence of any sweeping long-term effect 
on political/corporate corruption came to render Japanese postwar scandals as rather 
insignificant, socially-transformative social reflections on some crisis, and more 
importantly for the public and the media as spectacular media events grounded in a 
degradation of an individual elite.   
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4. THE JAPANESE PUBLIC AND SCANDAL RECEPTION 
 
4.1. On Affective Attitudes of Scandal Audiences 
 
This thesis focuses primarily on scandal as a scripted social performance, and a product 
of commodified media rituals. Nonetheless, as I indicated in earlier sections of this thesis, 
scandals must be always “played out” in front of a public forum (no matter how 
imaginary) in order to acquire their meaning. Thus, I aim to digress in this chapter and 
elaborate on the affective value of scandal and the audiences’ fundamental desires that 
underpin the “consumption” of scandal.70 
While echoing Freud’s metapsychology, Francois Fourquet noted that “there is 
no man, there is no praxis – there are only drives and intensities” (Fourquet 1974, 106). 
While being aware of the one-sidedness of this argument, I partly relate it to the critical 
insight that the media often make use of our inherent drives, affects and desires while 
exercising disproportionate powers in shaping our perception of morally- and 
emotionally-laden issues.  
                                                   
70  Simply put, affect is an emotional state not based on rational decision-making 
processes, while the so-called affect studies focus on mental and bodily encounters with 
feelings or emotions. More importantly for the scandal context, emotions are mobilized, 
solicited and shaped by economic forces, making the spectators simultaneously emotional 
and economic actors (e.g. Illouz 1997; Lukács 2010). The affective value of scandals lies 
in enabling the audience to experience transgression, crime and punishment, which 
precedes moral indignation (anger, contempt, envy, and other negative affects). In scandal, 
these affects bridge between the emotional, hegemonic and economic realms.  
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 In the discourse of media, morality and power, desire becomes an irreducible 
feature of human nature and one of the basic motives of human action. Also, the scandal 
industry can be scrutinized as parasitizing on our psychosocial affects that relate to our 
fundamental desires. I argue that the most important desire in consuming scandals is the 
desire to community. This desire can be further structured into the desire to relate, and the 
desire to know. Needless to say, we can relate other affective desires to scandal 
consumption (e.g. the desire for compassion versus the quasi-sadistic desire to punish), 
but the general aim of this section is to indicate that our inherent desires and sentiments 
usually precede and guide our moral contemplation associated with scandal narratives. 
Generally speaking, the desire to relate stems from the primates’ interest in 
tracking social hierarchies and patterns of social affiliation (e.g. Sapolsky 2013). 
Importantly for our context, this desire is also at the origin of all charismatics (primordial, 
religious, secular), while modern audiences relate to their idols (celebrities, politicians, 
and other VIPs) through the process of admiration. Contrarily to the original nature of 
charismatic authority (other-worldly, non-mediated), the image of real-world celebrities, 
politicians and artists is often effective only because of their charisma. In Weberian 
understanding, charisma is a collective belief that a person is embodying “the sacred” (the 
extraordinary, the divine). It represents specifically exceptional qualities that set an 
individual apart from ordinary people and create a basis for special treatment (Weber 
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1968). This treatment is simultaneously conditioned by his/her commitment and loyalty, 
which is expected to be demonstrated in turn. The projection of charismatic community 
can however fade away if the elites fail their extraordinariness.71 
The bond between a charismatic persona and the rest (i.e. the star/agency or 
politician/party on the one side, and the fan/voter on the other side) enters a sort of 
unwritten contract, guaranteed by what Alvin Gouldner (1960) calls “norms of 
reciprocity”. Simply put, it is a reciprocity of service and return service, while the 
spectator occupies the position of someone to whom a proposal of commitment is made. 
Such form of trust contains an element of socio-psychological, quasi-religious faith 
(Simmel 1978), and the Japanese voters have developed a strong feeling for these norms 
(Pye 1985). Thus, if someone aspires to some form of loyal political leadership, he/she is 
expected to be committed to produce benefits for supporters (voters, fans), which in turn 
reinforces his/her own social trust. Consequently, many citizens (and especially local 
authorities) cast their votes for the party they believe will provide them with more benefits 
than any other. In postwar Japanese politics since Tanaka Kakuei’s introduction of local 
                                                   
71 The loyal Japanese fans are known for internalizing the celebrities’ manufactured star-
image (encouraged by the celebrity agency and maintained by the media) while 
introjecting some aspects from heir star-personality by imitating their fashion, or by 
collecting the “totemic” objects of their stardom. They reach for their stars as sources of 
their ontological security, using them as “pedagogical aid in the discourse of the self” 
(Marshall 2010, 36). It is no wonder that large segments of the Japanese public are left 
confused once a celebrity scandal emerges, being unable to digest their sexual/drug-
related transgressions and feeling deceived while reflecting on their committed 
consumption. It goes without saying that this pain of disillusionment is aroused and 
sustained principally by the Japanese media. 
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support groups (kōenkai), nobody in the provinces cared really about the politics per se – 
what really counted was whether a politician gets results in pressuring the central 
government to send resources to region. The transaction of benefits, being itself usually 
asymmetrical and covert, must be “blurred” since it can be seen as bordering with 
corruption and bribery. The phenomenon of “structural corruption” (kōzō oshoku) can be 
understood as blurring the return of the favour in order to avoid accusation. (The ideal 
role of the media-watchdog would then be to “sharpen” the picture of this transaction.) 
Apart from affectively relating oneself to a charismatic authority, the 
proportionality of service and return service assures social cohesion and stability of the 
social system (Wuthnow 2004). In terms of media consumption, the ideal reciprocity of 
trust can be understood as maintaining the contract between producer (actor) and 
consumer (spectator) based on a desire produced on one side, and consumed (or “played 
with”) on the other. Channelling desire in predictable ways is represents one form of 
social control, but if social elites do not follow the symbolic commitments and/or material 
expectations, there occurs a “reciprocity imbalance”. This imbalance becomes significant 
in societies that emphasize lasting social ties based on mutual obligation and gift-giving, 
such as Japan. Removing oneself in such society from the obligation to receive or give 
will likely become the object of denunciatory scandal (Gluckman 1963; Mauss 1966; Blic 
and Lemieux 2013). The expression of disapproval can be apprehended by the public as 
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a betrayal of social trust, which provokes affective sentiments of moral indignation. At 
the same time, however, a more or less deliberate violation of conventions can actually 
form one’s public image and reinforce personal charisma.72 
 Another key desire in the context of this chapter is the desire to know. 
Intellectuals of all sorts keep on reminding us of the unbreakable desire of the human 
spirit to receive and convey stories of all sorts in order to get closer to “truth”. (This 
inclination indicated already by Aristotle’s dictum that “all men by nature desire to know”, 
while Plato’s allegory of the cave aimed to show how men naturally desire narratives 
although they often fail to recognize knowledge). In the same vein, the basic 
narratological pattern of a media text lies in initial uncertainty, advancing in a teleological 
manner toward the concluding climax. The elementary unit is knowledge, and the main 
goal of epistemic emotions in media is knowledge gain: it comforts us to be in the position 
of knowing the world around us. While parasitizing on this ontological weakness of 
mankind, especial the stardom discourse is structured by the concealment-revelation 
                                                   
72  In such case, the charismatic seduction is based on reaching beyond the 
commonsensical limits through transgressive acts and other enactments of “radical 
freedom” (term by Sartre). For instance, some politicians get more support from the 
public if they express anger about their scandal rather than expressing sadness about it 
(Jiang et al. 2011). In Japanese past, this often applied to arrogant-but-charismatic male 
politicians and celebrities with “liminal public image” such as Ishihara Shintarō, 
Hashimoto Tōru, or Kitano Takeshi, who in 1986 attacked the staff of the Friday tabloid 
inside editorial office based on the tabloid’s scoop related to Kitano’s girlfriend. Besides, 
those who have already survived several scandals can be rated higher by the public than 
those whose moral collapse can be perceived as an expression of personal weakness.  
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discourse, often “contaminating” audiences with unhealthy curiosity.73 
Equally importantly for scandals, the desire to know in principle contains further 
moral reasoning. There is something in our psyche that recognizes a wrongful act and 
wants to tell the story of how it came about, and what action ought to be undertaken to 
correct it (Estes 2004, xxxix). Furthermore, the search for truth lies in a reflective thought 
which usually occurs only when the system of values is disrupted (Durkheim 1955). This 
also applies to scandals, where the media present to us all upcoming facts as “things we 
must know” as soon as some moral disturbance emerges. This mediated knowledge is 
however not always sufficient for all the segments of the Japanese public, which does 
wield a certain power to enter into a “dialogue” with the overwhelmingly monologic 
media event of scandal. Especially the sub-publics (loyal fans, orthodox supporters, and 
other “communitas”) can publicly challenge the prosecutorial conduct in scandal, 
univocally side with the transgressor, or they create some “anti-structural” counter-event 
that becomes constitutive of the state of affairs. The most effective strategies are social 
networking (e.g. “flaming” incidents in online forums, or enjō jiken), sending angry 
letters to media companies, or even organizing public rallies. In Japan, the public 
                                                   
73 In scandal, this desire seems to be always socially constructed. The audiences might 
not desire gossip “naturally” (i.e. demanding knowledge for the sake of the survival of 
the fittest), but their curiosity is aroused on the backdrop of a morality tale. In a similar 
context, George Lakoff talks about narratives with “ready-made emotions” (2009), while 
the Frankfurt School insisted a century ago that popular culture is inevitably “pre-digested” 
by the cso called ulture industry. The inbuilt markers of desire seem to be “always-already” 
there, so the audiences do not spontaneously discover the topics/objects of desire, but 
they simply “re-cognize” them in new media representations.  
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broadcaster NHK experienced these pressures on multiple occasions. For instance, the 
1976 Lockheed scandal forced the president of NHK to resign after the broadcaster 
received over 1,200 angry phone calls over the president’s links to Tanaka Kakuei, while 
in 2004 more than a million of Japanese households refused to pay the television fees 
after what they perceived as a mild treatment of an NHK producer tainted by 
embezzlement scandal (see. West 2006; Chun 2007). In the aftermath of the 1992 Sagawa 
scandal, the Japanese public exerted enormous pressure on the prosecution via rallies, 
petitions, and even hunger strikes (the source of the public backlash was the prosecutors’ 
mild treatment of Kanemaru Shin). Most recently, prior to the scandals of Obokata 
Haruko (the 2014 STAP cell scandal), Sano Kenjirō (the 2015 Olympic logo scandal) and 
Shawn K (the 2016 CV fraud scandal), it was the internet communities that flamed the 
debate and contributed to unravelling of these scandals. 
 
4.2. Scandal Typology Based on Public Involvement 
 
John Tomlinson (1997) noted that scandals are “middle-order events” because their 
subject matter is somewhere between the borders of fairly trivial and extremely serious. 
The “high-order” issues (i.e. disrupting global events such as war, rebellion, economic 
depression, but also genocide or the refugee crisis) will not become scandal per se, either 
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because they cannot be condensed into a particular action of one individual, or because 
they are too complicated and abstract to the general public. Similarly, the “low-order” 
issues (i.e. insignificant, non-elite revelations that lack potential to disturb) will also not 
appear on the scandal agenda since they would fail to catch and hold public attention. 
Within the middle-order events that trigger public disturbances in Japan we can detect 
various types of scandal. The typology below distinguishes between five types of scandal 
based on the perceived involvement of the Japanese public.  
The level of moral engagement will be always higher in the case of scandals that 
directly affect the citizen/consumer. In the case of low public involvement scandals (i.e. 
the public feels more like an observer than a participant, while the transgression is less 
relevant to public interests) it is the political and corporate corruption (in Japan most 
notably illegal financial transactions, false statements in financial and fundraising reports, 
shady sources of donations, bribery, and rather sporadically the private lives of political 
figures). In Japan, political corruption is widespread among nationally elected officials 
and prominent bureaucrats, and omnipresent donation scandals remain peripheral in terms 
of attracting attention unless they somehow directly relate to lives of average citizens. 
Also the vagueness and complexity of structural corruption contributes to low public 
involvement. Besides, corporate corruption and political scandal are less attractive for the 
public, since they usually cannot be accompanied by any spectacular, dramatic visual 
222 
imagery. The sex scandals, accusations of infidelity and other displays of failing intimate 
decorum are common only in tabloids, although their frequency in the mainstream media 
increased after the DPJ came to power in 2009 (Carlson 2013). 
On the other hand, a relatively high public attention and public disapproval (i.e. 
the event is very relevant to the public) is usually earned by those scandals that directly 
affect the citizen/consumer: medical malpractices, food poisonings, defect cover-ups, 
false food labeling, cover-ups of product defects, but also environmental pollution and 
personnel/customer info-leaks. (This is said to be typical for the “spectator democracies”, 
where the politically passive citizens become active only when their personal interests are 
affected.) There was a significant public outrage in the case of the 2000 Snow Brand 
scandal: the milk producer poisoned up to 14,000 consumers as a result of sanitation 
procedures that had gone unchecked for decades. Furthermore, the advertising giant 
Dentsu controls the information flow in order to protect clients, which was the case of the 
Morinaga powdered milk contamination scandal in 1955, the Taishō Pharmaceutical cold 
medicine scandal in 1964-5, but also the 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis (Honma 2012; 
Karel van Wolferen, personal communication). It is however not only the big corporations, 
but also the Japanese Ministries that control information leaks or apply pressure on media. 
In many cases of bureaucratic corruption, the motivation is to maintain good relations 
with industries and suppliers. For instance, since 1950s the Ministry of International 
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Trade and Industry obstructed the spread of information on Minamata disease, while in 
1962 the Ministry of Health did not immediately order the withdrawal of dangerous 
products from the market (i.e. the pharmaceutical products using thalidomide). 
Furthermore, the same ministry in 1980s did not stop the flow of the imported AIDS-
tainted blood products (see e.g. Miyamoto 1996; Feldman 2004; Pontell and Geis 2008).  
Average public involvement rate is in Japan represented among others by the 
complex education/academia-related scandals. Academic scandals range from leaking 
exam questions (e.g. the Meiji University bar exam leak in 2015) and bribing professors 
(the medical universities scandals in 2007-08) to plagiarizing research (e.g. the Fujimura 
Paleolithic hoax in 2000, or the Obokata/STAP controversy in 2014) and sexual 
harassment cases (e.g. the scandal series involving the Waseda social club in 2001, the 
Kokushikan University soccer club in 2004, or the Kyoto University American football 
club in 2006). The last type of academia scandals is based on “CV fraud” (e.g. the Kuga 
Jun’ichirō scandal in 2004, or the Shawn K scandal in 2016). These scandals are hard to 
disclose and thus not so frequent in Japan, so the media give them considerable attention. 
Another type of a scandal which is not unusual in Japan but occasionally creates ripples 
in society is the “scandal of the source” (yarase). In this scandal type, it is the media 
themselves who gets caught violating conventions. They can scandalize the public as soon 
as it becomes revealed that they 1) invented/plagiarized news reports, 2) 
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obfuscated/participated in political corruption, or 3) they made false accusations with 
serious impact.74 
Very low public involvement (the theme is rather non-relevant to the general 
public) is typical for minority-related scandals, gaffes and discriminatory expressions.75 
Furthermore, there are basically no taboo-related scandals to be found in the big media – 
partly because they too represent issues with low public involvement. The mainstream 
                                                   
74 In case 1), consider the 1989 Asahi Shinbun “coral incident”, where it was revealed 
that a news photographer fabricated evidence of a vandalized coral reef, or the 1999 Fuji 
TV scandal, where the television company in question had paid prostitutes to act as wives 
on its supposedly true-life series “Loving Couples, Divorcing Couples” (Ai Suru Futari, 
Wakareru Futari). As for 2), which is the most frequent case of the scandal of the source 
in Japan, consider two major Japanese corruption scandals in the past –Recruit (1988) 
and Sagawa Kyūbin (1992). In the first case, where the top politicians were involved in 
insider trading in return for political favors, it became clear that also many journalists, 
including the president of the economic paper Nihon Keizai Shinbun were taking bribes. 
As is often the case in political corruption, in the case of Sagawa (a trucking company 
bribed more than 100 politicians) the club reporters did not immediately publish the 
transgressors’ names although they knew them. In yet another case (the 1990 Itōman 
scandal) a journalist from Nikkei Shinbun was paid to write favorable articles about the 
company in question (Freeman 2000). Finally, in case of 3), consider the wrong 
accusation of Kōno Yoshiyuki in 1994, or Shūkan Bunshun’s accusation of Professor 
Kagawa Mitsuo from 2001, which resulted in his suicide. These “media injuries” may 
awake temporary moral disturbance if revealed, but they often disappear from the news 
agenda without any further explanation.  
75 The postwar history of Japanese politics is rich in gaffes and talk scandals. Among the 
most infamous ones, Prime Minister Nakasone made in 1986 a scandalous remark about 
blacks and Hispanics dragging American educational standards down, while Prime 
Minister Mori Yoshirō generated a minor scandal in 2000 when he referred to Japan as a 
country of the gods (kami no kuni) with the emperor at its core. Another infamous gaffe 
was made in 2007 by the then Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare Yanagisawa Hakuo’s 
statement that women are birth-giving machines (josei ha umu kiki), and in the same year, 
the Defense Minister Kyūma Fumio resigned for his controversial remark regarding the 
“inevitability” (shōganai) of dropping the atomic bomb on Nagasaki. Other Japanese 
politicians known for their inappropriate utterances were the ex-Prime Minister Asō Tarō, 
or the Tokyo ex-Governor Ishihara Shintarō, who labeled illegal immigrants in Japan as 
“third-country people” (sangokujin) and commented on the issue of a bullied student 
contemplating suicide by saying “if you are gonna do it, hurry up and do it” (yaru nara 
sassa to yare).  
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Japanese media traditionally tend to avoid sensitive social topics related to the Emperor 
and his family, the religious Buddhist sect Sōka Gakkai, the ultra-right movement (uyoku), 
the right-wing lobby group “Japan Conference” (Nippon Kaigi), the Korean community 
(zainichi), the “impure” groups (burakumin), but also the Japan-America relationship or 
the child pornography.  
On the contrary, the category of minimal social relevancy but very high public 
involvement is represented by the celebrity scandals. The Japanese public feels more like 
a participant than an observer, making celebrity scandals surprisingly relevant to the 
Japanese. Japanese celebrities, including active performers (singers, actors, entertainers), 
young no-talent celebrity (tarento) and sports stars, are the most usual actors in large-
scale scandals. The typical cases drawing attention of both the mainstream media and the 
tabloids are divorces/marriages, sexual affairs/obscene behavior, suicide attempts, drug 
use, and illegal betting and match-fixing in sport (yaochō). Especially these scandals 
become a sought-after media commodity which sells papers and increases TV ratings.  
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4.3. Scandal as Popular Media Commodity 
 
In a sociocentric perspective, scandals become synonymous with negative public reaction 
against a revealed elite deviation. Thus, scandal starts with exposing some transgression 
to a negatively oriented audience, and it lasts as long as there is significant and sustained 
public interest in it. This interest, which is grounded either in moral indignation or in 
simple curiosity, contributes to media scandals becoming sought-after commodities on 
the media market. The Japanese media in general, and the weekly tabloids in particular 
must entertain the readers enough to keep them buying their products, and scandals are 
one of those symbolic contents that sell papers and increase TV ratings. For the 
commercial media, every scandal represents someone’s’ “fortunate fall from grace” (felix 
culpa) since it attracts audiences and generates profit. 
It is a common sense that the first responsibility of a government is to protect 
and empower its citizens, while the first responsibility of a business is to make money. In 
art and commerce, the dictum is that if the product does not sell, it will not be made, and 
this can be applied to scandals as well. Transgressions (fictional same as factual) sell well, 
while spectacular media events, including scandals, represent commercially motivated 
media contents. They can lead to significant profits if they succeed in attracting and 
entertaining the public.  
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Scandal-as-commodity is largely a product of historical development. The logic 
of newspaper publishing changed in the West throughout the 19th century from primarily 
political to primarily commercial (Herman and Chomsky 1988; McChesney 2008). 
Furthermore, the logic of mediating scandal was significantly affected by this 
transformation within the tradition of radical sensationalism (Curran 2002), and by the 
late 1990, sensational journalism was in the heyday of its corporate era. In other words, 
the Western media logic in late 20th century was shaped by both professional and 
commercial aspects of journalism, while the balance was shifting even more toward the 
commercial. Similarly, in Japan, the “small newspapers” (koshinbun) were traditionally 
carrying various scandalous articles before they were absorbed into “industrial papers” 
(shōgyō shinbun) toward the end of 19th century. The Japanese papers with the largest 
circulations in the first Meiji decade were commoner-oriented sheets such as Yomiuri 
Shinbun, which specialized in sensation and scandal. Later, in both Japan same as in the 
West, ever-larger conglomerates came to buy up the news media, while the international 
market was becoming the ultimate moral arbiter of economic correctness. Today, the 
Japanese and Western corporate media are primarily businesses: under the influence of 
advertisers they are dominated by business considerations, and for infotainment-oriented 
news, scandal is one of the most effective materials for attracting wide audiences. The 
mass media consider conflicts and crises of all sorts to be primarily commodities that 
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interest the viewer, and scandal is a lucrative news item also because its production cost 
is usually low. 
To conclude, media scandals are co-produced by these organizations as a 
commodity to sell, and thus they must be linked to capitalist modes of production and 
ownership. In order to remain in business, the news media must give people what they 
desire (or more critically: what they were “made to desire”). While this might be an 
inevitable occurrence, the danger of such commodification is that the profit intervenes (if 
not undermines) the alleged moral mission of “pursuit of truth”. Thus, especially TV 
ceremonies of confession and apology must be understood as both social performances 
with culturally-pragmatic qualities (see section III), and simultaneously as show business 
with producers assessing the economic potential of the event in advance. Rather than 
being motivated by a spontaneous desire to inform, it seems to be more often the 
commercial formula adopted in order to attract more readers and expand the target 
audience. The networks design the media content in principle according to their corporate 
strategies, whereby transforming the public into imaginary audiences by selling them the 
displays of transgressions of others. 
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5. SOME IDIOSYNCRASIES OF SCANDAL REPORTING IN JAPAN 
 
5.1. Mediopolitical Background: Economic and Professional Structures 
 
As I indicated in previous chapters, the sociopolitical background, including the role of 
the viewing/reading public, has an important impact on the logic of scandal in Japan. 
Within this overarching framework, specific economic patterns, journalistic values, and 
mediopolitical relations are likely to emerge. It is especially the economic and journalistic 
structures that co-define the process of scandal mediation:   
 
1. Economic structures and ownership patterns (vertical, horizontal and diagonal media 
ownership). Apart from the sale of the newspaper, the main sources of revenue for the 
Japanese press rest upon advertising (generally represented by Dentsu), and other 
businesses (i.e. publication of magazines and books). Furthermore, each of the “big five” 
Japanese dailies (Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Nikkei and Sankei) at least partially own one 
commercial TV station, many local TV's, radio stations and other non-media subjects, 
whereas they represent powerful media oligopolies (e.g. Yoshimi and Mizukoshi 1997). 
The “information cartel” is set up by Japanese media organizations based on the business 
model of keiretsu (somewhat controversial but generally legal grouping of 
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complementary firms that take place in an oligopolistic framework and are based on the 
stock control patterns). Many finance schemes within keiretsu are common and tolerated, 
which further increases the potential for media corruption while diminishing media’s 
capacity as an independent watchdog. 
 
2. Professional structures and the relationship between newspapers and their sources. 
The structure of this relationship is typically embodied in the reporters’ club system (kisha 
kurabu). These “clubs”, administered by the Japanese Newspaper Association (Nihon 
Shinbun Kyōkai), organize access and facilitate relations between news media and 
sources. The complex rules (both formal and informal) concern their operation and the 
treatment of information gathered, and they play an important role during scandals. In 
fact, almost all news articles distributed by the Japanese news agencies are from 
government, big companies, or big labor unions, and originate in press conferences and 
background meetings. The journalists collude with official sources (including the police 
or the prosecutors), and between the top politicians and veteran reporters there often exists 
an understanding of mutual empathy. This basic mutual trust, same as the clubs’ limited 
membership and sanctions in case of violating in-group norms have a significant impact 
on the control of scandal information flow. Among other norms of self-restraint (jishuku), 
there exist “blackboard agreements” (kokuban kyōtei) and “press agreements” (hōdō 
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kyōtei), that put the timing of each information release under control (including 
scandalous scoops), restrict the entire newsgathering process, and result in a more or less 
uniform, standardized coverage. Besides, the course of many official political discussions 
(but also mediatized interviews and press conferences) is often anticipated by transcripts 
and list of questions (burasagari) that are submitted to respective authorities in advance 
(e.g. Feldman 1993; Freeman 2000; Stockwin 2008). Some scholars note that these 
procedures are being informed by the sociocultural dichotomy of uchi and ura (the reality 
within/behind the scene) versus soto and omote (the reality of surface appearances). While 
uchi/ura is a platform, where real solutions are construed, soto/omote presents the ready-
made solutions to the outside world (e.g. Stockwin 2008). In its consequence, the 
Japanese mainstream press defers to elite sources by reporting stated principles (tatemae) 
at the expense of real journalistic intentions (honne), and is criticized for being just a PR 
office of Japanese authorities (for more info about the Japanese reporters’ club system 
see Feldman 1993; Freeman 1996; Lange 1998; Krauss 2000; Freeman 2000; Sugiyama 
2000; Asano 2001; Gamble and Watanabe 2004; Asano 2004; Killmeier and Chiba 2010; 
Uesugi 2012; McNeill 2014). 
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5.2. Political Journalism and the Use of Japanese Language  
 
Apart from the visual and auditory perception, our mediated experience of social reality 
is equally importantly shaped by the textual (linguistic, written) cues. Language itself is 
however not a neutral medium for transmission and reception of pre-existing knowledge, 
since it reconstructs experience by putting in grammatical form the results of retrospective 
analysis while failing to represent reality in its entirety (Wittgenstein 1953). More 
importantly for the context of this chapter, the journalistic language too can easily fall 
prey to a more or less deliberate “distortion”, which usually reflects the ideological 
leanings of each media organization. After all, journalism is a matter of rhetorical forms 
and choices of argumentation: it is always to a certain degree a “rhetoric fiction” (Fisher 
1984) based on the traditional function of storytelling (Barkin 1984), which 
argumentatively produces its “pseudo-environment” (Lippmann 1922; Ehrat 2011). This 
chapter was inspired by the sociology of language (e.g. Bourdieu 1991), whose aim is not 
to understand language only as a means of communication, but also as a medium of power. 
Such perspective can indicate how various social phenomena, including scandals, become 
reinterpreted through, in and by structures in language in general, and by the linguistic 
devices of Japanese journalism in particular. While blurring, and obfuscating some 
segments of social reality that becomes materialized in media texts, the ritual use of some 
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journalistic expressions often conveys additional information and meaning to media 
reports 
 In Japanese mainstream media, corruption and pollution is usually confined to 
latter part of the dichotomy of explicit, ritualized “front” (omote) which is exposed to 
public attention, and the implicit “rear” (ura) which is in principle hidden from the public 
eye. While this dichotomy is not exclusively Japanese, it parallels Erving Goffman (1959) 
and his distinction between the frontstage and backstage: in the media-sponsored “theater 
of politics” we can generally distinguish between the stage where politicians engage in 
formal, conventional performances, while being aware that they are framed by the media, 
whereas in the back stage the informal actions, private consultations and role 
performances are in principle not in the focus of the big media. Importantly for analyzing 
media scandals, deception and hiding of facts is one of the most crucial elements of a 
politician’s backstage performance. Such performance can also refer to concealment of 
some information from the audience in order to avoid divulging information that could 
be somehow damaging to political authorities. 
The Japanese power elites in general, and the brokers between business and 
bureaucracy in particular, were always naturally reluctant to support the policy of 
information disclosure (jōhō kōkai). In a similar vein, the Japanese press does not want 
to be seen as taking sides, so it in principle applies descriptive frames within the so-called 
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objective reporting (kyakkan hōdō) (e.g. Hara 1997). The primary medium that can soften 
up the impact of sensitive political information, is the language itself. Language can help 
structure the culture of structural corruption: words and phrases are used in a deliberately 
indirect fashion, and linguistic tricks are applied in order to maintain the power consensus 
even after a scandal surfaces. While being aware of the fact that every word is recorded 
(the off-record accounts can also trigger scandal), both the politicians and the mainstream 
journalist make use of the “imprecision” of the Japanese language, which offers various 
means of blurring the sources and obfuscating the reporting by using a “soft language”. 
For instance, when citing the sources, the mainstream media use expressions such as suji 
mono (official sources), seifu shunō (usually the secretary general or the Prime Minister 
himself), or shunō shūhen (usually people close to the person of Prime Minister such as 
his personal secretary), though the meaning remains indistinct. Besides, if the media 
choose not to quote someone’s name in an article, they simply refer to him/her as nado 
(etcetera) (Hattori Takaaki, personal communication). Especially in mainstream scandal 
reporting, milder versions of the phenomenon of corporate/political corruption are 
commonly used in the mainstream media, such as funshoku kessan (creative accounting), 
kinken seiji (money-politics), or sakiokuri (postponement, delay). Furthermore, the use 
of passive voice in Japanese journalism is one important way that the media avoids 
assigning responsibility. The way in which Japanese verbs are used, same as modifying 
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negative words into their milder versions, are among the effective ritualized means of 
blurring responsibility and protecting the sources via the journalistic language.76 
In this context, some scholars pointed at the phenomenon of kotodama 
(originally a Shinto-belief that words have spirits): the speaker is advised to avoid saying 
anything negative as it may become reality, and this tendency is embedded in the language 
of Japanese journalism (Maeda 2003; Killmeier and Chiba 2010). More importantly, the 
pragmatism of using indirect expressions, and the discrepancy between saying something 
and actually practicing is a structural feature around which the polity has evolved 
throughout Japanese political history (Yamamoto 1990; Maynard 1997; Feldman 1998). 
   Needless to say, in media scandal the data-gathering/editing processes reflect the 
policy of the mainstream media in general, and editorial policies of each newspaper in 
particular. The journalistic “labor” is divided and responsibility diffused during the 
teamwork. The full-time reporters (ban kisha) are on everyday basis attached to their 
                                                   
76 In such cases, the Japanese verb appears at the end of a sentence in a passive form, and 
it facilitates the “rhetoric of commentation” (term by Maynard 1997), where the human 
agent does not appear in the sentence as an explicit grammatical subject whereby avoiding 
responsibility for the described action. The most frequent examples of carefully 
formulating accusations are verbal expressions in a potential form, such as to ieru (“it can 
be said that”), and the usage of passive verbforms such as to iwareru (“it is said that”), to 
omowareru (“it is considered”), to mirareru (“it seems to be the case that”), keikō ga aru 
(“there is a tendency that”), koe ga aru (“there exists an opinion”), kanōsei ga aru (“there 
exists a possibility”) and koto ga wakatta/akiraka ni natta (it became clear/ it was 
understood that). The impact of a scandalous reporting can be also softened by using 
adverbs such as tabun (“probably”) or osoraku (“perhaps”). Related to this, another 
strategy of political vagueness lies in modifying negative words into milder ones. For 
instance, “prostitution” (baishun) becomes “helping relationship” (enjo kōsai), wartime 
sex slaves are called “comfort women” (ianfu), taxes (zeikin) are replaced by “public 
funds” (kōteki shikin) and self-censorship (jiko ken’etsu) by “self-regulation” (jishu kisei).  
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political counterparts, maintaining specific proximity, which in turn influences the way 
of coverage. This proximity is conditioned by the fact that reporters identify with the 
politicians they cover, while their careers advance along with the politician’s career (see 
Feldman 1993; Uesugi 2012). They are part of the aforementioned reporters’ club system 
(kisha kurabu) which largely controls political reporting in Japan, including the wording 
of power-sensitive news. It gives the official reporters privileged access to politicians 
while disadvantaging the regional press, the foreign press, and the freelance journalists. 
Besides, political journalists submit their questions in advance, while many front-line 
reporters are young and underexperienced. 
Finally, in Japanese language, various phenomena related to transgression, 
corruption and scandal are frequently reflected in proverbial phrases. This reminds us of 
Lyotard’s impression that popular sayings, proverbs and other maxims are “like little 
splinters of potential narratives that circulate on certain levels of the social” (Lyotard 1984, 
22). In the case of Japanese language consider the idioms “if water is too clean no fish 
can live in it”, “put a lid on something that smells”, “it is sometimes necessary to stretch 
the truth”, or “in strategy, secrecy is highly regarded”. In scandal, the idiom “cutting the 
tail of the lizard” (tokage no shippo kiri) is a proverbial account on the Japanese 
politicians’ ability to undertake “purification” (misogi) and swiftly regenerate after their 
transgression, while “the honest man is sure to lose” (shōjikimono ga baka wo miru) can 
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refer to the tendency to keep silent about a corruption rather than to blow the whistle. 
 
5.3. Bottom-up Mediation and the Role of Tabloids 
 
Scandals are primarily kept private by elite mainstream media. The Japanese mainstream 
press rarely confronts political controversies, and even if they eventually do, they expose 
elite deviations within the official, ritualized “front” (omote). Moreover, these media are 
unlikely to carry out any investigation that would uncover political or corporate secrets. 
On the one hand, this modus operandi is underpinned by unwritten norms of the reporters’ 
club (kisha kurabu), and on the other hand it is a result of the power of major advertising 
agencies (especially Dentsu), business circles (zaikai), government ministries, and even 
the organized crime. 
The implicit “rear” (ura) of things, which is normally hidden from the Japanese 
mainstream audiences, is usually handled by the outside media. The initial impulse for 
triggering a scandal usually lies in a bottom-up process initiated by the semi-mainstream 
weekly magazines (shūkanshi), but occasionally also via freelance reporting, local 
newspapers, and the sports papers. Furthermore, some Japanese scandals with global 
reach are instigated by foreign press (e.g. the 1976 Lockheed case), and/or amplified by 
online communities (e.g. the 2015 Olympic logo scandal). Some major postwar 
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corruption scandals were triggered by the prosecutor’s office (e.g. Lockheed, Recruit, 
Sagawa), or via a whistleblower who forwards some scoop to any place where the 
appearance of consensus is less assured (i.e. tabloids, foreign press, or prosecutors). 
Apart from a handful of biweeklies, Japan has over 100 weeklies and about 3,500 
monthly magazines with annual sales of more than three billion copies (Legewie 2010). 
Altogether amounting to a circulation of five to six million, the weeklies (shūkanshi) are 
usually the prime movers of scandals in Japan (the largest weeklies sell around half 
million copies). In terms of marketing, over 90 percent of Japanese magazines are bought 
at newsstands, so their existence is largely based on their controversial and scandalous 
appeal. In terms of censorship, they are free to indulge in a more speculative journalism 
because they do not belong to the restrictive system of kisha kurabu. Moreover, since 
major Japanese newspapers are known for representing the accurate-but-official omote-
reality in a strikingly homogeneous way, many readers turn to magazines for an 
alternative. Apart from the weekly tabloids like Sunday Mainichi or Shūkan Asahi who 
are rather conservative since they are owned by one of the big dailies, there exists a variety 
of sensationalist sports papers with circulation around one million (e.g. Sankei Supōtsu 
or Supōtsu Nippon).  
 The most prominent scandal instigators are those weeklies owned by larger 
publishing houses – most notably the Shūkan Bunshun (publisher Bungei Shunjū), Shūkan 
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Shinchō (Shinchōsha), and Shūkan Gendai (Kōdansha), or the photo-tabloids Friday 
(Kōdansha) and Flash (Kōbunsha) or Spa! (Fusōsha). No matter how speculative or 
unethical the weeklies get, they still represent an influential news format that is 
necessarily guided by profit, and ranges from celebrity news to high quality journalism, 
serious speculations and unsubstantiated libel.77 
The general press in the first instance ignores the tabloids' revelations. This is 
not only because of the journalistic agreements within the kisha kurabu system, but it also 
maintains the market share by avoiding offences (i.e. if a story is not based on an official 
investigation by prosecutors, there is always a risk that publications carrying the story 
will expose themselves to lawsuit). Nonetheless, depending on various circumstances (see 
below) the national dailies eventually start to cover a scandal as well.  
 Here is just a handful of examples of elite deviances and other “moral 
disturbances” in postwar Japan, that were exposed due to the aforementioned “bottom up” 
mediation. These cases vary in the degree of social importance, controversy and the media 
coverage, while some incidents are not proper media scandals. Nonetheless, all these 
incidents stemmed from either one-time transgression or a long-term corruption that had 
                                                   
77  The weeklies were in the past calling into question the background and details 
regarding factual historical events such as the Nanking massacre, the existence of 
Holocaust and gas chambers, or the sex slavery of the “comfort women” (ianfu) in the 
Japanese army during the World War II. Furthermore, the Japanese tabloids were in the 
past wrongly accusing and stigmatizing ordinary citizens (e.g. the case of Kōno Yoshiyuki 
in 1994) and stigmatizing individuals to the point of their suicide (e.g. the case of 
Professor Kagawa Mitsuo in 2001). 
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some scandalizing effect on the Japanese public. The intention of this listing is to point 
out how a certain private matter (including gossip, gaffe and cover-up) went public 
through other than the mainstream media channels in Japan. 
Takasugi case (1965). The chief Japanese delegate Takasugi Shinichi said that 
Japanese national emotion does not allow apology to Korea for war atrocities. Despite the 
request to keep his slip of tongue off-record, one Kasumi club reporter leaked it to the 
communist Akahata Shinbun and the gaffe was subsequently reported by the Korean 
papers Nodong Sinmun and Dong-A Ilbo (e.g. Lee 1980). Only then was the gaffe reported 
by the Japanese dailies that quoted the aforementioned papers. 
Black Mist Case (1971). A series of game fixing and bribe scandals in Japanese 
professional baseball league. The scandal broke after the investigative activities of the 
Shūkan Post magazine and was consequently broadcast on the Fuji TV news program. 
Minamata Case (1972). The Chisso Corporation's chemical factory leak of 
methyl mercury resulted in serious mercury poisonings in Minamata City. The Japanese 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (today METI) deliberately obstructed the 
investigation. The attention to Minamata was brought by a foreign photojournalist (the 
ex-Life magazine journalist William Eugene Smith). 
Tanaka Kakuei Case (1974). In the mid-1960s Tanaka was involved in making 
shady land deals. Furthermore, in 1974 Tanaka’s huge expenditures in the July election 
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and his failure to report details to the tax authorities became investigated by investigative 
reporters Tachibana Takashi and Kodama Takaya. Their findings were published in 
Bungei Shunjū, picked by Newsweek, and based on this revelation Tanaka was challenged 
during an appearance at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan (FCCJ). Only then 
did the Japanese mainstream media touch upon the story and Tanaka resigned his post 
following the accusations. 
Lockheed Case (1976). Tanaka Kakuei and other actors (Kodama Yoshio, the 
Marubeni Co.) accepted bribes from Lockheed Corporation in return for having Japan's 
All Nippon Airways purchase the Tristar model of a passenger plane. The information 
was released by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and published by the Los 
Angeles Times. Only then did the mainstream media publish the whole story. In early 
February, Asahi Shinbun covered the investigation in a short article (Asahi Shinbun, 
February 5, 1976), but Tanaka was identified as the recipient of the bribes only after he 
was arrested half year later. 
Miura Case (1984). The wife of Japanese businessman Miura Kazuyoshi was 
allegedly murdered by street robbers during a trip by the couple to the USA. Three years 
after the incident, the weekly Shūkan Bunshun ran articles indicating that Miura himself 
had actually been involved in killing his wife for the life insurance benefits. This incident 
sparked a harsh criticism of the Japanese mass media (see e.g. Asano 2004).  
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Toshiba-COCOM Case (1987). The Toshiba Machine Tool Company was 
suspected of selling the Russians advanced machining tools that were prohibited for 
export to the communist bloc. The material witness surfaced, and based on an angry 
reaction in the United States, a scandal was eventually generated (Wargo 1990). Initially, 
MITI and the Japanese Government denied the charges, but later the Toshiba Company 
itself atoned for the offence.  
Sugar cane Case (1987). The governor of Kyōto Prefecture made an 
inappropriate statement regarding the situation where a typhoon damaged sugar cane 
fields in Okinawa. The incident, provided by Kyōdō wire service, was left untouched by 
the mainstream media. Nonetheless, the local newspapers in Okinawa and Hokkaidō did 
publish the story and only then the governor pushed to offer his apologies, making the 
case into national news. 
Recruit Case (1988). Prime minister Takeshita Noboru, other Diet members and 
business leaders (altogether 159 people) were involved in insider trading and receiving 
shares from the Recruit Company in return for political favors. The scandal was 
obstructed because many journalists had also taken bribes (including the president of 
Nihon Keizai Shinbun). The Kawasaki local branch of Asahi Shinbun initially discovered 
the scandal but its management attempted to impede its own reporters’ investigation 
(Nester 1990). The newspaper’s affiliate weekly Asahi Journal finally picked up the story, 
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while the Communist Party’s newspaper Akahata published a list of original share 
recipients, which eventually made Takeshita resign his post in 1989. 
Uno Sōsuke Case (1989). Prime Minister Uno Sōsuke had an extramarital affair 
with a geisha. Later, she contacted the daily Mainichi Shinbun to provide them with a 
story, which was only briefly mentioned in Mainichi's sister magazine Sunday Mainichi. 
Two days later, the Washington Post reprinted the article for international audiences, and 
the Japanese political opposition used the same article during discussion in the Japanese 
Diet, whereby initiating its coverage in mainstream press. As a result, Uno resigned his 
post while the treatment of women in Japan briefly became an issue on the sociopolitical 
agenda. 
Dogeza Hatsugen Case (1990). Then LDP secretary general Ozawa Ichirō made 
an inappropriate wording of the prostration statement (dogeza hatsugen) toward the 
colonized Korea (this happened only ten days before the official visit of the South Korean 
President to Japan). The Japanese media did not directly print Ozawa's name – they only 
indicated “one of the heads of the LDP” (jimintō shunō) – however the Korean media 
published the details including Ozawa’s name. The Asahi Shinbun also mentioned Ozawa 
as the author of the statement but they immediately came under strong pressure from 
within the kisha club system for breaking the tacit agreement (see Freeman 1996). 
Sagawa Kyūbin Case (1992). The trucking company in question bribed more 
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than 100 politicians in return for political favors. The details including a list of bribed 
politicians were known to the club reporters, but stayed unpublished for many months 
due to the informal norms of silence. The scandal was initiated by Shūkan Shinchō, and 
the mainstream media started publishing the story only after the prosecutor's office had 
issued warrant arrests. Takeshita Noboru, Kanemaru Shin and others resigned, while their 
contacts with organized crime was revealed. The incoming prime minister Hosokawa 
Morihiro also resigned due to his own involvement in the scandal (this was published 
later in Bungei Shunjū). 
Owada Masako Case I. (1993). The story of Princess Masako's engagement to 
the Crown Prince was kept secret because of the information embargo imposed by the 
Imperial Household Agency (Kunaichō). However, the news agencies Reuters and 
Associated Press leaked the information to foreign media. Only then did the Imperial 
Household Agency and the Japanese Newspaper Association lift the embargo and send 
the same information to Japanese media through Japanese wire agencies Kyōdō and Jiji. 
Apropos of this, it was also the foreign media (the Newsweek magazine) that leaked 
classified information about the engagement of Emperor Hirohito to princess Michiko in 
1958. 
Jusen housing loan case. (1995). Japanese government was going to use the 
taxpayers’ money to deal with bad debts related to yakuza. The story was published in 
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Nikkei Weekly and was picked by the foreign media (e.g. Newsweek). Only then, the 
Japanese mainstream media also began to cover the case, while the Japanese edition of 
Nikkei only quoted Newsweek as the source of scandal.    
Toa Ilbo Case (1995). The Tokyo bureau of a leading Korean newspaper 
received an anonymous document, confirming inappropriate statements regarding the 
historical relationship with Korea, made by the Management and Coordination Agency's 
director during a Cabinet Press Club conference. Toa Ilbo contacted Asahi Shinbun, 
which did not confirm the allegations. The Korean paper then published the story, which 
was later picked by Mainichi Shinbun and Tokyo Shinbun. Consequently, both Japanese 
papers were barred from all club activities for one month (de Lange 1998). 
Tochigi ijime Case (1999). A teenager in Tochigi Prefecture was bullied to 
death. The media misinformed the public about the incident by quoting incorrect police 
reports. The real background of the incident was investigated and published with five 
months’ delay by the local branch of Sankei Shinbun, followed by Shūkan Hōseki and 
FOCUS (see Ito 2006). 
Owada Masako Case II. (2004). Princess Masako became a topic when she was 
diagnosed as suffering from a mental disorder. The Imperial Household Agency blocked 
the information, but the story was picked up by foreign correspondent Richard Lloyd 
Parry from The Times in London, and only then did Japanese mainstream media publish 
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the whole story while referring to foreign sources. 
Olympus case (2011). In a fraudulent accounting scandal, the British Financial 
Times published the story based on the article of Yamaguchi Yoshimasa in the magazine 
Facta. The main whistleblower became Michael Woodford, who was dismissed as 
president of the company, while Nihon Keizai Shinbun waited about a week to fully report 
on the scandal (Yamaguchi 2011; Woodford 2012).  
Fukushima coverage case. (2011). The Japanese networks were monitoring the 
post-quake nuclear crisis through local broadcast, but same as the TEPCO Company and 
the government, they were either reluctant or late to air specific info regarding the 
radiation leak. It was the European (especially German and Norwegian) media, while the 
American Washington Post that were among the first to report the radiation map and the 
diagram of meltdown (e.g. Uesugi 2012). 
Samuragōchi case (2013-4). The music composer Mamoru Samuragōchi (aka 
“deaf Beethoven”) was falsely claimed to be deaf, while most of his work was attributed 
to his ghost-writer (the composer Niigaki Takashi). In March 2013, the NHK was still 
celebrating the artist in a TV documentary, but only few months later, the magazine Aera 
(publisher Asahi Shinbunsha) and the newsweekly Shinchō 45 doubted the truth behind 
Samuragōchi. At the beginning of 2014, the big Japanese media finally started covering 
the scandal. 
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Shimomura case (2015). The Education Minister Shimomura Hakubun 
received political donation from the country’s largest yakuza group (Yamaguchi-gumi). 
The scandal was triggered by the communist Akahata Shinbun, but it did not gain its 
momentum until it was picked by Shūkan Bunshun and Sankei Shinbun one month later 
(e.g. Adelstein 2015). 
Amari case (2016). The Minister of State for Economic Revitalization, Amari 
Akira was accused of political bribery (he allegedly accepted money from the head of a 
construction company in exchange for political favors). The accusation was firstly 
published in a January article by the weekly Asahi Bunshun, and the follow-up piece in 
the same magazine caused Amari to call for a press conference and resign from his post, 
along with Amari’s two aides who were allegedly entertained in Tokyo nightclubs at the 
expense of the same construction company.     
          
The more powerful the object in journalism, the greater is editors’ reluctance to publish 
the story, same as the damage to the reporter if it collapses. The scandal-seeking tabloids 
are often in trouble and legal action comes with the territory. The danger lies in those 
cases where editors have to correctly judge the norm audience when publishing a scandal 
because it may backfire (Jacobsson and Löfmarck 2008). Furthermore, it is equally 
dangerous to scandalize too far and overstep the values of the target group (Gluckman 
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1963). If the privacy violation (puraibashī shingai) is at stake, the media can plead the 
constitutional freedom of expression (hyōgen no jiyū). The tabloids’ “nihilist enthusiasm” 
can get under fire also because of the placement and size of a transgressor’s unflattering 
images (most recently, the tabloids became criticized after ridiculing Obokata Haruko by 
oversizing her close-up image on front pages of the sports papers in the wake of her 
academic/plagiarism scandal in 2014). Although the Japanese generally tend to avoid 
litigation, in some cases the weeklies are brought to court and penalized (they are in 
principle represented by their publishing houses). Only sometimes are they prohibited 
publishing, but it is still rare to be prosecuted.78 
The financial damages are on the increase, but they are rather nominal, reaching 
up to one million yen per case (see Asano 2004; Legewie 2010). Once the cost/benefit 
estimation is made it is often worthwhile for the weeklies to run the risk, publish rumors, 
and eventually gain from negative publicity. 
 
 
 
                                                   
78 For instance, an arrest warrant was issued by Kobe prosecutors in 2005 on a suspicion 
of defamation in a tabloid magazine Kami no Bakudan (published by Matsuoka 
Toshiyasu’s Rokusaisha). Earlier in 1994 the popular tabloid Shūkan Shinchō (published 
by Shinchōsha) was ordered by court to pay damages in a serious misreporting incident 
involving a Sōka Gakkai priest. In 1995, the monthly magazine Marco Polo (published 
by Bungei Shunjū) ceased to exist based on an article denying Holocaust, which was 
publicly attacked by the Simon Wiesenthal Center. 
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6. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SCANDAL MEDIATION PROCESS IN JAPAN 
 
At the outset of this thesis, I postulated, following the neofunctionalist paradigm, that 
scandal is a social performance between ritual and strategy. While section III focused on 
ritualized aspects of scandal as a meaningful sociocultural performance, this section 
(especially its last chapter) analyzes “strategic” aspects (professional, organizational) of 
scandal mediation in Japan. I aim to create a map of scandal mediation process across the 
whole Japanese mediascape, including both the inside/outside media and their role in 
scandal. This endeavor falls within the objectivist paradigm of scandal studies, which 
focuses on transgressions and misconducts as related to various organizational biases 
(structural, impersonal issues, malfunctions of the system) and media routines (i.e. 
patterned and repeated practices and forms that media workers use). They both result in 
the so-called “journalistic rituals of objectivity” that prevent individual journalists from 
being blamed (Tuchman 1972), while ensuring that the media system responds in 
predictable ways (Shoemaker and Reese 1996). Thus, many classical observers claim that 
the less-routine events such as scandals are actually becoming routine news events, 
complete with standard reporting formulas (Molotch and Lester 1974; Edelman 1977; 
Gitlin 1980).  
Lance Bennett (2007) rightly noted that scandals occupy a strange sort of 
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gatekeeping develops. First of all, the basic communication model of sender-message-
receiver in scandal reporting is more complex than it looks like – most importantly 
because scandals are co-constructed by multiple interrelated or adversarial actors. Thus, 
I distinguish between four main types of actors that construct a media scandal: 
1. scandal promoters (“sources of perception”, insiders, whistleblowers). They 
identify and deliberately promote some transgressive occurrence as newsworthy. 
The promotion can take a shape of administrative spin, PR activity, or a simple 
tabloid gossip, while the promoters do not necessarily constitute a homogeneous 
entity  
2. primary participants (“assemblers”, “communicators”, newsmen). Various 
networks transform occurrences via mediatization into newsworthy media events. 
They include information sources, news agencies, and both the low-level media 
workers (reporters, editors, writers) and high-level workers (publishers, news 
(vice-)presidents). Same as in case of scandal promoters, the work-ethic and 
media coverage via the primary participants varies significantly.    
3. secondary participants (social control mechanisms, agencies, “pundits”). They 
legitimize/criminalize the transgression (the police, prosecutors, lawyers), they 
wield some power to influence the scandal development 
(entertainment/advertising agencies, crisis managers, investigative commissions, 
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the organized crime), and they provide the public with “expert truth” (media 
pundits and other opinion leaders that are relied on by the media to put events into 
a meaningful context) 
4. scandal consumers (“receivers”, “media audiences”, readers/viewers). They 
decode and interpret meanings of previously promoted, assembled and eventually 
criminalized media events.  
 
This chapter will focus most closely on the primary participants, i.e. the media institutions 
and their workers with more or less ritualized media routines. I will delineate those forces 
that control various functions along the scandal news process, including their decision 
what will become scandal and in what way. Furthermore, I consider the media-watchdog 
theory when analyzing the role of media in revealing elite deviances in Japan. The 
contemporary media/communication research implies that the traditional public 
watchdog argument is outdated. It is not paramount anymore in determining the media 
policy that are today given over largely to entertainment/infotainment, while more 
decisive is the exercise of economic power by shareholders and managers (e.g. Curran 
2002). In this vein, the Japanese mediascape is often criticized for having no real 
independent body to keep government from controlling the media, while the watchdog 
role of journalists is on trial in several cases with enormous implications for freedom of 
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the press. Also in order to review this criticism related to Japanese media, I highlight the 
developmental logic of and ideal-scandal mediation. I offer a five-act structure consisting 
of scoop leak to media, scandal processing, scoop leak to the public, scandal climax, and 
the post-scandal phase. 
 
6.1. Initiation Phase: Scoop Leak to the Media 
 
In the initiation phase, scandals are fundamentally structured by the dialectic of cover-up 
and exposure, and the explanation of initial revelation is seminal for understanding the 
process of scandal. Given how various social systems work (in Japan especially the world 
of entertainment, politics, and the corporate world), scandal seems to be always already 
there, “waiting to show itself”. The emergence of a scandal, as just one product of 
journalistic rituals, is however nothing epiphanic, while leaks are more routine than 
exceptional. Indeed, scandals may appear as discoveries, but they are in principle given, 
and not naturally born out of their respective contexts.  
In order to initiate a scandal, transgression must be revealed and leaked to the 
media that authorize it for publishing. During the initiation phase of scandal, the exposure 
itself is usually not controlled by the journalists. Generally, the scandal news content 
consists largely of statements from official sources, and in the same vein, the so-called 
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“scoops” in Japanese dailies are almost always authorized leaks (e.g. Shoemaker and 
Reese 1996; McNeill 2014). In some isolated cases, the scandal disclosure seems to be 
based on mere coincidence (for instance, the drug-packed husband of Sakai Noriko was 
body-searched by the Tokyo police “at random”; the Watergate burglars were caught 
“incidentally”). However, I argue that the primary motivation for leaking scoops to the 
media usually derives from the “3 C’s”: 
 
1. Capital. The disclosure is profit-oriented. Whistleblowers are motivated by financial 
benefits for leaking some sensitive information (notes, documents or photos) while 
usually hiding their real identity 
2. Conspiracy. In denunciatory scandals, the narrative about conspiracy can refer to 
secretive or illegal plots by political enemies, bureaucrats, prosecutors and other parties 
(i.e. some scandal incentives come as a part of attack-politics). 
3. Confession. The disclosure works as unforced confession to the media (e.g. based on 
a spontaneous moral reflection), or as a provocation (e.g. iconoclastic scandals 
challenging artistic norms or provoking shock from the “immoral” in art). 
 
While being primarily motivated by commercial profit, by a political plot, or simply by 
one’s “moral awakening”, a transgressive occurrence is transformed into a media event 
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and reduced into an understandable media phenomenon. The revelatory act is usually 
realized via whistleblowing (i.e. insider revealing information about some hidden secret), 
which is the most frequent type of short-circuiting of subversion of communication 
between reporters and their sources. 79  In other words, every scandal requires some 
intentional form of information leak, usually conducted by scandal “promoters” (insiders, 
or company zealots, anonymous reporter sources, political opposition, auditors, the police, 
prosecutors, or individual victims of corruption). Unfortunately, the information source 
is usually impossible to trace since scoops are based on the understanding that journalists 
will protect the person who gave them the information. 80  In Japan, the most of 
prosecutorial investigations that can lead to scandal are based on anonymous tips 
(Hasegawa 2000), or they were “motivated” by the data stemming from investigative 
journalism (Johnson 1997). Some law-breaking scandals are triggered by the police 
leaking data to the media through unofficial channels (e.g. Asano 2004). However, some 
                                                   
79  Apart from the practice of whistleblowing (i.e. insiders and informers revealing 
information about certain hidden secret) we can add two more types of short-
circuiting/subversion of communication between reporters and their sources: entrapment 
(journalists betraying their sources by breaking a formal or tacit agreement), and 
spotlighting (journalists retrospectively retracing a routine talk in the media that may have 
in the past lead to a major violation) (Liebes and Blum-Kulka 2004). The process of 
spotlighting became easier due to technological developments, since various journalistic 
sources are now accessible electronically, allowing to reconstruct past editorial efforts. 
80 For instance, up to 40 percent of published gossip in the weekly tabloid Uwasa no 
Shinsō (active 1979-2004) came straight from the kisha kurabu reporters (Gamble and 
Watanabe 2004). While enjoying friendly links with the weeklies, the reporter-
whistleblowers usually write under pen name, or they at least sell a tip for scandal, for 
which they can receive an amount of money which equals up to 1,000 dollars (Jameson 
1997; West 2006). The magazines in turn serve as a valuable scandal source for the 
commercial television broadcast. 
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leaks are not always accurate and can be potentially harmful to commoners.81 
Some Japanese celebrity scandals stem from coincidences resulting in public 
exposure (and they are further amped up by the tabloid paparazzi), while other leaks are 
based on rumors that first emerged outside the big media (e.g. in online forums such as 
Channel 2 and critical blogs such as Netgeek.biz). The most reliable source for scandal 
(not only in Japan) is a sensitive leak in a fixed form (busshō). In such case, the medium 
for scoop (and thus the body of evidence) is represented by audio/video tapes, phone 
calls/transcripts, seized account books, or photographs of celebrities in “unflattering” 
scenarios (the so-called nyan-nyan shashin). The emergence of fixed evidence hinges on 
whistleblowing, investigative journalism, the police, and the prosecutors. Nonetheless, 
some discrediting “mysterious documents” (kaibunsho) are discovered all of sudden, 
which is to be attributed either to the practices schemed attack-politics (Taniguchi 2007), 
to bureaucrats avoiding/calling for responsibility (Miyamoto 1996), or to attempts on 
character assassination based on ones’ sentiments of retaliation. These documents are re-
printed in the tabloids, generating up to three scandal articles per month (West 2006).     
                                                   
81 Consider the case of a leaked disinformation based on a flawed police report that lead 
to the false accusation of Kōno Yoshiyuki during the Matsumoto/Sarin incident from 1994, 
or the 1999 Tochigi ijime case from 1999, where a teenager from Tochigi Prefecture was 
bullied to death, but the media misinformed the public about the incident by quoting 
incorrect police reports (see Ito 2006). In cases like this, the Japanese journalists do not 
seem to tend to maintain the presumption of innocence, and they often uncritically adopt 
the police data since they are protected by the guidelines of The Japanese Newspaper 
Association (Nihon Shinbun Kyōkai), where newspapers are not held responsible for 
misinformation or libel as long as it is based on a police report. 
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6.2. Pre-scandal Phase: Data Processing 
 
Not every publicized behavior or action causes public outrage. Some scoops, same as 
other “low-order events” cannot constitute a proper scandal because 1) they do not reach 
the threshold of attention of the public, 2) there was no scandal promoter who would start 
the “moral crusade”, or 3) the solution was already internally reached at the level of elites 
and institutions. 
The pre-scandal phase lies primarily in investigation and search for information 
prior to actual media release. The media wrestle whether some rumors are fit to print. In 
cases of confirmed violation of dominant social norm, it is primarily the media to get 
involved, while in the case of a violation of law, it is the police and the prosecutor's office. 
Thus, scandals are often simultaneously processed on two levels: the repressive/legal 
level, where an occurrence becomes a criminal act (i.e. the wrongdoing is rendered as 
infringing formal rules), and the symbolic/ethical level, on which the occurrence 
becomes a non-routine media event (i.e. the wrongdoing is rendered as infringing social 
custom, tradition or taboo). Regarding the processing of information, the former level 
corresponds to the realm of fact and motivation (i.e. the “pentad” of questions starting 
with who, what, where, when and how), while eventually resulting in material punitive 
sanctions (detention, fines). The repressive/legal process is supervised by the agents of 
257 
formal social control (police, courts, correctional institutions) based on failing one’s 
“legal responsibility” (hōteki sekinin). The symbolic/ethical level lies in interpretations 
and meanings of transgression and relates to one’s “moral responsibilities” (dōgiteki 
sekinin). The latter leads to symbolic punitive sanctions (loss of status, reputation and 
other forms of social disgrace) and is facilitated by the media as informal agents of social 
control. Especially in Japan, where social order is said to be often maintained through 
informal social control and damaging one’s reputation (Haley 1982; Miller and Kanazawa 
2000), sanctions on the symbolic/mediated level are more devastating than legal 
punishment. 
In power-related scandals the Japanese mainstream media are likely to ignore 
the story, previously released by tabloids. They take the “see no evil” approach and keep 
the information outside their focus. As I indicated above, this is partly caused by 
institutionalized norms of silence: the details of corruption/transgression are an open 
secret to many mainstream reporters, who are however not encouraged to undertake any 
serious investigative reporting. This rule is institutionalized by aforementioned kisha 
clubs that are obliged to behave in accord with the information cartel. Another reason for 
keeping the rule comes from the conservative political pressures. These can de facto lead 
to revoking broadcasting licenses.82 
                                                   
82 The Communications and Internal Affairs Ministry has the power to issue, renew or 
revoke licenses of broadcasting companies. There are more cases in Japanese history 
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The mainstream media are also unlikely to carry out any investigation that would 
uncover corporate secrets including corruptive practices. Such norms of silence are 
underpinned by the pressure coming from advertising agencies (in Japan most notably 
Dentsu and Hakuhodo) and partners from within the business circles (zaikai). In some 
cases, the information is withheld since it is related to some tabooed social topic in Japan 
(see above). On the contrary, the non-mainstream tabloids, sports magazines and local 
papers pick a scoop and take the initiative in investigation. Some Japanese magazines sell 
their gathered memo to other domestic media companies, or they inform other subjects 
including the foreign media, police and prosecutors. Their risk lies in reliability of leaked 
information and accuracy of the tips from whistleblowers, and the scandal information is 
evaluated in terms of estimated profit and eventual financial damages. In many cases, 
however it financially pays to be sued for previously released untruths or half-truths, 
although it is not preferable for the weeklies to be sued by an ordinary person (Gamble 
and Watanabe 2004; West 2006). Once the prosecutor’s office obtains information from 
their sources (anonymous whistleblowers, police, tabloids, online forums), they 
eventually start investigation on their own. In other words, during the pre-scandal phase 
                                                   
where the politicians put pressure on a broadcaster due to sensitive media content (most 
notably the 1993 Asahi TV anti-LDP pre-election media coverage, or the 2001 NHK 
“comfort women” documentary censorship). Most recently, the Internal Affairs 
Communications Minister Takaichi Sanae warned the broadcasters that the government 
can order them to suspend operations if they keep on airing programs that are deemed 
“politically biased”. 
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the outside media can determine what information reaches the prosecutors and which 
subject will be investigated. Pre-arrest reports in the weeklies are rather exceptional, 
because they can become heavily criticized if the accusation turns out to be wrong. 
  
6.3. Scandal Proper: Transgression Going Public 
 
During the stage I call scandal proper, the media finally piece together all available 
fragments of information and approach the public with a more or less consistent basic 
narrative. After first revelation surfaces, the new ones are quickly made, and from now 
on the media will keep establishing a record while keeping the scandal alive.  
As I indicated above, the mainstream media are usually reluctant to pick up an 
info-leak pointing at some form of serious domestic corruption. However, these media 
can at least publish a “news report about a news report” while distancing themselves and 
referring to outside sources.83 
Some scandals (especially those related to plagiarizing or safety) are scrutinized 
                                                   
83 The mainstream Japanese media often avoid responsibility for releasing a controversy 
by reposting pictures or quoting articles from foreign sources or domestic weeklies. 
Without certificating the story or digging any deeper, the media state that something 
occurred “according to an article in…” (…ni yoru to). For instance, in 2004 the foreign 
media speculated that princess Masako suffered from depression, but the Japanese media 
only mentioned that Washington Post covered the story on its front page, and later they 
added that it was the weekly Shūkan Bunshun that had broken the story in Japan. In 
another case from 2013, Asahi Shinbun published an incident of four lynched American 
civilian contractors in Iraq’s Fallujah (the so-called “strange fruit” incident), but Asahi 
only reprinted the controversial picture as it earlier appeared in The New York Times. 
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in Japanese online platforms (most importantly the 2channel forum, or BuzzFeed Japan). 
Scandals and gaffes can be also initiated by individually posted clips (on YouTube, U-
stream, or Nico Nico Douga), pictures and comments (on Facebook or Twitter). 
Especially the platform of Twitter is a source for frequent political gaffes in Japan. 
The key media actors in this scandal phase are the weeklies (shūkanshi). While 
sensing larger profit, the biggest competing tabloids (especially Shūkan Bunshun and 
Shūkan Shinchō) deepen their investigative reporting and elaborate on new disclosures, 
twists and turns. By doing so, the tabloids infuse the social drama of scandal with new 
moral energy, facilitating a “media hype”.84 The scandal hype tends to focus on negative 
aspects (e.g. the alleged transgressor’s past is re-examined, leaving little space for other 
perspectives). There exist various strategies how to operate effectively during a media 
hype. For instance, the weeklies often choose to publish selected fragments of a scandal 
in a slow drip-drip process, where the first exposure (dai-ichidan) is followed by a new, 
more powerful one (dai-nidan) in next edition. Equally important is the intermedia 
influence as a routine of sharing information among various media/journalists. This 
invites for a (neo)functionalist interpretation, where the media power is in scandal 
                                                   
84  Generally speaking, media hype is a media-practiced form of overstatement and 
exaggeration of events predominantly for the sake of novelty and newsworthiness. It may 
be channeled via sensational headlines, melodramatic vocabulary, or deliberate 
heightening of certain elements in the story (see Vasterman 2005). As a result, large 
scandals under the spell of media hype become typically inflated in size, scope, 
seriousness, while shifting our attention from certain structural problem to various 
sensationalist elements.  
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generated within the relations among their actors: the conservative dailies “need” the 
radical weeklies (and vice versa) in order to assemble a commercially successful scandal. 
Owing to such “division of labor” in scandal mediation, the scandal proper represents a 
transformation of the sign of a transgression into a complex symbol of the profane, 
polluted, and impure. Furthermore, this symbol becomes “contagious”: those individuals 
and companies who happen to be associated with it can suddenly find themselves on the 
“evil” side of the polarized symbolic classification. Scandals often trigger the so-called 
snowball effect, which adds new polluted actors to the scandal agenda by indicating their 
links to main transgressor.85 
The complexity of the profane symbol can give birth to a second-order 
transgression (e.g. Thompson 2000). It is based on a new statement, performance, or 
opinion related to ongoing scandal. In other words, some actions during the scandal 
                                                   
85 One typical case of the snowball effect in postwar Japan was the Sagawa Kyūbin 
scandal from 1992. It became gradually clear that the trucking company bribed more than 
100 politicians in return for political favors. Based on a thorough investigative journalism 
followed by issuing warrant arrests, many heavyweight politicians including Takeshita 
Noboru and Kanemaru Shin had to resign from their posts one after another. The snowball 
effect can also travel across the border: in Lockheed bribery scandal from 1976, even the 
Prince Bernhard of Netherlands was stripped of his official functions, while the scandal 
resulted in investigation in several other countries. Dangerously enough, the snowball 
effect can also be based on some arbitrary correlation. For instance, then minister of 
finance Nakagawa Shōichi not only appeared drunk at the G7 press conference in Rome 
in 2009: he blamed his intoxication on the overuse of his cold medication, which in turn 
infuriated the Japanese medicine makers who blamed Nakagawa’s statement for sudden 
sales decrease of their products (Sassa 2011, 113). In another pseudo-correlation, the head 
of the Socialist party Doi Takako accepted in 1979 campaign money from the pachinko 
industry and the media linked her case to Koreans in Japan who own over one half of 
Japanese parlors and are involved in unsound activities (see Hayes 2005). 
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development can assign an aura of yet another scandal. Consider for instance the press 
conference of Nonomura Ryūtarō in 2014, which ended up in what looked like the 
politician’s emotional breakdown. The initial charges pointed to the politician’s 
accounting fraud, but Nonomura’s hysterical performance embarrassed the feelings of 
“national pride” as soon as it went global.86 
At a certain point of scandal proper, the reluctant Japanese mainstream press 
eventually takes up the case. Their own incentives to start covering a ceetain scandal are: 
1. official investigation: transgression becomes a subject of substantiated 
indictment. Public officials, prosecutors, and police make raids and arrests, 
changing a private matter to a public one whereby “legitimating” scandal 
2. foreign pressure: some non-Japanese agency (foreign media, international 
committees, auditors) enters the scene and reveals/magnifies scandal 
3. domestic mood: the public climate (seken) and scandal backlash reach critical 
levels that the mainstream media cannot ignore anymore. In extreme cases, the 
                                                   
86 The Japanese media are in principle careful not to disturb the “national harmony” by 
exposing certain sensitive issues. It is usually the foreign media, and/or the internet 
communities that make the public outrage occurs on a basis of national identity, which in 
turn may produce “national feelings” of shame. The image of the Japanese can be also 
shattered by exposing transgression during some closely watched global event, such as 
the plagiarism affair around the Japanse Olympic logo designer Sano Kenjirō, who was 
accused by Japanese tabloids of spoiling the image of Japan (Prusa, forthcoming). 
Moreover, in Japanese past the feelings of national embarrassment have arisen from 
letting the Japanese public know that it was actually the foreigners who exposed Japanese 
corruption (Johnson 1986; Nester 1990b), which was also the case of mediating 2011 
Fukushima disaster (Wakiyama 2011; Uesugi 2012).   
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public can en masse attack symbolically the media institution by sending angry 
letters or protesting to pay television fees.  
In the meantime, the desk people discuss obtained scoops with their bosses and editors of 
section that in turn consult the editor-in-chief. Nonetheless the highly-specialized factory-
like environment leads to a lack of personal commitment, and lack of the individuals’ 
control over the final news product. Besides, the individual journalists who write news 
are rarely named). In case of newspaper editing, scandals are usually handled by the social 
affairs section, or “city desk” (shakaibu), and not by the political section (seijibu). The 
latter usually keeps such scoops off the front page since they are either too close to their 
sources, or they are supportive of the LDP (e.g. Lee 1980; Farley 1996; Krauss 2000). 
Moreover, the shakaibu, which is the largest in size, controls the hierarchy of the news 
organization, not to mention that its reporters are often friends with police (Asano 2001; 
Uesugi 2012). On the other hand, the lack of political background knowledge makes the 
shakaibu section focus more on public degradations, apologies and punishments 
(Freeman 1996; Legewie 2010). 
The Japanese television broadcast is equally important in scandal, since in Japan 
many people still turn to television as their main source of information (e.g. Kabashima 
and Steel 2010). The TV broadcast usually catches on as soon as the scandal appears in 
one of the big dailies, which is partly due to the fact that the commercial TV networks get 
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their news from the same source as the elite newspapers (West 2006). Moreover, once 
televizualized, the tabloid stories reach millions more viewers once they shift from the 
tabloids to TV wideshows (ibid.) Other scandals become televizualized once the tabloid 
coverage of a scandal grew out of proportion. In such case, commentators in the studio 
introduce the story by pointing to its prominence in the tabloids. In terms of its form and 
content, I believe that by switching between hard news and soft news, the television 
during scandals both mimics and distinguishes itself from the tabloid media. In other 
words, the Japanese TV broadcast during scandals is more comparable to the media logic 
of the tabloid weeklies, albeit more in content than in form. (This convergence could be 
also attributed to the rising reputation of the weeklies that have just recently intensified 
their fierce investigative journalism.) Especially during Japanese celebrity scandals, the 
TV broadcast lies in what Gamson (2001) described as hardening and lengthening what 
is a soft, short-lived, and lower status story. 
Most of such stories become an issue during the daytime TV “wideshows” 
(waidoshō), where the commentators refer to the sensitive news as it previously appeared 
in daily press. These shows run on weekdays on major private TV networks, and they 
often monopolize attention of the viewing public (predominantly housewives) through 
real-life scandal, tragedy, crime, and gossip. Apart from continually debating the 
appropriateness of the transgressor’s performances, the TV broadcast likes to focus on 
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various pseudo-events that became related to a scandal. Especially the police arrests and 
prosecutorial raids are carefully staged for the TV consumption, while the closely 
watched televisual climax comes as a confessional ritual of apology and sanction. 
 
6.4. Scandal Climax: Confessions and Damages 
 
Not all stories lead to resolution. Some stories are unreliable, based on bad tips, or they 
fail to give rise to criminal/moral charges. Some investigations end by expelling the 
journalist from the reporter’s club on the grounds of violating the unwritten rules (Asano 
2001; 2004; Uesugi 2012). In case of false formal accusation, the media can be sued and 
brought to court where they are represented by their publishing houses. 
If a transgression becomes fully exposed and succeeds in awaking negative 
backlash, the ideal-type scandal will be concluded by mediated confessions and apologies. 
In this stage, the media uniformly and in detail cover the final part of the scandal including 
dismissals or further prosecution. The dailies’ social affairs divisions (shakaibu), the 
tabloids and TV channels accelerate the scandal by paying excessive amount of attention 
to the moment of denouncement. The scandal climax is constituted by a televizualized 
press conference with alleged transgressor (the celebrities sometimes apologize with 
agency representatives by their side). 
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The media event of a confessional conference follows the logic of a “degradation 
ceremony” (Garfinkel 1956): in the midst of moral indignation the elites are pushed to 
apologize, and eventually they step down in order to stabilize the situation or to minimize 
the snowball effect. Needless to say, these confessional events are overwhelmingly 
strategic: it is a mixture of efforts to preserve the system/subsystem one belongs to, to 
save one’s reputation, and to alleviate negative public moods.  
During the scandal climax, the Japanese media (represented mainly by the TV 
commentators, journalists and pundits that are located in a remote studio) judge 
passionately the adequacy of confessions and apologies while focusing on transgressors’ 
“expressive equipment”. The most closely watched is physical appearance (frequency and 
length of bows, appearance of tears, clothing, and gestures), and verbal eloquence (word 
usage, politeness level, and the amount of words expressing apology). In ideal-type 
scandal, the culprit apologizes for failing his/her responsibility and causing trouble to all 
concerned parties, but the less cooperative actors use the scandal climax as a site of 
contestation and conspiracy. The apologetic/cooperative performance is typical for 
Japanese celebrity scandals, while the protective/offensive strategy is at times utilized by 
experienced politicians. Importantly for the transgressor, the apologetic conference can 
start up the process, which aims to restore the damaged reputation and make future 
comeback possible. While being concerned with their symbolic capital, celebrities, 
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politicians, and corporate leaders in most cases demonstrate regret, apologize, and 
eventually resign. Some of them return part of their salary by way of a symbolic apology 
to the public. In case of a court trial they pay a fine, get a suspended sentence, and they 
almost never serve prison terms. 
 
6.5. Post-scandal Phase: Return to Normality 
 
In neofunctionalist thought, some social rituals present liminal opportunities to modify 
existing norms in moments of “collective effervescence” (Durkheim 1915; Turner 1969; 
Moore and Myerhoff 1977). However, in case of Japanese scandals, transgression only 
hardly disrupts social order or transforms social understanding of corruption. Rather, 
transgressions are regulated and integrated into social order by the ritual performance 
(Giesen 2006). Similarly, in Japan the social ritual of scandal rarely challenges deeper 
social structures or transform dominant norms (see above). Scandals only seem to offer 
an outlet for the social order, meet structural demands and re-confirm their integrative 
character without necessarily incorporating some transformative ideas in order to avoid 
future corruption. After a certain period of time (weeks in case of controversies and 
months in case of large-scale scandal) the liminoid state is suspended by readjusting to 
the routine world of: 
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1. Public everydayness. The scandal-ritual is concluded, and the audiences return again 
to the common-sense world. The mobilized media public repositions itself on the 
emotional level to resume the profane level of everyday reality. The short-lived emotions 
that the audiences have felt during the liminoid period of scandal seem rather alien to 
them once the scandal is concluded. In other words, we may retrospectively realize that 
during the scandal hype we have undergone the emotional stir rather than generating it.  
 
2. Journalistic everydayness. The scandal climax is followed by exiting the media event 
and converting back from the “ceremonial” (non-routine) to “agonistic” (routine) mode, 
in which events are again treated as news and addressed within ordinary news broadcast. 
Big scandals tend to overshadow other social, political or economic issues, and once the 
media return to journalistic routine, old conflicts loom large again, capturing the news for 
the first time in weeks or months. 
 
3. Elite everydayness. To be involved in a scandal can remove one’s delegated 
trustworthiness as a social elite (Bourdieu 1984). After the crisis of delegitimation 
subsides, the rules for the delegation of political power, that were temporarily annulled 
by scandal, are re-consolidated again. The return of Japanese transgressors to their 
professional platform (or to a different post) is possible, but it demands some time 
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(depending on the gravity of scandal, the decisions made by 
managements/parties/factions, but also on the personal charisma and popularity of the 
people involved. Only in extreme cases the return is made completely impossible. Once 
the punitive exile is nearly over, the transgressor usually offers another mediated apology 
to the public, symbolizing his/her comeback. Political actors are exiled from the public 
sphere, but many of them will be back, while some politicians conceive their next election 
campaign as a purification ritual (misogi). In bureaucratic and corporate scandal, the 
transgressor is often “side-slipped” (yokosuberi) to different section, assigned a different, 
usually lower post, or they retire while being compensated behind the scenes. Usually, no 
big lessons are learned, and no real reform is achieved. Nonetheless, during the post-
scandal phase a subtle outpouring from the “collective conscience” occurs: major 
scandals become materialized in books, articles, and films that are more or less loosely 
based on given scandal narrative.87  
 
                                                   
87 Apart from countless publications and confessional autobiographies in the aftermath 
of many scandals, it is the film production which leaves traces of scandal in popular 
culture. For instance, the scandalous wrong accusation of Yoshiyuki Kōno in the 
aftermath of the 1994 sarin gas attack was dramatized by Fuji TV in 2009. The Japanese 
celebrity megascandal of Sakai Noriko from the same year was adapted for the screen 
under the title Setsuna, and a feature-length documentary about the 2011 Olympus 
scandal, titled Samurai and Idiots: The Olympus Affair, was released in 2014. Recently, 
the acclaimed documentarist Mori Tatsuya produced a documentary-style film about the 
2014 scandal of Samuragōchi Mamoru, who was faking deafness while using a 
ghostwriter. 
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6.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I elaborated a five-step process of scandal mediation in Japanese 
mediascape. This process aimed to model the complex causes propelling the scandal 
process. Throughout aforementioned stages, the scandal promoters, primary and 
secondary participants, and the scandal audiences have all their share in constituting 
scandal. 
 
Figure 11. Diagram of the scandal mediation process in Japan. 
Source: Author 
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The diagram above illustrates the ideal-scandal flow from the moment of actual 
transgression, through the leak to the public via mainstream media, until the scandal 
climax. During each phase of the process there are multiple sets of forces facilitating the 
flow, or trying to get information under their control. First, whistleblowers forward a 
compromising data to the media (domestic/foreign, mainstream/nonmainstream) and/or 
to the formal agents of social control (police/prosecutors). It is usually in a common 
interest of the power circles (sei-kan-zai), the mainstream media with its kisha club 
system, the advertising companies (e.g. Dentsu), and the celebrity agencies (e.g. Johnny's) 
to “manage” the information flow. Simultaneously, sensitive information is being leaked 
from the outside media. The is possible due the fact that both the tabloids and the foreign 
press are not official members of the inside media, although they are related on a level of 
cross-reference. Only in cases where scandal is “inevitable” (the transgression was 
meanwhile recognized by the authorities and/or the public noise cannot be ignored any 
longer), the mainstream media (along with the elites designated as culprits) finally 
approach the public via quality papers and respectable magazines. 
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V.  
CASE STUDIES OF JAPANESE MEDIA SCANDAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
273 
In section III, I delineated the conception of scandal as ritual with confessional 
performances based on various strategies planned by the transgressor and the platform 
he/she belongs to. In section IV, I was more interested in the role of the Japanese media 
when mediating corruption scandals in postwar Japan. The media coverage of scandal is 
non-routine and ritualistic as well, depending on their location in the web of power circles. 
This section focuses on three concrete scandal cases in contemporary Japan and aims to 
apply the theoretical insights from previous sections. In each case study, I follow the main 
storyline and conduct a critical discourse analysis of the narrative. Furthermore, I observe 
the more or less ritualized performances of the key actors in each scandal – most 
importantly the main transgressor and the media outlets. Moreover, I connect each scandal 
with a certain pathology that can serve as a background for understanding the 
omnipresence of celebrity/political/corporate scandals in contemporary Japan. In the case 
of Sakai Noriko, I pay attention to the phenomenon of celebrity fetishism and the 
expectancy violation which can trigger a megascandal if a certain celebrity exposes the 
gap between her real and reel image. In the case of Ozawa Ichirō I discuss the role of 
money politics and support groups, which are at the core of many postwar political 
scandals, and I mention the role of prosecutors that are one of the key actors in exposing 
and judging scandals. In the case of the Olympus/Woodford scandal I mention the 
obstacles of the traditional corporate governance in Japanese post-bubble economy, and 
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I scrutinize the function of whistleblowing as a way of consciously revealing corporate 
and other secrets that seem to clash with certain law or convention. I chose these three 
scandals because each of them represents a frequently scandalized platform, and at the 
time of writing, they were one of the biggest, and most spectacular scandals in the new 
millennium.  
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1. CELEBRITY SCANDAL: THE CASE OF SAKAI NORIKO 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Immediately after Takasō Yūichi was arrested in central Tokyo at the beginning of August 
2009 for possessing illegal stimulants, his wife, the popular Japanese actress and former 
top J-pop idol Sakai Noriko suddenly disappeared from the city, fuelling media 
speculations. In the meantime, the arrest warrant was issued for her, based on minute 
quantity of drugs found in her Tokyo apartment. In the middle of an unprecedented media 
frenzy and six days after her disappearance, Sakai decided to surrender to police, was 
arrested after turning up in Tokyo and admitted to the charge. Following the headline-
making police search and the arrest of Sakai that made the front pages of the national 
dailies, her office (the entertainment company Sun Music) publicly condemned her 
actions, suspended sales of all products related to her persona, and eventually withdrew 
her contract (simultaneously all Sakai’s commercial contracts were cancelled). Sakai was 
indicted later that month and released on bail after spending a few weeks in detention. 
She publicly apologized during a closely watched mediated press conference and was 
sentenced in November 2009 to a suspended 18-month prison term for violating the 
Stimulants Control Act (Kakuseizai Torishimari Hō). In the scandal aftermath, the now-
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former celebrity divorced from her husband, started attending university courses (welfare 
studies and nursing care) and wrote a confessional autobiography titled Shokuzai 
(“Atonement”). According to some sources, her comeback is being planned in China and 
Taiwan, where Sakai grew extremely popular since the 1990s. 
Notwithstanding the perceived marginality and relative banality of the described 
events, Sakai’s story became a national obsession, the major media spectacle and the 
biggest Japanese celebrity scandal in years.88 In August 2009 Sakai’s case received three 
times as many hours of TV coverage as the national election that lead to power shift in 
Japan, and although the in-depth media coverage of average celebrity scandal in Japan 
usually takes about a week, Sakai’s case was extensively covered in the media over a few 
months. Furthermore, the scandal was picked by media editors including The Japan Times 
as the top domestic news story of 2009 along with events such as the political power shift, 
new swine flu hitting Japan, or the introduction of the lay-judge system. Besides, until 
now there were officially released three books elaborating on Sakai’s scandal, while one 
of them (Nashimoto 2009) was adapted for the screen.89 
The main aim of this case study is to offer some critical perspectives that would 
                                                   
88 Owing to Sakai’s popularity in Taiwan, Hong Kong and mainland China since the 
1990s, her scandal became also a global spectacle. Asian TV broadcasters included the 
news about Sakai within their prime-time agendas and the story reverberated all over Asia. 
89 The full-length semi-documentary about the Sakai transgression is titled Setsuna (“The 
Moment”). It was directed by Kasahara Masao, based on the script by Nashimoto Masaru, 
and was released in Japan in April 2011. 
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illuminate the background of an event that instigated the media extravaganza and shaped 
Sakai’s mediated morality tale into a nationwide megaspectacle. I will focus on the public 
ritualized performances of Sakai, and the way the Japanese media managed their non-
routine reporting on this seemingly extravagant case. Moreover, there are at least two 
general “pathologies” behind the case of Sakai and many other celebrity scandals: the 
obsession with celebrity (i.e. celebrity fetishism), and the fantasy-based expectancy tied 
to their public and private behavior (i.e. the stars’ behavior must not generate an 
expectancy violation). 
While following the train of thought in Jean Baudrillard (1988a) or Douglas 
Kellner (2003), I want to indicate that there is nothing really “scandalous” about Sakai’s 
transgression itself; it is rather the contradictory system of morals and the corporate media 
economy under consumer capitalism that is often ferocious, immoral, insensitive and 
therefore inherently “scandalous” in its obsession with celebrity. Thus, the whole capital-
oriented celebrity culture may be rendered as one big “scandal”, while the entertainment 
world reveals itself to be corrupt and inauthentic. Furthermore, I want to argue that Sakai, 
herself dealing with intrapersonal conflict based on the perceived gap between her 
“authentic” self and her “inauthentic” image, accidentally became an internal enemy of 
the social system, being caught in the discursive web of commercial media spectacularity, 
278 
anti-drug policy and celebrity fetishism.90 Sakai accidentally became a scarecrow in the 
joint hegemony project of the “therapeutical” state that through the police and media 
organizations mobilized all dominant codes and themes in order to dissociate Japanese 
public/celebrity world and illegal drugs. While paying homage to laws and conventions, 
Sakai was made to serve as a scapegoat of various strategic (both commercial and 
political) interests in the symbolic process that pulls up guideposts for social management 
and regenerates the reality principle in distress while masking the very core of the 
scandalous system. 
 
1.2. Who is Sakai Noriko? 
 
Known by the nickname Noripī, Sakai Noriko (born in 1971) is a former Japanese pop 
idol, actress and singer, who also grew extremely popular in Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
mainland China since the 1990s (she became one of the most well-known Japanese 
actresses among the middle-aged Chinese). She was an all-round celebrity who performed 
in TV dramas same as TV ads, and was a regular fixture on popular TV shows and TV 
                                                   
90 The stressful internal conflict was grounded in the gap between the professional image 
and the private self. Sakai initially found this dual nature of her persona “stunning”, but 
later it became the main reason for her physical and mental exhaustion (Sakai 2010). 
Linking these obstacles with drug use, Philip Brasor has ironically remarked that if 
someone like Sakai wants to cope with an image (agency-constructed, advertiser-
sponsored) that has nothing to do with reality, one would really “have to be stoned to 
think you could get away with it forever” (The Japan Times, August 16, 2009). 
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commercials. Born in 1971 in Fukuoka Prefecture and coming from a broken home, Sakai 
rose to fame in 1980s after releasing her debut single Otoko no Ko ni Naritai only a few 
days before her 16th birthday. Sakai adopted the style of another Japanese idol, Seiko 
Matsuda, and in the 1990s she turned to acting (she debuted as an actress already in 1986 
in a TV drama Harukaze Ichiban). Sakai belongs to the 1980s’ golden age of idols in 
Japan, along with other sweet-girl divas such as Matsuda Seiko or Nakamori Akina, 
establishing a female singer/actress celebrity that builds on previous markers of 
distinction within the kawaii celebrity system. Sakai was propelled to stardom by a minor 
entertainment management company, the Sun Music. In 1990s when young, good-looking 
singers were striving to become artists instead of idols, and right after Sakai got married 
and gave birth to her son, Sun Music transformed her original “pure” image (seijunha 
aidoru) to reflect that of a good mother (seitōha mamadoru). In 1993, Sakai appeared in 
anti-drug campaigns, and two years later she released a song Aoi Usagi (“Blue Rabbit”) 
which is considered her only real smash hit. While further maintaining her pure star image 
throughout the beginning of new millennium, Sakai was also actively engaged in 
significant international and domestic events such as the Japan-China sports-culture 
exchange event (2007) or the promotional campaign for the new lay-judge system in 
Japan (2009). She emerged again in the headlines after her drug scandal was triggered in 
the summer of 2009. 
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1.3. Noriko Sakai: The Scandal Narrative 
 
Scandals are in principle never born but always given. The information leak that triggers 
a scandal, usually comes from non-reporter sources (whistleblowers, insiders, the police, 
the prosecutors). In Sakai’s case, however, it was her husband’s arrest (Takasō), which 
triggered the scandal narrative and initiated the disequilibrium. This scandal was thus 
initially not based on a tabloid gossip as is often the case, but it came out in the form of 
hard news grounded on confirmed facts. Only hereafter did associations and speculations 
emerge, giving way to soft news reporting, although these were still only precursors of 
the real spectacle. It is safe to assume that Sakai’s management agency tried to get a hold 
of the situation, nevertheless the “norms of silence” (stemming from strong inclinations 
to private conflict resolution in Japan) were in Sakai’s case broken from the inside: it was 
the president of her agency, along with Sakai’s mother-in-law, who formally requested 
the police search while setting off the celebrity witch-hunt. 
When people’s expectations are shattered and social trust damaged, a common 
response is to develop explanations. Also in Sakai’s case, the media developed a narrative 
around the line of “pursuing the truth” (shinjitsu no tsuikyū), attempting to explain what 
went wrong. Initially, the media maintained agenda of confusion and uncertainty, 
proclaiming that the situation is out of control, while Sakai’s agency (Sun Music) voiced 
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“serious” concerns for her safety (this can remind us of the Foucauldian argument that 
caring is always also an opportunity for control. Sakai was turned into a “case” – both an 
example of transgression, and an object of care). 
In the meantime, the media started framing events, objects and persons 
correspondingly while securing great audience ratings. Both protagonists were now 
associated with concrete images representing transgression and crime, while the key term 
of the narrative, “stimulants” (kakuseizai), was constantly repeated whereby creating firm 
symbolic linkage. Although originally representing only a subsidiary character in the 
scandal, Sakai’s husband (Takasō) was categorically attributed the role of the main villain, 
and served as a target for Sakai’s fans and their negative projections. The media frame of 
Sakai was in flux. The media initially rendered Sakai as a “tragic” subject (higeki no 
hiroin, higeki no tsuma) whereby generating feelings of sympathy. However, her 
disappearance was soon recognized as “contemptible” (hiretsu), and her acts were 
reframed as “antisocial" (hanshakaiteki). Sakai’s “guilt frame” emphasized 
predominantly the negative aspects while critically re-examining her past. The gossip 
stories surrounding Sakai were now “backlighted” by her failure, the traps of success, and 
traps of entertainment industry as such.91 
                                                   
91 Especially the tabloids and Japanese celebrity commentators came to a conclusion that 
the key to explain Sakai’s drug “addiction” lies in her past, whereby claiming that her 
“real essence” (honshitsu) has been misunderstood since the beginning of her early career 
(Nashimoto 2009, 85). In order to support their assumptions, the tabloids went as far as 
to interview Sakai’s former classmates. Their testimony was remarkably similar to the 
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Roughly at that point of time, the narrative became what Douglas Kellner (2003) 
calls a “media-mediated spectacle”: the media became themselves a part and parcel of the 
story, with both mainstream and tabloid journalists following the traces of Sakai after her 
flight from Tokyo, flooding conference venues, and infiltrating into the Court building 
during the trial proceedings. It was however not only the presence of cameras and 
journalists that was modelling the scandal flow: the very medium of TV itself contributed 
to the main narrative twist: Sakai surrendered to police after she watched the breaking 
news on the TV when she was in hiding (Sakai 2010). 
It was an easy task for the media to inculcate a sense of lack of knowledge within 
the concealment – revelation framework, sparking off curiosity and boosting the ratings. 
Everyone exposed to the media at the designated period of time was “contaminated” by 
the desire to know what Sakai is “really” like, how her psyche works, and what were the 
motivations for her “antisocial” actions. While resonating with the economic notion of 
“creative destruction” (term by Joseph Schumpeter), the media “make” a celebrity, (i.e. 
they create her “unreal” social illusion) in order to later pragmatically “unmake” her by 
re-examining her “realness”. In a similar vein, the media make their audiences feel 
worried, surprised, afraid and outraged, just to offer them a remedy to make them feel 
“safe” again after the scandal.  
                                                   
Japanese news commentators concluding on criminals that they were fiends 
masquerading as average person. 
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In high profile scandal cases, the media create an intertextual universe of 
information (numbers, facts, observations, images, sounds) that are mediated on multiple 
discursive levels (mainstream media, tabloids, everyday gossip). Our perception of a star 
and her scandal is thus based on the sum total of all our mediated experiences. In Sakai’s 
case, the newsworthiness did not come solely from the original transgression (i.e. using 
illicit drugs), but more importantly, she was a full-fledged member of the powerless-but-
remarkable elite of the culture industry (e.g. Langer 1998). Owing to this remarkability 
of Sakai, the media had already a plenty of sensitive material at hand (mostly stemming 
from tabloids’ previous investigations), so they were able to immediately piece together 
various more or less ambiguous fragments into an impressive narratological body of 
knowledge that in turn generated a highly marketable media spectacle. Especially the dark 
and turbulent past of Sakai was newsworthy enough to have created a rich source for a 
net of meanings and associations that were more or less arbitrarily paralleled to her 
transgression.92 
Sakai’s deliberate flight from the crime scene in the wake of her husband’s arrest 
became the defining moment for the scandal narrative, as well as for the prosecution. 
Sakai’s “adventurous” disappearance from the scene in order to avoid the drug test (the 
                                                   
92 For instance, Sakai came from a broken home, she was abandoned after being born to 
a member of organized criminal underground who eventually tragically died. Besides, 
both Sakai’s stable mate (Okada Yukiko) and Sakai’s manager since her 1985 debut, 
committed suicide. Finally, Takasō’s long-term mistress was a good friend of Sakai who 
was aware of their relationship (Sakai 2010). 
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media used a dramatic expression tōbōgeki) had caused such an outcry also because her 
behavior gave rise to “action” (as opposed to a mere behavior, actions usually require 
particular intentions). Sakai’s noncooperativity and unpredictability greatly contributed 
to the agenda of speculation: along with the police that were attempting to locate Sakai, 
the media raised speculations and ethical questions, compiled and analyzed detailed maps 
of her escape route, and immersed themselves in “serious” investigations. While 
performing the role of “cultural police”, both parties were greatly exaggerating the 
situation: even after the actress eventually surrendered to authorities, one chief detective 
proclaimed that upcoming investigations will be difficult (muzukashī tansa), while media 
commentators lamented that things in the entertainment world will never be the same (for 
the latter, see Nashimoto 2009). 
In scandal, the denouncers must be located as supporters of the “sacred values”, 
and fix their distance from the denounced ones (Garfinkel 1956; Alexander 1988). 
Various public figures, scandal commentators, pundits, and in Japan also the celebrity-
colleagues felt that powerful words are needed. These “moral entrepreneurs” provided 
the audience with an “expert truth” about the scandal. Moreover, the producer Itō Terry, 
the veteran singer Wada Akiko, the major entertainment reporter Nashimoto Masaru, and 
even the then Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura Takeo vehemently condemned Sakai 
and refused her acceptance within the category of celebrity. Besides, occasional person-
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in-the-street interviewers on the TV (themselves being obviously under the spell of the 
spiral of silence) only reinforced the imaginary impression of a unified collective sacred. 
These self-appointed informal agents of social order were enthusiastically reaffirming 
their own positions within entertainment while publicly denouncing those symbolic 
elements that underlined corruptness and inauthenticity of that world. Meanwhile, the 
transgressor herself was temporarily muted, or only allowed to “say the right thing” 
during pre-scripted performances (i.e. during the prison release, trial proceedings and 
press conferences). 
The fan base of Sakai however did not always share the mainstream viewpoint. 
Many fans (including those in China where Sakai is popular), have been loud in their 
support for Sakai, condemning the arrest itself. Moreover, there were many individuals 
urging the police to let them volunteer to take her place in the detention center. There 
were supporters that gathered in front of the Tokyo Wangan police station, screaming 
“Noripī!” and greeting Sakai, who was just released on bail, with a banner saying 
Omedetō (“Congratulations”). There was even a case of one deranged fan (Kanbara 
Masami) who at the end of August demanded immediate release of Sakai from the Tokyo 
Wangan detention center under the threat of a firebomb attack. 
In the meantime, the media moved on with exploiting instincts inherent to human 
beings – especially the schadenfreude (i.e. the pleasure derived from the misfortunes of 
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others), which in media scandal lies in observing elites being degraded and humiliated. 
While retrospectively framing objects, events and actions related to Sakai in a negative 
way, the media at times transformed impressions into “facts” and Sakai’s past remarks 
into “statements”. Furthermore, Sakai’s body tattoos prior to scandal did not mean any 
serious problem to the system of representation, however now they were re-interpreted as 
symbolic referents of “civil evil” and signifiers of actual incoherence between the star 
and her non-star self. Similarly, Sakai’s predilection for clubbing and her actual DJ 
activities were now associated with drug culture. These anchorages strengthen the 
potential of the preferred reading and provide stimuli that the audiences draw upon in 
shaping their own values.93  
Authoritatively, roles are attributed only in courts of law, but in mediated world, 
attributions are being negotiated, accepted and corrected while providing for ready-made 
moral projections (Ehrat 2011). In Sakai’s case, the media employed linguistic devices 
                                                   
93 Regarding the visual guidelines, consider the Japanese “paparazzi aesthetics” which 
can be registered in most high-profile scandals: although some street shots of Sakai 
leaving/entering public venues were taken by a hi-tech gear, the final product often looked 
shoddy in terms of composition, lighting, shooting angle, and sharpness. This 
“conspiratorial amateurism” had to evoke a sense of raw realism, aiming to reveal the 
momentary (but hardly momentous) glimpse of backstage features (e.g. the disturbing 
snapshot implying the “lost face” of Sakai when back seated in a car with her head deeply 
bent and her face immersed in the dark during her transport after her arrest). Also, worth 
noticing was the utilization of music and sounds in TV mini-clips focused on Sakai: the 
overall narration was accompanied by musical motives whereas positive depictions of 
unspoiled, nostalgic moments from her past were provided by bright, merry tunes and 
optimistic themes (in principle in the major key) while those shots already somehow 
related to her transgression were tinged with suspicious, gloomy and tragic tunes (usually 
in the minor key).  
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central to the construction of frame, while the suffix attached to Sakai’s name underwent 
a “round-trip” throughout the narrative: “Ms. Sakai” (-san) or “actress” (-joyū), became 
in turn “suspect” (-yōgisha), “defendant” (-hikoku), “former defendant” (-moto hikoku), 
“former actress” (-moto joyū) just in order to once again reach the initial neutral status of 
“Ms. Sakai” (-san). Also, the nickname Noripī that Sakai is still known by, and whose use 
always connoted familiarity and lack of distance, was temporarily dismissed or mentioned 
with somewhat sarcastic undertone. While combining audiovisual and linguistic frames 
and anchorages, the media represented the audience by utilizing the emphatic/patriotic 
form of the personal pronoun “we” (watashitachi, wareware). For instance, at the scandal 
outbreak, the biggest Japanese daily shocked Japan by a sensationalist speculative 
headline “Noripī…can this be real?” (Yomiuri Shinbun, August 7, 2009). In a similar vein, 
the second biggest daily mourned on its front-page column Tensei Jingo (“Vox Populi 
Vox Dei”) that “…a pretty flower was destroyed by power of drugs” (Asahi Shinbun, 
August 10, 2009). While encapsulating the sacred “we”, the celebrity commentators 
lamented on behalf of the whole nation, that “...this behavior of the suspect Sakai Noriko 
is so far apart from how we used to know her...” (sono hyōjō ha watashitachi no shiru 
Noriko Sakai-yōgisha no imēgi to ha amari ni mo kakehanareteru), or “...where on earth 
did the pure idol, as we knew her, go?” (wareware ga shitteita seijunha aidoru ha ittai 
doko he itteshimatta noka) (see Nashimoto 2009). 
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1.4. Scandal Pathologies Related to Sakai Case 
 
1.4.1. Socioculturally Located Meanings of Celebrity Discourse 
In order understand the media frenzy around the case of Sakai in particular and celebrity 
scandals general, I deem it necessary to discuss some features of celebrity discourse in 
Japan. Owing to some universal narratives, and the global system of morals and media 
economy under late capitalism, the underlying conduct of celebrity scandal and 
transgression does not differ significantly from culture to culture. However, the 
recognition of a certain behavior/action as being transgressive and “scandalous” is 
culturally located. One issue that must be addressed in this regard is the centrality of 
television as “national medium” in contemporary Japan (see Yoshimi 2003; Heinze 2011). 
Furthermore, most people in Japan get their news from television, while the TV still 
represents one of the main media platforms Japanese idols are born in. Other researchers 
focused on the TV discourse while addressing Japanese celebrity discourse and concluded 
that there exists a culture-specific “televisual intimacy” (Holden and Ergül 2006), or 
“intimate televisuality” (Lukács 2010) in Japan, where a collective moral understanding 
underpins consciousness and has a direct impact on how the audiences conceive 
themselves and their stars. Especially the popular hybrid infotainment format of 
“wideshow” (waidoshō) engenders the taken-for-granted feelings of shared intimacy and 
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emotional proximity in Japan, broadening the appeal of the genre by injecting political 
and economic issues to the show. This platform works within the intertextual realm of 
mediated intimacy that is maintained and mediated by the tarento performers – often 
temporary figures in Japanese highly intertextualized mediascape that are emblematic of 
orchestrated ordinariness, imperfection and lack of talent (Stevenson 2008; Galbraith and 
Karlin 2012a).94  
Another scandal-related phenomenon is the existence of “entertainment 
management companies” (jimusho) that among other activities find, manage and promote 
new artists, secure and plan the overall production work for them, and negotiate fees. In 
turn, the careers of contracted artists are completely at the mercy of their “offices” since 
they can both make and break the artist (see Marx 2012; Galbraith and Karlin 2012a). In 
a similar vein, the Japanese media can put a celebrity’s career on hold by turning the 
audiences against her based on the way scandalous leaks are presented and framed. 
The aforementioned phenomena, and the logic of Japanese media production, 
help to shape specific ties and asymmetrical relationships between fans and stars in Japan, 
where hopes and dreams are excessively projected onto celebrities (including the deep 
dependency on talents, or tarento izonsho). Often emphasized is a higher degree of 
                                                   
94 Regarding the representation of imperfection, in order to create a sense of intimacy 
and authentic interaction between performer and audience in Japan, it is this immensely 
appealing human fallibility that represents an important factor and underlies the 
emotional connection between star and fan in Japan (Stevenson 2008). 
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affective involvement, and specific overlapping of audience’s selves and their stars. 
Japanese celebrities/tarento tend to publicly position themselves as fans’ servants rather 
than as superstars (Yano 2004), while Japanese fans tend to conceive themselves as 
participants rather than just observers of the celebrity world (West 2006). From within 
such perspective, the problem of authenticity and distinction between image and reality 
arises, having further impact on how celebrity scandals are approached.95 
In Japan, a prescribed form of celebrity conscience is required: celebrities are 
not only “social phenomena” within “social practices”, but they also represent symbolic 
commodities with unstable values, and carriers of information that stimulate consumption. 
They are in turn assigned significant cultural authority connected with huge symbolic 
influence (and correlated with immense monetary profits if at the top). However, they are 
simultaneously approached as public property with various obligations, duties, and 
socially created values that were ideologically designated as “virtues”. Moreover, such 
notion of public is defined in national terms, wherefore turning these obligations and 
values to “national virtues”. 
Gossip flows most readily in morally homogeneous social networks, and it is 
there that its impact is greatest (Merry 1984). It is however not easy to judge whether the 
                                                   
95 The “primary obstacle” in decoding celebrity drug scandals in general seems to be 
grounded in inherent inability of (not only Japanese) audiences/fans to accept that at those 
very moments of inhaling the fumes of heated methamphetamine, there was not the image 
(i.e. the Noripii-as-we-know-her), but there was fundamentally just an “empty” image 
holder (i.e. the “Citizen Sakai”). 
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relatively homogeneous Japanese society leans toward consuming scandals and enjoying 
gossip in a “natural” way (cf. the Japanese notion of uwasa no bunka, or “gossip society”), 
or if this desire to gossip and scandal is always-already inculcated by the Japanese tabloid 
machinery that feeds the audiences what it believes they crave. My evidence, that the 
enormous crowd waiting for Sakai’s trial on October 26 in 2009 did not really reflect the 
overheated public interest, would lean toward the latter assumption.96  
Apart from the capital-oriented entertainment/celebrity discourse, there is more 
generally the socio-cultural background at work: individual transgressions (if revealed) 
have serious meanings due to a strongly integrated societal system with strict boundary 
maintenance and antipathy against excessive individualism. In Japan, big stars might be 
allowed to be poor and unskilled, but they can by no means be excessively controversial 
or violating expectations tied to them. 
 
 
  
                                                   
96 According to media reports, there were 6,615 people waiting in the rain to possibly get 
one of the 20 public gallery seats at the Tokyo District Court, however apart from the 
commoners and hard-core fans (who even spent the night in a park), the significant 
number of people waiting in the line were actually part-time extras hired by the media 
companies in order to increase their chances to actually get into the courtroom. (The 
author is obliged for this information to Esaki Hajime from The University of Tokyo who 
was conducting a poll at the venue.) 
292 
1.4.2. Symbolic Transgression and Expectancy Violation 
Sakai’s transgression became so newsworthy precisely because it occurred 
simultaneously on two levels: within the legal frame, the prosecutors, police and the court 
criminalized her action by indictment and sentence. More importantly for initiating the 
spectacle, the media, operating within the symbolic frame, magnified the media-hype and 
triggered public outcry. The same media that colluded to fabricate, maintain and profit 
from Sakai’s celebrity image, caught her now violating what Daniel Boorstin (1992, 51) 
calls “the laws of social illusions”. Since the media could not reintegrate her transgression 
into any comfortable world view, they were allowed to construct what Douglas Kellner 
(2003) refers to as “megaspectacle”. 
 The expectancy violation theory asserts that in case the elite actors who appear 
frequently in the media violate our stereotypical expectancy, we tend to evaluate them far 
more extremely than other people that might be doing exactly the same thing (e.g. Hinton 
2000). Despite the entertainment agencies’ expectations that private lives of their stars 
will not be in serious moral contradiction with images they are holding, subtle 
discrepancies within the conventional frame are actually essential for the stardom (e.g. 
deCordova 1991; Lukács 2010). In both processes of “making” and “breaking” a star, the 
basic narratological pattern lies in initial uncertainty, advancing toward a concluding 
climax, where the elementary unit is “knowledge”. As I indicated in section IV, the news 
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media in general make use of our inherent “desire to know”, while the tabloids go as far 
as to converge the general search for knowledge (about the discontinuities of offscreen 
and onscreen personae) with search for knowledge as a practical imposition on life itself 
(cf. the basic philosophical problem of “things we must know”). The stardom as such is 
necessarily structured by this concealment-revelation discourse, and gossip and scandal 
are the key “tools” in this discourse. 
The aforementioned desirable discrepancy was in the case of Sakai however far 
from subtle: she fatally offended her constructed “remarkability” and sparked off 
tremendous expectancy violation on multiple levels. Firstly, Sakai, known rather by the 
nickname Noripī, debuted as a young cute idol (seijunha aidoru), eventually becoming a 
“national idol” (kokuminteki aidoru) embodying “national virtues”. She was unspoiled, 
virginal, and emblematic of purity whereby turning into a role model for many girls. 
During this initial idolization process, Sakai with her innocent girl-next-door image was 
molded into “Japan’s little sister” (West 2006, 178), who even introduced her own speech 
style (Noripī-go). One decade later, based on new circumstances (marriage, childbirth, 
aging), her pure image was strategically transformed into a “mother idol” (seitōha no 
mamadoru), still unspoiled but not virginal anymore. This time, Sakai was adjusted to 
live up to a symbolic reincarnation of the “good wife, wise mother” ideology (ryōsai 
kenbo), serving as a role model for many women within the Japanese framework of 
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socially and culturally defined embodiments of femininity. Contrary to other grown-up 
sweet-divas (such as Matsuda Seiko, Nakamori Akina or Miyazawa Rie), Sakai was 
throughout her career never at the center of any big scandal, which is yet another feature 
that contributed to a massive expectancy violation.97 
Throughout her acting career, Sakai represented various role types and characters 
that made the gap between her newly discovered “real self” (drug addict absconding from 
the law) and her past “reel selves” even more earth-shaking. Apart from many mother 
roles (hahaoya) the most significant ones, as related to Sakai’s expectancy violation, were 
the gentle character that is eventually diagnosed with leukaemia in the 1993/1997 TV 
series Hitotsu Yane no Shita, the deaf and mute abandoned girl in the 1995 popular TV 
series Hoshi no Kinka (the impact of this story was further intensified by the fact the Sakai 
herself was abandoned after birth), and more recently the leading role in the 2009 real-
life film to promote the new lay judge system in Japan.98 
                                                   
97 Apart from numerous disturbing occurrences throughout Sakai’s career that however 
cannot be categorized as scandals, perhaps the only event that was rendered by tabloids 
as “scandalous” was Sakai’s brief romantic involvement with Nojima Shinji, the 
scriptwriter of the popular 1993 TV series Hitotsu Yane no Shita where Sakai was also 
starring. Nonetheless, her scandal record before 2009 was virtually clean if being 
compared with her fellow old school celebrities that made headlines time after time since 
their debut. 
98 The immediate countermeasure in order to dissociate these representations from Sakai-
the-transgressor, was cancellation of the 2009 re-run series of Hoshi no Kinka just a few 
days after her arrest for drug offences in August. This was followed by the withdrawal of 
about 190,000 copies of the lay jury system promotional video from regional courtrooms 
and legal offices nationwide. Related to this, only three months prior to Sakai’s arrest the 
popular pop star Kusanagi Tsuyoshi, who promoted the government-backed campaign on 
Japan’s shift to digital terrestrial TV broadcasting, was also arrested over public 
indecency. Same as Sakai, Kusanagi was quickly pulled from the media while the 
295 
The conflation of the “pure” features with her “polluted” transgressive self had 
a seismic impact on her carefully cultivated image, which she was projecting for almost 
three decades, now shattering the whole taken-for-granted category of “celebrity”. While 
observing, and judging the (in)coherence and distance between the star and her non-star 
self, the Japanese media both retrospectively and concurrently monitored the gap between 
the signs that Sakai is “giving and giving off” (Goffman 1959). Moreover, they went on 
alert each time some signs appeared to them not to have fallen into what Barthes (1973) 
called a “proper circuit of signification”. 
 
1.5. Interpreting the Performance of Scandal Actors 
 
If we analyse the performances of the scandal of Sakai, we must touch upon the 
hegemonic aspects of the media performance, which aimed to create an exemplary 
morality tale while operating in tandem with the formal agents of social control. In the 
meantime, the later performance of Sakai was emblematic of repentance and 
subordination, which she demonstrated in a highly-ritualized manner (both in utterance 
and bodily performance), in order to achieve purification which is a precondition for 
eventual reintegration and professional comeback.  
                                                   
Japanese broadcasters temporarily withdrew all commercials that featured his persona. 
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1.5.1. The Morality Tale and its Hegemonic Aspects 
While being determined by their media logic and format, the print media simultaneously 
proceeded with the scandal coverage on two levels: the dailies were rather focused on the 
synchronic analysis of latest events related to Sakai (investigation results, trial 
proceedings, press conferences), whereas the tabloids were more often engaged in a 
diachronic analysis of Sakai’s past (diachronic narratives sometimes prevailed simply 
because there were no major new developments at times when the media were still 
determined to feed on Sakai’s case). The police/detectives now represented both the social 
control agencies, and the institutionalized crime news sources that adjust their messages 
to comply with media formats (Altheide 2002), when updating the main narrative by 
leaking to the media those private data they gained during interrogations with detained 
celebrity (Sakai 2010, 53). 99  Since infotainment merges news/journalism into 
entertainment/business, and thus enables to transmit tabloids’ investigative reports by the 
national media, both the synchronic and diachronic aspects informed the final output. In 
other words, it crystallized into a morality tale that conflated structurally deterministic 
moralizing (the responsibility for Sakai’s transgression was more or less extended to her 
                                                   
99 Despite this, Sakai was – in accord with the hegemony theory – generally respecting 
and praising the work of the police, the detectives and the prison staff, being impressed 
by their kind treatment (Sakai 2010), somewhat overlooking the fact that she was 
anything but an ordinary detainee. On the other hand, her worst nightmare throughout the 
whole scandal was the media circus. She knew that she became subject to police 
investigation, however rather than fearing the formal agents of social control, she was 
constantly preoccupied with the aggressive media that were demonizing and “bullying” 
her (ibid). 
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entertainment/celebrity/family environment whose factors were determining her steps) 
and relentless moralizing about personal failure, rise and fall, crime and punishment of a 
spoiled celebrity.100 
It must be also noted that Sakai’s affair occurred in a “drugophobic” country, 
where the “therapeutical” state cooperates with prosecutors, police and the media in 
setting the agenda of a moral system upon which it designates people who take “wrong” 
drugs as “drug addicts” (Szasz 1973;1974). Besides, it is generally agreed that drugs take 
away discipline and hence a capacity to be a “moral person”, while refusing to punish 
drug offences is seen as a moral failing (e.g. Lakoff 2009). At the same time, however, 
illegal drugs were always widespread in Japanese entertainment industry, with plenty of 
past and present celebrities involved in drug related scandals (see e.g. Nashimoto 2009; 
Ogata and Tsuda 2014). 
One of the media policies in scandal lies in fitting moral frames. As it is usually 
the case in drug-related scandals, excessive media coverage inserts the event into a more 
or less closely related “problem frame” whereby entailing the kind of discourse that will 
follow – e.g. treating illegal drug use as a “public health issue”, “criminal justice issue”, 
                                                   
100 The best example of such conflation is the moralizing account of the Sakai incident 
written by the veteran celebrity reporter Nashimoto Masaru (2009). By 
uncompromisingly condemning Sakai’s transgression (including her performance during 
the scandal), Nashimoto extended his harsh criticism to a “structurally spoiled” 
contemporary entertainment industry in Japan (amae no kōzō), while calling for reforms 
in order to save the Japanese society from the ever-growing evil of drugs (see Nashimoto 
2009). 
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“celebrity crime issue”, or “the foreign crime issue”. Regarding the last frame mentioned, 
it is a matter of fact that many Japanese celebrities involved in drug scandals in principle 
claim that they bought the illegal drug from a foreigner (Takasō and Sakai’s personal 
dealer was allegedly of Iranian descent). Apart from other “higher issues” arbitrarily 
linked to Sakai’s scandal, her case also initiated a debate on foreign crime problem while 
reinforcing the stereotype of foreigners selling drugs in central Tokyo (as a matter of fact 
the Sakai drug scandal was preceded by drug dragnets that started earlier in 2009 and 
targeted predominantly foreigners in Roppongi, Shibuya and Yoyogi). The biggest 
Japanese daily even linked Sakai’s case with the issue of foreigners’ illegal stay in Japan 
via the story of a Korean illegal immigrant who was also tried for illicit stimulants 
concurrently with Sakai’s trial (Yomiuri Shinbun, November 3, 2009). As usual the media 
and the police were dealing with mere symptoms of crime when focusing on easy-target 
individuals, while avoiding the well-known taboo of Japanese organized underworld 
(yakuza) that itself is the most prominent vehicle for drug business in Japan, outsourcing 
crime activities to foreigners (e.g. Messersmith 2003; Hill 2003). 
Throughout the narrative development, the Japanese media (predominantly the 
tabloids but also the dailies) simultaneously focused national attention on absurd minutiae. 
By putting on display the most banal and intimate aspects within the radius of Sakai’s 
persona, the tabloids and TV programs managed to give the emptiness an appealing 
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variety. Typically exhausting was the media’s inquiry into transformations of Sakai’s 
appearance (how and why did the length and color of her hair change, how does the color 
and style of her clothes accord with the nature of given public event), or their inquiry into 
the “prison discourse” (how many meals is she receiving a day in the detention center, 
how often is she allowed to bath, or even what does her prison toilet look like). The 
minutiae were usually accompanied by the (Barthesian) feature of “surprise of quantity”: 
the media were obsessed by recording and providing the audience with accurate 
numerical data, transforming trivia into obscurity (e.g. the police found 0.008 grams of 
stimulants and 42 strokes in Sakai’s apartment, her escape route was 481 kilometers long, 
at the conference Sakai shed 22 large teardrops). 
More importantly, some minutiae must have contributed to the hegemonic 
strengthening and awareness of the electronic panopticon: while minutely reporting what 
exactly was Sakai buying (the whole nation was informed that prior to her escape Sakai 
purchased underwear, cosmetics and instant noodles), how much money did she withdraw 
and where (400,000 yen from the ATM machine close to the JR Tokyo station building) 
and how did her escape route look like (the media were following and covering Sakai’s 
movement within Tokyo and across neighbouring prefectures of Yamanashi and 
Kanagawa while compiling detailed maps), there was an implicit but clear signal being 
sent out to the public: everybody who lives in the media-saturated postmodern symbolic 
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environment marked by what Altheide (2002) refers to as the discourse of fear, is 
permanently monitored while the personal data is being processed and stored in databases. 
This “field of documentation” provides detailed information about monitored individuals, 
and allow power systems to control them (Foucault 1977). Furthermore, since mediated 
displays of crime and punishment serve to reinforce social norms, the media as self-
appointed agents of social control are fully legitimate to make use of these databases 
while publicly shaming, persecuting and stigmatizing anybody who happens to defy given 
conventions. 
Sakai’s transgression was however neither grounded in deliberate subversion or 
challenge to the status quo (such a transgression could besides present the threat of 
gaining heroic potential), nor was she struggling to disrupt or transform the “artistic” field 
of process, where J-pop has been maintaining hegemonic position of cultural superiority 
in Japan ever since the 1990s. Yet, Sakai did defy both cultural conventions and legislative 
rules, and not punishing her “adequately” enough would represent actual threat to the 
integrity of the system. Besides, owing to the overall zeitgeist, Sakai’s mass-mediated 
morality tale fitted the general cultural prescription (“drugs are evil”), and the related 
particular problem frame (“celebrity crime”). Sakai’s drug affair, itself being just a tip of 
the iceberg, came to be socially and journalistically constructed as a symbol for that “root 
of all evil”.  
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1.5.2. Performing the Orchestrated Patterns of Repentance 
One important feature of media societies lies in a fact that the public is fascinated by trials 
and tribulations of celebrities (including various depictions of power/culture elites being 
submitted, degraded, humiliated and persecuted). The media in turn readily focus on such 
representations. Even victims in the news are evocative, bringing forth vicarious 
emotional experience, and may thus be “entertaining” (Altheide 2002). In case of scandals, 
the basic signs of submission and repentance expressed by deviating elites are resignation, 
stepping down from one’s post, or taking financial responsibility for compensating those 
who have suffered losses due to the scandal. While following this pattern, the Sun Music 
Company’s chairman stepped down and became advisor, the president became vice-
president, and apart from their own salary cuts they promised to pay around 500 million 
yen to commercial sponsors and record companies. The main scandal climax however 
came in a form of a televised press conference attended by the transgressor in person. The 
staged pseudo-event took place immediately after Sakai’s release on bail in September 
2009, attracted phenomenal attention (43.3 per cent of all viewing audiences in Japan), 
caused a traffic jam around the conference venue, and was quite rightfully labelled by 
Nashimoto (2009) as a moment of history. Apart from previous public appearances of 
Sakai leaving or entering the detention center or the court, it was this orchestrated 
persecution that provided the audiences with observable physiological evidence, 
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rendering the emotional content of apologies “sadistic”. In the spirit of what Garfinkel 
(1956) called “degradation ceremony”, the sobbing Sakai repeatedly demonstrated the 
commitment not to do it again, promising to resist any temptation while skilfully 
conflating apologies for causing inconvenience (meiwaku) and expressions of gratitude 
(kansha, ongaeshi). During the 10 minutes-long ritual, witnessed by more than 502 
reporters including 110 cameramen, the media recorded 22 large teardrops rolling down 
the Sakai’s cheeks, however their authenticity was doubted (Nashimoto 2009; Sassa 
2011). In this and other similar cases, the media commentators (in the studio joined by 
the “pundits”) do not impartially transmit the event, but they passionately judge the 
proportionality to her offence while focusing on every minutiae of the performance’s 
scenic aspects (e.g. the degree and duration of sorrow and guilt expressed by sobbing, 
blushing, sweating, shaking and other facial gestures, the frequency and length of bows, 
the physical appearance including makeup, clothing style/brand and color, the utterance 
style and the word usage). It is a standard obsession of the Japanese media during 
coverage of such events to somewhat playfully attempt to discover what has been 
carelessly violated, or more importantly, what was deliberately concealed for the sake of 
mastering the performance. Apart from moralizing based on evident of lack of etiquette 
(e.g. the media questioning the degree of repentance when Sakai’s husband entered the 
courtroom with a bottle of barley tea in his hand although food and drink are prohibited 
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there), the media try to discredit the “realness” of the apology by attacking the very 
essence of performing (e.g. Sakai’s “problematic” tattoos became again a topic for 
discussion since they were found to have been concealed with foundation during the press 
conference). Herein lies the main paradox: the media expect the transgressor to 
conventionally perform her repentant role during the conference with all devices at hand 
(including the waterproof makeup and waterproof eyeliner that would increase the 
visibility of Sakai’s teardrops), but at the very same time, they end up critically 
commenting on Sakai’s skillfully delivered dramatic act that is proclaimed to have only 
proven her virtues of an experienced actress. 
In degradation ceremony, where the transformation of identity lies in destruction 
of the transgressing object, the media observed and judged the performed “coherence of 
front” (Garfinkel 1956; Goffman 1959), her readiness to feel guilty, and the veracity of 
her moral transformation (i.e. the proportion of honesty and seriousness implying the 
“conforming self”, as opposed to cynicism of the false front indicating the “rebellious 
self”). The media thus again entered into a process of evaluating the signs that Sakai is 
giving and giving off, however this time focusing less on the incoherencies between the 
star and her non-star self, and more on the qualitative and quantitative signs of the 
repentant act itself. Perhaps they wanted to catch the glimpse of genuine imperfection that 
is an important factor in creating authentic interaction between performers and audiences 
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in Japan (Stevenson 2008). At any rate, being caught in a vicious circle of the coerced act 
of confession and apology, the former actress was required to perform that she is not 
performing, while the only “mysterious” aspect of this theater is that there really is no 
mystery. 
  
1.5.3. The Aftermath: Toward Purification and Reintegration 
A sufficiently painful apology postulates “never to do it again” rather than just “I am 
sorry”, and is ideally followed by moral reconciliation (Smith 2008). It has to be an act 
of both humility and humiliation. Once the apologetic ritual is concluded, celebrities are 
sent to “exile” and are not allowed to go immediately back on stage for a certain period 
of time. Usually the exile period differs according to the agency's strategic decision and 
the prosecution details, but social responses and moods can also significantly influence 
the impact on the period. The aforementioned apologetic press conference of Sakai 
Noriko already started up the process, which aimed to dissociate the entertainment agency 
(and the celebrities under their contract) from her stigmatized image, but it also hoped to 
restore her reputation in order to make her future comeback possible. In the meantime, 
Sakai and her advisors started making some effort to destigmatize her persona at the 
societal level (i.e. to replace the deviating identity with a non-deviant one) and rehabilitate 
her image at the representational level (i.e. to offset the previous media-supported 
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dissociation of her negative image from any possibility of identification). In her first step 
of ritual purification, Sakai was transported immediately after the press conference to the 
Tokyo Medical University Hospital to undertake drug rehabilitation.101 
During her trial, Sakai was asked about how she planned to “return to society” 
(implicating that she has been virtually ostracized and ordered out of the social realm), 
and although her agency’s contract had been withdrawn, it was again the former agency’s 
director Masahisa Aizawa who designed the re-integrative purification process for her: 
Sakai announced that she would enter university (social work department at Sōzō Gakuen 
University in Gunma Prefecture) and study welfare in order to once become a social care 
worker.102  
The “pornographic force” sometimes represents the center of celebrity scandal. 
In Sakai’s case, such a sub-drama did emerge, however only post facto: the tabloid Shūkan 
Posuto reported in March 2010 that a video tape which contains a pornographic content, 
allegedly featured Sakai. The story was however not covered in a way one would expect 
(also because the taboo prohibits sex in the Japanese news), and this tabloid gossip did 
                                                   
101 During this transfer (which partly resembled the notorious 1995 freeway flight of O.J. 
Simpson), Sakai’s van was followed by five helicopters, so that this pseudo-event could 
be transmitted live from the bird’s-eye view (Carol Tice calls this practice “helicopter 
journalism”). A propos of this, the charge for a single use of a helicopter in Japan exceeds 
one million yen (Hattori Takaaki, personal communication). 
102 The person of Aizawa demonstrates the ritualized quality of scandals and their actors: 
once being like a substitute father for her since recruiting her as a teenager, Aizawa 
publicly denounced her transgression as “unforgivable” and publicly dissociated from her 
after the indictment, just to once again help her to re-integrate into society. 
306 
not “revitalize” Sakai’s scandal. Meanwhile, Sakai proceeded with her purification: while 
giving up her luxury condominium in Tokyo (this however simply due to her problem of 
securing income after paying various damages and losing her annual income of one 
hundred million yen) she also decided to “sacrifice” her marriage for the sake of further 
disassociation from drugs (divorced in July 2010), and to devote herself to anti-drug 
campaigning. The “manifest” of her endeavor (along with well-known facts about her life 
and dull elaborations of her autocue answers from press conferences and trial hearings) 
was published in her autobiographical tell-all exposé from 2010, titled Shokuzai 
(“Atonement”) (Sakai 2010). As for the content, this book is less a clarification of the 
scandal events, and more a sort of commercialized auto-therapy. More importantly, the 
publication can be understood as the final stage of her purification: while aiming to 
reverse her expectancy violation, Sakai disassociated herself from the polluted, “profane” 
image of a convicted drug user, and attempted to offset the public outcry by moving back 
toward the imaginary “sacred” center.103 
                                                   
103 Another level, on which the symbolic purification occurred, can be seen in how 
Sakai’s overall image symbolically transformed throughout the course of the media 
events. For instance, Sakai was dressed in sober black from head to toe when released on 
bail, at the press conference and during trial proceedings (her hair was decolored). Later 
in November she was dressed in dark blue (and her hair dyed brown again) when touring 
the campus of her university. Finally, she hailed the reader from the cover of her 2010 
autobiographical book in white from head to toe. Color symbols have certain impact on 
our cognitive and emotional responses. Especially white color symbolizes multiple 
meanings in Japanese aesthetic perception (e.g. the purifying aspect of revenge or death 
by seppuku) but in Sakai’s context, it pointed more to confession and determination to 
reveal a secret (the Japanese words for confession, kokuhaku or hakujo, use the Chinese 
character for “white”, while the phrase hakushi ni modosu implies one’s wish to forget 
some conflict). 
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The stigma of Sakai’s deviance will partly vanish, because she did follow the 
ritual of purification via exclusion, but the memento of her transgression has entered the 
collective memory via popular culture. As a matter of fact, the recent developments, 
underpinned by the same culture industry that degraded her, indicate that she is finding 
her way back to show business, although her stigmatized image will be conceptually 
reshaped and/or geographically relocated.104 
 
Figure 12. The Sakai Noriko scandal flow. 
Source: Author 
 
                                                   
104 The preparations of her comeback, although initially not on Japanese soil, were under 
way already since the end of 2009 (initially, there seemed to be some chances to catch up 
in the Chinese music market). In April 2011, Sakai participated in an anti-drug campaign 
in China’s Beijing, and at a press conference in November 2012 she officially announced 
her comeback to entertainment industry (her first post-scandal role was a female character 
in a Japanese historical drama from the sengoku era. 
308 
1.6. Conclusion 
 
Since they gained legitimation as guardians of moral values, the media journalistically 
co-construct various social controversies. While simultaneously maximizing profits, 
these mediations dramatically embody society’s basic values, and in principle serve as 
pacifying, socially-integrative tools that may reinforce public definitions of morality. The 
institutional consequences of the Sakai scandal were however rather laughable: the main 
structural countermeasure suggested in order to eliminate the root of the problem 
(celebrities and drugs) was an introduction of celebrities’ medical check-ups including 
urine and blood tests, which would be enforced by their contracts with agencies. As 
addition, the Japan Association of Music Enterprises planned to distribute “celebrity 
manuals” that would promote the dangerousness of drugs (Yomiuri Shinbun, August 9, 
2009). Nonetheless, Japanese celebrity/drug scandals proliferated ever since. 
The scandal consequences can have contradictory effects, paradoxically 
delegitimating the social system. Sakai’ transgression was indeed presented as 
“scandalous”, however the main real actors of the scandal were the Japanese media, 
themselves entering the mode of transgression on more levels – among others by 
excessive, over-heated coverage out of proportion to the event being covered, and by 
multiple violation of norms of privacy and decency. The media coverage of this scandal 
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also illustrated how in contemporary Japanese media culture the mainstream journalism 
had become supplanted by tabloidization (i.e. aggressive shift away from important social 
issues to gossipy infotainment journalism) and celebrity fetishism (i.e. non-rational 
relation and excessive affection for “stars”). 
The effects of Sakai’s scandal were received in opposing ways: not only failing 
to put the case in a proper larger context, the mainstream media reports did not analyze 
very much why the use, manufacture, and distribution of drugs is bad, and the impact was 
alarming: Japanese Broadcasting Ethics and Program Improvement Organization (BPO) 
announced in early November 2009 that the overheated coverage of Sakai´s case actually 
aroused interest in drugs among the Japanese youth. Moreover, the reporting practices of 
covering Sakai’s drug scandal indicated something about reporting about illicit drugs in 
Japan. On one hand the Japanese media rarely specified the drug in question – usually 
abstract terms such as “stimulants” (kakuseizai) or “chemical substances” (yakubutsu) 
were used – but on the other hand they actually often provided detailed, instructive 
explanations of how to use the drug in question. The contradictory effects did not stop 
here: after Sakai’s music label (Victor Entertainment) responded to her scandal with total 
ban on her sales, the increased demand for Sakai’s music after her scandal briefly made 
her single Aoi Usagi (1995) the No.1 selling song on iTunes Japan in the fall of 2009.105 
                                                   
105 After her label banned sales of her music, “Aoi Usagi” became the number one 
downloaded single on the Japan iTunes Store because it was part of a compilation album 
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The reading of Sakai’s scandal may resemble the experience of reading a 
criminal novel, where disequilibrium is initiated while the narrative is organized around 
the adventure of “pursuing the truth”. Differing from criminal fiction, a clear-cut 
resolution in Sakai narrative is missing. As for the legal level, Sakai’s transgression has 
been criminalized and therefore legally concluded. Nonetheless, at the level of media 
production, where various media sources were simultaneously operating within different 
frames, the overall frame conflict hinders any final resolution. Consider the competing 
interpretations of scandal events as provided by the transgressor herself (Sakai 2010), and 
the major Japanese entertainment commentator (Nashimoto 2009). The frame conflict 
was existent across the whole Japanese mediascape throughout the scandal coverage: the 
big Japanese dailies were uniform and rather neutral/descriptive in their coverage. The 
TV channels and tabloids focused on sensation, visual spectacularization and absurd 
minutiae, while the coverage of the foreign press such as The Japan Times was either 
neutral, but at times sarcastic and sharp-tongued. The online chat-rooms, discussion 
forums and blogs presented a rich and balanced variety of pro-Sakai/anti-Sakai voices, 
stretching from emotional outbursts of disillusion to sophisticated insights into the 
scandal background. Unfortunately, there are no comments available from Sakai’s official 
                                                   
(her music label had licensed the single to a different company). Since the iTunes Store 
allows consumers to purchase singles from albums, including compilation albums, her 
song became the top selling song. 
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fan club because the club was dismissed right after the scandal. 
In other words, the symbolic “struggle” for meanings continued at the level of 
audience reception. No matter how firmly did the media set the agenda and frame the 
event, there will always be a discrepancy between the number of people who knew of the 
scandal, and who actually “believed it”. Besides, despite all the efforts of Japanese 
cultural and political hegemony, Sakai did gain some sympathy from both the 
“conforming selves” and the “rebellious selves”. Regarding the former, the key moment 
for the conformists was Sakai’s choice to give herself up to police and to face the court, 
which may in turn change her into a “good person” again. Regarding the latter group (and 
seen from the psychoanalyst perspective), she demonstrated and projected the irrational 
mass-id (i.e. the desire to go beyond the limits of “normality”, to transgress and revolt), 
whereby temporarily bypassing the collective super-ego (i.e. the civilization and its rules 
of everydayness). In this vein, her “epic” transgression had served as a sublimation of 
audiences’ escapist tendencies and revolting impulses, temporarily distracting them in a 
cathartic way from frustrations of their everyday lives.  
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2. POLITICAL SCANDAL: THE CASE OF OZAWA ICHIRŌ 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Few months after the arrest of his chief secretary over shady political donations in March 
2009, Ozawa Ichirō resigned as the president of his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) just 
to become the party’s Secretary General. Right after this shift, Ozawa became involved 
in two other scandals related to unreported donations from construction companies in the 
past, and to a shady purchase of land in Tokyo. In January 2010, Ozawa during his press 
conference denied any wrongdoing, but the Prosecution Inquest Committee (an 
independent judicial inquest panel composed of 11 citizens) decided to indict him in April 
over false reporting of political donations for the time period of 2004-2007. Later in June, 
Ozawa stepped down as the Secretary General. However, he was indicted again in 
February 2011 over another shady land purchase. His trial started in October 2011, and 
in April 2012 he was found not guilty of any fund conspiracy and was acquitted. Despite 
his multiple donation scandal, Ozawa soon reintegrated himself to the world of politics 
by establishing a new party, which was in 2016 renamed to Liberal Party (Jiyūtō), and is 
ready to challenge other parties in the upcoming elections.  
The general aim of this chapter is to illuminate how strategic and ritual 
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performances of scandal actors (Ozawa himself, his secretaries, the media, the public, and 
the prosecutorial office) co-constructed a scandal narrative, at the end of which the culprit 
was acquitted and eventually made a political comeback. The scandal occurred in an 
environment, where wealth and its surplus is tied to a higher potential to grasp and secure 
power, but the same excess can become dangerous for politicians who inevitably depend 
on, but are also threatened by the media, since political scandals can trigger media bashing 
and character assassination while flaming moral indignation and generating support for 
opposition. While being related to the emergence and climax of this scandal I touch upon 
the issue of money politics in Japan, and the role of the prosecutors that both triggered 
the scandal and influenced its outcome. I attempt to illustrate this complex actor-network 
by analysing the political funding scandal of one of the most powerful political 
heavyweights of the last decade. 
 
2.2. Who is Ozawa Ichirō? 
 
The veteran lawmaker Ozawa Ichirō is a native of Iwate prefecture, born in 1942. Aged 
27, Ozawa won a lower house seat for the first time in 1969 for the LDP. In 1985-6 he 
served as Home Affairs Minister, in 1989 he debuted as the youngest LDP secretary 
general, and until 1993, he served in prominent LDP and government posts. Ozawa was 
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famous for constantly drawing both praise and criticism, while being one of the most 
important politicians in postwar Japan who survived as a key player in national politics 
for almost three decades. During his heydays, Ozawa was strongly influenced by his main 
mentor and protégé Tanaka Kakuei, who was deemed not only the most powerful 
Japanese politician of all times, but also a father of the so-called money politics (kinken 
seiji) (Ozawa 2015). Same as Tanaka, Ozawa is known as a reformist politician who 
attempted to take on powerful bureaucrats and end the 1955 system and thus the LDP’s 
one-party rule. 
The main twist in Ozawa’s political career came in 1993. He shocked the 
political world when he quit the LDP (in part to escape associations with corruption), 
joined the opposition camp, and established his own Japan Renewal Party (Shinseitō). By 
doing so, he replaced the LDP as a ruling force since 1955 and briefly controlled the non-
LDP government with Prime Minister Hosokawa as its formal leader. Although Ozawa 
was always very close to LDP’s kingmaker Kanemaru Shin, one of the main reasons for 
Ozawa leaving LDP was Kanemaru’s involvement in the Sagawa Kyūbin scandal of 1992. 
In the years of 1994-97, Ozawa first appeared as the head of the New Frontier 
Party (Shinshintō), which was back then the largest opposition party consisting mainly of 
the renegades from the LDP. Two years after the power shift, the support group 
Rikuzankai became Ozawa’s main political funding organization. In December 1997 
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Ozawa broke up with Shinshintō due to a split of pro- and anti-Ozawa factions, and moved 
to another party, Jiyūtō (The Liberal Party). One year later, he joined the LDP in the 
governing coalition, but after Mori Yoshirō replaced Obuchi Keizō as Prime Minister in 
2000, Ozawa became politically isolated. Ozawa’s Jiyūtō joined with the DPJ, and in 
2004 Ozawa (then the deputy head of the DPJ) was appointed to the head of the party 
instead of Kan Naoto (Kan resigned earlier over a scandal related to his failure to pay 
mandatory premiums into the National Pension System). Finally, Ozawa became the 
president of the DPJ in April 2006, but as early as in July 2007 he promised to step down 
if the opposition camp loses the election. After a sweeping victory of the DPJ at the end 
of July 2007, the LDP lost majority in Upper House elections while Ozawa criticized Abe 
Shinzō for staying at the helm of the LDP and the nation. 
In March 2009, Ozawa’s chief secretary was arrested over shady political 
donations from a construction company (i.e. the Nishimatsu scandal), and a few months 
after the arrest, Ozawa resigned as president of the DPJ, being succeeded by Hatoyama 
Yukio. The scandal prevented Ozawa from becoming Prime Minister, but his influence 
within the party was far from being eliminated: after his resignation, Ozawa was made 
senior deputy leader with authority to manage election campaigns, which meant that he 
gained complete control over the money used for those campaigns.  
In August of 2009, the scandal-tainted Ozawa stood behind the DPJ’s historical 
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win in general election. Nevertheless, he was soon implicated in other scandal related to 
unreported donations from construction companies (the Mizutani scandal), and to a shady 
land purchase in Tokyo back in 2004. The inquest panel decided to indict Ozawa over 
false reporting of political donations in the time period of 2004 to 2007, and Ozawa finally 
stepped down as Secretary General of the DPJ. Despite this course of events, Ozawa 
decided to run in DPJ’s leadership race (and thus virtually aiming to become Prime 
Minister), but he was once again indicted in February 2011 over another shady land 
purchase. His trial started in October 2011, and in April 2012 he was found not guilty of 
any fund conspiracy.  
In upcoming presidential elections, the Ozawa-backed candidate Kaeda Banri 
lost to Noda Yoshihiko (the Prime Minister until December 2012), which undermined the 
influence of Ozawa as the “shadow shogun” (yami shōgun). The new “Ozawa-shock” 
came in July 2012: after not willing to agree with the DPJ policy on the issue of 
consumption tax hike Ozawa, accompanied by dozens of his loyal followers, left the DPJ 
and created a new “People’s Life First” party (Kokumin no Seikatsu ga Daiichi). Ozawa’s 
newly created party did poorly in the election, but in October 2016 Ozawa formed a new 
“Liberal Party” (Jiyūtō) with another Japanese politician and former actor Yamamoto 
Tarō.  
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2.3. Ozawa Ichirō: The Scandal Narrative 
 
The real opening of Ozawa’s scandal narrative did not start with his person. It was the 
arrest of his chief secretary, Ōkubo Takanori, or more precisely, the media hype which 
occurred after the Japanese news agencies reported the details on March 4, 2009. 
Although it was Ōkubo who was arrested on the grounds of allegedly breaking the 
Political Funds Control Law (Seiji Shikin Kisei Hō), the media immediately speculated 
about links to Ozawa and his political fund management body.106 
At this point of the narrative, Ozawa re-emerged as a proactive scandal actor, 
utilizing the strategy of offense and protection (seme no senryaku, mamori no senryaku). 
While refusing to admit any breach of the law from his side, Ozawa attacked the 
prosecutorial conduct in his scandal, casting general doubts on the exercise of legal justice. 
In the meantime, the media hype widened the scandal radius and brought about a minor 
snowball effect (some tabloids indicated that other LDP lawmakers were also receiving 
illegal donations from the same construction company in question). Soon enough, 
however, Ozawa switched to the apologetic/protective strategy (shazai no senryaku, 
                                                   
106 Rikuzankai allegedly accepted illegal corporate donation from two groups (dummy 
entities) headed by a former official of the construction company Nishimatsu (the former 
president of Nishimatsu, Mikio Kunisawa was already indicted in a separate case of 
financial fraud). Nishimatsu provided Ozawa’s office with a total of around 300 million 
yen for over more than 10 years in order to increase chances of winning contracts for 
public works projects in the Tōhoku region, where Ozawa’s political base is located. 
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mamori no senryaku): while utilizing the ambiguity of the Japanese language, the tearful 
Ozawa admitted during his press conference to accepting the donation. He apologized for 
causing “trouble” (meiwaku) but retained the “knowing-nothing” approach (shirimasen 
deshita), claiming that he was unaware of the source of donation. 
In the first instance, these loyal secretaries served as protective shields and 
scapegoats, setting their boss at a greater distance from alleged wrongdoing. During his 
own trial in 2012, Ozawa was pleading innocent mainly based on the claim that the 
financial reports were completely in the hands of his aides. Nonetheless, the loyalty of 
Ozawa’s aides (and the political image of Ozawa himself) became somewhat shattered in 
2011 when one of the aides, Ishikawa Tomohiro published an off-record book called “The 
Villain: Serving for Ozawa Ichirō” (Akutō: Ozawa Ichirō ni tsukaete).107 
The next stage, following the arrest of Ōkubo, was a “cooperative” one 
(kyōryoku no senryaku): only three days after Okubo’s arrest, Ozawa voluntarily agreed 
to be questioned by the prosecutors. The media polls showed that the majority of Japanese 
respondents would welcome Ozawa’s resignation, but Ozawa soon returned to his 
offensive style, denied any wrongdoing and refused to step down. At the end of March, 
                                                   
107 Among many other amusing details, the book revealed that Ozawa’s aides had to 
weed the politician’s garden early in the morning, cook his family breakfast, do the 
laundry, or clean the house. Other leaks included the secretaries keeping Ozawa cool with 
fans when it was hot because he hates air conditioning. Importantly, these accounts may 
generate defamation suits, but they are never powerful enough to bring down the 
politician in question. 
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he once again switched to the apologetic strategy (shazai no senryaku), apologizing in a 
tearful statement to the “people” (kokumin) while mentioning the term kokumin eight 
times. While operating on the empathic/patriotic basis, Ozawa reminded the public that 
despite his scandal he stood at the helm of the battle for the sacred good of the nation, 
centering his interest on national affairs instead of some political fund reports.  
While being aware of the ongoing crisis, the DPJ attempted to manage the 
situation by forming an advisory panel of external experts, which consisted of three 
professors and one former public prosecutor. Ozawa however refused to consider the 
panel’s advice.108 On the contrary, in May 2009 Ozawa proceeded with his own strategy: 
he announced his plan to resign in order to prevent the DPJ from losing the upcoming 
general election. The major election victory of the DPJ that followed in August must be 
partly ascribed to this strategic ritual of temporary self-exclusion. 
The scandal narrative was however far from being concluded. In November 2009, 
it became clear that between 2004 and 2005 one of Ozawa’s aides obtained an unreported 
donation worth 100 million yen in cash. Only few weeks later, yet another scandalous 
disclosure emerged, this time related to a shady land purchase, realized through Ozawa’s 
funding management body in Tokyo back in 2004. Same as in the Nishimatsu scandal, it 
was not Ozawa who was primarily targeted, but his aides (the first of the three Rikuzankai 
                                                   
108 The author is obliged for this information to Hattori Takaaki from Rikkyo University 
who served as one of the panel members. 
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secretaries, Ishikawa Tomohiro, was arrested at the beginning of 2010). In the meantime, 
the president of DPJ, Hatoyama Yukio became a “victim” of his own donation scandal: 
between 2002-8 he misreported large amounts of donations (over 1 billion yen), that he 
received from his mother, while other donations were recorded as political donations from 
deceased or fictitious people. 
 Only three months passed since the scandal-tainted LDP had been ousted out of 
power by the DPJ, which once promoted itself as a viable alternative to money politics 
despite Ozawa’s pending scandals. In February 2010, the prosecutors did not charge 
Ozawa, but indicted his former secretary, Ishikawa Tomohiro. Nonetheless, following 
Prime Minister Hatoyama’s abrupt resignation in June, Ozawa decided to quit as DPJ’s 
secretary general. He again retreated to the background, but broke the self-inflicted exile 
as early as in August of the same year when announcing to run for party presidency. 
However, only few days before the actual election, the inquest panel decided to review 
the prosecutorial decision not to indict Ozawa. Ozawa’s indictment on 31 January 2011 
gave the anti-Ozawa members of the DPJ, including then-Prime Minister Kan Naoto, the 
leverage needed to suspend Ozawa’s party privileges. Ozawa was indicted over shady 
land purchase, triggering speculations that his political career was over at last. According 
to another media report, Ozawa was to become a scapegoat in order to improve approval 
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ratings of Kan’s Cabinet.109 
Ozawa’s party membership was suspended until the end of his trial, which started 
in October 2011. Nonetheless, after Kan’s resignation in August 2011, Ozawa continued 
to wield influence over a large bloc of the DPJ. In April 2012, pleading not guilty of 
conspiring to make false financial reports, Ozawa was acquitted due to lack of evidence. 
 
2.4. Scandal Pathologies Related to Ozawa case 
 
The upcoming subchapters aim to highlight a background for understanding the 
environment from which most of the Japanese political scandals arise: it is the discourse 
of money politics (kinken seiji), the corruption that is at times related to Japanese support 
groups (kōenkai), and finally it is the prosecutorial conduct, which is decisive in triggering 
political affairs, but an oppressive prosecution ccan also create a sub-drama and 
decisively impact the outcome of a scandal (see below).  
 
 
                                                   
109 Ozawa was quoted to appear voluntarily before the Lower House Ethics Committee 
to testify about his money scandals, but the real reason for this testimony was not only 
the pressure from Kan Naoto, but also the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengō), 
which was a big supporter of the DPJ (The Japan Times, December 29, 2010). 
322 
2.4.1. The Issue of Money Politics and Support Groups 
On more occasions toward the new year of 2012, the pro-LDP Yomiuri Shinbun (e.g. 
December 2, 2011) reported that Ozawa’s political influence is based on his abundant 
financial resources including his funds management organization (Rikuzankai). The 
Sankei Shinbun, followed by other media, reported that Ozawa’s income in 2010 was six 
times higher than that of the previous year, and in January 2012 the Japan Property 
Central published a list of Ozawa and his wife’s real estate holdings, estimating their 
property being worth more than three billion yen.110 
Moreover, Ozawa’s political funds in 2010 were the highest ones compared to 
other Japanese lawmakers (The Japan Times, December 8, 2011), while Rikuzankai had 
the highest total revenue of any political organization that year (Yomiuri Shinbun, 
December 12, 2010). Although this is no unique phenomenon in Japanese politics, the 
dailies used these facts in order to facilitate a guilt frame by indicating that Ozawa was 
been living beyond his salaried means. 
Money is the essential element in funding political activities, and for Ozawa 
(same as for his mentor Tanaka), the main source of campaign funding was the money-
for-favours corruption in construction industry. Important in Ozawa’s case was the bid-
                                                   
110 Only Ozawa’s private residence and adjoining land in Fukuzawa were worth 1.3 
billion yen (see japanpropertycentral.com/2012/01/politician-ozawas-vast-real-estate-
holdings).  
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rigging practice within the “cement industrial complex” of the “construction state” (doken 
kokka) – a widely tolerated practice based on the nexus between officials, business people, 
high ranking politicians, and the Japanese yakuza (Goodall 1996; McCormack 1996; 
Messersmith 2003; Kingston 2004). Ozawa was enjoying loyalty and support from his 
local support groups since they knew well that he had a key word in deciding which 
company will be awarded construction deals in his home district. While still being a 
member of LDP, Ozawa was on a regular basis obtaining donations from construction 
companies, exceeding the legal limit more than six times (Bowen 2003). While criticizing 
the corruption in LDP in order to later achieve the power shift, and calling for abolishing 
the money politics (kane no kakaranai seiji), Ozawa himself was involved in many 
corruption cases, including the Recruit scandal, where he received a two-million-yen 
political donation from the company in question (Rothacher 1993). Only eventually, 
Ozawa’s office was accused of issuing “voices from heaven” (ten no koe) in determining 
the winners of orders for public works projects in Ozawa’s home prefecture Iwate 
(Yomiuri Shinbun, June 20, 2009). This system of money politics and the construction 
state practices are attributed to Tanaka Kakuei, who in 1970s perfected the collusion-
based system while depending on his political support group Etsuzankai.111  
                                                   
111 As a matter of fact, corruption in Japanese politics was in place long before Tanaka 
Kakuei, but it was Tanaka who perfected the system in which government-funded public 
works projects aided the economic development and the job market in Japan. The fact 
that Tanaka’s political entrepreneurship actually proved successful in terms of bringing 
about the Japanese economic miracle, points at the “inconsistency” of (not only Japanese) 
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Equally important for Ozawa’s political success was the practice of local 
“support groups” (kōenkai). These groups are usually backed by local companies and 
government workers who vote for their politicians, while these politicians are in turn 
expected to deliver “pork” to their constituents (Ozawa supported the Iwate prefecture, 
while his mentor Tanaka was famous for taking a good care of his constituency in Niigata). 
The local construction firms donate money in order to maintain friendly relationship with 
politicians who wield influence over public works contracts, and the politicians are in 
turn dependent on these firms for necessary campaign funds. Thus, it is not only the local 
support base (jiban), or the reputation of a politician’s name (kamban), but most 
importantly, it is the campaign funding (kaban) that renders kōenkai as one of the major 
sources of political funding and political corruption in Japan. The practice of loyal support 
groups in Japan supports the assertion that social actors (both the politicians and their 
supporters) are in given situation more “obligation-preoccupied” than “right-preoccupied” 
(e.g. Lebra 1976). Consequently, it becomes a politician’s “duty” to uphold the norms of 
reciprocity and to transgress the rules of conduct in order to fulfill their obligation toward 
the constituency. The constituents may yield materially from this reciprocity, and they 
readily support the corrupted politicians in next elections notwithstanding their scandals. 
Setting up and maintaining these support groups encourages intense fundraising, which 
                                                   
political discourse with any general moral theory of ideal conduct. 
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in turn contributes to recurring scandals in Japanese politics. 
The money politics is however a double-edged sword. Politicians can be 
discredited by their rivals and enemies by exposing certain corruption from the past at the 
most “infelicitous” moment (e.g. shortly before elections). As is usually the case of 
exposing political donation scandals, Ozawa’s investments were traced to a distant past. 
For instance, one of the real estate holdings that became a subject of discussion in the 
media in 2009 (the shady ownership of his apartment in Minami-Aoyama) was purchased 
by Ozawa’s political fund management body as early as in 2001. Similarly, the shady 
land purchase in Tokyo’s Setagaya Ward occurred in 2004, while the illicit donations that 
triggered the Nishimatsu scandal in 2009 had their roots already in 1995. In other words, 
in Japan it is rarely the case that certain corruption becomes exposed by a prompt 
investigative journalism. More typically, certain corruption is “dormant” for the time 
being, and it comes to light, if and only if it is exposed by some motivated party.  
    
2.4.2. The Issue of Prosecutorial Conduct in Scandal 
In contemporary Japan, prosecutors are often conceived of as “ambassadors of justice” 
(seigi no shisha), while the media are expected to cooperate as “democracy watchdogs” 
(minshushugi no banken). Ideally speaking, they both share same goals in cases of 
corruption and crime, i.e. to surveil authorities (kenryoku kanshi) and to search for truth 
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(shinjitsu no tsuikyū) behind corruption and crime (e.g. Matsubara 2014). As soon as one 
of them – or both of them at the same time, which is more often the case – publicly casts 
doubt about some power elite, they can immediately fuel public discontent toward them 
and their professional platform. 
The Japanese prosecutors and journalists during scandal are on a similar 
wavelength, although Iimuro (1995) claims that it is the former who surpasses the latter 
in the amount of information. The information flow in scandal is being constituted both 
ways: either prosecutors pick up an issue from newspapers or magazines (Hasegawa 
2000), or the mainstream journalists receive information from the prosecutor’s office 
(Murphy 2014) while promising the prosecutors uncritical coverage of their work in turn 
(Johnson 2002). In some scandals, the prosecutors leak information to the media simply 
in order to garner public support (West 2006). Other sensitive information is being 
received in a form of written complaints and accusations made by outside informants, 
which is according to Hasegawa (2000) another major source of information related to 
ongoing bribery cases.  
The role of prosecution in Ozawa’s scandal was significant, if not decisive. It is 
hard to identify the source, based on which the prosecutors decided to arrest Ozawa’s 
secretaries precisely in March 2009, i.e. close before the next general elections, where 
Ozawa’s DPJ was expected to win. Indeed, the timing of arrest lends itself to conspiracy 
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being the main motivation for the information leak to the Tokyo District Prosecutors 
Office (Karel van Wolferen, personal communication). At any rate, the Prosecutors Office 
arrested Ozawa’s aides and in 2010 they searched Ozawa’s private office while 
continually leaking information to the media. Ever since the charges were brought against 
his three former secretaries, Ozawa ended up being at war not only with the mainstream 
media, but also with the prosecutors, staying reluctant to cooperate with them while 
publicly criticizing decisions of the inquest panel. Besides, the Tokyo prosecutor’s office 
indeed triggered some of the biggest corruption cases in postwar Japan, but strong 
evidence, or a full confession was usually a prerequisite for indictment. In the case of 
Ozawa however, the prosecutors’ attempt to indict him was taken back precisely based 
on lack of evidence, and absence of confession, and although Ozawa’s case was reopened, 
he was finally acquitted. 
Ozawa attempted to shake off the guilt frame and re-shift attention away from 
his funding scandal by lamenting that the prosecutors were politically motivated, or that 
there existed some ties between the prosecutors and the Cabinet since they both lean 
toward the ideology of anti-Ozawa camp. These accusations were however nothing 
cognitively new: as a matter of fact, Ozawa was critical toward justiciary bureaucracy 
and its legal mistakes already during the 1970s scandal of his mentor Tanaka Kakuei 
(Ozawa 2015), and later in 1990s, Ozawa again accused the prosecution of legal mistakes 
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when his political mentor Kanemaru Shin was interrogated during the Sagawa Kyūbin 
scandal (Sassa 2011). More importantly for Ozawa’s case, it became clear that one 
prosecutor was employing abusive practices when questioning one of the indicted aides 
(the secretary Ishikawa was secretly recording with his IC recorder the prosecutor’s 
attempt to influence the outcome of the interrogation). This is a sensitive problem in 
contemporary Japan, where prosecutors release leaks according to a double standard 
(Yayama 1990; Johnson 2002), but more importantly where forced confessions eventually 
lead to cases of judicial error.  
Thus, the scandal narrative gained a new momentum via a new sub-drama, in 
which the Tokyo District Court accused prosecutorial interrogations of “illegality” 
(ihōsei) when embellishing the investigative report (e.g. Yomiuri Shinbun, April 27, 2012). 
The “scandalicity” shifted from root transgressors (Ozawa and his aides) to secondary 
participants (the prosecutors Maeda Tsunehiko and Tashiro Masahiro), which directly 
impacted the scandal development. The “new villains” of the scandal narrative appeared 
to use their authority in unlawful manner to pressure the suspect to adjust his testimony. 
Rendering the prosecutorial conduct as “inappropriate” (futekisetsu) meant a blow to the 
anti-Ozawa camp, and the issue effectively overshadowed the Ozawa scandal itself. 
While blending this new transgression with prosecutors’ lack of evidence, Ozawa was 
acquitted, the Ozawa-critical voices failed in their demands for his resignation, and the 
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media discussion steered toward a declining ability of judicial actors. 
 
2.5. Interpreting the Performance of Scandal Actors 
 
2.5.1. Ozawa versus the Media 
In terms of his ambivalent relationship with the media, Ozawa is the opposite of 
politicians such as Koizumi Jun’ichirō, who became popular due to his “media 
honeymoon”. On the contrary, Ozawa was infamous for taking an openly offensive stance 
toward the Japanese media, who were – along with the public and other politicians – 
allegedly perceiving him as a “villain” (George Mulgan 2014; Ozawa 2015). It can be 
however simultaneously argued that Ozawa, while struggling for power and leadership, 
was obtaining some public support exactly due to his self-confident, arrogant and non-
repentant rhetoric. Ozawa’s frequent gaffes and slips of tounge also belonged to his 
“unsociable” rhetoric before and during his scandal.112 
                                                   
112 One example is the leaked off-record quotation in the magazine Bungei Shunju from 
1994, where Ozawa was quoted labeling the former Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki a “fool” 
(baka). In another gaffe from May 1994, Ozawa made a seemingly misogynist remark 
“one is free to sleep with the woman of one’s choice” (dono onna to issho ni neyō ga ii 
janaika), which leaked to the public through Asahi Shinbun, and was met with harsh 
criticism from female members of the Diet. The remark was however taken out of context 
(Ozawa was commenting the departure of the Social Democratic Party of Japan from the 
ruling coalition). Instead of trying to clarify the misunderstanding, Ozawa attacked Asahi 
Shinbun while attempting to exclude their journalists from all of his upcoming press 
conferences. Ozawa’s scandalous remarks are however not restricted only to domestic 
politics. In a public speech in November 2009, Ozawa referred to Christianity as a self-
righteous, and “exclusive” faith (haitateki) because according to him it tends to exclude 
other religions. In this and other similar statements, the backlash comes usually from the 
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Long time before his 2009 scandal, Ozawa was quoted claiming that the mass 
communication media exist primarily to be utilized by politicians (Iimuro 1995). His 
radical stance toward the mainstream media was however reflected already after the 
power shift in 1993: in order to demonstrate his will to improve political transparency 
and information disclosure (jōhō kōkai), Ozawa temporarily abolished the infamous 
practice of kondan (the off-record background briefings held after regular press 
conferences). Besides, together with Okada Katsuya he attempted to reform the elitist 
kisha club system while making press conferences more transparent by including 
journalists of the weekly magazines and the foreign press in his own briefings. These 
moves, however can be perceived as populistic in nature. Besides, while proclaiming that 
the change in the relationship between politicians and journalists must follow the change 
in politics, Ozawa soon imposed embargo on topics related to his scandals, and 
proclaimed that press conference is a form of a voluntary “service” (sābisu), which can 
be bypassed if deemed necessary (Yomiuri Shinbun, October 23, 2009).113 
                                                   
periphery (in the last case mentioned, it was the Japan Christian Federation of Churches, 
followed by the foreign newspapers). Moreover, the development of a gaffe usually 
depends on the magnitude of a statement, same as on the decision of the mainstream press 
to either ignore the story, or to include it in the news agenda. 
113 Ozawa was however not the only heavyweight politician that took a radical stance 
toward the media. Consider Prime Minister Satō Eisaku and his refusal to give access to 
the journalists to his resignation press conference in 1972 (Satō expelled everyone except 
from the TV camera crews from the conference hall, allegedly in order to be able to speak 
to the public “directly”). Also, consider the ex-Mayor of Osaka city, Hashimoro Tōru, 
who was infamous for attacking and ridiculing journalists during his press conferences.    
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It was from a significant part the broadcast of the Asahi Shinbun-affiliated TV 
Asahi which helped to oust the LDP out of power in 1993, paving the way for Ozawa and 
his reformists. Initially, the left-of-center, liberal Asahi Shinbun and other left-leaning 
papers welcomed Ozawa and Hatoyama’s ideological positions as an alternative to the 
LDP (e.g. Ozawa pro-Asian stance versus the LDP’s subordination to the US). It was 
however Ozawa himself, who later criticized Asahi for “betraying” him (literally Asahi 
ni uragirareta), and for making use of his persona merely for commercial profit (Hattori 
Takaaki, personal communication). Indeed, the alleged “violent” editorial reporting (pen 
no bōryoku) of the Asahi Shinbun was at its starkest during the first half of 2012, when 
Ozawa struggled to stay in high politics despite his scandals. For instance, the editorial 
of Asahi Shinbun (January 13, 2012) asserted that Ozawa is unfit to be a politician, and 
although he was eventually found not guilty of fund conspiracy, the opinion column from 
July 5, 2012 and the editorial from July 12 stated that it is time for the untrustworthy 
Ozawa to retire (Ozawasan, sorosoro seikai intai wo). Rather adversarial was also the 
framing of the largest Japanese newspaper, the center-right conservative Yomiuri Shinbun, 
which supported Ozawa’s guilt frame, partly based on Watanabe Tetsuo (the leader of 
Yomiuri) and his antipathy toward Ozawa). However, compared to Ozawa bashing 
(Ozawa tataki) by Asahi Shinbun, Yomiuri facilitated the guilt frame rather indirectly (e.g. 
by using Ozawa-critical sources without much space of counterarguments, or by using 
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visuals of Ozawa in bad mood). 
As is usually the case, the Japanese tabloids were scrutinizing every aspect of 
Ozawa’s personal life, which would undermine his efforts to avoid responsibility for his 
scandal. For instance, Shūkan Bunshun announced that Ozawa’s wife Kazuko announced 
her divorce from him based on his cowardly way of handling the Fukushima radiation 
crisis in 2011 (Shūkan Bunshun, June 21, 2012), while other the tabloids speculated that 
the real reason of her coming-out was Ozawa’s long-lasting extramarital affair. There 
were however some Ozawa-friendly magazines (goyō shūkanshi or “patronage journals”) 
that did not fully support the tabloid-styled Ozawa bashing. However, rather than any sort 
of ideological leaning, it was more importantly the competition between the tabloids 
themselves. This generated a certain pro-Ozawa framing in order to challenge the rival 
on the tabloid market. Besides, the framing often depended on the ideological allegiance 
of those weeklies that are owned by one of the big dailies (Taniguchi Masaki, personal 
communication). 
In his media criticism during the scandal, Ozawa targeted particular media 
outlets, but his attacks were oriented toward the Japanese media system as such. Apart 
from the all-too-obvious argument that the media coverage is full of “distortions” 
(yugami), Ozawa accused the Japanese journalists of contradicting themselves because 
they tend to talk about the necessity of political leadership, but at the same time, they 
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denigrate anyone who aspires to a position of being a leader. (Related to this, the demand 
of a strong and charismatic political leadership also explains the popularity of 
controversial Japanese leaders such as Ishihara Shintarō or Hashimoto Tōru, whose 
inflammatory statements often generated media attention. Some critical journalists 
denounce and demonize them, but these newsworthy “charismatic villains” help to 
increase the circulation.)  
The press was particularly inventive when giving various metaphorical 
nicknames to Ozawa. While the loyal people of Iwate called the politician “Ozawa-sensei” 
(meaning “teacher”, but implying respect combined with affect), the Japanese media used 
most frequently “yami shōgun” (shadow shogun) which was the same nickname used for 
Tanaka Kakuei. The foreign journalists framed Ozawa as “strong-armed”, “self-confessed 
opportunist” and “lone wolf” (because of his tendency to act without consulting other 
party members and to switch factions/parties several times), “crasher”, “party breaker” or 
“destroyer” (because he both broke up and formed various political groups, and finally 
ended up splitting from his own party), “kingmaker”, “shadow Prime Minister” or 
“shadow shogun” (because without his approval it was close to impossible for any 
intraparty politician to be recognized, and his behind-the-scenes political influence lasted 
for decades. The list can go on with Ozawa being as “puppet master”, “deal maker” and 
“backroom fixer” (because he was often pulling the strings and manoeuvring politics 
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especially at turbulent times).114    
Nonetheless, the foreign coverage of Ozawa’s scandal was comparatively 
friendly, facilitating the excuse frame. Especially The Japan Times was opening certain 
space for the pro-Ozawa voices during his scandal.115 (The importance of the foreign 
media was also reflected in the fact that Ozawa was hiring a female translator that was on 
a daily basis briefing him on the news from the foreign press.) When Ozawa was losing 
support in Japan after the March 2009 scandal outburst, he agreed to give an interview to 
Time (March 13, 2009), and only a minimum space was given to discuss his corruption 
scandal. Other Asian mainstream media were also rather favorable when portraying 
Ozawa during his scandal.116 
                                                   
114 Besides, the media referred to Ozawa’s direct supporters from the DPJ as “Ozawa 
children” (as allusion to the “Koizumi children” of the LDP), while the unqualified-but-
attractive female candidates, who Ozawa installed in order to broaden the party’s appeal 
to voters, were dubbed as “Ozawa girls”. Apart from the fact that they were politically 
unqualified, their past was questioned by the tabloids. For instance, one of Ozawa girls, 
Tanaka Mieko originally worked as sex-industry reporter and appeared in an erotic horror, 
while another female member of the DPJ, Ota Kazumi used to be working as a hostess 
(e.g. Global Post, October 5, 2009). Nonetheless, these leaks themselves were not 
disturbing enough to bring about a scandal sub-drama.     
115 See the editorial “Indictment of Mr. Ozawa” on February 2, 2011, or the opinion 
article titled “Madness of the attacks on Ozawa” on October 28, 2010, or Roger Pulvers’ 
article from November 22, 2009, which justified some controversial statements of 
Ozawa). Needless to say, the sheer fact that a controversial politician is voluntarily giving 
interviews to the foreign press will render the whole article in a rather favourable light. 
The positive stance abroad could be also attributed to Ozawa’s book “Blueprint for a New 
Japan” (Nihon Kaizō Keikaku) from 1993, where Ozawa argued for a more open form of 
government and free trade, while his main model was the British parliamentary 
democracy (Ozawa 1993). 
116 In the editorials of leading Chinese papers, Ozawa was not rendered in a fully negative 
light despite his scandal. On the contrary, the Chinese coverage was relating him to his 
mentor Tanaka who always supported friendly ties with China. The Korean media are 
traditionally hostile to those Japanese politicians who are conflicting on sensitive 
territory/history issues. Nonetheless, partly owing to their will to make certain 
335 
Ozawa was not the first politician who noticed the diametrical difference 
between the paper media and the online media in Japan. While never ceasing to criticize 
the way how politics is being covered in Japan, Ozawa was among those who started 
using the new media in order to bypass his traditional rival, the mainstream media. Apart 
from his own carefully administered homepage, Ozawa became an early user of the 
potentially subversive, and largely unedited platform Nico Nico Douga (the popular 
Japanese video hosting website which offers real-time news and full press conferences). 
While creating a minor controversy, in November 2010 Ozawa used the site for 
elaborating on his funding scandal instead of explaining the allegation in the Diet. Earlier 
in October 2008, when still serving as president of the DPJ, Ozawa gave an on-line 
interview in order to improve his public image and to get his unedited message out to 
voters. By talking about his favorite food or his first love, Ozawa acceded to a tabloid 
agenda of “positive gossiping”: the revelation of one’s “transgressive intimate self 
(Marshall 2010) underpins the process of celebritization by revealing one’s private sphere 
in the form of somewhat spectacular voyeuristic intrusion. While bypassing the traditional 
(“representational”) media and using the new (“presentational”) media (Castells 2009), 
Ozawa pragmatically illuminated his personality which went beyond his onscreen 
persona, as he was attempting to heighten the affective connection to the audience of 
                                                   
amendments to colonial damages, both Ozawa and his protégé Hatoyama were rendered 
in a more positive light despite Ozawa’s pending scandal. 
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especially younger voters.117  
 
2.5.2. Ozawa versus the Public 
Public trust can be actively produced and manipulated, while the powerful individuals 
display emotion in order to signal that they can be trusted because they have empathy 
(Wuthnow 2004). Apart from suffering from a kind of aphasia, Ozawa was rather 
unskilled when garnering public trust (Hattori Takaaki, personal communication). 
Nonetheless, his media image, corresponding with a stubborn courage to stay in Japanese 
politics by all means in order to implement reforms from within, did gain a certain appeal. 
Some polls undertaken during various phases of Ozawa scandal indicated that not only 
the academicians and politicians were divided in opinion, but also a significant part of the 
Japanese public was in favor for the strong leader with nationalist/traditionalist leanings, 
no matter his scandal curriculum. For instance, in September 2009, just a few months 
after Ozawa’s aide was arrested, Ozawa still garnered more public support for the DPJ 
leadership than his rival Kan Naoto (Yahoo Nyūsu, September 14, 2009). This is however 
                                                   
117 Ozawa appeared on a minor live Internet broadcast in Ameba Studio in Tokyo’s 
Harajuku district. This cannot compare to the reach of the traditional media, but the fact 
that the show was hosted by a popular TV personality (Uehara Sakura), while the 
mainstream media actually reported on the broadcast, could have improved Ozawa’s 
image during his falling popularity. Needless to say, there is nothing original in this 
strategy: Ozawa only followed in the footsteps of previous Prime Ministers that improved 
their charisma by practicing Zen Buddhist meditation (Nakasone) or endorsing Elvis 
Presley and opera (Koizumi). Only shortly before his scandal, the Japanese public was 
“enlightened” by the fact that Ozawa likes fishing, his favorite meal is tofu, or that his 
first love went unrequited. 
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not surprising, given that the Japanese were rather sympathetic toward Richard Nixon 
even after the Watergate scandal broke, while they gave very high votes to Tanaka Kakuei 
in his district notwithstanding his involvement in Lockheed scandal. (Similarly, during 
the 1999 Clinton-Lewinsky affair, many Japanese actually came to admire Clinton more 
than before his scandal.) Besides, the struggle of Ozawa was occurring in a zeitgeist 
generated by the recession since the collapse of the bubble economy, being typical of 
voters’ cynicism and distrust toward hypocritical politicians (Yoshida 2002; Hayes 2005). 
Therefore, no matter how disturbing his scandals may have been, at such critical times a 
significant part of the Japanese public may have favored Ozawa simply for challenging 
the tax increase, calling for correcting the income gap, or calling for better management 
of the disaster zone after the March 2011 earthquake. 
The public support from Ozawa’s constituency in his home prefecture (Iwate), 
same as the backing of all his local supporters were taken for granted (unsurprisingly, the 
loudest ones who criticized the prosecutors’ way of handling the corruption case were the 
people of Iwate). Equally importantly, Ozawa gained some public support by attempting 
to bypass the big media (see below), by distributing leaflets in person or by campaigning 
in the countryside, where he was deliberately choosing rather rare, not easily accessible 
locations (Taniguchi Masaki, personal communication). While dining in cheap local inns 
together with the locals, he was not only winning their favor, but more importantly he 
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was generating favorable coverage in local newspapers. 
This however did not change the fact that the media’s guilt frame grew strong 
enough to have persuaded around more than sixty percent of the Japanese public to call 
for Ozawa’s resignation. Even after Ozawa was found not guilty, a poll conducted by 
Yomiuri Shinbun showed that 87 percent of respondents think that Ozawa has not 
sufficiently explained his scandal (Yomiuri Shinbun, April 24, 2012). It should be however 
also noted that the media polls taken by Yomiuri, Asahi and Mainichi were showing 
somewhat different results, not to mention the fact that the public opinion is conducted 
through media texts, and thus the notion of publicity – here represented by around 1,000 
randomly picked Japanese in a telephone survey – was “relative” at best. At any rate, 
another form of media power here lies in recursively influencing the public and its opinion 
by conducting polls immediately after a transgression leak, and publishing the results 
whereby eventually reinforcing the “spiral of silence” (term by Noelle-Neumann) in 
which the majority is pushed toward sharing similar opinions. 
 
2.5.3. The Performance of Ozawa 
Regarding his political style, Ozawa was always performing strategically as a political 
“trickster” who acts on two contradictory sets of notions. On the one hand, he was an 
embodiment of the established features of the more or less corrupted political life, which 
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might have gradually embarrassed many Japanese. On the other hand, however, he 
rendered himself as a reformist who tried to get rid of some features of the outdated 
political habitus Besides, Ozawa had a rich political history of creating and destroying 
the very framework he helped to create, and forming parties only to have them merge 
with other parties. Ozawa was openly opposed to bureaucratic nature of Japanese politics, 
and these “non-Japanese” attitudes rendered him too powerful (and dangerous) for the 
comfort of the bureaucratic and political circles. This all must have contributed to 
oppositional attempts on his character assassination via attack-politics and scandal. 
Regarding his scandal performance, Ozawa was on multiple occasions utilizing 
the strategic ritual of self-exclusion, followed by a temporary retreat to background and 
eventual comeback as a form of “purification” (misogi). In order to maintain a dynamic 
performance which could not be fixed and moralized upon, Ozawa initially utilized the 
strategy of offense and protection (seme no senryaku, mamori no senryaku), claiming that 
he doesn’t know/doesn’t remember (shirimasen deshita, kioku ni gozaimasen). However, 
he soon appealed to the people (kokumin) by contriction via the ritualized 
apologetic/cooperative strategy (shazai no senryaku, kyōryoku no senryaku) in a tearful 
apology for the troubles (meiwaku) caused to them. 
After announcing his plan to resign in order to prevent the DPJ from losing the 
upcoming general election, Ozawa skillfully utilized the ritual of (self)exclusion and 
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separation for the sake of maintaining stability and integrity of the “inside” (naibu) of the 
party. He ostentatiously took individual responsibility and exiled himself to the “outside” 
(gaibu) while only briefly retreating to political background. In the meantime, he 
vehemently insisted to have become a political scapegoat (same as did Tanaka during the 
Lockheed scandal), and a victim of character assassination based on political conspiracy. 
The real scapegoats were however his secretaries that were used as a protective shield 
after Ozawa’s funding management was accused of corruption. As is usually the case of 
political corruption scandals in general, Ozawa claimed that he had left the matter up to 
his secretary” (hisho ni makaseteiru). Indeed, Ozawa’s personal responsibility could have 
been doubted since all kinds of duties (especially those related to political funding 
management) are usually re-delegated to the management body (Rikuzankai), and to the 
politician’s aides (Ōkubo Takanori, Ishikawa Tomohiro and Ikeda Mitsumoto).118 
Finally, during the last stage of his scandal, Ozawa was fortunate to have the 
prosecutors themselves involved in scandal prior to concluding his trial. Ozawa made a 
good use the short-term tactics of ritual of self-exclusion especially when he resigned his 
position as party president, whereby preventing his political enemies and the media from 
further attacks while securing the election victory for his party despite his scandal. The 
                                                   
118  All three Ozawa’s former aides have been indicted on charges of falsifying the 
financial records of Rikuzankai in a trial that started in February 2011 (Ōkubo was 
arrested in March 2009 and Ishikawa and Ikeda followed in January 2010). In September 
2011, they all were given suspended prison term while infuriating the presiding judge by 
denying any responsibility.  
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major election victory of the DPJ that followed in August 2009, same as his acquittal 
2012, and the comeback which followed, must be ascribed to this strategic ritual of 
temporary self-exclusion, to the impotance of the media to unite in swaying the public, 
and to the flaws in prosecutorial conduct which accompanied his case. 
 
Figure 13. The Ozawa Ichirō scandal flow. 
Source: Author 
 
 
Toward the end of the scandal narrative, an interesting intermezzo occurred during the 
final stage of Ozawa’s trial. The media reported on March 12, 2012 that Ozawa’s portrait 
was displayed in the Diet. As a general rule, the long-time Japanese lawmakers can have 
their portraits displayed in the Diet after reaching the 25th year in service. Indeed, 
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powerful rulers in Japan and elsewhere always attempted to portray themselves as the 
bearers of special cultural symbols. This act of strengthening one’s political capital 
despite the scandal situation only confirmed that political scandal in Japan is rich in moral 
paradoxes: while being on trial for breaking the political funds law, Ozawa as an epitome 
of political corruption proudly observes how his own portrait is being displayed in a 
Lower House facility. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
In contemporary Japan, the goal of revealing political corruption is not any sort of 
combined moral crusade of fair-play politicians, socially-responsible media, and unbiased 
prosecutors. Furthermore, the primary aim of “attack politics”, which constitutes most of 
political scandals (and the scandal-mongering which eventually follows), is to raise 
doubts among potential candidate supporters, to mobilize opposition voters, and to sell 
papers. Moreover, in order to maintain the always-already corrupted system of money-
politics, the Japanese parties themselves seek replacement of the “villain” from their own 
group (resignation, stepping down, or retreating into background) in case his/her exposed 
“pollution” is too excessive, and thus diminishing the reputation related to chances in next 
elections. 
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Despite the media and the prosecutors’ attempt to insert the alleged corruption 
of Ozawa into the scandal framework of “searching for truth” while utilizing the 
bipolarities of legal-illegal, appropriate-inappropriate, or moral-immoral, the shadow 
shoguns’s narrative once again proved that there is no such thing as “truth” in the world 
of structural corruption (perhaps “utility” could better substitute the term). Ozawa’s 
performance between strategy and ritual should be labelled as “non-moral” since he 
himself only struggled not to be fixed within the moral binary framework of guilt (blame) 
versus excuse (praise). In such train of thought we may go as far as to assert that there is 
no such thing as a “real” individual scandal in politics. Much more scandalous is the 
unhealthy-but-functional relationship between politics and money in general, and the 
evil-but-necessary collusion of power circles. Furthermore, the damage control 
mechanisms, such as the aforementioned ritual of temporarily exclusion and reintegration, 
are not a form of transformative and meaningful moral reflection, but simply a means of 
preventing voters/supporters from distancing themselves from the party/faction in 
question. 
 Finally, the media were performing based either on their ideological allegiance, 
or on the logic of market as such. Moreover, they failed to put the transgression into a 
wider context, where the scandalicity arises from power struggles between interconnected 
actors of the scandal network (in this case the politicians, factions, oppositional parties, 
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prosecutors, and the public, which represents the marginal but an indispensable actor for 
the scandal to emerge). More importantly, the over-focusing on Ozawa scandals both in 
the media and in the Diet actually created a sort of political void while stalling much more 
socially relevant contemporary issues such as the measures to stabilize employment, the 
abduction question (rachi mondai), or the problem of relocating the U.S. Marine forces 
in Okinawa (Prusa 2012b). 
In the aftermath of his scandal, political commentators somewhat ironically noted 
that in order to increase the number of his political followers, Ozawa’s future will depend 
on his skills in campaign fundraising. In other words, money politics will keep on being 
an important modus operandi, no matter how many heavyweight politicians scandalized 
the postwar public because of this necessary evil. More importantly to understand the 
political ritual of exclusion, purification and reintegration, Ozawa made a comeback to 
the world of politics by establishing a new party, which was in 2016 renamed to Liberal 
Party (Jiyūtō) and is now supported by the charismatic former actor Yamamoto Tarō. 
Simultaneouslty, Ozawa keeps on educating young political leaders how to lead Japan in 
his Ozawa Juku (“The Ozawa College”). While still desiring for power in the discursive 
political vacuum “beyond good and evil” despite his funding scandal, and after publicly 
ridiculing the prosecutors and counter-attacking the mainstream media, in his struggle 
Ozawa was indeed “making his point”.   
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3. CORPORATE SCANDAL: THE CASE OF OLYMPUS  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
A number of high-profile corporate scandals were reported in Japan in 2011, and the 
accounting scandal of the Olympus Company was among them. Being the third largest 
publicly listed Japanese company, Olympus (established in 1919) was in 2011 an 
enterprise with around 40.000 employees and over 70 percent of the world’s medical 
endoscope market. It was a strong medical business, but lately it was performing rather 
poorly in camera business. During 2011, a suspicion surfaced that Olympus engaged in 
improper accounting practices for over 20 years. It allegedly circumvented relevant laws 
and continued to conceal its losses by transferring the financial instruments relating to its 
unrealised losses to several funds that were not part of the Olympus group. 
The scandal attracted global public attention especially after the CEO and 
president of Olympus at that time, Michael Woodford was expelled by the board of 
directors. After his removal, the scandal was fully exposed in The Financial Times, and 
Woodford brought charges against Olympus with the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO). By 
2012, the scandal had developed into one of the biggest and longest-lived loss-concealing 
financial scandals in the history of corporate Japan. In 2012, the scandal resulted in 
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resignations of the majority of board members, and the company settled its dispute with 
Woodford with a payment of more than 10 million pounds. In 2013, the former directors 
of Olympus and statutory auditor were sentenced to suspended prison terms. The main 
narrative of the Olympus scandal took around 12 weeks, and hundreds of billions of yen 
in shareholder value were wasted. In the aftermath of the scandal, Woodford published a 
best-selling book titled “Exposure: Inside the Olympus Scandal” (translated into Japanese 
under the title Kainin). A feature-length documentary in Japanese/French production, 
based on the book Samurai to Orokamono by Yamaguchi Yoshimasa from 2012, was 
titled “Samurai and Idiots: The Olympus Affair” (directed by Yamamoto Hyoe in 2014). 
The main aim of this case study is to delineate the scandal narrative while 
emphasizing the strategic and ritualized performance of its main actors: The Olympus 
representatives, the main whistleblower (Michael Woodford), and all the media outlets 
that participated in the scandal (both mainstream, tabloid, and foreign). I argue that it was 
precisely the reluctance of the mainstream media to publish the corruption on the one 
hand, and the vigilance of the foreign and tabloid media to amplify it on the other, that 
contributed to the outcome of the scandal. The exposure temporarily ridiculed the 
company in question, but it did not bring about any serious transformation of corporate 
corruption and corporate whistleblowing in Japan. While being directly related to this 
scandal, these two issues – namely the omnipresent corporate corruption in Japan, and 
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the practice of internal whistleblowing – will be closely scrutinized, since they represent 
the main pathologies on the backdrop of the Olympus scandal, and many others that 
followed.  
 
3.2. Who is Michael Woodford? 
 
Michael Woodford is a British businessman, born in Liverpool in 1960. In 2004, he 
became head of Olympus’s medical division, and in 2008 he was appointed head of 
Olympus Europe. In 2011, he became the president and the first non-Japanese to be 
appointed as the CEO of the Olympus Corporation in Japan, but was removed from his 
post after serving only few weeks. Soon he became the central figure, and the main 
whistleblower in exposing the Olympus scandal, which in the meantime developed into 
one of the biggest loss-concealing financial scandals in the history of corporate Japan. In 
June 2012 Woodford made an out-of-court settlement with Olympus over his dismissal. 
The western media outlets (The Sunday Times, The Independent, The Sun) recognized 
Woodford as “Businessperson of the Year” in 2011, and The Foreign Correspondents’ 
Club of Japan (FCCJ) declared him as “Friend of the Free Press” in 2015. While being 
praised for his brave attitude during the scandal, Woodford now consults on corporate 
governance and whistleblower laws while using part of the reimbursement money for 
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charities. Despite his „success“ in the Olympus case, Woodford remained very cynical 
and skeptical about any possibility of the Japanese corporate governance to reform itself, 
which rendered his exposure as a mere “Pyrrhic victory”. Furthermore, in an interview 
for The British Chamber of Commerce in Japan (January 2014), Woodford actually 
discouraged the Japanese junior company workers to blow the whistle on their superiors, 
given the nature of Japanese law and society. Also this points to the assumption that the 
Olympus case was anything but a precedent for transforming the whistleblowing practices 
and corporate governance in Japan.            
  
3.3. Olympus versus Woodford: The Scandal Narrative 
 
The scandal emerged shortly after the new president, Michael Woodford indicated in early 
October 2011 that Olympus had paid obscure companies that were used to hide old losses. 
Woodford appointed an outside auditor (PricewaterhouseCoopers) to confirm the 
allegation, but on October 14 he was dismissed as president, allegedly based on “obstacles” 
(shishō) and “divergences” (kairi) in management practices (The Olympus Corporation 
website, October 14, 2011). The previous president Kikukawa Tsuyoshi reassumed his 
title, only to be replaced by Takayama Shūichi who updated the apologetic message on 
the same website. While maintaining the official agenda, and shifting the blame away 
349 
from Olympus by all means, Takayama also insisted that the trouble was caused by 
various “speculations” (okusoku) in media reports. Olympus kept on denying any 
misconduct and blamed their “foreign boss” (gaijin shachō) for the immediate negative 
effect on the company’s stock price. Woodford was allegedly unsuited to running the 
company because he failed to master Japanese business culture while making the scandal 
public (The Financial Times, November 8, 2011). 
 As a matter of fact, it was not Woodford, but the Japanese journalist Yamaguchi 
Yoshimasa whose story was the first one to expose the scandal based on an internal gossip 
heard from another insider-whistleblower (Yamaguchi 2011; 2012). Yamaguchi’s article 
was released as a cover story in the Japanese monthly magazine Facta, revealing in detail 
that in 2011 Olympus was involved in an illegal practice of burying financial losses and 
running amok with senseless M&A (see Facta, August 2011). At that time, Facta was ran 
by Abe Shigeo (the former financial reporter for Nikkei) who also unearthed a major 
scoop in 1994 related to Yamauchi Securities, where dummy companies were set up to 
absorb the losses (McNeill 2014). Prior to releasing the scandal in June 2011, Abe had 
actually sent a letter to Olympus’s PR office requesting an interview with president 
Kikukawa, but he was refused, and his inquiry concerning the irregularities was ignored 
(Woodford 2012). Precisely this arrogance and noncooperativity from the side of 
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Olympus actually steered Abe and Yamaguchi toward their proactive approach in 
exposing the corruption. 
The original article, itself still rather harmless, centered on suspicions as to why 
Olympus would pay such high prices (close to 70 billion yen) for three small venture 
companies. While this was becoming a common knowledge (albeit only via internal 
gossip), the story prompted Woodford to inspect the case, only to find out that around 1 
billion dollars in acquisition-related payments were used secretly to cover losses on 
investments dating back to the 1990s. At this point of the scandal narrative, Woodford 
decided to step in as the main whistleblower, and Jonathan Sable from The Financial 
Times, who was secretly contacted by Woodford, finally exposed the story on November 
8, 2011. 
In the meantime, Woodford tried to support his case by using the Japanese video-
sharing website Nico Nico Douga as a “democratic” medium, through which he 
communicated directly with the Olympus employees with no media-gatekeeping 
restrictions. Equally importantly, one former board member of Olympus (Miyata Kōji) 
launched an online petition supporting Woodford’s case in order to sway the public 
opinion in Japan. The most important media exposure however, was Woodford’s 
appearance in the Japan National Press Club (Nihon Kisha Kurabu). Woodford behaved 
in a typically non-Japanese way, but he had his performance skillfully administered by 
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the charismatic veteran translator and trainee monk Waku Miller (at one point of the 
conference, Woodford half-jokingly called Waku the real “puppet master”). While 
effectively fanning the flames of scandal, Woodford-the-gaijin perplexed the reporters by 
describing the behavior of Olympus as “monkey theater” (sarushibai). He demanded to 
“live in a black and white world, not in a world of gray”, and even added that the 
Olympus’s board of directors should include at least one woman. 
After Kikukawa announced Woodford’s dismissal at official press conference on 
October 14, the Japanese dailies steered toward their “objective reporting” (kyakkan 
hōdō), which basically turned them into PR tools of Olympus. They ignored the revelatory 
news or interpreted the event non-critically, sharing their viewpoints with the non-
repentant Olympus. Even when some media voiced some doubts, the top Japanese 
executives at Olympus were refusing to answer direct questions while blaming them for 
misreporting the steps they were undertaking. Moreover, they were keeping distance from 
Woodford, whom they attempted to frame as the “villain”, threatening to take legal action 
against him. Despite minor improvements in approaching the issue of whistleblowing in 
Japan (see below), the media reported that Woodford was dismissed on the grounds on 
acting arbitrarily on his own authority (dokudan senkō).  
Immediately after Woodford blew the whistle via The Financial Times, he was 
approached by numerous journalists from global media organizations. Only then was the 
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scoop eventually picked up by the mainstream Japanese media. As addition, Woodford 
gave two first exclusive interviews to Channel 4 News and Bloomberg. The Japanese 
mainstream media, including the business daily Nihon Keizai Shinbun, refused to publish 
the scoop. In the early weeks after the initial exposure, much of the Japanese mainstream 
media stood firmly by Olympus, taking the “see-no-evil” approach and ignoring the 
original story in FACTA. Via the club reporters, the media bosses imposed silence on the 
story as part of the “blackboard rule” (kokuban kyōtei), while others treated the case as a 
mere “confusion” (konran) in management (e.g. Yomiuri Shinbun, October 27, 2011). 
Only after the business press in Europe and America published the scoop (most 
importantly The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and Bloomberg), some local 
Japanese newspapers started to catch up as well. The leading Japanese economy paper 
Nihon Keizai Shinbun, who was supposed to be the most “responsible” medium in cases 
like this, stayed mute for a week while accusing Woodford of being a troublemaker. 
Besides, the Olympus offices were unable to give any statement, or they were out of reach. 
The scandal gained a new momentum when The New York Times (October 23, 
2011) reported that the FBI was investigating the Olympus case. In the meantime, 
Woodford kept on actively approaching the media, eventually giving interviews to the 
Japanese commercial networks Fuji TV, Nippon TV, and even the public broadcaster 
NHK, which however censored the material by omitting all mentions about the Facta 
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magazine (Woodford 2012). In a rather unusual move, Prime Minister Noda expressed 
his disquiet about the situation around Olympus (The Financial Times, October 31, 2011), 
which gave the scandal an irreversible status of a national/economic crisis. 
On November 8, the Japanese media reported that Olympus finally admitted that 
the company’s accounting practice was inappropriate, albeit downplaying the illicit 
practice as a mere “postponement” (sakiokuri). The leadership shifted the blame on 
previous president (Kikukawa), one auditor (Yamada) and the executive vice-president 
(Mori). Within just few days, the share price of Olympus showed more than 80 percent 
drop from the day before Woodford’s dismissal one month earlier. In the meantime, 
Woodford gave up on a proxy fight to get him reinstated as the head of the company prior 
to the shareholders’ meeting. After months of time, the media scandal finally climaxed. 
Even the conservative Yomiuri Shinbun (December 8, 2011) now perceived any 
reformatory attempt by Olympus as simply avoiding responsibility (marunage). The 
majority of board members has resigned, Olympus settled its dispute with Woodford 
financially, and on February 2012 Kikukawa, Mori and Yamada were arrested for 
suspected violation of Japan’s Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (Kin’yū Shōhin 
Torihiki Hō). In 2013, the former directors of Olympus were sentenced, along with the 
statutory auditor, to suspended prison terms. The verdict was justified by the sheer fact 
that they only “inherited a negative legacy” from their predecessors (Asahi Shinbun, July 
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6, 2013). Years after the scandal, it remained unclear who was to be held responsible for 
the cover-up, while the former Olympus president Shimoyama Toshirō who at the 
beginning of 1990s instructed the board of directors to hide the losses, died in July 2013. 
In the same month, the Tokyo District Court sentenced one of the main handlers of the 
tobashi transaction and his two accomplices to four and three years in prison respectively. 
Eventually, Sony entered an alliance with Olympus (by investing into the company 
through a new joint venture) while Olympus started to advertise again in Japan. 
 
3.4. Scandal Pathologies Related to the Olympus Case 
 
3.4.1. The Issue of Corporate Corruption 
The economy in general, and corporate scandals in particular should be analyzed from 
within the culture-specific framework of institutions, traditions and moralities. 
Importantly for Japan, behaviors of blind obedience and deference are deeply ingrained 
within the traditional corporate culture. Apart from the safety/cover-up scandals, the most 
frequent root of corporate corruption in Japan lies in “creative accounting” (funshoku 
kessan), including the practice of tobashi (shifting the losses to different accounts), 
dubious merger and acquisitions (M&A), and generally making false statements in 
financial reports. These “trends” became most evident during the wave of Japanese 
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corporate scandals of the early 1990s when companies were hiding losses from the asset 
bubble in temporary off-balance-sheet-havens. Consequently, at the end of this “lost 
decade” the Japanese market grew discriminatory, nontransparent and corrupt (Yukawa 
1999). The roots of the Olympus scandal can be also directly traced to this historical 
period. 
On the one hand, Japan is still often regarded as world’s number one in business 
innovation (World Economic Forum 2015), while some aspects of Japanese corporate 
culture have become models for foreign companies. On the other hand, frequent 
corruption cases point at lower levels of corporate ethics. Needless to say, the behavior of 
corporations not only in Japan also depends on the emotional mind-set and manners of 
individual company managers. (For instance, only two weeks after the Olympus exposure, 
the ex-chairman of the Daio Paper Corporation, Ikawa Mototaka caused serious financial 
damage to seven affiliated companies from which Ikawa “borrowed” large sums of money 
in order to support his gambling habit.) 
The dynamics of the Japanese economy – same as the nature of Japanese power 
scandals – began to shift since early 1990s. Many elite agencies including the Ministry of 
Finance and the Bank of Japan experienced scandals involving bribery and cover-ups. In 
a first string of financial scandals that followed the bubble burst, it was revealed that each 
of the biggest Japanese security firms was in the past involved in insider trading (Yomiuri 
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Shinbun, July 1, 2012). One of them, the Daiwa Bank was accused by the US Federal 
Reserve of hiding more than one billion dollars of trading losses from federal authorities 
in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, another string of the so-called 
sōkaiya/banking scandals have loosened the bank ties with government in 1997 (see 
below). 
One important factor in understanding corporate scandals in Japan, including the 
Olympus scandal, is the traditional corporate governance, which is typical of opaque 
decision-making, hierarchy-driven culture, and internal managerial rigor. Some foreign 
elements were incorporated after the World War II, but the corporate governance still 
somewhat differs from global standards. For instance, the Japanese corporate culture 
usually does not require having outside directors on the board, while various committees 
and panels often exercise full authority without being held accountable, thus facilitating 
a “system of irresponsibility” (Maruyama 1969; Pye 1985) in Japanese corporate and 
political culture. Related to this, the outside directors at Olympus were often its business 
partners, or they hailed from the foundation to which Olympus had made donations. 
Olympus had an accounting auditor (KPMG Azsa) prior to the scandal, which actually 
did notice some accounting irregularities, but this auditor was not re-elected as Olympus’s 
accounting auditor in the shareholders’ meeting in 2009 (see Maeda and Aoyagi 2013). 
Furthermore, while having no general code of corporate governance, Japan 
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represents a rather unique system of cross-shareholding with a symbiotic relationship 
between companies, suppliers and the banks. This also impedes the institutional 
shareholders (kikan tōshika) from criticizing the company’s board of directors if 
accounting irregularities emerge. In such setting, institutional shareholders (mostly banks 
and insurance companies) control large proportions of the share registers, making up for 
a concentrated powerful group, which allows Japanese corporations to behave in a way 
they do. (In the case of Olympus, the responsibility and power rested mainly with the 
shareholders of the Sumitomo Bank.) Besides, the members of a company’s founding 
families usually monopolize the power in Japanese management (this can be partly 
attributed to the culture of absolute obedience to the family heads, due to which the 
executives in charge of accounting often “fail” to report the real data and other looming 
issues to the omnipotent board of executives). 
Finally, the situation becomes further complicated by established connections of 
the corporate bodies with Japanese crime syndicates. Such constituted corporate culture 
will not only make it difficult to avoid the in-group rules that hide or obscure various 
corruption practices, but it will also treat harshly any signs of whistleblowing.    
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3.4.2. The Issue of Whistleblowing 
Following the infamous Mitsubishi whistleblowing scandal in 2000, the Olympus scandal 
once again brought to the fore the issue of whistleblowing in 21st century corporate Japan. 
Simply put, whistleblowing is based on leaking to the public (via some media channel) a 
certain illegal, corruptive, or unethical activity that was/is occurring in a private or public 
organization. Generally, group membership affects ethical attitudes and behavior in a 
country where the relationship between collectivism and corruption is recognized. In 
Japan, the social group norms are often more effective than the overall legal framework, 
while corruption and bribery refers to acts of exchange that exist in a “gray zone”, i.e. 
outside the range of customarily defined rules. In other words, failure to abide by the law 
in Japan may be known to, but not condemned by, the group. In this light, avoiding a leak 
of scandalous information in order to maintain the group can be considered “public 
morality”, although it contradicts with the laws related to whistleblowing. 
Despite the often-proclaimed strong unity (ittaikan) within every organized 
social group in Japan, there always exists a majority of loyal “core members”, and a 
minority of less committed “peripheral members” (terms by Stockwin 2008). The leaders 
of the former may know about some ongoing corruption, but they do not question it, or 
they ignore it since they dwell under instructions of the top elites and family heads. The 
corporate social responsibility in Japan aims to ensure that corruption is prevented before 
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it happens. If corruption becomes dysfunctional, and the main culprit is indicated, he is 
dismissed quietly, while his crime is covered up (Kerbo and Inoue 1990; Inagami 2009). 
Prior to the scandalization process, the peripheral platform becomes further divided into 
what Sherman (1978) recognized as “evil fringe” and “zealot fringe”. These two fringes 
are both equally perilous for any corrupt system: the evil fringe is usually committing 
corruption beyond limits, while the incorrupt zealot fringe engages in gossiping about a 
certain wrongdoing.  
In the case of the Olympus scandal, the corruptive practices of hiding losses were 
circling around for a very long period of time in a form of internal gossip (Yamaguchi 
2012). Generally speaking, we recognize between three main types of gossip (both 
socially-integrative and disruptive) that can lead to social consequences of both individual 
and collective nature. The transactional argumentation lies in an assumption that gossip 
is conducted by individuals, seeking to forward their own interest (symbolic, material) by 
manipulating cultural codes and denigrating others. Once its articulation is made public, 
a scandal can be born out of a seemingly innocent rumor. Furthermore, the functionalist 
argumentation stresses that gossip wields a certain integrative potential: it helps to 
maintain group collectivity and solidify social ties between its practitioners (e.g. 
Gluckman 1963). Most importantly for this case study, the democratic argumentation 
implies that in civic sphere (same as in corporations), it is precisely the rumor-mongering 
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spectator who is able to maintain a network of information (e.g. in a form of dissent), 
while it is usually not easy for the authorities to detect the source of civil gossip and 
control its transmission. This was also the case of Olympus: many company members 
were aware of the gossip regarding the illicit accounting. They communicated it only on 
internal level, but in this case, the brave “internal whistleblowers” transmitted the 
negative gossip to the unbiased media. These whistleblowers are usually company zealots 
who inform the management about some deviation for the sake of improvement, but they 
can also belong to a group which is cooperating with, but located outside of the corrupted 
center.119 
Perhaps contrarily to expectations, the internal whistleblowing (naibu 
kokuhatsu) is not rare in Japan, and it seemed to be on a rise since the new millennium. 
The first high-profile instance of a corporate whistleblowing occurred in 2000 when an 
employee at Mitsubishi Motors exposed the company’s cover-up of accident-causing 
defects. The Mitsubishi scandal, followed by dozens of other whistleblowing incidents 
                                                   
119 For instance, in the 2011 gambling scandal of the Daio Paper Corporation, the main 
whistleblower belonged to a group subsidiary of Daio (Yomiuri Shinbun, November 24, 
2011). Similarly, in the case of the 2002 cover-up scandal related to falsifying reports on 
nuclear safety by industry officials and public services, the person who blew the whistle 
was a foreign subcontractor (Kingston 2004). It is however not only the victims of 
corruption since the elites themselves can become zealot-whistleblowers (this role was 
assumed by Michael Woodford in Olympus scandal, see below). This phenomenon is 
however not limited to Japan: among the top global zealot-whistleblowers today consider 
Chelsea Manning who leaked classified military information to Wikileaks in 2010, 
Edward Snowden, who in 2013 publicly disclosed classified files of the United States 
National Security Agency, or the anonymous hacker who leaked the so-called Panama 
Papers in 2016. 
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(most importantly the mislabelling scandal of the Snow Brand Food Co. from 2002) 
brought the issue of whistleblowing in Japan to the fore. The Japanese legislature in 2004 
did attempt to legitimize corporate whistleblowing via the Whistleblower Protection Act 
(Kōeki Tsūhōsha Hogo Hō), but the preconditions for enjoying statutory protection from 
retribution became paradoxically even tougher (see Wolff 2004). 
Some believe that nowadays many corrupt in-group practices are in Japan often 
exposed by the employees themselves (Inagami 2009; Matsubara 2014). This can be 
partly explained by a snowball effect, in which each revelation of wrongdoing motivates 
more whistleblowers to come forward. Besides, these occurrences cast further doubt on 
the stereotype that Japanese employees exhibit a single-minded devotion to a group they 
belong to. As Martin Fackler observed, Japan now routinely sees several scandals a year 
that are initiated by employee whistleblowers (The New York Times, June 7, 2008). On 
the other hand, however, other observers believe that despite the existence of the 
whistleblower laws, the Japanese will always strongly hesitate to accuse their employers. 
Already prior to the Olympus scandal, the Japanese professors and lawyers grew skeptical 
about Japanese business ethics which values business at the expense of the morals (e.g. 
Daily Yomiuri, May 24, 2004). Besides, some whistleblowers expose their company’s 
wrongdoing simply because they are afraid of being arrested (this was the case of 
Akahane Kiroku, who in 2008 blew the whistle in a false labeling scandal of the meat 
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processor Meat Hope). Most recently, writing a story that eventually exposes political 
corruption can now be regarded in Japan as misusing private information, carrying with 
it the danger of fines and imprisonment. This new rule was approved in December 2013 
via the Special Secrecy Law (Tokutei Himitsu Hogo Hō), based on which can 
whistleblowers be punished to 10 years in prison and up to 10 milion yen fine. 
In modern Japanese history, the act of whistleblowing was almost absent, while 
eventual whistleblowers were ostracized. Despite aforementioned exceptions, many 
Japanese scandals indicate that this tendency persists until today. The Whistleblower 
Protection Act aimed to encourage corporate whistleblowing in Japan, but the way it was 
formulated will hardly encourage whistleblowers, who are protected far less than in the 
West (Wolff 2004; West 2006). Consequently, the Japanese whistleblowers will hardly 
be protected for revealing corruption of public office. For instance, earlier in 2008, 
another exposed whistleblower from the Olympus Company, Hamada Masahara actually 
won his case in the Supreme Court, but the workplace abuse continued despite the 
successfully concluded lawsuit. In April 2016, Hamada was reimbursed and reinstated, 
but he lost any chance of promotion or pay rise. (This case reminds us of Akahane Kiroku 
– a sales executive at the Meat Hope Company, who revealed his company’s misconduct, 
but became treated like an outcast in his community while suffering depression.) Despite 
his “Pyrrhic victory”, Woodford’s case proved that there will be little or no tolerance for 
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whistleblowing in Japan, while the new Special Secrecy Law only makes whistleblowers 
and journalists even more uncomfortable. 
 
3.5. Interpreting the Performance of Scandal Actors 
 
Scandals are “fairy tales for adults” (Burkhardt 2011) with typical actor-categories: the 
protagonists (“heroes”) who fight for the “good cause”, antagonists (“villains”) who 
violate rules and represent danger for social system, and finally the victims (usually 
citizens to be saved from the impact of corruption). Such narrative structuring is however 
never fixed, and it largely depends on the media framing (i.e. facilitating guilt frame 
versus excuse frame, or setting no frame at all by overlooking scandal), and on the public 
performances of the main scandal actors. Also, the larger sociopolitical context can matter. 
For instance, the Olympus scandal occurred one year after the disastrous Tōhoku 
earthquake, followed by the nuclear crisis at Fukushima. Apart from the catastrophic 
atmosphere of the post-3/11 zeitgeist, the Japanese networks, along with the failing 
TEPCO Company, must have contributed to public skepticism when it became clear that 
they both were reluctant/too late to air specific info regarding the radiation leak. Besides, 
the year 2011 witnessed many other corporate scandals that must have only deepened 
public skepticism toward latest developments in Japanese corporate culture. 
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The polarized framing in the case of Olympus/Woodford was clear: Woodford-
the-villain (a foreign trouble-maker, leaking harmful information outside the Olympus 
family) versus Woodford-the-hero (an enthusiastic revelatory, attempting to “save” a 
dysfunctional corporation). At the outset of the scandal, Woodford was framed as a 
“villain” who through his non-Japanese, “arbitrary” moves disturbed the “harmony” of 
Japanese corporate governance while putting Olympus, its employees, and shareholders 
at risk. Once the scandal became global, owing to a handful of Japanese investigative 
journalists and the foreign media, Woodford succeeded to re-interpret his character in the 
eyes of the public as that of a “victim” of Japanese corporate system. Related to this, 
Woodford compared himself to Horie Takafumi (aka Horiemon), who had his Livedoor 
scandal in 2006.120 
 Although being foreign to Japan, Woodford was dismissed by his own company 
in a country, where forced removal of a company president is rare. Besides, Woodford’s 
whistleblower-status allegedly put him in personal danger due to alleged involvement of 
the organized crime. On the one hand, the perceived threat of yakuza can be partly 
                                                   
120 Horiemon is a former head of once hugely successful Japanese internet company 
Livedoor. The un-Japanese and easy-going entrepreneur was popular especially among 
the Japanese youth when criticizing the conservative business circles, but he was 
effectively demonized by the mainstream media. At the beginning of 2006, prosecutors 
raided Horiemon’s company and arrested him on suspicion of market manipulation, and 
this lead to a disastrous loss of his company’s market value. In a nationally publicized 
accounting scandal, Horiemon was accused of securities fraud, sentenced to two and half 
years in prison, and released on parole in March 2013. After his release, Horiemon was 
successfully “reintegrated” and returned to public life while publishing books and 
appearing in Japanese media. 
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contributed to Woodford’s growing paranoia during the scandal. On the other hand, 
however, there did exist a certain relationship between Olympus and the organized crime: 
according to available information, the Japanese organized crime had its own share on 
the Olympus scandal since over one half of the amount from the pool of questionable 
payments was allegedly channeled to yakuza syndicates (Facta, August 2011; Greenfeld 
2012; Maeda and Aoyagi 2013). 
Due to the course of his public performances, Woodford became gradually 
perceived as a “hero”, albeit motivated by seeking vengeance for his demotion. On the 
contrary, the top executives of Olympus (especially Kikukawa and Mori) were gradually 
steered toward the actor-category of “villain”, albeit motivated by sheer survival of their 
own characters. Their vilification solidified once the independent committee had released 
their damning conclusion related to the structural corruption at Olympus. The non-
mainstream media pressure culminated as well: in the weeklies, the Olympus leadership 
was degraded to “emperor without clothes” (hadaka no ōsama) (Gendai Business, 
October 10, 2011), while Woodford became labeled as a samurai among “idiots” 
(orokamono) (Yamaguchi 2014). 
Generally speaking, media scandal is always a form of a more or less radical 
conflict where two main ideals (or their interpretations) are negatively polarized through 
public accusation and defense. First, the Olympus scandal was a conflict of two differing 
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interpretations of “loyalty”. The Olympus leadership was primarily loyal to its traditional 
corporate principles of their predecessors – including the “necessary evil” of corporate 
cheating via creative accounting. On the contrary, Woodford (along with the primary 
whistleblower, who forwarded the gossip to Facta magazine) was loyal to a company, 
which was put into imminent danger through these illegitimate practices. Contrarily to 
expectations however, his method for dealing with the issue was a transparent “forensic 
accounting” (as opposed to “creative accounting” of Olympus). 
Secondly, since Olympus was in 2011 an international company with both 
Japanese and foreign shareholders, the conflict occurred beyond the boundaries of 
separate cultures, triggering “global scandal”. In other words, the conflict was 
simultaneously occurring on two levels: Olympus versus Woodford, and Japan versus 
“the world”, while at stake was not only defamation (meiyo kison) of the Olympus 
Company, but also denigration of the Japanese corporate system as such. Seen from a 
global corporate perspective, the scandal lay in a fact that the Japanese leadership refused 
a talented leader mainly because of his “non-Japanese” corporate values (transparency, 
honesty, superb qualification). On the contrary, seen from the perspective of traditional 
Japanese corporate culture, Woodford violated the unwritten rules of conduct by leaking 
sensitive information to the public, whereby seriously damaging the reputation of a 
leading Japanese company. In other words, the fundamental problem did not lie in an 
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accounting misdeed, but in two differing mind-sets. This provoked a scandal “crisis” that 
was initiated by a rather unfortunate reaction of the Olympus leadership (ritually 
dismissing the disloyal president), to which Woodford reacted in a non-Japanese way 
(becoming an aggressive whistleblower). 
Thirdly, it is a fact that around 70 percent of the turnover on the Tokyo stock 
exchange market is realized by foreign investors. Consequently, this time the Japanese 
corruption involved not only the global media, but also the world of investors, and the 
overseas law-enforcement agencies (FBI, SFO). Along with the unsurprisingly delayed 
entry of the Japanese media, this was the decisive force, which impeded Olympus from 
treating problems as usual, i.e. through an orchestrated ritual of apology, a promise to 
investigate the case, and a routine move to establish ad hoc reform committee. 
Finally, the Olympus scandal was a typical example of the “bottom-up” 
mediation, this time significantly supported by the foreign (media) pressure, or (media) 
gaiatsu. It was however the Japanese non-mainstream economic monthly that made the 
initial exposure possible, based on which the global exposure could only have followed. 
The editorial policy of the Japanese mainstream media at first did not acknowledge the 
scandal, because the scoop was too sensitive in terms of offending advertisers and 
damaging the status quo within the business circles (zaikai). Even the Japanese magazines 
initially rejected the scoop because it was not based on official prosecution and thus the 
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risk of being exposed to a lawsuit was too big (e.g. Yamaguchi 2011). Later on, especially 
the Asahi Shinbun and Mainichi Shinbun grew critical toward the case, however it was 
the Japanese dailies that in the first instance took the see-no-evil approach and refused to 
perform the ideal role of a media-watchdog. In the meantime, the independent 
investigative journalists disseminated the scandal (most importantly The New York Times 
correspondent in Tokyo, Tabuchi Hiroko, the investigative journalist Yamaguchi 
Yoshimasa, and the Facta editor Abe Shigeo). Only then could the global media networks 
make the scandal a top story in the Western media (the British television news company 
ITN even sent a team of reporters to Tokyo to cover the story). Without such intervention 
(alongside the notoriety Woodford received as a whistleblower-turned gaijin shachō), the 
misconduct would have gone unnoticed, and thus unpunished. 
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Figure 14. The Olympus/Woodford scandal flow. 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
 
3.6. Olympus and Beyond   
 
Not long after the Olympus scandal, many cases of corporate corruption were exposed 
one after another: The Takata airbag/safety scandal (2013), the Toshiba accounting 
scandal (2015), the Asahi Kasei data fabrication scandal (2015), and most recently the 
Mitsubishi data manipulation scandal (2016). Without learning a lesson, much of the 
trouble that these Japanese corporations got into in the course of their scandal resulted 
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from the same pattern: denial and exposure. The corporate governance through outside 
directors had been reduced to an ineffective formality, while the denial stems from the 
superiors’ pressure to achieve goals in the context of a corporate culture where going 
against the wishes of one’s boss is unacceptable. The exposure is initiated only by the 
“heroic” internal whistleblowers who forwarded a sensitive information despite the 
ostracism and stigmatization which awaited them.  
The companies in question have been tainted by profit-padding scandals, in 
which high-handed bosses for years systematically pushed their subordinates to cover-up 
weak financial figures. This sort of amoral self-preservation does not make for a scandal. 
It is more importantly the media’s stance (most importantly the Nikkei in case of corporate 
scandals) and the negligence to uncover corruption, which only confirms the firm modus 
operandi of the Japanese mainstream media that have their own amoral reasons not to 
disrupt the fabric of things beyond the tatemae reality. Thus, similarly as in the case of 
Olympus, the Toshiba scandal was initiated from the outside (the Bloomberg News, 
quoting unnamed sources, reported that the US Justice Department and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission are examining if any fraud occurred over a loss booked by 
Toshiba’s US nuclear business unit Westinghouse), while the Mitsubishi scandal was 
triggered by the internal “zealots” located outside the corrupted center (i.e. the 
whistleblowing engineers of the Nissan Company that were forming a minicar joint 
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venture with Mitsubishi since 2010). Notwithstanding the new disturbance around the 
structural corruption of Mitsubishi, the company in question has already submitted 
documents to the government with the corrected mileage, and when the procedure is 
completed, it can again start selling the vehicles. The message was clear: Mitsubishi 
(same as Olympus or Toshiba) displayed their sorriness for the exposure (rather than for 
the corruptive practice per se) which only caused nuisance (meiwaku). The case of 
Olympus was different mainly because the key person, Michael Woodford was a foreigner 
who refused to accept the ritual of exclusion after humiliating the family/company he 
belonged to. Instead, he himself triggered the scandal by blowing the whistle, and despite 
his non-Japanese performance during the scandal, he succeeded to turn the public opinion 
against Olympus.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
In concluding his book in 2012, Woodford was correct when lamenting that he was 
“winning the argument, but losing the war”. In a war, where “Japan’s enemy is Japan” 
(Yukawa 1999), the consequences of the Olympus scandal could have been anything but 
transformative, both in terms of corporate governance, and in terms of the mainstream 
media’s social responsibility. Furthermore, some observers falsely claimed that Olympus 
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was more of an isolated case than an example of business culture. Having similar features 
of corporate corruption, Olympus was preceded in 2006 by the Livedoor scandal (see 
above), and yet another bigger corporate scandal (the Toshiba accounting scandal) 
emerged in 2015. While differing in extent (e.g. the accounting irregularities of Toshiba 
were 30 times larger than Liverdoor’s fraud), these scandals involve the same type of 
corporate corruption: a long-term attempt to exaggerate earnings (Toshiba, Livedoor) or 
hide losses (Olympus) by insiders directed from the very top. Later, the Japanese 
corporate government was scrutinized as a “culture of deceit” (kyogi taishitsu) even by 
the mainstream Japanese media (e.g. Mainichi Shinbun, July 22, 2015). Rather 
unsurprisingly, these media unanimously agreed to make it a legal requirement to hire 
outside directors once the scandal was concluded. This idea was however refuted by the 
Japanese business lobbies that also opposed the Whistleblower Act (Asahi Shinbun, July 
6, 2013).  
Woodford was perceived as setting a new precedent for whistleblowing in Japan, 
adding to whistleblower-related laws that were passed in previous decade, but also here 
no substantial transformation occurred. In fact, earlier in 2008, another whistleblower 
from the Olympus Company, Hamada Masaharu, won his case in the Supreme Court, but 
his workplace abuse continued despite the successfully concluded lawsuit (e.g. Asahi 
Shinbun, July 11, 2012). In April 2016, Hamada was reinstated and reimbursed with 11 
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million yen, but he will have no chance of promotion or pay rise. Besides, the scandal 
further deepened cynicism in the way Japan operates the capital market, and it is safe to 
assume that no gaijin boss will be allowed to run large Japanese organization in near 
future.  
Regarding the media-watchdog role, the Japanese mediascape did not undergo 
any serious liberal transformation either. On the contrary, in 2015 the conservative Nikkei 
purchased the independent Financial Times. Apart from the well-known fact that changes 
in ownership and corporate takeovers often bring different values, objectives, and 
ultimately the content of the news (Shoemaker and Reese 1996), this takeover can be 
related to the Olympus scandal, prior to which Nikkei functioned as “public information 
section” of the Olympus Corporation (Sankei Shinbun, July 24, 2015), while The 
Financial Times was the first foreign medium to expose the scandal. Despite the gravity 
of Olympus scandal, a revolution in corporate whistleblowing did not occur, while the 
chain of corruption scandals immediately after the Olympus case only confirmed that 
corporate fraud is here to stay.   
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VI. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study is among the first to examine systematically the phenomenon of media scandal 
in postwar Japan. While conducting an interdisciplinary research informed by Jeffrey 
Alexander’s neofunctionalism, the main aim of this thesis was to induce general 
principles about Japanese scandal as a social drama, and to address the role of scandal as 
cultural performance and journalistic ritual. Apart from the basic understanding of scandal 
as framed narrative and spectacular media event, I highlighted the role of scandal as a 
performance semantically located between (1) motivated expressive behavior (stemming 
from cultural rituals and fixed patterns), and (2) conscious strategic action (determined 
by journalistic routines and media ideologies).  
After introducing my methodology and reviewing the literature on scandal in 
section I, I explicated on (private) transgression as an important social phenomenon that 
precedes every (public) scandal. In section II, I conducted a diachronic analysis that 
showed how scandal in both Japan and the West simultaneously developed from its 
original (religious) meaning to its (post)modern mediated form. Here, I showed how 
crucial was the development of technology, journalism, and politics in giving the shape 
to contemporary Japanese scandal. Furthermore, I argued that the basic understanding of 
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scandal as a media text must be grounded on the fact that media scandals are in principle 
narrativized, framed, and spectacularized morality tales, while their quality is often 
“pseudo-eventual”. In section III, I extended the framework for understanding Japanese 
scandals as staged ceremonial performances that enable transgressors’ pardon/comeback 
via culturally-specific rituals of confession, exclusion, and reintegration. In this relation, 
I also indicated that the scandal-ritual wields certain hegemonic features: on the one hand, 
derogatory gossip and public scandal of the elites serves to indicate (indirectly, and in a 
highly moralizing manner) how commoners should not live their life. On the other hand, 
scandal is a hegemonic tool used in conspiratorial attack-politics, while the damaged party 
produces individual scapegoats that take the blame and are sacrificed in order to “purify” 
those power segments whose corruptive practices became exposed. In section IV, I made 
a survey into the postwar history of Japanese corruption and found out that the media 
were overmagnifying corruption ever since the Lockheed scandal in the 1970s, and that 
in postwar Japan there occurred no significant changes in the wake of big scandals despite 
the media frenzy and politicians’ calls for reform. In other words, Japanese scandals have 
been largely nontransformative – both in terms of dealing with elite deviances, and in 
terms of making the collusion of power structures more transparent. This renders scandal 
as a ritualized conflict with little reformatory potential, while its commodification helps 
to sell papers and increase TV ratings. Finally, in section V, I conducted case studies of 
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three large-scale Japanese scandals within their respective social contexts (entertainment, 
politics, and economy). While critically evaluating the main narrative of these scandals, 
I conducted a neofunctionalist analysis which focuses on scandal as social performance 
between ritual and strategy. In other words, I observed how each scandal in question had 
been (1) mediated as narrativized text, (2) performed as sociocultural ritual, and (3) 
generated by various pathologies (political, economic, media-related) on the backdrop of 
Japanese postwar history.       
 
(1) Japanese scandal as structured text and morality tale 
Every media scandal is an open text with twists and turns, second-order transgressions 
and peripheral sub-dramas. It finds its expression only through a narrative order, and must 
be infused with the overarching conflict of good against evil. The media readily 
disseminate those codes of morality where the difference of good and evil is indicated, 
and where purifying and polluting motives can be contrasted to create narratological 
tension. 
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a) Polarized Structuring  
In Japan and elsewhere, the negative media framing is essentially based on the polarized 
structuring of the sacred (“pure”) versus the profane (“impure”). The latter part of this 
binary is associated with Japanese elites being deceitful, calculated, and egoistic, and it 
can further activate the imagery of the weak (i.e. easily corrupted), tainted (by 
transgression) and deviating (from the norms of decency). Once these qualities are 
indicated in the text frame, it can pollute the collectivity in question: a faction, political 
party, an office (jimusho), but also the public, and the nation as a whole in case of global 
scandal. 
The threat to moral purity of a “good society” induces the need to cleanse the 
pollution, partly because immorality is believed to be a contagion that can spread. This 
process is usually realized by scapegoating and ostracizing a designated individual via 
“purification ritual” (see below). The narrative purpose of scandal-as-text lies in telling a 
story about how one should not live one’s life. The teleological function of such text lies 
in narrating for sanctioning, but it can fail if the plot is not dynamic, spectacular, and 
persuasive enough to catch the attention of wide audiences. The binary “true-false” is 
only of secondary importance in scandal, because the elites’ confessional performance 
becomes effective and “truthful” if, and only if the audiences are persuaded. 
Seen from the neofunctionalist perspective, the overarching binary, into which all 
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three analyzed scandals were inserted via media framing, was that of sacred-profane. In 
the Japanese press, this becomes indicated by expressions such as social-antisocial 
(shakaiteki-hanshakaiteki). (Such polarization is however misleading, because the term 
“antisocial” generally points to a deliberate behavior against society or community as 
such, not to mention that the same adjective is in Japan used for describing organized 
crime.) In the case of the Sakai Noriko scandal, the most relevant binary was that of pure-
impure, since Sakai, who became exposed as a drug user absconding from the law, 
established her “reel self” in the past based on various innocent/motherly roles. In her 
scandal case, the media commentators subsumed the Japanese public into the overarching 
pronoun of “we” (wareware, watashitachi) in order to clearly disassociate the nation from 
the celebrity who once served as the “sacred signified”. In the case of Ozawa Ichirō, his 
political funding scandal was mainly treated within the moral framework of legal-illegal 
(or lawful-unlawful). His actions were however not necessarily rendered as illegal 
because, as is often the case in political scandal, Ozawa effectively shifted the 
responsibility for his scandal to his secretaries, while the prosecution was eventually 
dropped based on lack of evidence. Ozawa’s frequent gaffes and slips of tongue fell into 
the in-between category of “unsociable” and did not cause any serious harm to his 
reputation since the heavyweight Japanese politicians are “expected” to sound 
controversial. Furthermore, after new exposures related to the prosecutorial conduct were 
379 
published, it was the prosecutors themselves that ended up being judged from within the 
binary of legal-illegal whereby helping Ozawa to complicate the narrative and confuse 
the public’s indignation. In the case of the Olympus scandal, Michael Woodford was 
initially judged based on the binary loyal-disloyal (to his company), but throughout the 
scandal narrative the binary “appropriate-inappropriate” (to fire Woodford) was applied 
to the Olympus company itself, vilifying its leadership and moving it to the latter part of 
the binary (inappropriate/illegal) on the pages of the mainstream press. 
 
b) Expectancy Violation 
The polarized structuring of a scandal narrative, and the media’s guilt frame become more 
fixed if the so-called expectancy violation occurs (i.e. if an elite actor violates our 
stereotypical expectancy tied to him/her, we tend to evaluate him/her far more harshly 
than others who would do the same thing). Sakai was the biggest victim of this violation, 
mostly owing to her previous innocent/mother roles, and her PR activities connected to 
introducing the lay judge system in Japan. That is why the Japanese media framed her far 
more extremely than other people that might have perpetrated the same transgression. On 
the contrary, Ozawa Ichirō did not bring about any expectancy violation once his scandal 
was exposed. While echoing Machiavellian philosophy, the Japanese common knowledge 
contains a presupposition that politicians are to be corrupt in order to keep their power, 
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which in turn brings profit to their constituencies. The performance of Woodford versus 
Olympus also did not bring about any serious expectancy violation – mainly because 
Woodford was a foreigner who refused to play according to the rules of traditional 
corporate governance in Japan (including the norms of silence that impede the company 
members from whistleblowing). 
 
c) Scandal as Open Text 
All three case studies have shown that media scandal is a journalistically constructed 
narrative whose primary text is always an open story. Furthermore, it is a morality tale 
where the media symbolically attribute the roles of villains and heroes, but can shift the 
guilt/excuse frame depending on the scandal development. Besides, all three scandals 
generated various secondary texts, commodifying the transgression via books, films, 
interviews, and other post-scandal texts. 
 It was the second-order transgression that became decisive in the development of 
all three scandals. Following the twist in narrative development, Sakai Noriko was 
initially framed as a victim, but after her “unprecedented” escape from Tokyo in order to 
avoid the drug test she was quickly reframed as the main villain. It was precisely the 
“escape plot” (tōbōgeki) that opened space for highly spectacular reporting. The media 
were on a daily basis compiling charts and maps of Sakai’s flight from Tokyo, they 
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practiced the costly “helicopter journalism”, and finally went berserk during Sakai’s 
tearful press conference. This only added to perceiving Sakai’s scandal as a 
journalistically constructed text, and a pseudo-event that did not unleash any 
transformative force but invited the attention of more than 40 per cent of all viewing 
audiences in Japan. In the scandal of Ozawa, the spectacular quality of the media text was 
rather lacking (this is usually the case of political scandals that were not based on sex or 
drugs). Ozawa was skillfully utilizing his press conferences, switching between denying 
and admitting guilt while appealing for the Japanese public (kokumin) to soothe their 
moral indignation. More importantly, his scandal narrative produced a significant twist – 
the exposure of illicit prosecutorial conduct – which added spice to a relatively dull and 
lengthy scandal narrative. This second-order transgression helped him to reach the 
acquittal and reintegrate into to the world of politics. The scandal case of 
Olympus/Woodford was more complicated. The narrative started without the presence of 
the media: Woodford as the new CEO who discovered the fraud was humiliated by the 
leadership by being ritually removed from his position. The second order transgression 
lay in exposing the mistreatment of a whistleblower-turned CEO. Once revealed by the 
foreign media, this increased the intensity and spectacularity of the media coverage in 
Japan (later producing books and a film), and it changed irreversibly the course of the 
scandal. Olympus had to apologize while Woodford became a celebrated whistleblower 
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albeit only outside Japan.   
 
(2) Japanese scandal as social performance and secular ritual 
Throughout this thesis, I argued that in Japanese scandals, ritual permeates strategy and 
vice versa. While being in accord with this argumentation, all three analyzed scandals 
contained elements of a secular ritual that gets reflected in the ritualized performance of 
the culprits, same as in Japanese journalists’ rituals of objectivity. As for the former, the 
dramaturgical aspect of a scandal performance lay either in a staged conduct which tries 
to conceal some inappropriateness (i.e. denying responsibility), or in apologetic 
confession which speeds up the transgressor’s rehabilitation (i.e. accepting responsibility). 
Either way, the Japanese scandal actors usually follow ritualized patterns (kata) of speech 
and behavior in order to save their face (see section III, chapter 2). As for the latter, 
magnifying or soft-pedalling scandals depends largely on the media’s professional biases, 
ideological leanings, and commercial gains (see section IV, chapter 6). 
In contemporary scandal, the ritualization (i.e. production of ritualized acts) is a 
strategic social activity partly based on cultural patterns, but it does not resolve social 
contradictions. Rather, it only temporary illuminates (and not eliminates) a certain 
conflict or opposition. To follow Maruyama (1969), we can state that ritualization of 
scandal became a part of the “interminable struggle” on the backdrop of tenseness and 
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uncertainty of postwar Japan. While resembling a sort of perpetuum mobile, new scandals 
are just updated cases of an old, well-known object and the usual subject. Instead of being 
an effective long-term prevention of the return of a crisis, scandals are rather just 
variations on one mythical theme: the perpetual, cyclical state of disintegration and 
renewal. 
 
a) Ritualized Performance of Scandal Actors 
For the most time during her scandal, Sakai’s performance was carefully managed and 
her voice “muted“ (she was only allowed to utter prescripted apologetic phrases during 
her press conference, and upon her release from detention). Her predominantly passive 
stance did not change even in her own book, published right after the scandal, where she 
further supported the hegemonic power of scandal by accepting her guilt, apologizing for 
the nuisance (meiwaku), and praising the work of the agents of formal social control. Her 
case is an example of a scandal where one’s attempt to cover up his/her transgression 
becomes more important for the media than the original offence. It was her deliberate 
flight from Tokyo in order to avoid the drug test that irreversibly hyped up the scandal 
and flamed an unprecedented media frenzy. Initially, Sakai was noncooperative (and thus 
demonized by the media) after disappearing from Tokyo. Nonetheless, once being 
arrested, she utilized the apologetic strategy (shazai no senryaku), relying solely on 
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prescripted expressions of contrition. Especially the tabloids criticized her performance 
for being artificial, but owing to her well-managed public ritual of atonement, Sakai 
succeeded toward the next step of rehabilitation (divorce, hospitalization, anti-drug 
campaigning) and eventual reintegration (see below). On the contrary, Ozawa was a 
proactive scandal actor who co-defined the tempo of his narrative while attacking other 
scandal actors (most importantly the mainstream media and the prosecutors). Contrarily 
to Sakai, Ozawa was counter-hegemonic in essence, refusing to fully accept the guilt and 
personally take the blame. Furthermore, he skilfully confused the rituals of offence and 
apology in order to sway the public opinion. During his two-years long scandal 
performance, Ozawa was switching between offensive strategy (seme no senryaku) by 
attacking the media and the prosecutors, and protective strategy (mamori no senryaku) by 
making prototypical claims that he was not aware of the ongoing corruption. Furthermore, 
Ozawa repeatedly used the ritual of exclusion and reintegration, which was not any sort 
of a meaningful moral reflection, but simply a means of preventing voters and supporters 
from distancing themselves from the political platform he represented. In the case of 
Olympus versus Woodford, the scandal took shape of an “affair”: the performance of both 
actors transformed the scandal into an intrigue while generating opposed entities and 
eventually reversing the accusation process. The performance of Olympus was an 
example of a faulty crisis management: the company attempted to discard Woodford as 
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an irresponsible foreign boss (gaijin shachō) who is unsuitable for the position he 
assumed, but precisely based on this latently xenophobic provocation Woodford turned 
counter-hegemonic, using alternative media channels to topple the Olympus leadership. 
The beginning of the scandal was constituted by a failed ritual of exclusion: the Olympus 
management tried to get rid of Woodford based on his alleged disloyalty (i.e. breaking the 
ingroup norms of silence related to company losses). With his gaijin attitude however, 
Woodford refused to accept the ritual of exclusion, whose real reason lay in polluting the 
company by whistleblowing. On the contrary, Woodford backfired and counter-attacked 
the Japanese management with dire consequences for the company in question. It must 
however be noted that the narrative repositioning from villain to hero based on 
Woodford’s offensive strategy (seme no senryaku) could have been effective precisely 
because he was a foreign whistleblower who leaked the scandal to non-Japanese media 
while ignoring the “sacred” code of traditional Japanese corporations (i.e. the norms of 
silence and private conflict resolution). Consequently, the foreign media exerted their 
pressure (gaiatsu) on both the corrupted company, and the Japanese media that based on 
their rituals of objectivity initially ignored the scandal.   
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b) Media Performance and Journalistic Rituals of Objectivity 
Following Marshall McLuhan, we can claim that in Japanese scandals the medium is the 
message. Based on their media routines and rituals, the dailies during a scandal 
performance either take the see-no-evil approach, or they use a neutral, “objective” 
language (kyakkan hōdō). The television broadcast is usually more moralizing, 
symbolically punitive, and spectacular, while the weeklies are investigative, adversarial, 
and aggressive when focusing on human-interest aspects of a scandal. The social network 
communities are proportionally bashing and supporting the transgressor, but their power 
to change the scandal flow in selected case studies was marginal.121 
At any rate, the Japanese media performance (i.e. the way the media perform 
their professional routines when covering scandal) becomes more important than the 
transgression per se. Nonetheless, the initial leak, which precedes every scandal, is rarely 
faciliated by the media themseves. It usually emerges from the outside of the mainstream 
mediascape, and is in principle motivated by one of the “3Cs“: Capital, Conspiracy, or 
Confession. These motivations do not exclude each other, which makes it difficult to 
identify one primary mover. In the case of Sakai Noriko, the initial leak was based on 
                                                   
121 This however cannot be said about the latest scandals of Obokata Haruko, Sano 
Kenjirō, or Shawn K, where online communities (nettomin) became the decisive force in 
triggering the scandal. On the on hand, this points to social media’s rising popularity in 
contemporary Japan, while on the other hand these scandals indicate that the role of the 
traditional media as gatekeepers who prevent the elites’ negative publicity is being 
significantly weakened.  
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pure coincidence (i.e. the police patrol found illegal stimulants when checking the 
belongings of Sakai’s husband in the streets of Tokyo’s Shibuya district). It was however 
the police who contacted other actors (the media, prosecutors, Sakai‘s agency) in the wake 
of the incident. Thus, the chances are that the leak was also capital-oriented since 
policemen sell scandalous information to interested parties. Once the leaked transgression 
had spread throughout the Japanese mediascape, the media performance was typical of a 
heightened spectacularity while focusing on absurd minutiae and emphasizing visual 
stimulation at the expense of describing the pathologies of the Japanese culture industry 
as such. Usually, the entertainment agencies (jimusho) attempt to block any scandalous 
information about their stars, but in the case of Sakai the transgression occurred on both 
a symbolic and legal level, and the prosecutorial conduct (e.g. the raid of Sakai’s 
apartment, during which a minute amount of an illicit drug was found) allowed the 
frenzied media to cover the case as an attractive criminal story. In the case of Ozawa 
Ichirō, it was the prosecutors that triggered the case by arresting Ozawa’s aides. This 
leads us to believe that the exposure was primarily a confession with traits of political 
conspiracy, since Ozawa’s DPJ was going to win in next elections after a long 
uninterrupted reign of the LDP. The mainstream media (especially the Asahi Shimbun), 
followed by the weeklies, proceeded with Ozawa-bashing immediately after his 
secretaries were arrested for an alleged accounting fraud. During their performance, the 
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media applied a guilt frame by using visuals of Ozawa in a bad mood, spreading 
inconvenient information, publishing negative opinion columns, and leaving limited 
space to counter-arguments. The media performance however was not univocal: the Asahi 
Shimbun, accompanied by the Yomiuri Shimbun, became the main Ozawa-bashers, while 
the foreign media, and loyal weeklies (goyō shūkanshi) actually stood by Ozawa. In the 
case of the Olympus/Woodford scandal, the initial leak was clearly motivated by 
confession: it was an internal whistleblower who warned the CEO of Olympus about the 
corruptive practices thereby urging Woodford to confess to the media. We may 
hypothesize that Woodford’s leak to the foreign press was also motivated by capital (i.e. 
Woodford must have been aware of the reimbursement in case he wins the dispute), but 
this interpretation is rather unlikely, given his present activities (lecturing on corporate 
governance and whistleblowing, and contributing money to charities). The big media and 
even the tabloids initially took the see-no-evil approach (mainly because of the threat of 
losing their advertising partners), but the foreign press magnified the scandal abroad 
thereby putting the Japanese mainstream media into a position where they could hardly 
ignore the case anymore. Their belated entry into the “struggle for meanings” did validate 
the claims of corruption in Olympus, but as the fresh cases of corruption indicated, the 
scandalization of the Olympus case – same as the coverage of Ozawa’s scandal, and the 
media frenzy around the Sakai megaspectacle – did not bring about and serious 
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consequences for the world of political and corporate governance. 
 
c) The Nontransformative Nature of Japanese Scandals 
According to Dayan and Katz (1992), ceremonial media events are – contrarily to 
ordinary news – those mediated performances that can challenge or affirm the established 
order while temporarily disrupting the normal flow of broadcast. As I indicated in section 
IV (chapter 3), Japanese scandals are typically frequent, short-lived, and rather 
nontransformative. In other words, no substantive lesson seems learned despite the calls 
for reform, while many similar scandals soon follow the case. In this regard, the long-
term effects of the three scandals I analysed also did not bring about any serious 
transformation of corruptive practices. On the contrary, the effect of Sakai‘s scandal was 
rather contradicotry: while many of her loyal fans both in and outside Japan kept on 
supporting her notwithstanding her scandal, her music sales temporarily soared while the 
interest in drugs among the young Japanese has actually increased. Sakai herself was not 
permanently excluded from the entertainment industry: her comeback was planned ever 
since the scandal climax, and her first real professional re-appearence occured in 2012. 
Needless to say, she will never reach the same popularity, but formally speaking she is 
now back to business and available for advertising. Furthermore, her scandal did not 
create any new precendent for the entertainment industry since countless drug/sex 
390 
scandals of Japanese celebrities soon followed her case. Regarding Ozawa, he was fully 
aquitted in 2012 and immediately created a new political party (Seikatsu no tō, renamed 
in 2016 to Jiyūtō). At the time of writing, he is getting ready to challenge other parties in 
upcoming general elections despite his scandals. The abolition of donations from 
companies and organizations listed in the DPJ’s manifesto remained in limbo, while 
donation scandals and other “financial irregularities” of many top politicians have been 
proliferating ever since, culminating in 2014, when as many as four ministers of Abe’s 
cabinet had to resign. Ozawa’s donation scandal only proved that political corruption in 
Japan is indeed structural, pathological and deeply-rooted, with little chances to make the 
system more transparent and less corrupt. Unfortunately, the scandal of Olympus also did 
not bring about any real consequences, both in terms of corporate corruption, and in terms 
of internal whistleblowing. On the contrary, the economic corruption (usually based on 
hiding losses or fabricating data) actually started booming right after the Olympus case, 
with Takata (2013), Toshiba (2015), Akebono (2015), Asahi Kasei (2015) and Mitsubishi 
(2016) having their corruptive practices exposed one after another. Furthermore, potential 
whistleblowers became even more discouraged by the new laws that now persecute 
whistleblowing in Japan even more severely. As a matter of fact, the punitive practice of 
leaking the whistleblower’s name to one’s superior, the harsh ostracism which follows, 
and no chances of promotion or pay rise for whistleblower, stayed intact ever since the 
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Olympus scandal. The internal consequences for Olympus were mostly the result of bad 
crisis management. Besides, the badly handled corporate crisis of Olympus caused 
irreparable damage leading to board resignations, a plunge in share values and mass 
firings. On the contrary, Woodford was generously reimbursed and became celebrated in 
the West. 
  
(3) Japanese scandal as a product of mediopolitical pathologies 
All three analyzed scandals brought to the fore some issues that constitute the background 
of many scandals in Japan: the issue of celebrity fetishism and media frenzy (Sakai), the 
issue of money politics and biased prosecution (Ozawa), and the issue of corporate 
corruption and internal whistleblowing (Olympus/Woodford). These are some of the 
pathologies that remained practically intact, although they became more (or less) 
transparent on the backdrop of technological and journalistic transformations in postwar 
Japan. Equally importantly, the impact of these scandals depended on a specific zeitgeist 
in which they occurred. The scandal of Sakai happened right after many other celebrities 
were caught transgressing conventions of decency (both symbolic and legal). Despite the 
gravity of her transgression, which generated a tremendous expectancy violation and a 
global megaspectacle, Sakai also became a victim of the principle of congruity (i.e. events 
that occur together closely in time and/or space become more fully and firmly associated). 
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Her scandal was socially and journalistically constructed as the boiling point of the 2009 
super-scandal series related to stimulants possession or public indecency (most notably 
the preceding scandal of the sumo wrestler Wakarin and Japanese stars Suzuki Shigeru, 
Kusanagi Tsuyoshi or Manabu Oshio). This arbitrary grounding of Sakai’s transgression 
to the zeitgeist of 2009 further magnified the media frenzy, fixed the media guilt frame, 
and prolonged the length of her social exile. The scandal of Ozawa occurred in a zeitgeist 
generated by the recession since the collapse of the bubble economy, being typical of 
voters’ cynicism and distrust toward hypocritical politicians. Thus, no matter the 
seriousness of his transgression, at such critical times the Japanese public judged Ozawa 
also based on him challenging the tax increase, calling for correcting the income gap, and, 
toward the end of his scandal, for demanding better management of the disaster zone after 
the March 2011 earthquake. In the case of the Olympus scandal, its exposure occurred 
one year after the disastrous Tōhoku earthquake, followed by the nuclear crisis at 
Fukushima, which was also connected with malfunctions of the information exposure. 
This too contributed to public skepticism regarding the inherently corrupted corporate 
culture in Japan with little tolerance for whistleblowing, and to eventual public support 
for Woodford struggling with Olympus over the meaning of the scandal. 
While following the criticism of Baudrillard (1988a) and Burkhardt (2011), I 
came to argue that in Japan it is not the scandal per se, which is inherently “scandalous”, 
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but it is rather the deeply rooted mediopolitical pathologies that make scandals inevitable. 
However, even these pathologies are a “necessary evil” which inheres in postwar Japan. 
As Durkheim (1982) insisted, transgressions and deviations of various sorts represent 
habitual, inevitable, and thus “normal” occurrences in a society. Despite the tendency of 
the Japanese media to either avoid or ritualize conflicts, the crises that arise from a 
conflict are ubiquitous and integral to the workings of every society, arising from the very 
structure of society itself. This is especially the case of democracies that cannot exist 
without a certain measure of opacity. Finally, scandals and other moral disturbances are 
those genuine portions of reality that allow us to see what the social is made out of (James 
1902; Garfinkel 1956; Latour 2005).   
It becomes evident from my research that the most serious pathology dwells 
within the Japanese media system. The mainstream media are in principle forced to take 
up, or to hush up certain scandal news. They rarely practice investigative journalism – 
both in order to maintain good ties with elite sources, and in order to not “confuse” readers 
and advertisers that secure subscription figures. On the contrary, once they start covering 
transgression/corruption, the mainstream press renders itself as insanely democratic and 
relentlessly authoritarian. Moreover, news coverage often lacks editorial ethics, and the 
journalistic rituals of objectivity do not avoid invasion of privacy. However, the situation 
is much more complex, because the Japanese mediascape is not an ideological monolith. 
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Some mainstream Japanese media (especially the NHK and Yomiuri Shimbun) indeed 
gravitate toward their traditional role of a silent partner of power, restricting the flow of 
information and avoiding controversies, while the semi-mainstream tabloids (most 
notably Shūkan Bunshun and Shūkan Shinchō) synthetize both criticism and praise for the 
power elites. Nonetheless, relating the Japanese inside media to a fourth estate of power 
is too vague, and it does not illuminate the function of all interrelated media outlets during 
scandal. 
The Japanese mainstream media are too free and too controlled at the same time: 
they have vast access to information channels but only very limited possibilities to make 
certain information public. While maintaining consensus with elite sources and 
advertisers, they often do not cover, but rather cover-up scandals. On the other hand, the 
outside media (weeklies, local media, foreign outlets) are both loyal and adversary, 
scrutinizing power elites from a detached perspective and disobeying conventional 
behavior depending on the profit/cost estimation. Especially the Japanese weeklies are 
effective “media tricksters” (term by Pharr 1996). They attack the status quo to defend it 
again later, and they utilize the creative/destructive dualism while blurring distinctions 
between good and evil. Perhaps paradoxically, their aggressive investigative journalism 
renders them as the closest to the western ideal of the media as “democracy watchdog”.  
In Japanese scandal, we register a sort of journalistic “division of labor”: the 
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scandal industry flourishes on the periphery, while the mainstream media often function 
as a PR tool of power circles (political, bureaucratic, corporate). In other words, the 
dailies offer for the most part the preferred reading of a certain transgression/corruption, 
while the weeklies tend to negotiate/oppose the mainstream interpretation of scandal. This 
inside/outside media system is cross-referring, complementary, and always “functional” 
in its own way, because it eventually benefits all players: the mainstream media maintain 
the information cartel by framing and self-censoring the news, while the outside press, 
unbound by the rules of the cartel, keeps the privilege of a relatively unrestrained, 
controversial reporting. Simultaneously, their radical coverage sets the scandal agenda for 
other competing media – both mainstream and tabloid. Consequently, the media 
accountability is always diffused because scandal is neither a result of a single self-
conscious performance, nor is it reducible to one single actor. It is in principle a product 
of the distributive and composite nature of agency, which operates in: 
- journalistic field constituted by both the cross-reference and rivalry between 
different bureaus, between national newspapers, and between the weeklies 
- power field occurring on a level of elite representatives, and within the 
invisible attack-politics 
- symbolic entanglement of mainstream journalists with their elite sources, 
being realized in a symbolic cooperative/coercive manner. 
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Such “scandal network” blurs the lines between objectivity and political authority on the 
one hand, and between fact and political spin on the other. Moreover, in Japanese scandal 
the adversarial relationship among some actors is itself a ritual that mystifies media 
reporting. To sum up, the real issue does not lie in exposed transgression/corruption, but 
more importantly it points to multifaceted mediopolitical pathology: 
 
1. The institutional background of scandals is usually systematically ignored by the 
inside media (i.e. the big five dailies and the NHK). What is produced is a 
fragmented picture, which necessarily falls short of representing the complete 
context of corruption (often at the expense of absurd minutiae and human-interest 
aspects). Japanese scandals rarely morph into “institutional morality tales” (term 
by Gamson 2001), having only cosmetic consequences for actual contents in the 
world of politics, business, sport and entertainment. In case of scandals that 
seriously threaten social trust (especially the food/safety scandals), the system 
produces scapegoats and ritually excludes them. Especially in celebrity scandals, 
the Japanese media often condemn transgressors that are the very products of the 
same media system. In political/economic scandals, they do not help to eliminate, 
but only temporarily illuminate the corruptness of the system if inevitable.  
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2. Once being forced to expose and investigate a scandal (usually based on 
prosecutorial raids, the weeklies or the foreign media), the Japanese mainstream 
media perform a role of self-appointed arbiters of justice, but are usually 
deferential to powerful forces, and often collaborate with the police and 
prosecutors. On the contrary, the tabloids are emblematic of journalistic nihilism 
and scandal frenzy while disregarding basic reporting principles and nourishing 
cynicism and political withdrawal. Besides, they are the main cause of “public 
pollution” (i.e. coarse invasion of privacy, disclosure of personal information 
about suspects or people associated with them, and spreading of moral panic and 
unhealthy curiosity).  
 
3. The Japanese media often act as ethically flexible “tricksters”: on the one hand, 
they are voluntarily undergoing self-censorship (jishu kisei) and regulate reporter 
routines via the kisha kurabu system in order to avoid retaliation from power elites 
and advertisers, but on the other hand they use selective framing to deconstruct 
the institutional authority in order to appeal to audiences and sell papers. In 
mainstream press, the former position overlaps with the ideology of political affair 
section (seijibu) that pragmatically downplays power-related scandals as 
superficial phenomena. The latter position applies to semi-mainstream weekly 
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tabloids that become “revitalized” by political sleaze, corporate greed, and 
celebrity fetishism. 
 
4. Japan is characteristic of absence of strong social sanctions against political 
corruption, with laws being still easy to evade. These evasions are normally left 
to investigative journalism, but this practice is in mainstream media 
systematically discouraged. Corruption flourishes because of available loopholes, 
the impotence of the whistleblowing laws, and the tricks that power holders 
employ to sidestep legal liabilities. If caught, Japanese politicians are rarely 
punished and they often get back on track after undergoing the secular mediated 
ritual of confession and eventual temporary exclusion. Regarding the corporate 
world, it is often inevitable for the new enterprises (under the conditions of 
privatization and deregulation) to bribe political administration in order to win 
their patronage and to prevail over competitors. Besides, the corporate law of and 
other rules of disclosure encourage corporations to keep secrets. However, secrecy 
leads to leaks, and leaks lead to scandal. 
 
5. The anti-corruption policies are difficult to implement because of the strong 
Japanese business lobby, and because the amount of reward is unlikely to offset 
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the downsides of reporting one’s employer. The culture of whistleblowing 
somewhat increased in Japan with the outset of the new millennium, but the 
Japanese still have a relatively strong loyalty to their organizations, while the 
enacted whistleblower laws fail to curb corporate deception. Besides, the 
institutional/structural corruption is often employed in a pursuit of “socially 
legitimate” goals of business/politics, and is integrated as a part of the particular 
communication of the system. The corruption, however, must be always kept at 
some “reasonable” level in order to avoid the attention of tabloids and prosecutors. 
In other words, what matters in Japanese scandals is the extent of the disjunction 
between goal and means (i.e. the amount of illegally accumulated profit), and the 
excess of one’s individualistic endeavor (i.e. the degree of one’s ideological 
radicalism). 
 
6. The high-level corruption does not usually become an important social issue in 
Japan. It will only become temporarily scandalized if a cooperation between the 
government and big business had some “unintended consequences”, or if there 
occurred a breakdown in the ritualized system of media management. Besides, the 
finance schemes within the media keiretsu-based industries are common and 
tolerated, which further neutralizes the role of the media as independent 
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watchdogs that serve the public interest. Finally, the government-media collusion 
influences the news content, including the way scandals are approached. 
Especially significant are close ties of the ruling LDP and the biggest daily 
Yomiuri Shimbun, while the Japanese government pressures the national 
broadcaster NHK to modify or exclude certain information from their agenda. 
 
7. The idol/celebrity discourse – importantly including gossip and scandal – was one 
of the “achievements” of Japan as an advanced industrial society with an 
economic surplus. The countless celebrity scandals are a daily fixture in the 
Japanese media; their pathology is emblematic of excessive, over-heated coverage 
out of proportion to the event being covered, and of violating norms of privacy 
and decency. Finally, the media coverage of celebrity scandals illustrates how in 
Japanese media culture the mainstream journalism became irrecoverably 
supplanted by tabloidization and celebrity fetishism. 
 
Despite all sociocultural idiosyncrasies mentioned in this thesis, scandal and corruption 
is not an issue of specific social development in a non-Western country. Indeed, in Japan 
virtually every major politician has had some experience with bribes, while the growing 
exposure of corporate corruption has in recent years damaged the reputation of major 
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Japanese companies. However, structural corruption which derives mainly from capitalist 
conditions and collusive politics is evident in other western and Asian democracies as 
well. Corruption in the US became effectively institutionalized, while in European 
countries corruptive practices had been common and tolerated since the 20th century. 
Even the corrupt power elites in China cannot completely control media, manage news 
and hide scandals, although they try (Lull 1991). Besides, journalists everywhere find it 
now increasingly hard to maintain that they are wholly “objective”, falling back on more 
defensive and ambiguous standards such as “balance” or “fairness” (e.g. Shoemaker and 
Reese 1996).  
In this thesis, I have proposed a new framework within which we can reconsider 
the complex social phenomenon of media scandal in postwar Japan. While being in 
accord with the neofunctionalist paradigm, I scrutinized scandal as a sociocultural 
performance between ritual and strategy. In order to illustrate this quality, I elaborated on 
three case major media scandals in recent Japanese history, and observed the narrative 
structuring of scandal as a structured text and ritualized performance of involved actors 
(most importantly the mainstream/tabloid media and the main transgressor). This method 
however does not need to be limited only to the Japanese mediascape. In all media-
saturated societies, there exists a similar tendency toward ritualization when treating 
transgressions of corrupted elites: not only in Japan, the media routines serve to defend 
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the organizational product from blame, while the ritualized performances are conducted 
by scandal culprits in order to save their face. I believe that such methodology can give a 
better insight into the ways transgression and scandal are processed and performed in 
contemporary media-saturated societies.   
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